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Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2018  with  funding  from 
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https  ;//archive.org/details/louisxivzenithof01hass 


H^eroes  of  tbe  IRations 


EDITED  BV 

lE'cel^gn  Hbbott,  /lO.H. 

FELLOW  OF  BALLIOL  COLLEGE^  OXFORD 


FACTA  DUClS  VIVENT,  0PEH08AQU6 
GLORIA  RERUM. — OVJD,  IN  LIVIAM,  266. 

THE  HERO’S  DEEDS  AND  HARO>WON 
FAME  SHALL  LIVE. 


LOUIS  XIV. 


LOUIS  XIV.  IN  1661. 

(From  an  illustration,  based  on  an  old  print,  in  Philippson’s 
Das  Zeit alter  L  iidwigs  XIV.) 


LOUIS  XIV 


AND  THE  ZENITH  OF  THE  FRENCH 
MONARCHY 


ARTHUR  HASSALL,  M.A. 

STUDENT  OF  CHRIST  CHURCH, 
OXFORD 


1  5  G.  1 

G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 

NEW  YORK  LONDON 

27  WEST  TWENTY-THIRD  STREET  24  BEDFORD  STREET,  STRAND 

Cbc  jiniclutbocket  |)rcss 

1895 


COPYRIGHT,  l8g5,  BY 

G.  P.  PUTNAM’S  SONS 
Entered  at  Stationers’  Hall,  London 


'Cbc  tinicftcrbocfccr  jprcse,  IKlcw  l^orft 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS  ......  xiii 

LIST  OF  AUTHORITIES . .XV 

PROLOGUE  I 


CHAPTER  I. 

OPENING  YEARS  OF  THE  REIGN  (1643-1651)  .  .  8 

Birth  of  Louis  XIV. — Condition  of  France  upon  the  death 
of  Richelieu — Arrangements  for  the  government  after  the 
death  of  Louis  XIII. — Action  of  Anne  of  Austria — Maza- 
rin’s  difficulties — State  of  the  finances — Victories  of  Enghien 
and  Turenne — The  King’s  education — The  year  1647 — 
Peace  between  Holland  and  Spain,  January,  1648 — French 
successes  in  1648 — -Beginning  of  the  Fronde  movement — 

The  Peace  of  Westphalia — The  parliamentary  Fronde — ■ 

The  Treaty  of  Rueil,  April  i,  1649 — Arrest  of  Conde, 
Conti,  and  Longueville,  January  18,  1650 — The  new  Fronde 
— Retirement  of  Mazarin  from  France. 

CHAPTER  11. 

FIRST  EXPERIENCES  OF  WAR  AND  POLITICS  (1651- 

1661) . 45 

Louis  attains  his  majority  September  7,  1651 — Civil  war — 
Return  of  Mazarin,  January,  1652 — Turenne  joins  the  royal 

^  yG  9  q- 


VI 


Contents. 


cause — The  Court  returns  to  Paris,  October  21,  1652 — War 
in  the  I’rovinces — The  end  of  the  Fronde,  July,  1653 — Con-\ 
tinuance  of  the  war  with  Spain — Louis  with  Turenne’s 
army — Progress  of  the  war — Louis  and  the  Parkment  of 
Paris — The  English  alliance — French  successes — The  elec¬ 
tion  of  Leopold  and  the  League  of  the  Rhine — The  battle 
of  the  Dunes — Illness  of  Louis — Marriage  negotiations — 
The  Peace  of  the  Pyrenees — End  of  the  northern  war — Louis’ 
marriage  with  the  Infanta — France  at  the  close  of  Mazarin’s 
administration. 


CHAPTER  III. 

LOUIS  XIV.  RULES  (1661-1715)  .  .  .  .82 

Louis  XIV. ’s  appearance — His  faults  of  character — The 
influence  of  Colbert  and  of  Madame  de  Maintenon— Louis’ 
pride  and  belief  in  himself — His  devotion  to  work — The 
theory  of  divine  right — His  determination  to  rule — The 
power  of  the  nobility  reduced — The  Parlement  checked 
and  the  independence  of  the  provinces  practically  destroyed 
— The  man  with  the  iron  mask — The  elements  of  constitu¬ 
tional  life  in  France — Louis’  policy  of  centralisation  suited 
to  the  French  nation — The  aims  of  the  King  in  1661 — 
Many  of  the  elements  of  greatness  in  Louis’  character — 
What  France  and  Europe  owes  to  his  reign. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  FALL  OF  FOUQUET  AND  THE  RISE  OF  COLBERT 

(1661)  .......  IO3-13O 

The  effect  of  the  death  of  Mazarin — Louis  asserts  himself — 

The  summer  of  1661 — Position  of  Fouquet — His  over-con¬ 
fidence — Intrigues  against  him — Louis’  visit  to  Vaux — Louis 
at  Nantes — The  arrest  of  Fouquet — His  trial — -The  import¬ 
ance  of  his  fall — The  rise  of  Colbert — Order  in  the  finances 
— Development  of  the  Navy  and  the  Colonies — TheJVench 
in  the  East  and  West  Indies — The  Commercial  Companies 
— Colbert’s  encouragement  of  art  and  literature — The  value 
of  his  work. 


Contents. 


CHAPTER  V. 

PAGE 

LOUIS’  FOREIGN  POLICY  AND  THE  END  OF  THE  DEVO¬ 
LUTION  WAR  (1662-1668) ....  131-161 

The  general  aims  of  Louis’  foreign  policy — Ilis  anxiety  to 
advance  Roman  Catholicism— The  Spanish  Succession  ques¬ 
tion — The  yiis  Dcvolutionis — The  affair  of  Crtqui — The 
battle  of  St.  Gothard — Death  of  Philip  IV.  of  Spain — Louis’ 
negotiations  with  the  Emperor  and  the  German  Princes — 

War  between  England  and  Holland — Conference  of  Breda 
— Opening  of  the  War  of  Devolution — The  h'rench  overrun 
the  Spanish  Netherlands — Secret  Treaty  of  Partition  be¬ 
tween  Louis  and  the  Emperor — Conquest  of  Franche- 
Comte — Formation  of  the  Triple  Alliance — Treaty  of 
Aix-la-Chapelle. 


CHAPTER  VI. 


THE  WAR  OF  1672  (1672-1678)  .  .  .  162-195 


Louis  intrigues  after  the  Treaty  of  Aix-la-Chapelle — His 
determination  to  crush  Holland- — Criticism  of  his  policy — 
Scheme  of  Leibnitz — Beginning  of  the  Dutch  war — French 
successes — The  crossing  of  the  Rhine — Louis’  blundens — 
Cutting  of  the  dykes  and  flooding  of  the  country — Refusal 
of  Louis’  terms  by  the  Dutch — Louis’  return  to  France- — 
Development  of  the  war — F'ormation  of  the  Coalition  of 
1673 — Reconquest  of  Franche-Comte  by  the  French — The 
Empire  declares  war  against  France — Sweden  attacks 
Brandenburg — Turenne’s  campaign  of  1674-5 — The  deaths 
of  Turenne,  Conde,  and  Montecuculi — The  Treaty  of  Zur- 
awna — French  successes  in  1676 — Anti-French  feeling  in 
England — Battle  of  Cassel — The  Congress  of  Nimeguen — 
The  Peace  of  Nimeguen — Position  of  Louis  in  1679. 


CHAPTER  VH. 

THE  TAKING  OF  STRASBURG  (1681)  .  .  .  196-214 

The  completion  of  the  ceinture  de  frontilres — Importance  of 
Alsace  to  France — The  French  claims — Louis’  resolution  to 
make  the  Rhine  the  French  boundary  on  the  east — The 


Contents. 


viii 


Chambers  of  Riimion — French  designs  against  Strasburg — 
Its  defenceless  position — The  decision  of  the  Parletncnt  of 
Breisach — The  policy  of  the  Great  Elector — Relations  of 
Louis  with  England — The  Hungarian  war — The  conduct 
of  Fiirstenberg,  Bishop  of  Strasburg — Fall  of  Strasburg, 
Sept.  28,  16S1 — Louis’  entry  into  Strasburg. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE  TRUCE  OF  RATISBON  (1684)  .  .  .  215-229 

German  opinion  on  the  fall  of  Strasburg — Position  of  the 
Emperor  within  and  without  Germany — Louis’  hopes — 

The  siege  of  Luxemburg — The  siege  raised — Growing  op¬ 
position  to  Louis’  aggressiveness — Charles  XL  and  Zwei- 
brilcken — The  Conference  of  Frankfurt — The  Diet  of 
Ratisbon — Invasion  of  Austria  by  the  Turks — Louis’  atti¬ 
tude  towards  the  invasion — French  policy  with  regard  to 
Sweden,  Poland,  and  Turkey — The  siege  of  Vienna — John 
Sobieski  the  saviour  of  Europe — Resumption  of  the  siege  of 
Luxemburg — A  general  European  war  imminent — The 
Truce  of  Ratisbon. 


CHAPTER  IX. 


THE  YEAR  1685  ......  230-252 

Louis’  object  to  convert  the  Truce  of  Ratisbon  into  a  de¬ 
finitive  peace — The  Truce  a  landmark  in  Louis’  reign — 
Position  of  France  in  1685 — Versailles  the  residence  of  the 
King — French  relations  with  Siam — Growth  of  French 
influence  in  Bangkok — Siamese  embassies  to  France — 
French  expeditions  to  Siam — A  Court  revolution  overthrows 
French  influence  in  Siam  in  1688 — Louis’  policy  to  the 
Huguenots — Increase  of  persecution,  1660-85 — Influence  of 
Louvois  and  Mme.  de  Maintenon — Louis’  own  share  in  the 
policy  of  the  Revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes — The 
Revocation  the  turning-point  in  the  history  of  the  reign — 

The  emigration  of  the  Huguenots — Its  effect  on  France. 


Contents. 


IX 


CHAPTER  X. 

PAGE 

THE  LEAGUE  AND  THE  WAR  OF  AUGSBURG  (l686- 

1697) . 253-285 

Growth  of  a  Phiropean  opposition  to  Louis — Formation  of 
the  League  of  Augsburg,  July,  1686 — Louis’  demands^ — Ilis 
determination  to  secure  the  districts  given  him  for  twenty 
years  by  the  Truce  of  Ratisbon — The  Cologne  Archbishop- 
rick — The  Palatinate  Succession  ejuestion — Seizure  of  Phil- 
ippsburg — Criticism  of  Louis’  action — Revolution  of  1688  in 
England — The  German  opposition  to  France  is  strength¬ 
ened —  Devastation  of  the  Palatinate — Its  import  and  effects 
— The  definite  beginning  of  the  war  of  Augsburg — England’s 
influence  thrown  against  Louis — War  between  England  and 
France  in  Ireland,  at  sea,  and  in  the  Spanish  Netherlands — 

The  battles  of  Beachy  Head  and  the  Boyne — Ruin  of 
James  11. ’s  cause  in  Ireland — French  defeat  at  La  Hogue 
— Campaigns  in  the  Netherlands,  in  Italy,  and  on  the 
Rhine — Death  of  Louvois — Defection  of  the  Duke  of  Savoy 
— Peace  of  Ryswick — The  Peace  only  a  truce. 


CHAPTER  XL 

VERSAILLES  AND  THE  PROIVNCES  (1678-1700)  .  286-314 

Louis  at  the  height  of  his  glory — Subservience  of  the 
Nobles — The  French  administrative  system — Versailles  and 
the  monarchy — The  daily  life  at  Versailles — Marly,  Fon¬ 
tainebleau,  and  the  Grand  Trianon — The  Duke  and  Duchess 
of  Maine — Madame  de  Maintenon  ;  her  influence  and  aims 
— Her  marriage  to  Louis  XIV. — The  establishment  of 
Saint-Cyr — The  affairs  of  the  regale — The  four  propositions 
of  1682 — The  Revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes — Religious 
unity  in  France — Fenelon  and  Bossuet — Madame  de  Guyon 
and  Madame  de  Maintemon — Banishment  of  Fenelon — 
Increase  of  taxation — Misery  in  the  Provinces — Le  Peletier 
and  Pontchartrain — Tenant-right  in  Picardy,  etc. — Popu¬ 
larity  of  Louis  XIV.  in  the  Provinces. 


X 


Contents. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

PAGE 

THE  SPANISH  SUCCESSION  QUESTION  (1697-1700)  315-33I 

Explanation  of  Louis’  willingness  to  make  the  Peace  of 
Ryswick — The  Spanish  Succession  question — His  intrigues 
in  Spain — The  Secret  Partition  Treaty  of  1668 — The  claims 
of  Louis,  of  the  Emperor,  and  of  the  Elector  of  Bavaria — 

The  first  Partition  Treaty — Death  of  the  Electoral  Prince — 

The  Treaty  of  Carlowitz — The  second  Partition  Treaty — Its 
reception  in  Spain — Louis’  motives  in  making  the  Partition 
Treaties — The  probable  effect  of  their  adoption  upon  Eng¬ 
lish  interests — The  last  will  of  Charles  11.  of  Spain — Would 
the  Partition  Treaty  be  carried  out  ? 


CHAPTER  XIH. 

THE  SPANISH  SUCCESSION  WAR  (1702-1713)  .  332-383 

Louis’  difficult  position — His  hesitation — Death  of  Charles 
II.  of  Spain  leaving  the  Spanish  Empire  to  the  Duke  of 
Anjou — The  psychological  interest  of  the  problem  awaiting 
solution — The  council  of  November  loth — Louis  decides  to 
accept  the  Will,  Nov.  16,  1700 — Effect  of  this  decision  on’ 
England,  Holland,  and  Austria — Accession  of  Philip  V., 
January,  1701 — Condition  of  Spanish  monarchy — Louis’ 
determination  to  reform  Spain  from  Paris — Louis’  mistakes 
in  Europe  bring  on  the  Spanish  Succession  war — His  attack 
on  the  Dutch  barrier — His  recognition  of  the  Pretender  as 
King  of  England — The  Grand  Alliance — Louis  takes  charge 
of  the  administration  of  the  Spanish  government — His  direc¬ 
tion  of  Spanish  foreign  policy— The  opening  of  the  war — 

The  strength  of  England  and  weakness  of  France — Louis’ 
ministers — His  generals — Villars’  brilliant  scheme  of  1703 
— Its  failure — The  battle  of  Blenheim — Arrival  of  Amelot 
in  Spain — His  drastic  reforms — The  disasters  of  1706 — 
Barcelona,  Turin,  and  Ramillies — Battle  of  Almanza,  1707 
—The  Convention  of  Milan — Charles  XI 1.  in  Germany — 

The  battle  of  Oudenardt,  1708 — The  winter  of  1708-9 — 
Recall  of  Amelot,  1709 — Louis  desires  peace. 


Contents. 


XI 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

TAGE 

PEACE  (1709-1713)  .  384-414 

Change  of  French  policy  in  Spain — Villars  wins  Malplaquet, 

I  yog— Negotiations  at  The  Hague  and  at  Gertruydenherg 
— Their  failure — The  disasters  of  Almenara  and  Saragossa 
— Victories  of  Brihuega  and  Villa  Viciosa — Philip  V.’s 
objection  to  any  partition  of  his  dominions — The  embassies 
of  Bleco'urt  and  Bonnac — The  change  in  English  policy — 
Views  of  Harley  and  St.  John — The  battle  of  Denain — 
Opening  of  the  Congress  of  Utrecht — The  Renunciations — 

The  Peace  of  Utrecht — Continuance  of  the  war  against  the 
Emperor — Treaties  of  Rastadt  and  Baden — France  and 
Spain  after  the  war — Death  of  the  Spanish  Queen — Philip’s 
marriage  to  Elizabeth  Farnese  and  fall  of  Madame  des 
Ursins — Louis’  domestic  afflictions — Louis’  foreign  policy 
during  the  war. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

THE  END  (1714-1715) . 415-435 

France  after  the  Peace  of  Utrecht — The  new  position  of 
Spain — Louis  and  the  Jansenists — Quesnel’s  Reflexions — 

The  destruction  of  Port  Royal — Clement  XL  and  the  Bull 
Unigenitus — Review  of  Louis’  blunders — Criticisms  of  his 
religious  and  foreign  policy — The  advantages  and  disadvan¬ 
tages  of  the  centralised  government  of  Louis  XIV. — 
Diminution  of  Provincial  liberties — His  taxation — His 
latter  years — llis  death. 


INDEX 


•  473 


ILLUSTRATIONS. 


The  medals  at  the  heads  of  chapters  are  from  Les  Medailles  s»r  les  Principaux 
du  Regne  Entier  de  Louis^  Paris,  1723. 

PAGE 

LOUIS  XIV.  IN  1661  '  .  .  .  .  Frontispiece 

TABLE  OF  LOUIS’  ANCESTORS . 12 

BEAUFORT.  FROM  A  PRINT  IN  THE  LIBRARY  OF 

CHRIST  CHURCH,  OXFORD  .  .  .  .  l6 

ANNE  OF  AUSTRIA  .......  I4 

MATHIEU  MOLE.  FROM  A  PRINT  IN  THE  LIBRARY 

OF  CHRIST  CHURCH,  OXFORD  ....  32 

THE  LOUVRE  AND  THE  TUILERIES.  BASED  ON  AN 

OLD  PRINT  ' . .  50 

MAZARIN.  FROM  AN  OLD  ENGRAVING  ...  54 

“  LOUIS  ;  THE  KING  ;  KING  LOUIS.”  FROM  A  SKETCH 

BY  THACKERAY  IN  HIS  “  PARIS  SKETCH  BOOK  84 

LOUISE  DE  LA  VALLIERE . I  12 

COLBERT.  FROM  AN  OLD  PORTRAIT  ‘  .  .  .126 

LOUIS  XIV.  AT  THE  AGE  OF  4I.  BASED  ON  AN  OLD 

PRINT  140 

MAP  OF  THE  AUSTRIAN  NETHERLANDS  .  .  .  150 

THE  GREAT  CONDE.  FROM  AN  OLD  ENGRAVING  ‘  .  156 

MAP  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1672  ....  170 


'  From  Philippson’s  Zeitalter  Ludwigs  des  fiirze/inten,  Grote, 
Berlin. 

’  Smith,  Elder,  &  Co. 

xiii 


XIV 


Ilhtstrations. 


THE  PASSAGE  OF  THE  RHINE.  FROM  A  COLLECTION 

OF  PRINTS  OF  LOUIS  XIV.’s  CAMPAIGNS  .  .  172 

TURENNE* . 186 

VIEW  OF  STRASBURG.  FROM  AN  OLD  PRINT  '  .  .  202 

vauban"  ........  226 

RECEPTION  OF  THE  SIAMESE  AMBASSADORS  AT 
VERSAILLES.  FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH  OF  A 

PAINTING . 240 

THE  REVOCATION  OF  THE  EDICT  OF  NANTES.  FROM 

AN  OLD  PRINT  246 

LOUIS  IN  robes;  FROM  an  old  portrait  .  .  254 

JAMES  II.  OF  ENGLAND.  BASED  ON  AN  OLD  EN¬ 
GRAVING^  .  .  .  260 

LOUVOIS.  FROM  AN  OLD  PORTRAIT  “  .  .  .  270 

VERSAILLES  .  288 

LOUIS  XIV.’s  BEDROOM  AT  VERSAILLES.  BASED  ON 

AN  OLD  print”  ......  294 

MME.  DE  MAINTENON  . . 300 

FENELON.  BASED  ON  AN  OLD  PRINT  ”...  308 

TABLUAR  LIST  OF  THE  CLAIMANTS  TO  THE  SPANISH 

THRONE  ........  322 

WILLIAM  III.  OF  ENGLAND.  FROM  AN  OLD  PRINT”  324 
CHARLES  II.  OF  SPAIN.  BASED  ON  AN  OLD  PRINT’  .  332 

VILLEROY.  AFTER  AN  OLD  ENGRAVING  ‘  .  .  360 

THE  EMPEROR  JOSEPH  I.  “ . 376 

SKETCH  MAP  OF  MALPLAQUET  ....  387 

MARSHALL  VILLARS”  . . 396 

MAP  OF  THE  FRONTIER  OF  FRANCE  .  .  .  .  412 


‘  From  Erdmannsdorfer’s  Deutsche  Geschichte  von  164S-IJ40, 
Grote,  Berlin. 

From  Philippson’s  Zeitalter  Ltidwigs  des  Vierzehnten,  Grote, 
Berlin. 

“  From  Courcy’s  Coalition  of  i^oi. 


NOTE  ON  THE  AUTHORITIES  OF  THE 
REIGN  OF  LOUIS  XIV. 


Few  periods  of  European  history  offer  such  unrivalled  oppor¬ 
tunities  for  investigation  as  that  known  as  the  Age  of 
Louis  XIV. 

In  the  Bibliographie  de  V Hisioire  de  Francehy  G.  Monod, 
will  be  found  an  admirable  list  of  the  works  dealing  with  the  history 
of  France  in  the  17th  century.  The  contemporary  sources  of  infor¬ 
mation  are  numerous.  Of  these  the  memoirs  of  Saint-Simon  and 
those  of  Mine,  de  Motteville  are  the  best  known  and  the  most 
valuable,  and  with  the  letters  of  Mine,  de  Maintenon,  of  Mine,  de 
Sevigne,  and  of  Charlotte  Elizabeth,  Uuchesse  d'Orleans,  the  memoirs 
of  Villars,  Retz,  Choisy,  I.e  Fare,  and  Torcy,  the  journal  of  Dangeau, 
and  the  memoirs  of  Louis  XIV.,  Pour  V Instruction  du  Dauphin, 
enable  the  reader  to  appreciate  the  true  character  of  the  times. 
These  and  many  other  sources  of  information  have  been  carefully 
sifted  by  the  great  historians  of  this  particular  period,  of  whom 
Martin,  Ranke,  Mignet,  and  Cheruel  are  the  most  distinguished. 

The  histories  of  France  by  Martin  and  Ranke,  the  History  of 
England,  Principally  in  the  ijth  Century,  by  Ranke,  Mignet ’s  A'lgo- 
ciations  Relatives  h  la  Succession  d’Espagne  sous  Louis  XIV., 
(  'lieruel’s  Histoire  de  la  France  pendant  la  Minority  de  Louis  XIV. 
el  sous  le  Alinisth'e  de  Mazarin,  will  continue  to  be  consulted  by  all 
who  make  a  serious  study  of  French  history  in  Louis  XIV.’s  reign. 

Valuable  supplementary  works  are  the  Due  d’Aumale’s  Histoire 
des  Princes  de  Condi,  Lair’s  Nicolas  Fouquet,  Clement’s  Colbert, 
Rousset’s  Histoire  de  Louvois,  Lefevre-l’ontalis’  yohn  de  IVitt, 
I.egrelle’s  La  Diplomatic  Francaise  et  la  Succession  d' Espagne, 
Courcy’s  Coalition  de  ijor,  llaudrillard’s  Philip  V.  ct  la  Cour  de 
Prance,  and  Parkman’s  volumes — The  Old  RIgime  in  Canada  and 
Count  Frontenac  and  New  Prance  under  Louis  XI V.  Equally 


XV 


XVI 


Note  on  AtitJiorities. 


important  is  the  excellent  series  of  Instriiciions  aux  Ainbassadetirs  et 
Alinistres  de  Fratice  now  in  course  of  publication. 

It  is  impossible  to  enumerate  all  the  monographs  and  essays 
written  to  elucidate  various  episodes  of  Louis’  reign. 

Lavallee’s  Histoire  de  la  IMaison  Royale  de  Saint-Cyr ;  Lair’s 
Louise  de  la  Vallilre  ei  la  yeuuesse  de  Louis  XI V.  ;  Legrelle’s  Louis 
XIV.  et  Strasbourg ;  Lanier’s  Atiide  Historigue  sur  les  Relations  de  la 
France  et  du  Royaume  de  Siam;  Reynald’s  Louis  XIV.  et  Guil¬ 
laume  III.;  Dr.  Bollinger’s  Lectures  on  Louis  XIV.  and  Mme. 
de  Maintenon ;  Mr.  Armstrong’s  Elizabeth  Farnese ;  Rocquains’ 
II Esprit  Re'vohttionaire  avant  la  Revolution  ;  are  but  a  few  instances 
of  the  wealth  of  material  ready  to  the  hand  of  the  student. 

In  my  attempt  to  write,  with  the  aid  of  the  knowledge  gained 
from  a  study  of  some  of  the  memoirs  and  histories  of  the  time,  a  Life 
of  Louis  XIV.  I  have  received  very  considerable  assistance  from  Mr. 
Evelyn  Abbott,  Editor  of  this  series.  To  him  and  to  Mr.  Charles  E. 
Thompson,  whose  courteous  help  to  me  when  choosing  the  portraits 
for  the  volume  has  been  most  valuable,  I  wish  to  tender  my  best 
thanks. 

Oxford,  February,  1895. 


LOUIS  XIV. 


>» 


LOUIS  XIV. 


ROLOGUE. 

1 1 E  character  and  position  of 
Louis  XIV.  are  peculiarly  dif¬ 
ficult  to  estimate,  partly  on 
account  of  the  attitude  taken 
towards  him  during  his  life¬ 
time  by  his  own  subjects, 
partly  owing  to  the  entire 
misapprehension  under  which 
foreisrn  nations  laboured  as  to 
his  real  aims.  The  French 
people  during  more  than  two-thirds  of  his  long  reign 
made  him  into  a  god  and  worshipped  him,  while  at 
the  time  of  the  Spanish  Succession  war  a  generation 
had  grown  up  in  England  which,  says  Mr.  Wyon  in 
his  History  of  Great  Britain  during  the  Reign  of 
Queen  Ayine,  regarded  “  Louis  XIV.  as  a  monster  of 
ambition  with  a  mission  from  the  devil  to  make 


1 


2 


Louis  XIV. 


slaves  and  Papists  of  the  whole  human  race,  a  per¬ 
fidious  tyrant  with  whom  it  was  useless  to  think  of 
entering  into  a  compact,  whom  it  was  absolutely 
necessary  to  bind  with  chains  of  iron.” 

Again  at  the  present  day,  modern  historical  writers, 
for  the  greater  part  hailing  from  France,  are  well- 
nigh  unanimous  in  wholesale  condemnation  of  the 
age  of  Louis  XIV.  on  the  ground  that  it  was  essen¬ 
tially  the  cause  of  the  French  Revolution.  Even 
allowing  that  it  be  strictly  historical  to  say  that 
Louis’  reign  made  the  Revolution  inevitable,  it  re¬ 
mains  none  the  less  true  that  the  blame,  if  there  be 
any,  must  be  shared  by  the  people  with  the  King. 
The  French  nation  made  Louis,  and  Louis  was  the 
epitome  of  the  French  nation.  It  is  easy  to  sympa¬ 
thise  with  the  many  hostile  criticisms  levelled  at  the 
King  by  German  historians,  who  cannot  forgive  the 
devastation  of  the  Palatinate  or  forget  the  loss  of 
Strasburg.  But  it  is  peculiarly  ungracious,  ungrate¬ 
ful,  and  unhistorical  for  French  writers  who  are  well 
acquainted  with  the  history  of  their  own  country, 
to  allow  themselves  to  be  so  carried  away  by  feeble 
republican  predilections,  as  to  pour  virulent  abuse 
upon  the  most  brilliant  period  of  their  history,  and 
their  most  hardworking,  painstaking,  and  on  the 
whole  successful  ruler. 

Louis  has  certainly  as  great  a  claim  as  Napoleon 
to  be  considered  a  Hero.  He,  at  any  rate,  left  his 
/Country  holding  a  powerful  position  in  Europe,  a  id 
when  he  died  he  could  boast  that  his  foes  had  never 
entered  Paris.  In  spite  of  his  mistakes  he  succeeded 
in  placing  Philip  on  the  Spanish  throne. 


Prologue. 


3 


The  French  Revolution  undoubtedly  tended  for 
a  long  time  to  damage  Louis’  reputation  and  to  blind 
men  to  the  real  character  of  his  work.  And  yet  the 
Revolutionists  only  developed  Louis’  system  of  in¬ 
ternal  administration,  and  continued  with  vigour  and 
success  his  foreign  policy.  To  credit  Louis  with  the 
evils  under  which  France  suffered  during  the  eigh¬ 
teenth  century  is  to  ignore  the  history  of  the  reigns 
of  Louis  XV.  and  Louis  XVI.  These  monarchs,  it 
is  true,  found  themselves  handicapped  through  the 
position  of  the  nobles  and  the  weight  of  taxation. 
But  had  they  been  energetic  and  enlightened  ad¬ 
ministrators,  had  they  adapted  themselves  to  the 
needs  of  the  day,  France  might  by  securing  timely 
reforms  have  escaped  from  the  horrors  of  revolution. 

As  it  was,  when  Louis  established  a  bureaucracy 
dependent  on  an  absolutism,  he  gave  the  French 
government  the  shape  which  it  preserved  unchanged 
till  1789.  His  administrative  reforms  were  admirably 
suited  to  the  France  of  his  own  day.  It  was  the 
fault  of  his  successors  that  the  bureaucratic  system 
became  an  impassable  barrier  between  the  people 
and  their  rulers. 

There  is  no  doubt  whatever  that  with  the  majority 
of  his  countrymen  the  rule  of  Louis  XIV.  was  in  the 
seventeenth  century  extremely  popular.  It  was 
admirably  calculated  to  arouse  the  enthusiasm  of  his 
subjects.  The  French,  more  than  any  other  Euro¬ 
pean  nation,  have  always  been  most  easily  affected 
by  the  love  of  military  glory.  They  have  of  all 
nations  ever  been  sensitive  of  their  prestige,  and 
appreciative  of  a  brilliant  foreign  policy. 


4 


Lo2iis  XIV. 


Louis’  reign  was,  as  far  as  military  glory  was  con¬ 
cerned,  the  most  glorious  in  the  annals  of  French 
history,  and  never  did  the  prestige  of  the  French 
arms  stand  higher.  Even  at  the  end  of  the  Spanish 
Succession  war,  that  prestige  was  nobly  maintained 
by  Villars.  At  no  period  in  French  history  was  the 
foreign  policy  of  France  conducted  with  greater 
ability  or  with  more  conspicuous  success.  In  the 
clearness  of  his  views  on  foreign  policy,  Louis  was 
always  essentially  a  Frenchman,  while  in  his  dogged 
perseverance,  his  close  attention  to  details,  his  care¬ 
ful  grasp  of  facts,  and  his  recognition  of  the  necessity 
of  withdrawing  from  untenable  positions,  he  showed 
that  he  possessed  characteristics  rarely  found  among 
Latin  nations.  Unlike  George  III.,  who  never  rose 
to  a  higher  level  than  that  of  most  of  his  subjects, 
Louis  was  in  many  respects’  head  and  shoulders 
above  the  majority  of  the  Frenchmen  of  his  day. 
And  he  was  really  great  when  dealing  with  questions 
bearing  on  the  future  welfare  of  France  as  a  European 
Power.  His  foreign  and  colonial  policy  is  superior 
to  that  of  any  of  his  predecessors  or  successors 
and  should  be  keenly  appreciated  by  his  countrymen 
of  the  present  day. 

An  unerring  instinct  told  him  that  Belgium  should 
be  in  French  hands.  He  was  equally  bent  upon 
securing  Lorraine,  Luxemburg,  and  Savoy.  His  at¬ 
tempts  to  make  the  Mediterranean  a  French  lake 
showed  consummate  statesmanship,  while  if  his 
colonial,  Indian,  and  Siamese  projects  had  been 
continued  and  wisely  developed  by  his  successors, 
France  would  have  very  practical  reasons  for  looking 
back  on  his  reign  with  gratitude  and  respect. 


Prologue. 


5 


Whether  he  was  revoking  the  Edict  of  Nantes,  or 
was  avenging  an  insult  offered  to  his  ambassador,  or 
was  appealing  to  the  patriotism  of  the  people  against 
the  impolitic  demands  of  the  insatiable  allies  after 
Oudenarde,  Louis  was  always  in  touch  with  the 
majority  of  his  subjects.  He  set  a  great  value  on 
himself  as  the  holder  of  the  kingly  office  and  the 
nation  accepted  his  estimate  of  its  importance.  In 
spite  of  the  many  faults  of  his  rule,  France  was  ably 
administered  during  his  reign.  The  noble  class,  who 
hitherto  had  influenced  the  government  of  the 
country,  were  unfit  to  take  any  share  in  the  ad¬ 
ministration.  Like  the  Parisians  of  all  time,  they 
were  wanting  in  balance,  they  had  no  principles, 
they  were  carried  away  by  every  passing  impulse. 
The  conduct  both  of  the  nobles  and  the  Parisians 
during  the  Fronde  troubles  amply  justified  the  es¬ 
tablishment  of  a  strong  centralised  monarchy.  Ac¬ 
cepted  by  the  French  nation  as  the  only  form  of 
government  possible  after  the  years  of  anarchy,  it 
soon  became  thoroughly  popular. 

In  spite  of  the  criticisms  offered  by  Madame  de 
S^vign6,  Gui  Patin,  Bussy-Rabutin,  and  Ormesson, 
royalty  came  to  be  regarded  by  a  large  majority  of 
the  nation  as  the  glorious  personification  of  the  unity 
and  power  of  France.  And  with  his  natural  acute¬ 
ness  of  observation,  his  decision,  and  his  grand  man¬ 
ner,  Louis  satisfied  the  aspirations  of  his  people. 
For  more  than  fifty  years  he  had  the  most  brilliant 
Court  in  the  world,  and  he  directed  the  affairs  of 
France  and  Europe  with  a  magnificence  which  the 
reverses  at  the  end  of  his  reign  could  not  efface. 
The  history  of  the  world  presents  few  epochs  on 


-7 


Louis  XIV 


6 


which  civilisation  and  literature  have  thrown  greater 
eclat  than  that  of  Louis  XIV. 

Louis  was  thus  pre-eminently  a  Frenchman  in  the 
unique  sympathy  that  existed  between  him  and 
the  nation — a  sympathy  seen  in  their  aims,  in  love 
and  in  hate,  in  taste  and  in  prejudice.  /  As  a  man 
he  may  not  have  been  great,  but  a  greab  King  he 
certainly  was,  and  the  age  in  which  he  lived  and 
which  bears  his  name  was  a  great  age.  Whatever 
claim  he  may  bear  to  the  title  of  Hero  must  be 
based  upon  the  determination  and  courage  shown 
during  the  last  fourteen  years  of  his  reign.  In  spite 
of  the  calamities  which  the  war  brought  upon  his 
country,  in  spite  of  the  domestic  afflictions  which 
wellnigh  overwhelmed  him,  Louis’  skill  and  ability 
and  courage  succeeded,  with  honour  and  with  com¬ 
paratively  small  territorial  loss,  in  extracting  France 
from  a  death  grapple  with  Europe.  Few  periods  in 
the  reign  of  any  European  monarch  present  more 
striking  examples  of  real  patriotism  and  heroism 
than  will  be  found  in  the  history  of  the  great  King 
of  France  during  the  years  from  1707  to  1713. 


CHAPTER  1. 

OPENING  YEARS  OF  THE  REIGN. 
1643-1651. 

OUIS  XIV.  was  born  on  the 
5th  of  September,  1638,  at 
Saint-Germain,  in  the  Chateau 
Neuf.  The  news  of  this  event 
was  received  with  great  rejoic¬ 
ings.  The  birth  of  the  Dau¬ 
phin  in  the  pavilion  of  Henry 
IV.  coincided  with  successes 
abroad,  which  must  have  re¬ 
called  to  men’s  minds  the 
deeds  of  the  King  of  Navarre. 

The  year  1638  brought  with  it  the  capture  of 
Alsace  by  the  French  armies  ;  it  saw  also  French 
ascendancy  established  in  the  Mediterranean  waters. 
The  terrible  Thirty  Years’  War  was  then  at  its  height 
and  till  this  year,  in  spite  of  the  victorious  career  of 
Gustavus  Adolphus,  men  were  still  doubtful  as  to 
the  issue.  Under  the  great  Cardinal  Richelieu, 

7 


8 


Louis  XIV. 


[1643 


France  had  plunged  into  the  war;  and  the  year  1638 
proved  to  be  the  “  turning-point  of  the  struggle 
between  France  and  the  House  of  Austria.” 

The  birth  of  Louis  XIV.  upset  all  the  plans  of  the 
Court  party,  and  strengthened  the  hands  of  Riche¬ 
lieu  at  home.  The  hopes  of  the  opponents  of  the 
Minister  had  been  founded  entirely  on  the  expecta¬ 
tion  that  Gaston  of  Orleans,  the  brother  of  Louis 
XIII.,  would  succeed  to  the  throne,  and  destroy  at 
one  blow  the  work  of  Richelieu.  These  hopes  were 
now  scattered  to  the  winds  and  in  spite  of  the 
spasmodic  resistance  of  the  nobles  during  the 
Fronde,  the  birth  of  Louis  XIV.  decided  the  mo¬ 
mentous  question  for  France  that  the  administrative 
reforms  of  Richelieu  should  be  adhered  to  and  de¬ 
veloped.  Aristocratic  tyranny  and  selfishness  were 
to  yield  to  an  irresistible  despotism. 

A  year  later  Louis  XIII.  had  another  son,  Philip, 
destined  to  become  celebrated  as  the  husband  of  the 
ill-fated  Henrietta,  daughter  of  Charles  1.  of  England. 

At  the  close  of  1642  Richelieu  died  and  with  the 
beginning  of  the  next  year  it  became  apparent  that 
the  reign  of  Louis  XIII.  was  drawing  to  a  rapid 
close.  In  April  the  King  moved  to  the  new  Palace 
of  Saint-Germain,  where  the  air  was  purer  than  in 
Paris.  Feeling  his  end  was  at  hand,  he  devoted 
himself  to  religious  exercises  and  to  the  settlement 
of  all  matters  affecting  the  government  of  France. 
On  the  25th  of  April  he  declared  his  wishes  with 
regard  to  the  future.  In  the  event  of  his  death  his 
wife  Anne  of  Austria  was  to  be  Regent,  his  brother 
Orleans  to  be  Lieutenant-General.  The  real  power, 


1643] 


Opening  Years  of  the  Reign. 


9 


however,  was  to  lie  with  the  Council  of  Regency,  a 
body  composed  of  Mazarin,  the  Chancellor  Seguier, 
Conde,  and  others.  The  members  were  to  be  irre¬ 
movable  and  the  Queen  and  Orleans  were  to  refer 
to  them  all  questions  of  importance.  The  appoint¬ 
ment  of  such  a  Council  was,  as  Mazarin  said,  an 
CglTront^to  the  Queen. 

On  April  2ist,  the  Dauphin  was  christened, 
Mazarin  and  the  Princess  of  Conde  being  his  spon¬ 
sors,  and  after  the  ceremony,  though  only  four  and 
a  half  years  old,  he  told  his  dying  father  that  he  had 
received  the  name  Louis  XIV.  “  Not  yet,  not  yet,” 
answered  the  sick  monarch. 

Within  a  month,  on  May  14th,  Louis  XIII.  died, 
leaving  his  country  in  a  far  more  prominent  position 
than  when  he  succeeded  to  the  throne.  France  was 
now  recognised  “  as  the  champion  of  the  true  rights  of 
nations  against  the  domination  of  an  arrogant  House 
and  the  Catholic  reaction  in  its  worst  aspect.” 
German  Protestantism  was  by  the  combined  efforts 
of  France  and  Sweden  practically  secure.  At  home 
feudalism  had  received  its  death  blow ;  lawless  dis¬ 
order  and  selfish  tyranny  were  crushed.  While 
Germany  was  torn  in  pieces  through  religious 
divisions,  in  France  the  Huguenots  had  become 
loyal  subjects.  The  monarchy  was  steadily  growing 
and  already  was  beginning  to  symbolise  the  unity 
and  the  grandeur  of  France.  This  improvement  in 
the  position  of  France  was  due  to  Richelieu. 
Though  his  name  is  not  associated  with  the 
treaties  of  Westphalia  and  of  the  Pyrenees  or  with 
the  final  overthrow  of  the  great  nobles  in  the 


lO 


Louis  XIV. 


[1643 


Fronde,  he  had  prepared  the  way.  Under  her  able 
minister  France  was  supreme  in  diplomacy,  in  arms, 
and  in  letters. 

France  was  left  by  Richelieu  in  a  strong  position. 
She  held  Alsace,  Artois,  Roussillon,  and  part  of 
Catalonia.  Victorious  on  the  Rhine,  she  occupied 
Brisach  and  the  Forest  Towns.  Sweden  and  the 
United  Provinces  were  her  trusted  allies,  the  House 
of  Savoy  leant  on  her  for  protection.  The  capture 
of  Arras  laid  open  the  road  into  the  heart  of  the 
Spanish  Netherlands. 

Within  France  the  policy  of  the  great  Cardinal 
seemed  equally  successful.  The  kingdom  was  peace¬ 
ful  and  flourishing.  Time  to  complete  and  consoli¬ 
date  his  work  was  alone  required.  And  there  is  little 
doubt  that  had  Richelieu  lived  a  few  more  years  he 
would  have  established  his  system  on  so  firm  a  basis 
that  no  Fronde  would  have  been  possible.  For 
Richelieu,  though  intensely  monarchical,  in  many 
points  resembled  the  enlightened  despots  of  the 
eighteenth  century.  He  was  keenly  alive  to  the 
necessity  of  conciliating  public  opinion  ;  he  often 
studied  the  cahiers  of  the  States-General  of  1614  to 
discover  the  popular  needs.  In  1626  he  had  sum¬ 
moned  an  Assembly  of  Notables  and  had  laid  before 
it  his  policy. 

So  loyally  had  this  Assembly — composed  of  magis¬ 
trates,  financial  officials,  and  merchants — supported 
his  plans  for  the  repression  of  the  political  designs 
of  the  Huguenots,  for  the  creation  of  a  navy  and 
for  the  development  of  commerce,  that  just  before 
his  death  he  had  resolved  to  call  another  such  As- 


1643]  Opening  Years  of  the  Reign.  1 1 

sembly  to  strengthen  his  hands  in  the  probable 
event  of  Louis  XIII. ’s  death. 

Unfortunately  for  his  country  Richelieu  died  be¬ 
fore  his  great  work  was  thoroughly  consolidated,  and 
F ranee  had  in  consequence  to  pass  through  upwards  of 
ten  years  of  confusion  till  his  successor  Mazarin  was 
strong  enough  to  complete  the  overthrow  oTTfiF^iis- 
cordant  elements  within  the  kingdom  and  to  place 
the  monarchy  at  the  head  of  an  obedient  and  united 
France. 

No  sooner  was  Louis  dead  than  the  Parlemcnt  of 
Paris — that  close  corporation  of  lawyers,  that  body 
of  hereditary  magistrates  which  had  bought  or  in- 
N  herited  judicial  places  and  which  aspired  to  take  the 
place  of  the  States-General — at  once  asserted  itself. 
In  1641  Richelieu  had  dealt  what  seemed  a  decisive 
blow  at  its  political  pretensions.  He  had  forbidden 
it  to  take  any  part  in  or  cognisance  of  state  affairs. 
On  financial  matters  they  could  remonstrate,  but 
henceforward  these  turbulent  magistrates  were  not 
to  regard  themselves  as  a  political  assembly.  The 
minority  of  Louis  XIV.  was,  however,  an  oppor¬ 
tunity  too  good  to  be  lost.  Just  as  during  the  mi¬ 
nority  of  Louis  XV.  so  now  the  Parle^nent  asserted 
its  authority,  and  attempted  to  regain  its  former 
position. 

Louis  XIII.  had  appointed  a  Council  to  control 
the  Queen  Regent.  On  May  i8th,  four  days  after 
Louis  XIII.’s  death,  the  Parlement  abolished  this 
Council  and  placed  the  whole  power  in  the  hands  of 
Anne  of  Austria.  At  the  meeting  of  the  Parlement 
the  young  King  was  present.  On  May  15th,  the 


Louis  XIV. 


[1643 


I  2 


day  after  his  father’s  death,  Louis  XIV.  had  left  the 
ancient  chateau  of  Saint-Germain  and  had  made  a 
solemn  entry  into  Paris,  amid  the  greatest  enthu¬ 
siasm.  “  The  Queen,”  says  Gui  Patin,  “  arrived  in 
Paris  at  four  o’clock  in  the  afternoon  attended  by 
ten  thousand  men,  without  reckoning  the  cavaliers 
and  volunteers,  who  swarmed  out  of  Paris  to  meet 
the  little  King.”  The  Venetian  ambassador  was 
favourably  impressed  by  the  appearance  of  the 
youthful  monarch,  and  anticipated  an  era  of  pros¬ 
perity  for  France  as  soon  as  this  prince  “of  noble 
aspect,  with  his  air  of  greatness  ”  had  attained  his 
majority. 

On  May  i8th  at  8  A.M.  a  Lit-de -Justice  was  held — 
a  solemn  assembly  to  which  not  only  the  Parlement 
but  also  the  Dukes  and  Peers  of  France  and  the 
great  officers  of  the  Crown  were  summoned.  The 
importance  of  the  assembly  lay  in  the  attitude  as¬ 
sumed  by  the  Parlement .  Over  this  Lit-dc-Justice 
the  young  King  in  a  violet  dress  presided.  On  the 
right  of  the  throne  stood  his  mother,  on  the  left 
Madame  de  Lansac,  his  governess.  Assisted  by  the 
latter  Louis  stood  up  and  said  the  few  words  neces¬ 
sary  to  open  the  proceedings.  The  Parlement,  filled 
with  hopes  of  regaining  their  political  influence,  in¬ 
vested  Anne  with  absolute  power  during  the  King’s 
minority,  and  appointed  the  Duke  of  Orleans  Lieu¬ 
tenant-General  of  the  kingdom  and  President  of  the 
King’s  Council.  The  only  symptom  of  future 
trouble  was  to  be  found  in  the  words  of  Barillon  one 
of  the  Presidents  of  the  Chajnbre  des  Enqukes,  who 
asserted  that  the  Parlement  should  have  the  power 


1643] 


Opening  Years  of  the  Reign. 


13 


of  urging  measures  for  the  reforms  of  the  state.  But 
his  words  received  little  support,  so  satisfied  was  the 
majority  of  the  Parlenient  with  the  prospects  of  the 
reign.  The  work  of  Richelieu  would  be  undone,  the 
intendants  would  be  dismissed,  the  Chancellor  Pierre 
Seguier,  one  of  Richelieu’s  ministers,  would  be  re¬ 
placed  perhaps  by  Bailleul  a  member  of  the  Parle- 
7nent,  perhaps  by  Chateauneuf,  a  noble  who  had 
suffered  during  the  late  reign.  The  policy  of  Riche¬ 
lieu  would,  in  a  word,  be  entirely  reversed  and 
Mazarin  would  at  once  return  to  Italy. 

On  the  very  evening  of  the  i8th  of  May  the  Par- 
lement  knew  the  worst.  The  Queen  had  confirmed 
Mazarin  as  First  Minister.  The  pupil  and  confidant 
of  Richelieu,  an  Italian  adventurer,  a  low-born 
ecclesiastic  who  could  hardly  speak  the  French  lan¬ 
guage,  had  been  deliberately  chosen  to  continue 
Richelieu’s  work,  the  humbling  of  the  Austro- 
Spanish  House  and  the  consolidation  of  the  French 
monarchy.  After  the  first  surprise  had  worn  off,  men 
of  the  mental  calibre  of  the  Duke  of  Beaufort  consoled 
themselves  with  the  hope  that  the  Queen  would 
simply  employ  Mazarin  temporarily,  till  she  had 
learnt  how  to  govern  the  kingdom.  Mazarin’s  posi¬ 
tion  had  hardly  been  confirmed  before  the  news  of 
the  battle  of  Rocroi  came  to  strengthen  and  shed 
lustre  upon  the  new  government.  The  death  of 
Richelieu  had  raised  fresh  hopes  in  the  minds  of  the 
Spaniard.s  and  Imperialists.  The  time  had,  it 
seemed  to  them,  come  for  striking  a  decisive  blow  at 
the  heart  of  France — a  blow  that  should  have  a  tell¬ 
ing  effect  upon  the  negotiations  for  peace,  which  had 


Louis  XIV. 


[1643 


H 

already  begun.  But  the  youthful  Enghien  proved 
equal  to  the  task  of  defending  France.  Aided  by 
the  rare  gifts  of  the  veteran  Captain  Gassion, 
Enghien  won  a  brilliant  victory  at  Rocroi.  France 
was  saved  from  all  danger  of  invasion,  Thionville 
shortly  afterwards  fell  before  the  victorious  French 
troops,  and  the  way  into  Germany  and  the  Low 
Countries  lay  open  for  attack  from  the  side  of 
France.  The  victory  of  Rocroi  and  the  capture  of 
Thionville  came  most  opportunely  to  the  aid  of  the 
government  of  Anne  of  Austria  and  Mazarin.  For 
the  moment  these  successes  silenced  the  voices  of 
intrigue  and  faction.  They  proved,  moreover,  to  the 
world  that  though  Richelieu  was  dead,  his  spirit  still 
guided  the  foreign  policy  of  France,  and  that  the 
Spanish  leanings  of  Anne  of  Austria  were  completely 
subordinated  to  her  feelings  of  patriotism  and  affec¬ 
tion  for  her  son.  These  successes  then  reassured 
the  allies  of  France,  disheartened  her  enemies,  and 
helped  to  establish  the  government  on  a  firm  basis 
at  home.  Still  the  difficulties  of  Mazarin  were 
enormous.  Though  France  was  safe  from  fear  of 
invasion,  though  her  armies  were  preparing  if  pos¬ 
sible  to  advance  into  the  heart  of  Germany  and 
dictate’  peace  at  the  gates  of  Vienna,  the  attitude 
of  the  enemies  of  the  government  was  most  threat¬ 
ening. 

The  Conde  family  were  opposed  to  and  jealous  of 
Mazarin  ;  Madame  de  Chevreuse,  who  returned  to 
France  in  July  was  bitterly  hostile  to  him  ;  the  Duke 
of  Beaufort,  grandson  of  Henry  IV.  and  Gabrielle 
d’Estrdes,  headed  a  faction  mainly  composed  of  the 


ANNE  OF  AUSTRIA, 


# 


1643] 


Opening  Years  of  the  Reign. 


15 


lower  noblesse,  and  was  prepared  to  compass  his 
overthrow.  Uncertain  as  to  the  future  policy  of  the 
government,  the  Huguenots  were  becoming  unquiet, 
and  some  of  the  provinces,  owing  to  the  heavy  taxa¬ 
tion,  were  discontented  and  ready  to  take  advantage 
of  any  weakness  shown  by  those  in  authority.  It 
was  difficult  too  to  prevent  Anne  of  Austria  from 
showering  favours  on  the  most  unworthy  objects. 
With  the  indolent  Orleans  as  Lieutenant-General, 
the  avaricious  Henry  of  Conde  in  the  Council,  the 
weak  and  good-natured  Anne  as  Queen  Regent,  the 
docile  Pierre  Seguier  as  Chancellor,  and  the  ever 
watchful  and  active  Mazarin  as  Chief  Minister,  the 
situation  was  well  summed  up  in  the  lines : 

“  La  reine  donne  tout, 

Monsieur  joue  tout, 

M.  le  prince  prend  tout, 

Le  cardinal  fait  tout, 

Le  chancelier  scelle  tout.” 

But  perhaps  the  most  serious  danger  to  the  mon¬ 
archy  was  to  be  found  in  the  claims  of  Orleans  and 
the  House  of  Cond6  to  some  of  the  most  important 
governorships  in  France.  Already  Henry  of  Cond^ 
held  Burgundy;  his  son-in-law,  the  Duke  of  Longue- 
ville,  Normandy;  while  Provence  was  under  the 
Count  of  Alais,  a  relation  of  the  Cond^  family.  The 
ambitious  Henry  of  Condd  now  demanded  Langue¬ 
doc  for  himself,  proposing  to  transfer  Burgundy  to 
Enghien.  Orleans  was  at  the  same  time  pre.ssing 
his  claims  for  Champagne.  It  seemed  that  Riche¬ 
lieu’s  work  was  in  imminent  danger  of  being  undone, 
and  that  France  would  again  suffer  all  the  evils  of 


i6 


Louis  XIV. 


[1643 


provincial  governments  under  a  feudal  aristocracy 
which,  humiliated  by  Richelieu,  still  preserved  the 
memory  of  its  former  independence.  The  whole 
provincial  question  bristled  with  danger  to  the 
centralised  system  lately  established  by  the  great 
Cardinal. 

By  the  end  of  1643,  however,  Mazarin  had  by  dint 
of  patience,  tact,  fertility  of  resource,  and  tenacity  of 
purpose  triumphed  overall  the  dangers  which  threat¬ 
ened,  during  the  early  days  of  the  minority,  the 
authority  of  the  infant  King.  By  appealing  to 
Anne’s  maternal  instinct  he  checked  her  over-liber¬ 
ality  and  induced  her  to  adopt  a  more  dignified  and 
a  firmer  attitude  towards  the  factions  which  sur¬ 
rounded  her.  He  quieted  the  Huguenots  by  assuring 
them  that  the  toleration  of  their  religion  should  not 
be  interfered  with.  He  conciliated  Orleans  by  allow¬ 
ing  him  the  semblance  of  power,  and  he  successfully 
undermined  the  influence  of  the  dangerous  Henry  of 
Cond^with  the  Queen.  But  with  the  handsome  Beau¬ 
fort  and  his  faction,  Les  Importants  as  they  were 
termed,  owing  to  their  ridiculous  pretensions,  he 
could  make  no  terms.  Reinforced  by  the  returning 
exiles  and  especially  by  the  clever  and  dangerous 
Duchess  of  Chevreuse,  they  threatened  to  become 
even  dangerous. 

The  Duchess,  whose  exile  by  Louis  XHI.  should 
have  been  made  perpetual,  on  her  return  in  July  at 
once  attacked  Mazarin  indirectly.  Having  failed  to 
secure  for  the  Condd  family  Brittany,  she  attempted 
again  unsuccessfully,  to  introduce  her  own  friends 
into  the  Council.  Defeated  on  this  point  she  en- 


BEAUFORT, 

(From  a  print  in  the  library  of  Christ  Church,  Oxford.) 


1643]  Opening  Years  of  the  Reig7i. 


17 


deavoured  to  revolutionise  the  foreign  policy  of 
France  and  to  bring  about  a  Spanish  alliance. 
Foiled  by  Anne’s  patriotism  and  defeated  on  all 
points  she  relinquished  her  policy  of  assailing  Maza- 
rin  indirectly,  and  resolved  by  allying  with  Beaufort 
and  the  Importants  to  make  a  direct  attack  on 
the  Minister’s  power.  The  exile  of  Madame  de 
Montbazon,  one  of  Beaufort’s  allies,  owing  to  a  quar¬ 
rel  with  Madame  de  Longueville,  determined  Beau¬ 
fort  to  assassinate  Mazarin.  But  courage  failed  the 
conspirators,  and  Beaufort — le  roi  des  Halles,  as  he 
was  popularly  termed — was  arrested  on  September 
2nd  and  the  party  of  the  Imporlatils  dispersed.  The 
suddenness  of  the  blow  and  the  completeness  of  the 
overthrow  of  the  Imporlatiis  recalled  the  energetic 
measures  of  Richelieu.  The  latter  lived  again  in 
the  prompt  and  decisive  action  of  his  successor. 
The  following  lines  composed  at  this  time  show  the 
popular  feeling  on  the  subject : 

“  II  n’est  pas  mort ;  il  n’a  que  change  d'age, 

Ce  Cardinal,  dont  chacun  en  enrage  ; 

Mais  sa  maison  en  a  grand  passetems  ; 

Maints  Chevaliers  n’en  sont  pas  trop  contens, 

Ains  I’ont  voulu  mettre  en  pauvre  equipage 
Sous  sa  faveur  renait  son  parentage 
Par  le  nienie  art  qu’il  niettoit  en  usage, 

Kt,  par  ina  foi,  c’est  encore  leur  terns  ; 

II  n’est  pas  inort. 

“  Or  nous  taisons  de  peur  d’entrer  en  cage  ; 

II  est  en  cour,  I’eminent  personage, 

Et  pour  durer  encor  plus  de  vingt  ans 
Demandez-leur  a  tons  ces  Importans  ; 

IIs  vous  diront  d’un  moult  piteux  langage, 

II  n’est  pas  mort.” 


i8 


Louis  XI I 


tlo43 


Mazarin  was  now  firmly  established  in  power.  A 
guard  of  three  hundred  gentlemen  accompanied  him 
whenever  he  went  out.  In  the  Council  he  was 
supreme.  The  Secretaries  of  State,  Le  Tellier, 
Brienne,  Gu^ndgaud,  and  La  Vrilliere,  were  merely 
his  agents  and  the  Duke  of  Orleans  was  perfectly 
docile.  Supported  by  the  Queen,  Mazarin  decided 
all  important  inatters  without  consulting  anybody. 
The  minister’s  position  was  immensely  strengthened 
by  the  overthrow  of  Beaufort  and  his  friends.  He 
was  now  strong  enough  to  deal  with  the  serious 
question  of  the  provincial  governments.  Champagne 
owing  to  its  proximity  to  Lorraine  could  not  be 
taken  out  of  the  hands  of  the  central  administration, 
so  he  offered  and  gave  the  government  of  Languedoc 
to  Orleans  with  the  ulterior  design  of  stirring  up 
enmity  between  him  and  Henry  of  Cond^,  who  had 
set  his  heart  on  securing  Languedoc  for  himself. 
All  agitation  in  the  provinces  subsided  early  in  1644 
and  the  government  of  the  Regency  seemed  to  have 
triumphed  over  its  enemies  both  within  and  without 
the  kingdom.  Throughout  this  trying  period  Maza¬ 
rin  had  acted  with  great  discretion.  The  Queen  was 
surrounded  by  men  and  women  devoted  to  herself 
but  hostile  to  Mazarin.  To  conciliate  these  enemies 
of  Richelieu’s  home  policy  Mazarin  reversed  many 
of  the  late  Cardinal’s  appointments.  Madame  de 
Senecey  took  the  place  of  Madame  de  Bressac  as 
maid-of-honour  to  Anne;  Claude  Le  Bouthilier,  the 
Superintendent  of  the  Finances  made  way  on  June 
5th  for  Bailleul  and  the  Count  of  Avaux,  Madame 
de  Vaucelas  succeeded  Madame  de  Lansac  as  the 


1644] 


Opening  Years  of  the  Reign. 


19 


young  King’s  governess.  L6on  Le  Bouthilier,  Count 
of  Chavigny,  refused  to  remain  in  the  Council  after  his 
father’s  fall  and  his  Secretaryship  of  State  was  given 
to  Henri  de  Lomenie  de  Brienne.  The  adoption  of 
these  well-timed  measures  rendered  Mazarin’s  posi¬ 
tion  still  more  secure.  At  the  end  of  1643,  too,  another 
change  took  place  which  affected  the  young  King. 
The  headquarters  of  the  royal  family  were  moved 
from  the  Louvre  to  the  Palais  Royal  which  Richelieu 
had  bequeathed  to  Louis  XIV.  In  the  apartments 
of  Richelieu  the  young  monarch,  then  five  years  old, 
was  installed,  while  Mazarin  also  occupied  rooms  in 
the  palace.  Under  the  care  of  his  female  attendants 
Louis  remained  till  his  seventh  year,  though  Villeroi, 
Dumont,  P^refixe,  and  Laporte  were  respectively 
nominated  his  governor,  sub-governor,  preceptor,  and 
first  Valet-de-Ciianibre.  His  tastes  were  warlike  and 
consequently  all  his  amusements  had  a  military  char¬ 
acter.  A  troop  of  the  noblest  children  in  France  was 
organized,  was  subjected  to  military  discipline,  and 
with  the  King  was  drilled  each  day.  Louis  delighted 
in  his  young  soldiers  and  was  very  fond  of  marching 
at  their  head,  up  and  down  the  long  gallery  of  the 
Louvre.  “  The  King’s  amusements  were  all  war¬ 
like  ”  wrote  the  Count  of  Brienne,  who  was  one 
of  the  young  soldiers;  “as  soon  as  his  little  hands 
could  grasp  a  stick  the  Queen  had  a  large  drum  pre¬ 
pared  upon  which  he  played  continually.”  His 
principal  companions  were  his  brother  the  Duke  of 
Anjou,  the  young  Count  of  Quiche,  and  Louis  Henri 
de  Lomenie. 

But  these  early  years  of  Louis  were  not  spent  in 


20 


Louis  XIV 


[1644 


comfort.  Whether  through  the  avarice  of  the  Car¬ 
dinal  or  through  the  difficult}'  of  getting  sufficient 
supplies,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  condition  of  the 
Court  was  often  that  of  extreme  penury  and  discom¬ 
fort.  It  is  at  any  rate  certain  that  the  finances  of 
France  were  in  a  most  desperate  state.  The  good¬ 
nature  of  Anne,  the  rapacity  of  the  courtiers,  the 
large  bribes  which  had  to  be  paid  to  Orleans  and 
Henry  Cond^,  the  unscrupulousness  of  the  farmers 
of  the  taxes,  the  exorbitant  rate  of  interest  paid  on 
loans,  the  enormous  expenses  of  the  war — all  these 
explain  the  expenditure  which  in  1642  had  been 
ninety-nine  millions,  and  by  1644  had  increased  to 
one  hundred  and  twenty-four  millions. 

The  very  method  of  collecting  taxes  gave  oppor¬ 
tunity  for  unlimited  embezzlement,  and  Emery,  the 
Controller-General  of  Finance,  was  known  to  take 
every  advantage  of  a  pernicious  and  oppressive  sys¬ 
tem  to  enrich  himself  and  the  bankers  who  provided 
the  loans.  To  raise  more  money  the  Taille  was 
severely  enforced,  numerous  fresh  offices  were  cre¬ 
ated  and  sold,  new  taxes  were  levied.  And  when 
these  methods  did  not  prove  adequate  a  tax  called 
the  Tois^  was  invented — a  fine  on  all  houses  built 
outside  Paris  since  1548,  followed  by  a  forced  loan 
on  the  richer  classes. 

These  measures,  however,  not  only  failed  in  their 
object,  but  caused  popular  revolts  in  the  provinces 
and  provoked  a  strenuous  resistance  on  the  part  of 
the  Parlement  of  Paris.  In  fact,  the  attitude  taken 
by  the  opponents  of  the  policy  of  the  government 
was  so  threatening  that  Mazarin’s  position,  if  not 


1645] 


Opening  Years  of  the  Reign. 


2  I 


actually  shaken,  tended  rapidly  to  become  one  of 
considerable  danger. 

Fortunately  another  brilliant  success  abroad  came 
to  his  aid  and  gave  a  temporary  prestige  to  the  gov¬ 
ernment.  The  year  1644  had  witnessed  the  defeat 
of  Rantzau  by  Mercy  at  Duttlingen,  followed  by  the 
three  desperate  battles  of  Fribourg  and  the  occupa¬ 
tion  of  the  Rhine  valley  by  the  French  armies.  The 
year  1645  saw  the  famous  attempt  of  Turenne  to 
arrange  with  the  Swedes  a  concerted  attack  on 
Vienna.  In  March,  1645,  the  latter  had  won  the 
battle  of  Jankowitz,  and  Mazarin  had  arranged  that 
George  Ragotsky  of  Transylvania  should  send  an 
army  to  aid  Torstenson  while  Turenne  should  enter 
Suabia  and  march  on  Vienna.  The  Emperor  was 
saved  by  the  want  of  a  proper  understanding  among 
his  enemies,  by  the  illness  of  Torstenson,  and  by 
the  defeat  of  Turenne  at  Mergentheim  on  May  5th. 
The  French  were  checked  for  the  time,  but  rein¬ 
forced  by  Enghien  and  eight  thousand  men,  Turenne 
aided  his  brilliant  colleague  to  win  the  great  battle 
of  Nordlingen  on  August  3d,  when  Mercy  was 
killed  and  the  road  to  Vienna  lay  open.  Though 
the  weakness  of  the  French  army  after  the  battle, 
the  illness  of  Enghien,  the  retreat  of  Torstenson 
into  Thuringia,  and  the  retirement  of  Ragotsky  ren¬ 
dered  an  advance  on  Vienna  for  the  moment  hope¬ 
less,  the  victory  of  Nordlingen  had  important  effects. 
The  death  of  Mercy  was  worth  many  successes  to 
the  French,  but  above  all  the  brilliant  victory  of 
Nordlingen  enabled  Mazarin  to  deal  firmly  with  his 
foes  at  home.  The  check  at  Mergentheim  had  en- 


22 


Louis  XIV. 


[1645 


couraged  the  resistance  to  the  government,  and  had 
impressed  Mazarin  with  the  necessity  of  being  more 
than  usually  circumspect.  All  through  his  ministry 
the  influence  exercised  by  the  course  of  events  out¬ 
side  France  upon  the  home  policy  of  the  govern¬ 
ment  was  immense,  and  Mazarin  at  once  took 
advantage  of  the  victory  of  Nordlingen  to  strike 
a  blow  at  the  growing  opposition  to  his  rule. 

A  Lit-de-Jtistice  was  held  on  September  7th,  pre¬ 
sided  over  by  the  young  King.  At  this  solemn 
assembly  the  Queen  took  a  very  firm  attitude. 
The  Parlement  made  no  opposition  to  her  demands, 
and  the  government  withdrew  the  most  unpopular 
of  the  taxes,  the  Toise  and  the  Taxe  des  aises.  To 
raise  money  numerous  new  offices  were  created, 
taxes  were  laid  on  various  trades,  and  other  ex¬ 
pedients  adopted  for  increasing  the  revenue. 

Two  days  before  the  Lit -de -Justice  Louis  XIV. 
had  attained  his  seventh  year,  and  had  arrived  at 
the  age  when  kings  were  accustomed  to  pass  from 
the  care  of  women  into  the  hands  of  men.  The 
Queen,  anxious  to  give  Mazarin  the  supervision  of 
Louis’  education,  created  him  Superintendent  of  the 
Education  of  the  King,  and  letters-patent  were  pub¬ 
lished  announcing  to  the  world  the  elevation  of  the 
Cardinal  to  this  dignity.  Until  the  King  was  much 
older  Mazarin  seems  to  have  taken  little  active  par¬ 
ticipation  in  Louis’s  education,  which  he  left  in  charge 
of  Villeroi  his  governor,  P6r^fixe  his  teacher,  and 
La  Porte  his  principal  Valet-de-Chambre.  Villeroi, 
whose  principal  claim  to  fame  lies  in  the  fact  of 
his  being  the  father  of  the  Marshal  Villeroi,  so 


1646]  Opening  Years  of  the  Reign.  23 

prominent  in  the  Spanish  Succession  war,  was  bound 
to  accompany  Louis  everywhere,  to  watch  over  his 
safety,  and  generally  to  direct  his  actions.  He 
was  a  born  courtier,  and  taught  Louis  at  an  early 
age  the  usages  of  the  Court.  His  son,  the  young 
Villeroi,  became  one  of  the  young  King’s  compan¬ 
ions  and  favourites.  Perefixe,  his  tutor,  was  a  Doc¬ 
tor  of  the  Sorbonne,  v/ho  became  later  Archbishop 
of  Paris,  and  who  was  the  author  of  a  history  of 
Henry  IV.  composed  for  the  benefit  of  Louis. 

The  young  King,  Madame  de  Motteville  tells  us, 
“  was  taught  to  translate  the  Conuncntaries  of  Ccesar  ; 
he  learnt  to  dance,  to  draw,  and  to  ride,  and  he  was 
very  skilful  at  all  athletic  exercises.”  He  became 
also  greatly  interested  in  history,  and  especially  de¬ 
lighted  in  the  wars  of  Charles  the  Great,  St.  Louis, 
and  Francis  1.  La  Porte,  the  King’s  chief  Valct-dc- 
CJianibre,  the  author  of  some  memoirs  on  the  early 
years  of  Louis  XIV.,  served  him  faithfully,  though  he 
apparently  disliked  Mazarin,  who  always  ranked  him 
amongst  his  enemies.  It  is  La  Porte  who  asserts 
that  Mazarin  cared  nothing  about  Louis’  education, 
and  was  merely  anxious  to  surround  him  with  his 
own  friends  and  relations.  On  the  contrary,  it 
seems  certain  that  Mazarin  was  fully  alive  to  the 
necessity  of  carefully  educating  Louis,  but  during  his 
early  years  left  the  direction  of  it  to  his  governors. 
In  1647,  when  Louis  was  in  his  tenth  year,  he  told 
his  mother  at  a  ball  at  Fontainebleau  that  he  wished 
to  take  the  government  into  his  own  hands.  It  was 
discovered  that  one  of  Louis’  attendants  had  sug¬ 
gested  the  thought,  and  Mazarin  took  the  opportu- 


24 


Louis  XIV. 


[1646 


nity  of  reprimanding  Villeroi  for  the  bad  education 
which  he  was  giving  Louis.  The  Cardinal  was  always 
keenly  alive  to  the  danger  of  letting  the  King  be 
surrounded  by  flatterers.  “  These  perpetual  flatteries 
are  most  prejudicial,”  wrote  Mazarin,  “  and  make 
the  King  dislike  those  who  tell  him  the  truth.”  The 
Cardinal  was  at  that  period  too  much  occupied  in  the 
absorbing  political  movements  of  the  time  to  be  able 
to  superintend  closely  the  King’s  education.  But  in 
the  later  years  of  his  own  life  it  is  well  known  how 
carefully  and  successfully  he  instilled  into  Louis  the 
necessity  of  cultivating  habits  of  order,  of  regular 
work,  of  perseverance,  of  firmness,  and  of  taking  into 
his  own  hands  the  supreme  direction  of  affairs.  It  is 
probable  that  Louis  disliked  the  Cardinal  just  as  any 
child  is  apt  to  dislike  his  schoolmaster.  There  seems 
no  doubt  that  he  was  encouraged  in  this  dislike  by 
several  of  those  round  him,  who  hoped  in  some  way 
to  profit  by  sowing  discord  between  the  King  and 
the  Minister.  The  numerous  stories  bearing  on 
Louis’  aversion  to  the  Minister  as  shown  on  various 
occasions  at  Compiegne,  at  Fontainebleau,  or  at  the 
Palais  Royal,  though  doubtless  in  the  main  true, 
have  no  historical  importance. 

At  this  period,  however,  Louis  was  having  forced 
upon  him,  by  stern  experience,  convictions  of  im¬ 
mense  importance  to  France. 

Though  the  Importants  had  been  crushed,  and 
though  the  young  Louis  had  successfully  presided  at 
the  Lit- de- Justice,  where  the  complaisance  of  the 
Parlement  seemed  to  prove  that  absolutism  in 
France  rested  on  a  secure  basis,  in  reality  the  posi- 


1646] 


Opening  Years  of  the  Reign. 


25 


tion  of  the  government  was  most  precarious.  The 
political  and  social  condition  of  France  at  the  be¬ 
ginning  of  1646  was  full  of  danger,  and  at  any  mo¬ 
ment  the  throne  of  the  Bourbons  might  be  shaken,  if 
not  overthrown.  Though  France  was  victorious 
abroad,  and  apparently  tranquil  at  home,  she  was  in 
truth  on  the  verge  of  bankruptcy.  The  expedients 
of  Mazarin  to  avert  the  inevitable  crisis  only  tended 
to  alienate  every  class.  The  discontent  was  univer¬ 
sal,  but  for  the  moment  the  brilliant  victories  of  the 
French  armies  postponed  an  outbreak  in  Paris. 

Successful  abroad  and  supreme  at  home,  the  gov¬ 
ernment  of  the  Regency  seemed  in  1646  to  be  in  an 
almost  enviable  position.  Anne  of  Austria  presided 
over  a  brilliant  circle,  and  the  “  happy  hours  ”  of 
Compiegne,  Fontainebleau,  and  the  Louvre  were 
often  looked  back  upon  with  regret  by  many  who 
witnessed  the  glories  of  Versailles. 

In  this  frivolous  and  yet  magnificent,  noble  and  yet 
vicious  society,  Enghien  was  the  most  striking  figure. 
He  was  the  hero  of  Rocroi  and  Nordlingen,  and  by 
these  victories  he  had  inaugurated  the  ascendancy  of 
the  arms  of  France,  which  continued  till  the  battle 
of  Blenheim.  In  spite  of  his  treasonable  conduct 
during  the  latter  years  of  the  conflict  between  France 
and  Spain,  he  deserves  to  be  placed  with  Richelieu 
and  Turenne,  as  having  aided  in  raising  the  mon-, 
archy  to  the  highest  point  of  splendour.  On  his  re¬ 
turn  to  the  capital,  he  was  welcomed  by  Mazarin 
and  Anne  of  Austria,  and  even  the  little  King  was 
taught  to  praise  his  “  Cousin.”  He  was  the  favour¬ 
ite  of  Paris,  and  his  father,  the  President  of  the 


26 


Louis  XIV. 


[1647 


Council  of  State,  demanded  for  him  provinces  and 
governments.  But  Enghien,  though  an  admirable 
representative  of  the  frivolity,  the  licentiousness,  the 
lawlessness,  and  the  magnificence  of  the  society  of 
which  he  had  become  the  idol,  had  sterner  work  on 
hand,  and  was  not  content  to  remain  in  Paris  while 
French  armies  were  busy  on  the  frontiers. 

In  the  Low  Countries,  the  Spanish  forces  had  been 
successful,  and  Mardyck,  Bergues,  and  Cassel  had 
been  retaken.  It  was  necessary  at  once  to  recom¬ 
mence  the  war,  and  to  resume  active  operations. 
The  Court  proceeded  as  far  as  Amiens,  and  in  1646 
Gaston  of  Orleans  and  Enghien,  at  the  head  of  the 
French  armies,  turned  the  tables  on  their  enemies. 
Though  Orleans’s  adhesion  to  the  old  routine  of  a 
campaign,  which  regarded  long  sieges  as  the  height 
of  military  skill,  checked  the  achievement  of  any 
brilliant  successes  in  the  field,  Enghien’s  presence 
made  itself  felt,  and  the  capture  of  Dunkirk  at  the 
end  of  the  campaign  was  one  of  his  greatest  triumphs. 
His  return  to  the  capital  was  followed  by  the  death 
of  his  father,  and  by  his  appointment  to  the  civil 
and  military  command  in  Spain.  On  arriving  at 
Barcelona  in  the  spring  of  1647,  he  found  the  influ¬ 
ence  of  France  almost  destroyed  in  Catalonia,  and 
the  small  French  army  in  a  very  perilous  condition. 
His  well  known  failure  before  Lerida  was  his  only 
reverse  when  leading  a  French  army,  and  he  was  no 
doubt  perfectly  right  in  raising  the  siege  of  that 
strong  fortress.  Conde’s  check,  however,  unfortu¬ 
nately  coincided  with  disasters  and  misfortunes  to  the 
French  arms  in  other  parts  of  Europe,  and  with  an 


1647] 


Opening  Years  of  the  Reign. 


27 


increasing  deficit  in  the  treasury  and  a  deepening 
discontent  at  home. 

The  year  1647  seemed  indeed  fraught  with  disas¬ 
ter  and  even  danger  to  the  French  monarchy.  The 
failure  of  the  French  at  Lerida  had  shaken  its  repu¬ 
tation  in  Catalonia,  the  revolt  of  the  VVeimarian 
troops  and  the  quarrel  of  Gassion  and  Rantzau  had 
for  the  moment  not  only  destroyed  Mazarin’s  hopes 
of  securing  the  Spanish  Netherlands,  but,  combined 
with  the  success  of  the  Archduke  Leopold  in  taking 
Landrecies,  had  even  imperilled  the  French  conquests 
from  Courtrai  to  Dunkirk  ;  even  in  Italy  the  French 
cause  had  suffered  reverses.  “  Mazarin  has  grown 
pale,”  wrote  the  Venetian  ambassador  in  August, 
1647,  “  and  his  hair  has  turned  white.”  Disaster 
abroad  was  accompanied  by  an.xieties  at  home.  In 
September  of  the  same  year  the  young  Duke  of 
Anjou  fell  dangerously  ill  ;  in  November  the  King 
himself  was  attacked  by  small-pox,  and  the  Queen, 
worn  out,  was  seized  with  fever.  The  friends  of 
Orleans  actually  looked  forward  to  the  reign  of  Gas¬ 
ton  I.,  the  Iniportaiits  once  more  raised  their  heads, 
epigrams  became  numerous,  certain  members  of  the 
Parlenient  began  to  make  preparations  for  asserting 
their  rights  on  the  first  opportunity,  and  Paris, 
already  seething  with  discontent,  began  to  stir 
uneasily. 

The  recovery  of  the  Queen  and  her  sons  destroyed 
the  ambitious  schemes  of  Orleans  and  the  Parlanent ; 
the  appointment  of  Conde  to  the  command  of  the 
army  of  Flanders  seemed  to  augur  well  for  the  future 
success  of  the  French  arms.  But  for  a  time  bad 


28 


Louis  XIV. 


tl648 


luck  dogged  all  Mazarin’s  efforts,  and  his  efforts  to 
make  peace  with  the  Empire  seemed  destined  to 
come  to  nothing.  The  Elector  of  Bavaria,  who  had 
in  1647  signed  the  treaty  of  Ulm  with  France,  now 
early  in  1648  broke  the  treaty  and  returned  to  his 
allegiance  to  the  Emperor.  This  defection  seemed 
to  destroy  all  chance  of  an  early  peace  with  the  Em¬ 
pire.  But  what  was  even  a  more  serious  blow  to  the 
foreign  policy  of  Mazarin  was  the  conclusion  of  a 
treaty  (of  Munster)  between  the  United  Provinces 
and  Spain,  in  January,  1648.  Ever  since  the  capture 
of  Dunkirk  by  the  French,  the  Dutch  had  become 
uneasy,  lest  the  French  should  within  the  near 
future  secure  the  Belgian  Provinces.  This  uneasi¬ 
ness  was  accentuated  by  the  discovery  that  Mazarin 
was  endeavouring  early  in  1646  to  arrange  a  peace 
with  Spain — the  latter  to  yield  the  Spanish  Nether¬ 
lands  to  France,  which  country  would  on  her  part, 
abandon  all  Catalonia  and  Portugal  to  the  Spaniards. 
To  extend  the  French  frontiers  to  the  Scheldt  was 
always  one  of  Mazarin’s  favourite  schemes,  and  the 
year  1646  seemed  unusually  favourable  for  the  exe¬ 
cution  of  this  design.  England  occupied  with  her 
Civil  war  could  not  interfere  ;  Spain  had  had  ample 
opportunity  of  recognising  not  only  the  difficulty  of 
defending  her  distant  and  often  disloyal  Belgian 
Provinces  against  the  attacks  of  French  and  Dutch, 
but  also  the  vast  importance  of  thoroughly  conquer¬ 
ing  Catalonia,  and  if  possible  Portugal. 

The  Dutch  opposition  to  this  scheme  soon  showed 
itself.  It  was  feared  in  Holland  that  Antwerp  in 
French  hands  would  not  only  rival  Amsterdam  and 


1648] 


Opening  Years  of  the  Reign. 


29 


so  endanger  the  Dutch  trade,  but  that  the  presence 
of  a  powerful  neighbour,  such  as  France,  would  be  a 
constant  menace  to  the  liberties  and  independence 
of  the  Republic.  Aided  by  these  fears  on  the  part 
of  the  Dutch,  the  work  of  Spanish  diplomacy  was 
easy.  The  ancient  alliance  between  the  French  and 
the  United  Provinces  was  broken,  and  in  January, 
1648,  the  treaty  between  the  Dutch  and  Spanish 
governments  destroyed  all  chance  of  the  French 
frontiers  being  pushed  to  the  Scheldt. 

But  though  the  year  1648  opened  so  gloomily  for 
the  French  foreign  policy,  four  events  revolutionised 
the  condition  of  affairs  in  Europe  and  compelled  the 
Emperor  to  agree  to  make  peace.  The  victory  of 
Turenne  over  the  Bavarian  troops  at  Zusmars- 
hausen  (May  17th)  rendered  Bavaria,  now  occupied 
by  the  troops  of  Turenne  and  Wrangel,  useless  as  a 
check  upon  a  march  on  Vienna ;  the  capture  of 
Tortosa  (July  13th)  laid  Spain  open  to  a  French 
invasion  ;  the  success  of  the  Swede  Koenigsmarck  in 
occupying  Little  Prague  was  a  strong  argument  in 
the  mouths  of  the  Duke  of  Bavaria  and  the  other 
German  Princes  who  pressed  the  Emperor  to  make 
peace ;  Condi’s  splendid  and  decisive  victory  at 
Lens  on  August  20th,  after  a  long  campaign  at  the 
head  of  a  very  inferior  force,  finally  decided  the 
Emperor  to  conclude  the  peace  of  Westphalia. 

As  far  as  foreign  policy  was  concerned  the  mi¬ 
nority  of  Louis  XIV.  had  seen  France  achieve  bril¬ 
liant  successes.  She  had  not  extended  her  frontier 
to  the  Scheldt,  but  she  had  by  securing  Alsace  ad¬ 
vanced  her  boundaries  wellnigh  to  the  Rhine.  Her 


Louis  XIV. 


[1648 


30 

rival  Austria,  moreover,  was  permanently  weakened 
by  the  changes  effected  in  the  Germanic  constitu¬ 
tion.  The  independence  of  each  German  state  and 
the  introduction  of  Sweden  into  the  north  of 
Germany  were  in  themselves  a  considerable  check 
on  the  power  of  the  Emperor.  The  Empire  was 
paralysed  and  the  Rhine  was  no  longer  a  German 
river.  The  French  were  established  almost  through¬ 
out  all  Alsace,  and  the  Imperial  dignity  was  enor¬ 
mously  lessened.  The  smaller  German  Princes  had 
learned  to  look  upon  France  as  their  protector,  and 
Louis  XIV.  was  to  reap  later  the  benefits  of 
Mazarin’s  skilful  advocacy  of  the  rights  of  these 
petty  states. 

The  Austro-Spanish  House  had  indeed  suffered  a 
severe  fall  in  the  Thirty  Years’  War.  A  balance  of 
power  was  established  in  Europe  under  the  guaran¬ 
tee  of  France  which  could  not  easily  be  overthrown. 
In  spite  of  her  internal  troubles  the  French  mon¬ 
archy  had  gained  immensely  in  the  consideration  of 
Europe;  France  remained  the  leading  power  in 
Europe  and  was  regarded  by  the  secondary  states 
as  their  ally  and  protector. 

The  year  1648  was  disastrous  to  the  cause  of 
royalty.  Charles  I.  fell  into  the  hands  of  his  foes 
and  early  in  the  following  year  ended  his  life  on  the 
scaffold,  in  Naples  a  republic  was  proclaimed  and 
the  arms  of  Spain  defied,  in  Germany  the  Emperor’s 
power  had  been  for  ever  weakened  by  the  recogni¬ 
tion  of  the  federal  character  of  the  Empire,  even 
in  Russia  an  aristocratic  movement  hostile  to  the 
royal  power  took  place. 


1648] 


Opening  Years  of  ike  Reign. 


31 


/  France  was  no  exception  to  the  general  rule. 
There  the  murmuring  Parlcment  of  the  early  years 
of  Louis  XIV.’s  reign  became  the  mutinous  and 
rebellious  Parle^nent  of  the  period  of  the  Fronde. 
“  The  constellations  were  terribly  against  Kings,” 
wrote  Madame  de  Motteville.  For  some  five  years 
the  Fronde  filling  France  with  the  turmoil  and 
misery  of  a  civil  war  compromised  the  conquests 
and  the  glory  gained  by  the  French  armies  during 
the  years  1643-48.  Dominated  at  one  time  by  the 
Parlcment,  at  another  by  the  Princes,  at  another  by 
a  union  of  both,  the  period  of  the  Fronde  is  marked 
by  intrigue,  by  selfishness,  and  by  an  entire  absence 
of  patriotism. 

There  is  probably  no  period  in  later  French  his¬ 
tory  which  afforded  more  justification  for  absolutism. 
The  ready  acceptance  by  the  French  people  of  the 
establishment  of  Louis  XIV.’s  despotic  power  was 
in  great  measure  due  to  the  factious  character  of  the 
Fronde  movement. 

It  was  during  these  years  1648-54  that  Louis 
learnt  some  of  his  first  lessons  in  the  art  of  govern¬ 
ment.  It  was  during  these  years  that  he  gained  his 
earliest  political  experiences.  Opposed  on  all  sides 
by  a  curious  medley  of  princes  like  Beaufort,  of  gen¬ 
erals  like  Turenne  and  Cond6,  of  ecclesiastics  like 
Paul  de  Gondi,  of  ambitious  intriguers  like  Madame 
de  Chevreuse  and  Madame  de  Longueville,  it  was 
not  to  be  wondered  at  that  Louis’  early  experiences 
taught  him  the  necessity  of  crushing  all  opposition. 

The  failure  of  the  P'ronde  movement  to  secure 
any  constitutional  concessions  or  any  tangible 


32 


Louis  XIV 


[1648 


reforms  was  due  to  two  causes.  In  the  first  place 
the  Parlemeiit  of  Paris — a  mere  corporation  of 
magistrates  holding  their  power  from  the  King — 
had  no  right  to  take  the  place  of  the  States-General 
and  to  pose  as  the  representatives  of  the  nation. 
This  official  aristocracy,  indignant  at  Mazarin’s 
attempt  to  deprive  them  of  the  hereditary  rights 
which  belonged  to  their  offices,  now  proved  as  hostile 
to  the  minister  as  the  feudal  aristocracy  had  been 
to  Richelieu.  Though  these  lawyers  spoke  brave 
words  about  individual  liberty,  they  were  far  more 
anxious  about  the  extension  of  their  own  privileges 
and  the  threatened  loss  of  the  “  paulette  ”  than 
about  the  advancement  of  the  liberties  of  the 
nation  at  large.  It  is  indeed  true  that  the  first 
or  Parliamentary  Fronde  (1648-49)  did  certainly 
number  among  its  ranks  men  who,  like  M0I6,  the 
President  of  the  Parlement  and  a  real  patriot,  were 
honest  citizens  and  anxious  for  the  welfare  of  their 
country.  And  undeniably  this  movement  is  worthy 
of  a  certain  amount  of  respect  in  that  it  did  attack 
a  most  wasteful  administration,  and  a  ruinous 
system  of  taxation.  But  the  Parlement  was  incapa¬ 
ble,  from  its  very  constitution,  of  carrying  through 
a  scheme  of  reform  in  face  of  the  insuperable 
difficulties  which  beset  its  path. 

The  second  cause  of  the  failure  of  the  Fronde 
movement  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  the  New  or 
second  Fronde  (1649-1653)  had  no  title  whatever  to 
any  respect. 

The  constitutional  leanings  of  a  certain  portion  of 
the  members  of  the  first  Fronde  had  been  to  a  great 


Ah:s/iu: 


\/.VT////'\'  MOI.I.F.  ('on  'jn  HOY 

OHS.-//-  yv-.v///,v  /vrj;/,/,v//  an  ptlr/ann'iiOi- /'•I'ls 
/nrj.  t/rj  >.  ;nnx  s  </r-  trn,-.-  ,iu  4  inr//  , 


MOLE. 

(From  a  print  in  the  library  of  Christ  Church,  Oxford.) 


1648] 


Opening  Years  of  the  Reign. 


33 


extent  overshadowed  by  their  exaggerated  and 
unreasoning  hatred  of  a  First  Minister — in  the  per¬ 
son  of  Mazarin.  In  the  second  Fronde  the  object  of 
the  new  Frondeurs  was  simply  to  secure  for  them¬ 
selves  appointments,  governments,  pensions.  They 
aimed,  in  a  word,  at  the  overthrow  of  Mazarin  and 
the  establishment  of  the  government  of  the  aris¬ 
tocracy.  Had  the  first  Fronde  triumphed  and 
officialism  as  represented  by  the  members  of  the 
Parlenient  of  Paris  divided  the  government  with  the 
King,  or  had  the  nobles  in  the  second  Fronde 
triumphed,  the  country  would  have  suffered  far 
more  evils  than  attended  the  establishment  of  the 
absolute  monarchy. 

Both  Frondes  had  an  object  in  common,  viz.  the 
overthrow  of  Mazarin  and  with  him  of  the  idea  of 
an  irresponsible  Prime  Minister  bequeathed  to 
France  by  Richelieu.  Ostensibly  both  Frondes 
struggled  to  shake  royalty  free  from  the  check  im¬ 
posed  by  the  creation  of  a  Prime  Minister,  but  in 
reality,  though  struggling  nominally  for  the  King, 
the  Frondeurs,  whether  as  hereditary  magistrates  or 
as  frivolous  nobles,  were  mainly  fighting  for  their  own 
selfish  interests.  There  is  no  doubt  whatever  that  the 
triumph  of  the  Parlenient  ox  o{  the  nobles  would  have 
been  equally  disastrous  to  the  interests  of  France. 

And  this  is  very  clearly  seen  in  the  attitude  taken 
by  the  thirty-two  delegates  from  the  Parlenient  and 
the  sovereign  Courts  which  met  in  the  Chamber  of  St. 
Louis  and  there  formed  themselves  into  what  prac¬ 
tically  amounted  to  a  permanent  political  body  for 
dealing  with  all  existing  grievances. 

3 


34 


Louis  XIV. 


[1648 


On  June  30th,  1648  they  demanded  the  abolition  of 
Richelieu’s  intcndants,  whose  extended  powers  often 
encroached  upon  the  jurisdiction  of  \.\\q  Pari em cut. 
Apart  from  their  other  demands,  some  of  which  were 
admirable,  the  attempt  of  the  delegates  to  upset  at 
one  blow  Richelieu’s  administrative  system  illus¬ 
trates  the  folly  and  blindness  of  this  self-constituted 
committee.  The  abolition  of  the  unity  of  the 
French  administration  meant  a  return  to  feudal 
anarchy  and  local  misgovernment.  For  the  time 
being  Mazarin  found  it  advisable  to  persuade  the 
Queen,  who  was  herself  determined  to  maintain  in¬ 
tact  her  son’s  authority,  to  yield  to  the  pressure  of 
the  Parleinent,  which  had  received  with  favour  the 
propositions  of  the  Chamber  of  St.  Louis.  Not  only 
was  Emery  dismissed  and  his  place  given  to  a  sol¬ 
dier,  the  Marshal  de  la  Meilleraye,  but  all  the  inten- 
dants  were  removed  except  those  in  the  Lyonnais, 
Champagne,  and  Picardy.  These  concessions  not 
satisfying  the  Parleinent,  and  the  Chamber  of  St. 
Louis  continuing  its  sittings,  Mazarin  waited  till 
August,  when  on  the  20th  the  battle  of  Lens  seemed 
to  come  most  opportunely  to  the  aid  of  the  Court. 
“At  last,’’  wrote  Mazarin,  “heaven  has  declared  in 
our  favour.”  The  Queen’s  policy  of  maintaining 
intact  the  royal  authority  at  all  hazards  was  to  be 
immediately  tried. 

The  victory  of  Lens  was  to  have  a  double  effect. 
It  was  to  hasten  the  conclusion  of  a  general  peace, 
it  was  to  assure  the  triumph  of  the  royal  cause  over 
that  of  the  Parleinent.  It  was  reported  that  on 
hearing  of  the  victory  of  Conde,  Louis  himself  had 


1648] 


Opening  Years  of  the  Reign. 


35 


said  :  “  The  Parlement  will  be  very  sorry.”  The  royal 
Council,  in  which  sat  with  the  Queen,  Mazarin,  Or¬ 
leans,  Longueville,  Seguier,  La  Meilleraye,  and  Cha- 
vigny,  decided  that  the  three  most  prominent  mem¬ 
bers  of  the  Parlement,  Broussel,  Blancmesnil,  and 
Charton,  should  be  arrested  on  the  very  day  when  at 
Notre  Dame  a  Te  Deum  was  being  chanted  in  hon¬ 
our  of  Lens.  Of  the  three  Charton  escaped,  but  the 
other  two  were  seized,  Blancmesnil  being  taken  to 
Vincennes,  while  Broussel  was  imprisoned  at  Sedan. 

The  effect  was  as  serious  for  France  as  had  been 
the  attempted  arrest  of  the  five  members  by  Charles 
1.  in  England. 

The  Revolution  had  begun.  In  a  frenzy  of  excite¬ 
ment  barricades  were  thrown  up,  and  the  mob  re¬ 
fused  to  lay  down  their  arms  till  the  prisoners  were 
released.  The  Palais  Royal  itself  was  in  no  little 
danger.  It  was  not  till  the  Court  had  given  way  to 
the  demands  of  the  Parlement  and  Broussel  had 
arrived  and  been  escorted  in  triumph  to  Notre  Dame 
that  the  barricades  were  removed  and  tranquillity 
reigned  again  in  Paris.  But  it  was  evident  that  a 
rupture  with  the  Parlement  was  bound  to  take  place. 
The  moderate  section  in  the  Parlement  itself  was 
incapable  of  controlling  the  younger  members  who 
were  determined  to  carry  through  their  projects  of 
reform  and  to  exercise  a  powerful  if  not  a  permanent 
influence  on  the  government.  Paul  de  Gondi,  known 
as  the  Cardinal  de  Retz,  a  born  conspirator,  whose 
object  in  life  was  to  be  a  successful  party  leader,  had 
taken  up  a  position  of  bitter  hostility  to  the  Queen 
and  Mazarin.  Instigating  the  younger  and  more 


36 


Louis  XIV. 


[1648 


fiery  members  of  the  Parlcment,  he  entered  upon  a 
course  of  definite  hostility  to  Mazarin,  which  he 
expected  would  place  him  in  a  commanding  position 
among  the  leaders  of  the  factions  of  the  day. 

The  rest  of  the  picturesque  history  of  the  first  or 
Parliamentary  Fronde  can  be  told  in  a  few  words. 
The  war  which  seemed  likely  to  break  out  upon  the 
retirement  of  the  Court  to  Rueil  in  September,  and 
later  to  Saint-Germain,  followed  by  some  forcible 
measures  of  Mazarin,  was  temporarily  averted  by  a 
conference  at  Saint-Germain,  which  lasted  from 
September  25th  to  October  4th,  and  resulted  in  the 
declaration  of  October  22d,  perhaps  the  most  im¬ 
portant  act  of  the  Parliamentary  Fronde,  a  sort  of 
charter  in  which  a  large  number  of  the  claims  made 
by  the  Chamber  of  St.  Louis  were  conceded.  Fora 
time  the  Court  returned  to  Paris,  where  the  Parle- 
7nent  was  far  too  intent  on  securing  the  fulfilment  of 
the  promises  made  by  the  Declaration  to  appreciate 
the  fact  that  on  October  24th  the  memorable  Treaties 
of  Westphalia  were  signed — a  signal  tribute  to  the 
skill  and  success  of  Mazarin’s  foreign  policy.  Only 
by  means  of  extensive  bribery  and  by  working  on 
Conde’s  contempt  for  the  noblesse  of  the  gown  had 
Mazarin  succeeded  in  keeping  Orleans  and  Cond6 
faithful  to  the  cause  of  the  Court.  But  the  intrigues 
of  De  Retz  and  the  violent  and  aggressive  policy  of 
the  younger  members  of  the  Parlement  rendered  war 
inevitable  unless  the  Queen  was  prepared  to  consent 
to  a  considerable  curtailment  of  the  royal  power. 
But  Anne  had  no  intention  whatever  of  allowing  her 
son’s  heritage  to  be  shorn  of  any  portion  of  its  rights. 


1649] 


Opening  Years  of  the  Reign. 


37 


She  had  only  agreed  to  the  Declaration  of  October 
22d  on  the  assurance  of  Mazarin  that  she  could  vio¬ 
late  it  whenever  she  chose.  Alarmed  now  at  the  ap¬ 
pearance  of  numerous  Mazarinadcs — personal  at¬ 
tacks  on  the  minister,  which,  as  he  pointed  out,  re¬ 
sembled  those  which  preceded  the  fall  of  Strafford, 
— she  allowed  herself  to  be  persuaded  by  Orleans  and 
Mazarin,  and  agreed  to  leave  Paris  secretly  and  to 
prepare  for  open  hostilities.  Conde,  with  the  eye  of 
a  great  captain,  had  wished  to  keep  the  King  and 
the  Court  in  Paris,  and  had  devised  a  plan  worthy  of 
the  great  Napoleon  for  destroying  the  barricades  and 
clearing  the  streets  by  means  of  artillery.  But  the 
counsels  of  those  who  advocated  the  reduction  of  the 
city  by  famine  prevailed,  and  flight  was  decided  upon. 

The  young  Louis,  now  ten  years  old,  was  to  have 
a  practical  illustration  of  the  inconvenience  resulting 
from  the  rebellious  conduct  of  the  Parlenicnt.  On 
January  5,  1649,  the  flight  from  the  Palais  Royal 
took  place.  Berringhen,  the  King’s  first  Equerry, 
had  prepared  the  carriage,  which  stood  ready  at  the 
Palais  Royal  garden.  With  Louis  and  his  brothe-r 
the  Duke  of  Anjou,  and  accompanied  by  Villeroi, 
Villequier,  Guitaut,  Comminges,  and  one  lady-in- 
waiting,  Anne  escaped  at  3  A.  M.  on  a  winter  morn¬ 
ing  to  Saint-Germain.  Arrived  there  the  hardships 
began.  The  Chdteati  Viciix  had.  little  or  no  furni¬ 
ture  ;  there  were  no  beds.  For  five  days  the  Parisians 
refused  to  allow  the  royal  luggage  to  leave  the  city. 
At  the  Chateau  Neuf,  where  Monsieur  had  his  apart¬ 
ments,  matters  were  almost  worse,  and  “  Mademoi¬ 
selle  ”  has  left  an  amusing  account  of  the  hardships 


Louis  XIV. 


[1649 


which  she  experienced.  The  inconveniences  inci¬ 
dent  to  this  condition  of  affairs  in  midwinter,  in  an  un¬ 
furnished  house,  made  an  impression  on  the  mind  of 
the  youthful  King  which  was  never  eradicated. 

For  three  months,  from  January  6  to  April  i,  1649, 
the  civil  war  continued.  That  it  lasted  so  long  was 
due  to  the  treachery  of  many  of  the  Princes,  who 
joined  the  Parlement,  to  troubles  in  Normandy,  and 
to  the  treason  of  Turenne,  who  threatened  to  ad¬ 
vance  to  the  aid  of  Paris  at  the  head  of  his  large 
army.  Cond6,  too,  found  that  a  force  of  15,000  was 
insufficient  to  invest  Paris,  while  the  determination 
of  the  citizens  to  defend  the  ramparts  was  an  unex¬ 
pected  obstacle  to  success.  Eventually  divisions 
among  the  Frondeurs,  scarcity  of  food  in  Paris,  the 
failure  of  the  Fronde  forces,  dislike  of  the  intrigues 
of  Spain,  and  the  death  of  Charles  I — an  event 
which  shocked  the  moderate  party  in  the  Parlement, 
— and  general  weariness  of  the  war  felt  by  Court, 
Parlement,  and  Bourgeoisie,  led  to  the  treaty  of 
Rueil,  April  1st.  The  treaty  of  Rueil,  received  with 
enthusiasm  by  the  Bourgeoisie  in  Paris,  where  a 
solemn  Te  Deum  was  chanted  and  a  display  of  fire¬ 
works  took  place,  proved  to  be  only  a  truce. 

The  restrictions  on  the  royal  power  were  so  exces¬ 
sive  that  it  was  impossible  for  the  Court  party  to  re¬ 
gard  the  terms  of  the  treaty  as  valid  for  any  length 
of  time.  And,  moreover,  a  large  number  of  the 
Frondeurs  never  ceased  insulting  the  Queen  and 
Mazarin  in  their  pamphlets.  These  attacks  re¬ 
doubled  in  vigour  after  the  failure  of  the  French 
arms  to  capture  Cambrai  in  July. 


1649] 


39 


Opening  Years  of  the  Reign. 


For  many  months  the  return  of  the  Court  to  Paris 
was  postponed,  the  Queen  preferring  the  quiet  df 
Compiegne  to  the  insults  of  the  Frondeurs.  At  last 
on  August  1 8,  1649,  the  Court  definitely  returned  to 
the  capital.  In  the  entry  to  Paris  the  young  King 
played  a  considerable  part.  The  royal  carriage  was 
received  with  great  pomp  by  the  municipal  author¬ 
ities  half  way  between  Paris  and  Saint-Denis,  and 
there,  on  bended  knee,  the  city  dignitaries  asserted 
their  loyalty  to  the  King.  Then  they  escorted 
Louis  on  horseback  to  the  Palais  Royal,  the  plain  of 
Saint-Denis  being  covered  with  triumphal  arches, 
and  the  people  stirred  up  to  great  enthusiasm. 
Some  days  later,  on  August  25th,  the  King  went 
with  considerable  pomp  to  celebrate  the  festival  of 
Saint-Denis  at  the  principal  Jesuit  Church.  This 
time  the  cortege  surrounding  the  King  included  the 
elite  of  the  nobility  with  their  horses  magnificently 
caparisoned.  All  along  the  route  the  King  was 
received  with  extravagant  demonstrations  of  popular 
rejoicing. 

But  in  the  midst  of  these  manifestations  of  the 
popular  joy  there  were  signs  of  the  approach  of  a 
storm,  which  assumed  proportions  far  more  serious 
than  those  of  the  late  movement.  Known  as  the 
New  Fronde,  this  fresh  development  of  hostility  to 
the  government  was  distinguished  by  its  contempt 
for  all  reform,  its  insolence  towards  the  bourgeois 
magistracy  and  the  open  selfishness  of  its  aims. 
This  New  Fronde  illustrated  well  the  influence  of 
women  in  politics  in  France  ;  it  amply  demonstrated 
the  political  incapacity  of  the  nobles  ;  it  justified  the 


40 


Loziis  XIV. 


[1650 


policy  of  Richelieu  and  Mazarin.  Moreover,  the 
conduct  of  the  nobles  during  the  New  Fronde  made 
an  ineffaceable  impression  upon  the  mind  of  Louis, 
and  led  to  the  adoption  by  him  of  a  policy  justifiable 
at  the  time,  but  fatal  to  the  nobles  as  a  class,  a 
policy  destined  to  make  still  wider  that  cleavage 
between  classes  which  more  than  any  other  sin¬ 
gle  circumstance  was  answerable  for  the  French 
Revolution. 

Between  August  i8,  1649,  and  the  declaration  of 
his  majority  in  September,  1651,  the  young  King 
passed  through  a  stormy  period  of  his  career.  Both 
Paris  and  the  provinces  rebelled,  and  a  general  rising 
all  over  the  country  was  with  difficulty  prevented. 
This  internal  commotion  was  disastrous  to  the  con¬ 
duct  of  the  war  against  Spain,  and  the  Spaniards 
eagerly  seized  the  opportunity  of  taking  the  offen¬ 
sive  and  invading  France.  The  first  sign  of  trouble 
came  from  Cond^.  He  was  very  powerful,  being  sup¬ 
ported  by  the  nobles  and  princes  of  the  Fronde;  he 
was  very  jealous  of  Mazarin ;  he  was  exceedingly 
ambitious.  But  his  cruelty,  his  pride,  and  his  arro¬ 
gance  had  destroyed  that  popularity  which  Rocroi 
and  Lens  had  brought  him.  Dissatisfied  with  the 
recognition  of  his  services,  Cond6  determined  to 
seize  the  reins  of  government,  and  to  break  with 
Mazarin.  The  position  of  the  Court  was  most  un¬ 
enviable.  Mazarin,  universally  unpopular,  was  daily 
subject,  at  the  hands  of  Conde,  to  insults  which 
reflected  on  the  royal  authority.  The  treasury  was 
empty,  some  of  the  Court  jewels  were  in  pawn,  and 
the  royal  table  was  but  ill  supplied  with  provisions. 


1650]  Opening  Years  of  the  Reign.  41 

But  Cond6  played  into  the  hands  of  Mazarin.  He 
quarrelled  with  the  noblesse,  he  was  insolent  to  the 
Queen,  and  by  the  end  of  the  year  he  had  so  alien¬ 
ated  all  sections  in  Paris  that  Mazarin  felt  strong 
enough  to  strike  a  blow  at  the  once  popular  general. 
On  January  18,  1650,  Conde  was  suddenly  arrested 
and  imprisoned  at  Vincennes.  With  him  were 
seized  Conti  and  Longueville.  “  They  have  taken,” 
said  the  Duke  of  Orleans,  “  the  lion,  the  monkey, 
and  the  fox.” 

Paris  made  no  movement  in  favour  of  the  prison¬ 
ers,  but  in  the  provinces  Conde’s  influence  was  great. 
The  danger  from  Normandy,  Burgundy,  and  Guienne 
was  peculiarly  pressing,  and  it  must  always  be 
remembered  that  at  this  time  Turenne,  committing 
the  one  great  fault  of  his  life,  had  decided,  at  the 
instigation  of  the  Duchess  of  Longueville,  to  oppose 
the  Court,  and  held  Stenai — a  fortress  in  a  most  im¬ 
portant  position — for  Spain.  But  Mazarin’s  coup  d' 
^tat  was  at  first  attended  with  conspicuous  success. 

To  Normandy  the  young  King  was  taken  by  the 
cardinal  in  the  hope  that  the  royal  presence  there 
might  do  something  to  counteract  the  intrigues  of 
such  women  as  Madame  de  Longueville  and  Madame 
de  Chevreuse,  who  could  in  his  own  words  overthrow 
ten  states.  Successful  in  securing  the  submission  of 
Normandy,  the  Court  proceeded  to  Burgundy  in 
March,  and  the  siege  of  Bellegarde  was  undertaken. 
The  presence  of  Louis  aroused  the  greatest  enthu¬ 
siasm  among  both  the  besiegers  and  besieged,  and  the 
place  capitulated  on  April  nth.  But  though  Nor¬ 
mandy  and  Burgundy  had  been  quieted,  Guienne 


42 


Louis  XIV. 


11651 


remained  a  serious  danger,  and  in  July  it  was  found 
necessary  to  take  the  King  to  Bordeaux.  The  royal 
presence  in  the  south,  however,  had  not  the  effect  de¬ 
sired.  Bordeaux,  already  the  focus  of  a  widespread  re¬ 
bellion,  refused  to  admit  Louis  and  declared  strongly 
for  Conde.  On  September  5th  the  royal  forces  under 
La  Meilleraye  definitely  began  the  siege  of  the  town, 
and  at  the  end  of  the  month  an  agreement  was  come 
to,  the  inhabitants  receiving  a  fresh  amnesty.  Maza- 
rin’s  moderation  was  caused  by  his  increasing  diffi¬ 
culties  in  the  north-east.  The  Spaniards  in  alliance 
with  Turenne  had  invaded  France  and  at  the  end  of 
August  had  advanced  within  ten  leagues  of  Paris. 
The  doubtful  attitude  of  Orleans  and  the  continual 
intrigues  of  De  Retz  aided  in  making  the  position  of 
the  Court  very  insecure.  To  allay  the  political  dis¬ 
content  the  three  Princes  were  removed  on  Novem¬ 
ber  i6th  from  Paris  to  Havre,  and  on  December  13th 
the  courage  and  dash  of  the  royal  troops  defeated 
Turenne  at  the  battle  of  Rethel,  and  the  New  Fronde 
was  overthrown. 

But  this  victory  did  not  strengthen  the  position  of 
Mazarin.  The  east  of  France  remained  in  the  hands 
of  the  foe ;  the  Minister  could  not  possibly  stand  un¬ 
less  he  was  supported  by  Conde  or  Orleans,  for  his 
many  enemies  were  reunited  to  secure  his  ruin. 
Directly  after  Rethel  he  was  vigorously  attacked  by 
De  Retz  and  the  Parlemeiit,  aided  and  abetted  by  the 
powerful  Anne  of  Gonzaga,  the  Princess  Palatine,  and 
the  other  partisans  of  Condd  ;  and  Orleans  after  much 
wavering  threw  himself  into  the  opposition.  The 
alliance  of  Orleans  with  the  Frondeurs  marked  a  new 


1651] 


Opening  Years  of  the  Reign. 


43 


combination  of  the  two  Frondes  and  determined 
Mazarin,  who  was  probably  taken  by  surprise,  to  retire 
into  voluntary  exile.  He  recognised  that  the  demand 
for  his  overthrow  united  all  parties.  The  coalition 
against  him  would  during  his  absence  break  up  into 
its  former  discordant  elements.  On  February  4th, 
1651,  he  left  Paris  for  Saint-Germain,  and  on  the  9th 
the  Parlenient  of  Paris  decreed  that  within  fifteen 
days  he  must  leave  the  kingdom. 

The  Queen-Mother  and  the  young  King  were  in  a 
helpless  and  isolated  position.  The  city  was  under 
arms  and  a  close  watch  was  set  on  the  movements  of 
the  Court. 

On  Mazarin’s  retirement  from  Paris  the  Queen- 
Mother,  like  Louis  XVI.,  determined  to  escape  with 
the  King.  Rumours  of  this  intention  got  about  and 
at  once  a  scene  was  enacted  which  resembles  some  of 
the  incidents  of  the  French  Revolution.  De  Retz 
sounded  the  alarm  and  De  Souches  was  sent  to  the 
Palais  Royal.  He  forced  his  way  into  the  King’s 
bedroom  and  found  Louis  in  bed.  He  was  in  fact  a 
prisoner,  and  on  February  the  loth  the  Queen-Mother 
signed  an  order  for  the  release  of  the  Princes.  On 
February  13th  Mazarin  himself  set  free  the  Princes, 
,who  were  received  three  days  later  in  Paris  with  the 
utmost  enthusiasm.  Excited  by  the  fall  of  Mazarin 
the  populace  forgot  that  thirteen  months  earlier  they 
had  been  equally  pleased  at  Conde’s  imprisonment. 

But  though  the  plotters  were  apparently  success¬ 
ful  and  had  imposed  their  terms  on  the  Queen,  their 
position  was  far  from  strong.  Henceforward  Louis 
hated  Conde  with  a  vindictive  hatred.  Already 


44 


Lotus  XIV. 


[1651 


master  of  himself  he  had  indeed  “  caressed  Monsieur 
le  Prince  ”  on  his  first  appearance  at  Court  after  his 
imprisonment.  For  the  moment  Conde  was  all  pow¬ 
erful.  But  as  Mazarin  then  at  Briihl  had  foreseen, 
discord  soon  arose  among  the  parties  who  composed 
the  Fronde  and  within  six  months  Cond^  was  at  war 
with  the  men  who  now  supported  him.  A  certain 
number  of  the  nobles  desired  the  summoning  of  the 
States-General.  The  Parlcitient  of  Paris,  anxious  to 
secure  political  power  for  itself,  was  strongly  opposed 
to  such  a  proposal.  Though  Anne  consented  that 
the  States-General  should  meet  on  September  the 
8th,  the  day  after  the  attainment  of  the  King’s  ma¬ 
jority,  Conde  soon  ceased  to  care  about  the  States- 
General  and  attempted  to  make  a  close  alliance  with 
Anne. 

But  his  arrogance  and  rashness  destroyed  his 
chance.  He  was  most  insolent  to  Louis  ;  he  was  the 
dupe  of  unworthy  counsellors.  He  intrigued  against 
Beaufort ;  he  quarrelled  with  De  Retz.  His  relations 
with  Orleans  became  strained. 

Intrigues  and  general  discord  thus  filled  the  first 
half  of  1651,  the  Queen  quietly  waiting  for  the  cele¬ 
bration  of  the  King’s  majority.  By  August  feeling 
strong  enough  to  definitely  oppose  Cond^,  she  boldly 
appealed  to  Retz  to  aid  her.  Amid  scenes  of  turbu¬ 
lence  the  month  of  August  closed,  all  moderate  men 
looking  forward  to  the  restoration  of  order,  even 
under  the  once  hated  Mazarin. 


CHAPTER  11. 

FIRST  EXPERIENCES  OF  WAR  AND  POLITICS. 

165 I-1661. 

T  nine  o’clock  on  the  morning  of 
September  7th  the  procession 
left  the  Palais  Royal,  and  met 
with  a  magnificent  reception 
from  the  crowd  which  thronged 
the  streets.  Every  window  was 
occupied ;  among  the  specta¬ 
tors  of  the  brilliant  scene  being 
Henrietta  of  England,  then  a 
hapless  exile  in  France;  while 
the  immense  concourse  of  people  were  with  difficulty 
restrained  by  the  troops  who  lined  the  whole  of  the 
route  from  the  Palais  Royal  to  Notre  Dame.  The 
appearance  of  Louis  XIV.  was  the  signal  for  a  great 
ovation.  His  youth,  his  manly  looks,  and  his 
courtesy  made  an  excellent  impression,  and  the 
multitude  to  whom  the  King  was  the  personification 
of  the  unity  and  the  power  of  France  testified  by 


45 


46 


Louis  XIV. 


[1651 


their  shouts  of  joy  the  hope  that  the  days  of  civil 
disorder  had  passed  away.  After  hearing  Mass  at 
the  Sainte  Chapelle,  Louis  proceeded  to  the  Grande 
Chambre  where  his  majority  was  formally  declared 
with  the  accustomed  ceremonies.  The  King  signified 
his  intention  of  governing  himself ;  the  Chancellor 
made  a  long  harangue  on  the  policy  about  to  be  pur¬ 
sued  by  Louis  ;  and  after  a  discourse  by  the  First 
President  of  the  Parlement,  Anne  of  Austria,  in  a 
few  simple  words,  resigned  the  pov^ers  which  she 
had  wielded  for  nine  years.  The  King,  after  thanking 
her,  received  homage  from  all  present.  Omer  Talon 
then  delivered  a  long  oration  which  wearied  his 
hearers,  and  shortly  afterwards  the  ceremony  came 
to  an  end,  and  the  procession  returned  to  the  Palais 
Royal.  Fireworks  and  a  general  illumination  con¬ 
cluded  the  day’s  proceedings.  The  self-possession 
of  Louis  and  his  dignified  behaviour  during  the  cere¬ 
mony  had  created  a  most  favourable  impression.  He 
behaved,  it  was  said,  like  a  man  of  four  and  twenty. 
That  he  already  possessed  considerable  firmness  was 
shown  the  next  day,  when  he  constituted  a  new 
ministry  in  direct  opposition  to  the  wishes  of  the 
Duke  of  Orleans.  Louis  also  began  to  hold  his  court 
at  the  Palais  Royal,  as  he  did  for  some  fifty  years, 
with  that  regularity  and  dignity  which  so  strongly 
marks  all  that  he  did.  The  words  attributed  to 
Mazarin,  that  the  King  had  in  him  the  making  of 
many  kings  and  of  one  honest  man,  seemed  on  the 
day  when  he  attained  his  majority  fully  justified. 
Already  he  had  shown  a  knowledge  of  men  very  un¬ 
usual  in  one  so  young.  For  Louis,  who  had  ex- 


1651]  First  Experiences  of  War  and  Politics.  47 


perienced  the  drawbacks  of  imprisonment  in  his  own 
palace,  and  who  had  been  exposed  to  frequent 
insults  at  the  hands  of  the  ambitious  Princes  during 
the  Fronde  period,  had  been  taught  the  lesson  of 
discernment  in  the  bitter  school  of  adversity  More¬ 
over  during  the  ensuing  two  years,  the  King’s  ex¬ 
perience  of  the  character  of  the  French  nobility 
was  to  be  further  strengthened.  His  responsibilities 
may  be  said  to  date  from  the  proclamation  of  his 
majority.  For  Conde  still  hoping  to  overthrow  the 
Ministry  threw  himself  into  rebellion.  ^ 

The  struggle  which  ensued,  though  serious  enough, 
differed  in  many  points  from  the  earlier  Fronde 
movement.  All  opposition  to  the  government  had 
now  become  rebellion  against  the  King’s  person.  In 
this  new  civil  war  the  ministers  had  the  advantage 
of  using  the  royal  authority  as  a  lever  against  the 
rebels.  It  was,  however,  a  critical  period  in  the  his¬ 
tory  of  France.  Spain,  not  yet  sank  into  decrepi¬ 
tude,  was  almost  openly  supported  by  the  Emperor, 
while  Lorraine  was  a  constant  danger  to  the  French 
government.  The  outbreak  of  hostilities  gave  the 
Spaniards  an  opportunity  of  making  inroads  into 
France,  and  Cromwell  an  admirable  excuse  for  ham¬ 
pering  a  Court  which  he  had  every  reason  to  suppose, 
would  support  the  young  Charles  II.  Had  the 
ministers  been  freed  from  the  Spanish  War,  and  from 
all  fear  of  English  intervention,  Conde’s  rebellion 
would  have  been  easily  and  quickly  crushed.  As  it 
was,  one  army  had  to  be  sent  to  oppose  the  Spaniards 
in  Champagne,  while  another  under  Harcourt  op¬ 
posed  the  far-reaching  schemes  of  Conde,  who  had 


48 


Lotus  XIV. 


[1652 


been  received  in  almost  regal  state  in  Bordeaux  and 
generally  with  enthusiasm  throughout  Guienne.  Thus 
occupied  with  defending  France  against  open  foes, 
the  government  were  unable  to  deal  with  the  inter¬ 
nal  divisions  of  the  country.  Mazarin  was  almost 
universally  hated,  the  party  of  the  great  nobles 
anxious  for  civil  war  was  ready  for  open  rebellion 
under  Cond^  and  Orleans.  Many  towns  were  dis¬ 
affected,  and  the  ladies  of  the  Fronde  were  using  all 
their  influence  on  the  side  of  faction. 

But  though  Mazarin  was  still  in  exile  the  govern¬ 
ment  proved  successful.  Harcourt  defeated  Cond6 
in  the  south,  and  Cromwell  refused  to  support  an 
obviously  lost  cause  ;  even  the  Duke  of  Lorraine 
held  his  hand. 

In  January,  1652,  Mazarin,  in  deference  to  an  ex¬ 
press  order  from  Louis,  joined  the  Court  at  Poitiers, 
and  Turenne,  disliking  the  lawless  selfishness  of  Cond^ 
and  his  supporters,  at  the  same  time  threw  in  his  lot 
with  the  royal  cause.  ■  The  next  six  months  proved 
to  be  the  critical  period  in  the  civil  war,  and  Turenne’s 
admirable  generalship  proved  decisive  in  the  crisis. 
He  saved  the  King  from  certain  capture  by  his  vic¬ 
tory  at  Jargeau  (March,  1652),  while  his  prudence  and 
presence  of  mind  and  tactical  skill  prevented  Conde 
from  gathering  any  advantage  from  a  slight  success 
secured  at  Bleneau  in  April.  In  May  Turenne  cut 
to  pieces  at  Etampes  an  army  of  Spanish  mercenaries 
introduced  into  France  by  Cond6,  and  by  skilfully 
averting  a  junction  between  the  Prince  and  the 
Duke  of  Lorraine,  he  undoubtedly  saved  the  Court 
from  extreme  peril ;  a  week  later  he  occupied  Saint 


1652]  First  Experiences  of  War  and  Politics.  49 


Denis.  Paris  in  the  meantime  had  been  in  a  state  of 
anarchy  and  chaos./^ The  Parlanent  had  shown  itself 
utterly  incapable  of  preserving  order,  and  was  de¬ 
servedly  despised  ;  the  nobles  were  denounced,  and 
the  citizens  saw  in  the  triumph  of  the  royal  cause 
the  only  hope  for  peace  and  good  government. 

The  dregs  of  the  populace  on  whom  Condd  and 
the  Princes  relied  became  each  day  more  violent,  and 
by  their  conduct  ensured  the  success  of  the  King. 
Insurrections  in  June  were  followed  by  the  flight  of 
the  Presidents  of  the  Parleinent,  and  Mazarin  and 
Turenne  then  decided  to  strike  a  blow  at  the  failing 
cause  of  the  Prince.  On  July  the  2nd  Condd  was 
defeated  in  the  Faubourg  Saint -Antoine  and  only 
saved  from  immediate  overthrow  by  the  cannon 
of  the  Bastille.  Turenne  had  been  unwilling  to 
begin  the  contest  till  the  royal  artillery  had  arrived. 
But  against  his  right  judgment  he  was  persuaded, 
by  the  Court  and  Louis  impatiently  anxious  to  wit¬ 
ness  the  destruction  of  Condd,  to  adopt  a  wrong  line  of 
action.  At  the  critical  moment  when  the  royal  artil¬ 
lery  had  come  up,  and  all  was  ready  for  the  decisive 
effort.  Mademoiselle  had  the  gates  of  Paris  opened, 
and  Condd  and  his  forces  being  safe,  she  turned  the 
guns  of  the  Bastille  on  the  royal  army.  Louis  XIV. 
never  forgave  her  for  this  insult.  Thus  the  Battle  of 
Saint-Antoine  was  virtually  a  defeat  of  the  King,  and 
for  a  few  months  more  Paris  was  to  remain  in  the 
hands  of  the  party  of  anarchy  and  treason. 

But  the  end  of  the  Fronde  movement  was  at  hand. 
No  sooner  had  Turenne  retired  than  the  mob,  in¬ 
cited  by  the  Princes  and  by  a  large  number  of  dis- 


50 


Louis  XIV. 


[1652 


guised  soldiers,  set  fii'e  to  the  Hotel  de  Ville,  where 
the  city  Assembly  sat,  and  killed  several  of  the 
councillors.  This  massacre  of  the  Hotel  de  Ville 
was  the  death-blow  to  the  cause  of  the  Princes. 
Cond6  had  no  army,  no  moral  authority  ;  he  was  in 
alliance  with  the  mob,  and  he  was  opposed  by  all 
moderate  men. 

His  violent  acts  only  strengthened  the  royal  cause. 
The  Parleinent  was  summoned  to  Pontoise  and  pre¬ 
sided  over  by  Mol6  ;  it  secured  the  adhesion  of  more 
of  its  members  each  day.  Though  it  demanded  and 
obtained  the  retirement  of  Mazarin  to  Bouillon,  the 
support  of  the  Parlement .ids  outweighed  the  incon¬ 
veniences  caused  to  the  royal  party  by  the  temporary 
exile  of  Mazarin.  The  'conciliator^  policy  of  the 
Court  soon  made  itself  felt.  TBe  reaction  in  Paris 
grew  stronger  day  by  day,  and  in  September  the 
royal  party  among  the  bourgeoisie  and  clergy  in  Paris, 
taking  advantage  of  Condd’s  illness,  and  fully  alive 
to  the  disasters  brought  upon  France  by  the  civil 
war,  sent  a  deputation  headed  by  Retz  to  Com- 
pifegne  and  begged  Louis  to  return  to  Paris.  The 
conduct  of  the  Princes  had  become  so  unsupportable 
to  men  of  all  classes,  whether  clergy,  lawyers,  mer¬ 
chants,  or  artisans,  that  the  declaration  of  the  King 
dated  September  17th,  in  which  the  citizens  of  Paris 
were  exhorted  “  to  arm  and  deliver  themselves  from 
this  odious  tyranny,”  was  received  with  acclamation. 
Chavigny  died  on  October  4th ;  Condd  fled  from 
Paris  on  the  13th,  and  was  made  General-in-chief  of 
the  forces  of  Spain.  It  was  arranged  that  Louis, 
who  was  at  Saint-Germain,  should  enter  Paris  on 


THE  LOUVRE  AND  THE  TUILERIES, 

(From  an  old  print,  and  reproduced  in  Philippson’s 
Das  Zeitalicr  Ludwigs  XI Vi) 


1652]  First  Experiences  of  War  and  Politics.  51 


October  21st,  that  he  should  reside  at  the  Louvre,  his 
brother  at  the  Tuileries,  and  Henrietta  Maria,  Queen 
of  England,  at  the  Palais  Royal.  About  mid-day  on 
the  2 1st  the  King  escorted  by  a  small  army  under 
Turenne,  set  out  from  Saint-Germain.  All  along 
his  route  he  was  received  with  the  wildest  enthusi¬ 
asm.  In  the  young  King  men  saw  the  personification 
of  order,  peace,  and  prosperity.  Never  had  a  monarch 
such  a  reception.  Already  an  imposing  figure,  he 
entered  Paris  on  horseback  by  the  light  of  torches 
and  accompanied  by  Charles  II.  and  many  Princes, 
Dukes,  and  Marshals.  When  he  reached  the  Rue 
Saint- Honors  the  excitement  reached  its  height. 
Not  only  the  streets  and  the  windows,  but  even  the 
roofs  were  crowded  with  enthusiastic  spectators,  and 
so  amid  the  extravagant  joy  of  the  Parisians  the 
King  passed  on  to  the  Louvre  which  he  had  chosen 
as  his  future  residence  on  the  ground,  says  Madame 
de  Motteville,  that  ordinary  houses  without  any  de¬ 
fences  were  not  suitable  in  such  times.  But  Paris 
caused  Louis  little  further  anxiety.  Orleans  with 
Beaufort  and  Chabot-Rohan  retired  quietly  into 
the  country ;  Chateauneuf  soon  followed  them ; 
Mademoiselle  of  Orleans,  together  with  the  Duch¬ 
esses  of  Montbazon  and  Chatillon,  was  compelled 
to  leave  Paris.  And  in  December  Retz  was  arrested 
and  imprisoned  in  Vincennes. 

/^One  of  Louis’  first  acts  had  been  to  check  all 
possibTe”b^pbsilToh  Trom  the  Parlement.  The  day 
afterTrls  arrival  in  Paris  a  Lit-de-Justice  was  held  at 
the  Louvre,  and  the  Parlc7netit  was  forbidden  to  take 
any  part  in  the  affairs  of  state,  or  to  interfere  with 


52 


Louis  XIV. 


[1652 


the  public  finances.  It  was  to  have  no  political  in¬ 
fluence  in  the  future,  but  was  to  confine  itself  to  its 
legal  functions.  To  impress  upon  the  lawyers  the 
determination  which  underlay  these  edicts,  Broussel 
and  nine  other  members  of  the  Parleinent  shared  the 
fate  of  Beaufort  and  Rohan  and  were  banished. 

On  the  26th  of  October,^  llouis  sent  a  letter  to 
•Mazarin  pointing  out  that  there  was  no  reason  why 
he  should  be  any  longer  deprived  of  the  wise  coun¬ 
sels  of  his  minister,  and  expressing  a  hope  that 
Mazarin  would  at  once  return  to  the  capital.  It 
was  not,  however,  till  the  beginning  of  the  next  year 
that  Mazarin  actually  set  out  to  resume  his  duties  as 
the  King’s  Prime  Minister.  During  the  interval  the 
administration  had  enough  on  its  hands  in  quelling 
the  last  efforts  of  the  adherents  of  the  Fronde  in  the 
provinces,  and  in  making  head  against  the  Spaniards. 
The  year  1652  was  a  disastrous  one  for  the  French 
arms.  Picardy  and  all  the  country  round  Paris 
were  ravaged,  and  Gravelines  was  taken  in  May.  In 
September  a  severe  blow  was  inflicted  on  France, 
for  Dunkirk  was  compelled  to  surrender  to  the 
Spanish  troops.  In  Italy  and  Catalonia  the  French 
suffered  similar  reverses.  Casale,  so  famous  for  its 
capture  by  Richelieu,  was  lost  in  October,  and  in  the 
same  month  the  whole  of  Catalonia  had  become 
again  an  integral  portion  of  the  Spanish  monarchy. 
To  remedy  these  losses,  Mazarin,  with  the  aid  of 
Turenne,  had  already  begun  to  act  on  the  defensive 
on  the  eastern  frontier,  and  it  was  arranged  to  begin 
the  new  year  with  vigorous  measures.  In  order  to 
obtain  the  necessary  supplies,  Louis,  on  December 


1653]  First  Expcrie^tces  of  War  and  Politics.  53 

31st,  held  another  Lit-de-Jiistice  a.nd  compelled  the 
unwilling  Parlement  to  agree  to  his  demands.^.,,.^'^ 

In  the  part  he  played  in  carrying  out  what 
amounted  to  a  revolution,  Louis  showed  an  amount 
of  presence  of  mind,  imperturbability,  and  indeed 
discrimination,  which  astonished  his  contemporaries. 
Mazarin  is  supposed  to  have  taught  the  King  the 
precept  that  he  who  cannot  practise  dissimulation, 
does  not  know  how  to  govern.  In  the  history  of  the 
arrest  of  Retz,  Louis  showed  that  he  had  mastered 
that  lesson.  When  Retz  visited  the  Louvre  on 
December  19th,  he  was  received  with  affability  by 
the  King,  who  at  once  renewed  the  orders  for  his 
arrest  and  retired  to  hear  Mass  with  the  utmost 
calmness. 

At  the  beginning  of  1653  the  Fronde  movement 
was  over  except  in  Provence,  Burgundy,  Saintonge, 
and  especially  in  Guienne,  where  it  still  smouldered 
on.  Cond^  was  endeavouring  to  revive  Huguenot  dis¬ 
loyalty  in  La  Rochelle,  and  encouraged  the  citizens 
to  aim  at  securing  republican  institutions.  Bordeaux 
was,  however,  the  centre  of  disaffection,  and  though 
the  party  of  order  had  been  strengthened  by  the  pacifi¬ 
cation  of  Paris,  Bordeaux  still  occasioned  the  govern¬ 
ment  some  uneasiness  owing  to  the  rise  of  a  radical 
party,  known  as  the  Ormcc,  among  the  lower  orders. 
Like  the  Jacobins  of  later  days  its  leaders  numbered 
among  their  ranks  a  lawyer  and  a  butcher;  it  hung 
out  the  red  flag  and  perpetrated  numerous  atrocities. 
Unlike  the  Jacobins  the  insurrectionists  appealed  to 
England  for  aid.  Deserted  by  Cond6,  failing  to  get 
any  help  from  Cromwell,  and  divided  in  its  own 


54 


Louis  XIV. 


[1653 


ranks,  the  Ormce  could  not  hope  to  make  a  success¬ 
ful  resistance  to  the  royal  forces  under  the  Dukes  of 
Vendome  and  Candale.  On  July  31st  the  terms  of 
peace  were  accepted  by  the  citizens  of  Bordeaux, 
and  the  Fronde  was  finally  over. 

In  this  work  of  stamping  out  the  last  embers  of 
disaffection  in  the  provinces,  Mazarin  had  played  a 
leading  part.  On  February  3d  he  had  returned,  be¬ 
ing  met  some  distance  from  Paris  by  the  King  and  a 
number  of  the  courtiers.  Till  his  death  he  governed 
France  with  the  full  concurrence  of  the  young  King, 
and  to  the  great  advantage  of  the  country.  A  firm 
and  wise  hand  was  indeed  required.  Order  had  to 
be  restored  and  the  finances  reorganised ;  the  war 
with  Spain  demanded  vigorous  treatment  and  care¬ 
ful  supervision.  It  was  of  the  utmost  importance 
to  secure  the  alliance  of  England.  In  all  these 
matters  he  showed  promptness  and  resource.  La 
Vieuville,  the  Superintendent  of  the  Finances  had 
died  on  January  2nd.  On  February  7th  Mazarin 
appointed  Servien  and  Nicholas  Fouquet,  who  had 
been  useful  in  contributing  to  the  overthrow  of 
the  Fronde  in  Paris,  to  hold  the  post  jointly. 
Mazarin  had  appreciated  the  value  of  the  latter’s 
services  and  his  enterprising  schemes ;  he  also  had 
gauged  his  character,  and  knew  his  love  of  intrigue, 
and  perhaps  his  untrustworthiness.  In  1653  Maza¬ 
rin  had  put  an  end  to  the  Fronde  in  the  provinces, 
and  dispersed  the  remaining  discontented  Princes. 
For  the  next  six  years  his  efforts  were  directed  to 
expelling  the  Spaniards  from  Champagne,  and  to 
checking  their  influence  in  Italy  and  Catalonia. 


t 


MAZARIN. 

(From  an  old  engraving.) 


1 6  53]  First  Experiences  of  War  a  nd  Politics.  5  5 


Further  he  aimed  at  recovering  the  maritime  places 
lost  to  Spain  during  the  late  internal  troubles,  and 
finally  he  hoped  to  impose  on  the  Spanish  King 
rigorous  terms  of  peace  and  so  to  complete  the 
work  of  Richelieu.  It  was  not  till  1659  that  his 
policy  was  in  great  part  carried  out.  No  sooner 
had  the  troubles  in  the  south  of  France  been  ap¬ 
peased  than  he  definitely  began  to  combat  Spain. 
In  1654  Turenne,  aided  by  the  skilful  diplomacy 
of  the  Cardinal,  drove  the  Spaniards  out  of  Cham¬ 
pagne,  and  in  1655  invaded  Ilainault  and  encamped 
within  the  enemy’s  territory. 

These  years,  important  as  they  are  in  the  his¬ 
tory  of  France,  are  of  great  interest  in  the  biography 
of  the  King.  For  it  was  in  1653  that  he  had  his  first 
real  experience  of  warfare.  Up  to  this  period  he 
had  never  passed  more  than  a  few  days  in  camp. 
But  now  he  was  nearly  fifteen  years  old,  and  in 
view  of  the  dangerous  crisis  through  which  France 
was  passing,  Mazarin  rightly  thought  that  not  only 
would  Louis  derive  considerable  advantage  from 
seeing  military  operations  conducted  by  Turenne, 
but  that  the  presence  of  the  King  in  camp  would 
have  a  most  beneficial  effect  upon  the  troops.  In 
fact  from  1653  Mazarin  himself  took  the  greatest 
pains  with  Louis’  education.  He  pointed  out  the 
importance  of  a  close  application  to  business,  and 
impressed  on  him  the  necessity  of  ruling  by  him¬ 
self,  while  using  the  advice  of  his  generals  and 
ministers.  From  Mazarin,  too,  Louis  learnt  the  art 
of  choosing  good  instruments ;  he  learnt  also  the 
advisability,  when  once  his  plans  had  been  carefully 


56 


Louis  XIV. 


[1653 


thought  out,  of  prudently  choosing  favourable  occa¬ 
sions  for  boldly  executing  them.  Perseverance  com¬ 
bined  with  a  certain  elasticity  in  his  methods  was, 
he  was  taught,  the  true  way  to  arrive  at  the  end  in 
view. 

Louis  remained  throughout  his  life  ignorant  so  far 
as  the  ordinary  knowledge  of  letters  was  concerned. 
His  judgment  of  men  was,  as  a  rule,  sound.  His 
intellectual  development  never  proceeded  far ;  but  in 
his  acquaintance  with  those  matters  which  were 
necessary  at  that  time  for  a  successful  king,  Louis 
soon  became  proficient. 

The  campaign  of  1653  was  one  of  the  highest  inter¬ 
est.  Spain  and  her  allies  were  superior  to  France  in 
fighting  strength,  and  Cond^  had  resolved  to  march  on 
Paris.  But  Turenne,  by  a  series  of  brilliant  operations, 
and  aided  by  the  discord  among  the  allies,  baffled 
Cond^  and  saved  Paris.  In  July,  1653,  Louis  joined 
Turenne’s  army.  He  was  received  with  enthusiasm 
by  the.  troops,  saw  some  fighting,  was  present  at 
councils  of  war,  and  remained  in  camp  for  about  ten 
days.  In  the  autumn  Mazarin,  hearing  of  conspiracies 
emanating  from  the  north-east  frontier,  took  the 
King  with  him  to  Amiens,  and  placed  the  govern¬ 
ment  of  that  important  town  in  the  hands  of  the 
well  tried  Guy  de  Bar,  whose  devotion  to  the  royal 
cause  had  been  thoroughly  tested.  From  Amiens 
he  and  the  King  proceeded  to  Soissons  and  then  to 
Laon,  where  it  was  resolved,  in  spite  of  the  custom 
of  retiring  into  winter  quarters  in  October,  to  besiege 
Sainte-Menehould.  It  was  not  till  November  27th 
after  the  besiegers  had  suffered  much  from  the  rain, 


1654]  First  Experiences  of  War  and  Politics.  5  7 


snow,  and  frost,  that  Louis  took  possession  of  the 
town.  Though  the  tide  of  Spanish  success  was 
checked  at  the  close  of  1653,  the  position  of  France 
in  Europe  was  still  most  critical.  She  was  far  from 
having  recovered  the  position  which  she  enjoyed  at 
the  time  of  the  peace  of  Westphalia. 

The  Emperor  Ferdinand  III.  had  secured  the 
election  of  his  son  Ferdinand  as  King  of  the  Ro¬ 
mans,  and  a  strong  coalition  between  Austria,  Spain, 
the  Duke  of  Lorraine  and  Conde  seemed  likely  to 
come  about,  followed  by  a  determined  effort  to 
conquer  Alsace,  Brisach,  and  Phillipsbourg.  Good 
fortune  and  the  mistakes  of  her  foes  came,  however, 
to  the  assistance  of  France.  The  Spaniards  in  occu¬ 
pying  the  Bishopric  of  Liege  which  belonged  to 
Cologne  gave  Mazarin  an  opportunity  of  interfering 
on  behalf  of  Fiirstenburg  the  Archbishop,  and  the 
prestige  of  the  French  name  in  Germany  was  restored 
to  such  an  extent  that  when  the  young  Ferdinand 
died  in  1654  Mazarin  thought  of  bringing  forward 
the  name  of  Louis  XIV.  as  a  candidate  for  the  Im¬ 
perial  throne. 

The  good  fortune  of  1653  did  not  fail  the  minister 
in  1654.  Early  in  the  year  the  Spaniards  arrested 
the  Duke  of  Lorraine  and  sent  him  to  Spain ;  in 
May,  by  clever  intrigues,  Mazarin  circumvented  Har- 
court  the  traitorous  governor  of  Alsace,  and  by  the 
Treaty  of  Bale  secured  Brisach,  Alsace,  and  Phillips¬ 
bourg.  So  firmly  was  the  royal  power  established  in 
France  and  with  it  Mazarin’s  own  position,  that  not 
only  “  all  the  great  nobles  were  eager  to  marry  the 
Cardinal’s  nieces,”  but  it  was  considered  practicable 


58 


Louis  XIV. 


[1654 


to  have  Louis  crowned  at  Rheims.  The  coronation 
ceremony,  which  took  place  on  June  7,  1654,  bore 
many  traces  of  its  origin  in  the  days  of  Charles  the 
Great  and  was  performed  with  all  the  necessary 
adjuncts.  No  sooner  was  the  coronation  over  than 
Louis  joined  the  army  besieging  Stenai  in  Lorraine, 
while  Conde  and  the  Archduke  Leopold  were  besieg¬ 
ing  the  great  fortress  of  Arras,  the  ancient  capital 
of  Burgundian  Artois,  defended  by  Jean  de  Schu- 
lemberg,  Comte  de  Montdejeu.  Extraordinary 
efforts  were  made  by  the  Spaniards  to  capture  what 
had  been  one  of  the  gems  of  the  monarchy,  and 
thousands  of  peasants  aided  their  already  consider¬ 
able  armyr-  Mazarin  no  doubt  acted  wisely  in  again 
introducing  Louis  to  military  life.  His  presence  in¬ 
spirited  the  troops,  and,  moreover,  the  experience  of 
warfare  gave  him  manly  tastes,  though  it  may  have 
tended  to  produce  later  a  somewhat  dangerous  love 
of  military  glory.  Success  again  attended  the  King 
in  this  campaign,  Stenai  was  captured  by  Hocquin- 
court,  Arras  was  relieved  in  spite  of  Condd’s  brilliant 
efforts  to  drive  back  Turenne’s  force,  and  the  north¬ 
ern  frontier  was  safe;  Turenne  finished  the  year  by 
taking  Quesnoi  and  Binche,  and  after  a  conference 
in  October  with  Mazarin  and  the  King  at  Guise  it 
was  resolved  to  send  the  Marshal  de  la  Fertd  to  be¬ 
siege  Clermont,  which  fell  on  November  22nd.  The 
relief  of  Arras  was  a  serious  blow  to  Spain  and  may 
be  regarded  as  the  turning-point  in  the  war.  From 
this  time  the  power  of  France  began  to  revive  with 
extraordinary  rapidity.  The  armies  of  Spain  soon 
ceased  to  be  a  match  for  those  of  France.  Spain 


1655]  First  Experiences  of  War  and  Politics.  59 


was  a  declining,  France  a  rising  power.  Louis  was 
now  really  a  King  and  was  looked  upon  as  the  em¬ 
bodiment  of  an  ancient,  powerful  monarchy. 

During  the  winter  of  1654-5,  the  Court  was  the 
scene  of  festivities.  The  King  loved  dancing  and 
took  a  leading  part  in  the  ballets  which  were  then 
very  popular.  Fetes  and  carnivals  made  men  forget 
the  miseries  of  the  Fronde  period.  But  the  financial 
difficulties  remained  a  dreary  heritage  of  the  civil 
wars,  and  Mazarin  again  found  that  it  required  all 
the  authority  associated  with  the  person  of  the  King 
to  overcome  the  resistance  of  the  Parlement  to  edicts 
enforcing  new  taxation.  A  Lit-de-Justice  was  held 
on  March  20,  1655,  at  which  Louis  was  present 
surrounded  with  all  the  trappings  of  royalty.  In 
spite  of  a  speech  from  the  lawyer  Bignon  testifying 
to  the  misery  of  the  people,  the  Chancellor  Seguier 
got  the  edict  registered.  But  the  next  day  the  mem¬ 
bers  of  the  Chambres  des  Enquctes,  which  consisted 
mostly  of  the  younger  and  more  turbulent  spirits 
among  the  Parlement,  in  contravention  to  the  royal 
order  of  October  22nd,  1652,  forbidding  all  interfer¬ 
ence  on  the  part  of  Parle^nent  in  political  matters 
and  in  the  administration  of  the  finance,  criti¬ 
cised  the  edicts  and  resolved  to  continue  to  do  so. 
The  situation  recalled  the  early  days  of  the  Fronde. 
It  seemed  not  improbable  that  the  scenes  of  1648 
would  be  repeated.  The  crisis  was  serious.  Louis 
XIV.,  however,  showed  himself  capable  of  dealing 
with  the  Parliamentary  opposition.  He  was  at  the 
time  hunting  in  the  woods  round  Vincennes.  A 
very  pretty  legend  has  grown  up  in  which  Louis  is 


6o 


Loitis  XIV. 


11655 


represented  as  arriving  before  the  united  Parlement 
cane  in  hand  and  in  hunting  costume,  and  making 
use  of  the  famous  expression,  “L'Etat,  cestmoi." 
The  truth  is  that,  realising  early  in  April  the  serious-^ 
ness  of  the  situation,  Louis  on  April  13th,  in  his 
every-day  dress,  suddenly  burst  in  upon  the  aston¬ 
ished  Parlement  and  upbraided  the  members  for 
their  conduct.  “  Each  of  you,”  he  said,  “  knows 
how  your  assemblies  stirred  up  troubles  in  my  state. 

I  have  learnt  that  you  intend  to  continue  these 
meetings.  ...  I  am  come  here  expressly  to 
forbid  the  continuation  of  them.”  On  the  comple¬ 
tion  of  his  short  address  the  King,  without  hearing 
a  word  in  reply,  went  to  the  Louvre  and  thence  to 
Vincennes.  Though  the  Parlement  protested,  Maza- 
rin,  by  the  aid  of  Turenne,  by  clever  management, 
and  by  bribery,  averted  any  outbreak. 

The  King’s  determination  astonished  all  who  knew 
him — a  determination  which  he  continued  to  show 
during  the  campaign  of  1655.  The  French  took 
Landrecies,  and  marched  through  part  of  the  Spanish 
Netherlands.  “  The  King,”  wrote  Mazarin  on  July 
31st,  “is  indefatigable,  and  he  has  marched  all  along 
with  the  army  .  .  .  after  having  been  fifteen 

hours  on  horseback,  he  is  not  tired.”  During  this 
campaign  provisions  ran  short,  but  Louis  bore  all 
his  privations  most  good-humouredly.  The  capture 
of  Stenai  the  previous  year  had  developed  in  him  a 
love  of  siege  warfare,  which  increased  as  he  grew 
older.  He  was  now  delighted  at  invading  the  ene¬ 
my’s  country,  and  in  anticipation  of  future  invasions 
was  very  desirous  of  pushing  on  to  Brussels.  This 


1655]  First  Experiences  of  War  and  Politics.  6 1 


military  promenade  across  the  Belgian  provinces 
made  undoubtedly  a  great  impression  on  the  young 
King’s  mind,  while  it  proved  the  superiority  of  the 
French  arms  over  those  of  their  Spanish  rivals.  It 
was  only  after  long  argument  that  Mazarin  was  able 
to  persuade  Louis — burning  to  remain  with  the  army 
and  to  witness  fresh  successes — to  stay  behind  with 
him  at  Quesnoi,  while  the  French  marshals  pushed 
on.  But  Mazarin  was  well  aware  of  the  excellent 
effect  produced  on  the  army  by  Louis’  arrival  at  the 
frontier.  At  Quesnoi  then  the  King  remained  for  a 
time,  his  presence  there  being  keenly  appreciated  by 
his  marshals  and  their  men.  After  the  town  of  Cond6 
had  been  taken  it  was  thought  that  the  King  could 
safely  join  the  army  then  besieging  Saint-Guillain. 
On  August  22nd,  to  the  great  delight  of  Louis, 
Turenne  arrived  with  three  thousand  horse,  and 
escorted  the  King  to  the  camp,  which  was,  according 
to  Turenne’s  usual  custom,  very  carefully  defended. 
On  August  26th,  Louis  had  the  satisfaction  of  seeing 
the  capitulation  of  Saint-Guillain,  and  after  riding 
well-nigh  up  to  Mons,  he  retired  on  August  27th 
from  the  camp,  and  joined  his  mother  and  the  Court 
at  La  F^re,  whence  they  all  moved  to  Chantilly  and 
later  to  Paris.  The  return  of  the  King  from  the 
army  was  a  matter  of  great  satisfaction  to  the  Court, 
who  were  bored  to  distraction  by  the  quiet  life  at 
La  Fere.  At  Paris  all  the  festivities  of  the  previous 
winter  were  repeated,  and  a  grand  ball  was  given — 
notable  from  the  attentions  paid  by  Louis  to 
Olympe  Mancini,  one  of  Mazarin’s  nieces  who  mar¬ 
ried  later  the  Comte  de  Soissons.  There  seems  little 


62 


Louis  XIV 


[1655 


doubt  that  the  ambitious  Countess  hoped  through 
her  influence  over  Louis  to  govern  France.  But 
Mazarin’s  system  of  education  saved  Louis  from  an 
effeminate  life.  He  had  acquired  a  taste  for  martial 
exercises,  he  had  thoroughly  realised  the  dignity  of 
his  position,  and  he  had  acquired  a  certain  elevation 
of  soul,  which  enabled  him  at  this  time  to  steer 
safely  through  the  shoals  of  Court  life. 

The  last  five  years  of  his  minority  were  not 
without  their  special  dangers  to  the  young  King. 
In  the  first  place,  Louis  ran  some  risk  from  his  in¬ 
fatuation  for  Olympe  Mancini  in  1655,  and  for  her 
sister,  Marie  Mancini,  in  1659.  During  these  years 
he  had  two  more  or  less  serious  illnesses  in  1655  and 
in  1658.  In  October,  1655,  while  Mazarin  was  busy 
fortifying  the  towns  lately  taken  on  the  frontier, 
Louis  fell  ill  at  Fontainebleau.  After  a  month’s 
sickness,  which  gave  Mazarin  some  uneasiness,  Louis 
recovered,  and  in  December  visited  Peronne  and 
Ham,  and  by  his  presence  strengthened  the  royal 
authority  in  these  towns.  The  year  1655  was  in 
many  ways  important. 

The  Lorraine  army  declared  for  France,  the  cam¬ 
paign  in  Flanders  had  been  successful,  and  though 
in  Catalonia  and  Italy  success  and  failure  were 
equally  balanced,  Mazarin’s  preparations,  diplomatic, 
military,  and  naval,  augured  success  in  the  near 
future.  The  year  1655,  too,  marked  an  epoch  in  the 
history  of  charitable  institutions  in  Paris.  Vincent 
de  Paul  brought  into  notice  the  condition  of  the 
Parisian  poor,  and  by  state  aid  the  General  Hospital 
was  founded.  Important  religious  developments 


1655]  First  Experiences  of  War  a7id  Politics.  63 


were  taking  place,  Port  Royal  was  becoming  cele¬ 
brated,  and  in  1656  Bossuet  began  to  deliver  his 
famous  sermons.  The  end  of  the  Fronde  had  been 
followed  by  a  religious  re-awakening.  But  France 
could  not  turn  to  internal  development  as  long  as 
she  was  burdened  with  a  foreign  war,  as  long  as  her 
north-eastern  frontier  was  not  safe.  It  was  neces¬ 
sary  to  bring  the  war  to  an  immediate  conclusion. 

The  Spaniards  had  been  driven  from  Champagne 
in  1654,  and  in  1655  French  troops  had  entered 
Hainault,  and  encamped  in  the  enemy’s  territory. 
It  was  now  absolutely  necessary  to  retake  Grave¬ 
lines,  Mardyck,  and  Dunkirk.  To  effect  the  capture 
of  these  maritime  towns  the  assistance  of  the  Dutch 
or  English  fleet  was  necessary.  The  death  of  the 
Stadtholder  in  1650  destroyed  any  chance  of  assist¬ 
ance  from  the  Dutch,  and  from  1651  Mazarin  en¬ 
deavoured  to  secure  an  English  alliance.  At  the 
end  of  1652  the  English  Republic  was  officially 
recognised  by  the  French  Government,  and  Antoine 
de  Bordeaux  was  sent  to  London  as  the  French 
representative,  and  in  1654  received  the  title  of 
French  Ambassador. 

But  three  years  passed  before  Mazarin  succeeded. 
Cromwell  wished  to  be  head  of  all  the  Protestants 
of  Europe.  Mazarin’s  objects  were  entirely  political. 
A  commercial  treaty — the  treaty  of  Westminster — 
which  was  at  last  agreed  to  in  November,  1655, 
paved  the  way  to  the  more  important  political  alli¬ 
ance.  The  treaty  of  Westminster  was,  however,  re¬ 
ceived  with  enthusiasm  in  France.  Its  conclusion 
was  made  the  occasion  for  fetes  in  which  the  King 


64 


Louis  XIV. 


[1656 


took  a  prominent  part — though  all  the  supporters  of 
the  exiled  Stuarts  were  furious  with  Mazarin  for 
allying  with  Cromwell.  After  a  vain  attempt  to 
negotiate  a  peace  with  Spain  hostilities  were  re¬ 
sumed.  In  June  Turenne  with  La  Fert6  laid  siege 
to  Valenciennes.  It  was  to  the  south-east  at  the 
highest  point  of  the  rising  ground  that  years  later 
“  Louis  XIV.,  in  front  of  William  III.,  and  on  horse¬ 
back  at  the  head  of  his  troops  under  arms  halted, 
held  a  council  of  war,  and  finally  gave  up  the  hope 
of  victory,  not  owing  to  personal  fear,  but  that 
the  King  was  not  to  be  exposed  to  the  risk  of  a 
defeat.  And  beyond,  towards  the  west  ...  is 
Denain  .  .  .  where  Villars,  turning  to  account 

with  admirable  readiness  the  mistake  of  a  great 
captain,  pierced  the  lines  of  Prince  Eugene  and 
saved  France  when  exhausted.” 

Don  John  of  Austria  and  Cond6,  however,  routed 
La  Fert^’s  division,  and  Turenne  made  a  masterly 
retreat  to  Quesnoi.  The  progress  of  the  French 
arms  was  for  the  moment  checked,  and  the  Span¬ 
iards  gained  several  successes,  retaking  Cond6  and 
Saint-Guillain.  As  usual  at  the  outbreak  of  hostili¬ 
ties  Louis  was  very  anxious  to  join  Turenne  and  the 
army,  but  Mazarin,  who  expected  a  pitched  battle, 
with  difficulty  prevailed  on  him  to  remain  with  the 
Court  for  a  time  until  Turenne  had  inflicted  a  serious 
blow  on  the  enemy  by  the  capture  of  La  Capelle, 
one  of  the  strong  places  of  Picardy,  in  September, 
1656.  Then  neither  Mazarin  nor  the  generals  could 
keep  Louis  away  from  the  army,  and  with  Turenne’s 
troops  Louis  repeated  the  promenade  of  1655  and 


1657]  First  Experiences  of  War  and  Politics.  65 


advanced  into  the  Spanish  Netherlands.  But  such 
promenades  availed  little.  The  refusal  of  the  Span¬ 
iards  to  negotiate  a  treaty,  followed  by  their  suc¬ 
cesses  on  the  frontier,  had  encouraged  the  Emperor 
to  draw  closer  his  relations  with  Spain  and  to  openly 
break  the  treaty  of  Westphalia  by  sending  assistance 
to  the  Spaniards.  A  close  alliance  with  England  was 
more  than  ever  necessary,  and  at  length,  after  long 
negotiations  and  the  exercise  of  much  diplomacy  on 
the  part  of  Mazarin,  the  treaty  of  Paris  was  made 
March  23,  1657.  Cromwell  was  to  aid  the  P'rench 
with  six  thousand  soldiers.  Dunkirk,  Mardyck,  and 
Gravelines  were  to  be  captured,  and  the  two  former 
were  to  be  handed  over  to  England.  In  May  the 
English  troops  arrived,  and  Louis  proceeded  to 
Montreuil  to  review  them.  His  position  was  each 
day  becoming  stronger.  In  August  of  the  previous 
year  Gaston  of  Orleans  had  been  allowed  to  visit 
him,  and  their  reconciliation  had  done  much  to  de¬ 
stroy  the  hopes  of  the  discontented.  Madame  Mont- 
pensier  had  followed  her  father’s  example  early  in 
1657,  and  even  Beaufort  was  reconciled  with 
Mazarin.  Cond^  and  De  Retz  alone  remained  hos¬ 
tile.  The  winter  of  1656-7  had  as  usual  brought  in 
its  train  numerous  fetes  and  balls,  varied  with  hunting 
expeditions  from  Vincennes.  It  saw  the  marriage  of 
Olympe  Mancini  to  the  Count  of  Soissons,  the  son 
of  Prince  Savoy,  and  witnessed  the  strange  conduct 
of  Christina,  ex-Queen  of  Sweden,  who  spent  a 
portion  of  the  year  1656-7  in  France.  In  spite  of 
the  death  of  Mazarin’s  sister,  Madame  Mancini,  and 

that  of  his  niece,  the  Duchess  of  Mercoeur,  the 
5 


66 


Louis  XIV 


[1657 


Court  gaieties  proceeded  with  little  interruption. 
In  these  festivities  the  King  took  the  lead,  danced 
in  the  ballet  entitled  L' Amour  Malade,  conceived 
a  deep  affection  for  one  of  the  maids-of-honour, 
Mademoiselle  de  la  Motte  d’Argencour,  and  seemed 
likely  to  be  influenced  by  a  cabal  of  young  men  who 
called  themselves  Les  Endormis.  Mazarin,  ever 
watchful,  descended  suddenly  on  Les  Endormis. 
They  and  their  leader  Marsillac,  son  of  the  Duke  de  la 
Rochefoucauld,  were  scattered,  and  Mademoiselle  de 
la  Motte  d’Argencour  was  sent  away  from  the  Court. 
Mazarin  could  not  allow  his  influence  over  the  King 
to  be  impaired  or  even  endangered.  These  Court 
intrigues  were  broken  in  upon  by  the  Treaty  of  Paris 
with  Cromwell  and  by  Louis’  wish  to  review  the 
English  troops.  He  was  astonished  and  pleased  with 
the  appearance  and  excellent  discipline  of  the  Iron¬ 
sides.  He  was  present  later  at  the  siege  of  Mont- 
medi,  in  Luxemburg,  where  the  young  French  nobles 
excited  by  the  presence  of  the  King  performed  pro¬ 
digies  of  valour,  and  the  place  fell  on  August  4th. 
So  far  the  campaign  had  not  been  very  successful. 
The  Spaniards  had  seized  Saint-Guillain  in  March, 
and  Condd  by  a  brilliant  feat  of  arms  had  compelled 
Turenne,  who  was  taken  by  surprise,  to  raise  the 
siege  of  Cambrai  in  June.  With  the  fall  of  Mont- 
medi  fortune  began  to  smile  on  the  French  cause. 
Turenne  took  in  rapid  succession  Saint  Venant  in 
Artois,  and  La  Motte-aux-Bois,  a  neighbouring  strong¬ 
hold,  and  on  September  30th,  in  conjunction  with 
the  English,  the  siege  of  the  maritime  towns  was 
seriously  begun.  Mardyck  fell  in  October  and  was 


1658]  First  Experiences  of  War  and  Politics.  67 


handed  over  to  England,  and  preparations  were  made 
for  the  siege  of  Dunkirk  in  the  following  year. 
Louis  himself  was  not  present  at  the  siege  of  Mar- 
dyck.  The  greater  part  of  September  and  October 
had  been  spent  by  him  and  Mazarin  at  Metz.  The 
Emperor  Ferdinand  III.  had  died  on  April  ist,  after 
aiding  the  Spaniards  against  the  French  in  contra¬ 
vention  of  the  Treaty  of  Westphalia.  To  hamper 
the  power  of  the  Imperial  House  while  the  struggle 
continued  between  France  and  Spain  became,  there¬ 
fore,  one  of  the  principal  objects  of  Mazarin’s  policy. 
He  incited  Cromwell  and  Charles  against  the  Court 
of  Vienna,  he  sent  an  embassy  into  Germany  to  op¬ 
pose  the  candidature  of  Leopold,  Ferdinand’s  son, 
and  he  and  Louis  proceeded  to  Metz  to  influence 
and  support  the  German  Electors.  It  was  an  ad¬ 
mirable  opportunity  for  the  Minister  to  give  Louis  a 
lesson  in  foreign  policy  and  Mazarin  did  not  let  the 
occasion  slip.  He  laid  before  him  the  general  state 
of  Europe  and  explained  the  objects  of  the  foreign 
policy  of  each  Power,  and  their  several  relations  to 
France.  Though  Louis  was  put  forward  as  a  candi¬ 
date  for  the  Imperial  throne  his  candidature  was 
not  considered  as  serious. 

In  July,  1658,  Leopold  was  elected  Emperor,  but 
through  Mazarin’s  influence  his  hands  were  so  tied 
that  he  could  not  use  the  Spaniards  against  the 
French,  and,  moreover,  in  August  the  League  of  the 
Rhine  was  definitely  formed,  and  France  concluded 
defensive  alliances  for  the  preservation  of  the  treaty 
of  Westphalia.  Sweden,  Bavaria,  the  Rhine  Electors, 
and  Brunswick  sided  with  the  French  King,  who 


68 


Louis  XIV. 


[1658 


thus,  by  isolating  the  Netherlands,  had  struck  a 
blow  not  only  at  the  power  of  the  Emperor,  but  also 
at  the  Spanish  monarchy.  As  under  Richelieu  and 
Mazarin,  so  now  under  Louis  XIV.,  France  posed 
as  the  defender  of  the  independence  of  the  German 
Princes,  menaced  by  the  House  of  Austria.  It  was 
only  when  Louis  in  later  years,  leaving  this  policy  of 
moderation,  wished  not  only  to  extend  the  influence 
but  also  the  possessions  of  France  in  the  direction 
of  Germany  and  began  his  Reunion  policy,  that  the 
Empire  swung  round  and  supported  the  Emperor 
against  the  French  monarchy. 

While  the  League  of  the  Rhine  paralysed  the 
efforts  of  the  Court  of  Vienna  to  aid  Spain,  the 
renewal  of  the  English  alliance,  followed  by  the 
battle  of  the  Dunes  and  the  capture  of  Dunkirk, 
destroyed  all  chance  of  any  Spanish  success  and 
compelled  Philip  to  demand  peace. 

On  March  28,  1658,  the  alliance  with  England  was 
formally  renewed  and  the  siege  of  Dunkirk  began. 
Louis  was  as  anxious  as  ever  to  take  part  in  warlike 
operations,  and  wished  to  be  present  at  the  siege. 
The  Court  moved  to  Calais,  but  Mazarin  and  the 
Queen  would  only  permit  him  to  go  as  far  as  Mar- 
dyck.  Mazarin,  indeed,  was  strongly  opposed  even  to 
this  step.  He  told  the  King  plainly  that  provisions 
were  scarce,  and  that  the  Court  only  rendered  the 
lot  of  the  soldier  harder.  Mazarin  was  right.  The 
water  at  Mardyck  was  bad,  the  heat  was  excessive, 
and  the  dead  of  the  preceding  year  had  often  been 
only  half  buried.  But  Louis  cared  nothing  for  these 
considerations.  He  was  on  horseback  all  day,  seeing 


1658]  First  Experiences  of  War  and  Politics.  69 


everything,  giving  orders  for  putting  Mardyck  in  a 
thoroughly  defensible  position,  and  generally  show- 
ing  great  intelligence  as  well  as  activity. 

On  June  14th  the  Spaniards  fought  and  lost  the 
famous  battle  of  the  Dunes — a  decisive  battle  as  it 
turned  out.  The  King  and  Queen  were  overjoyed, 
and  the  former  was  only  with  considerable  difficulty 
prevented  from  visiting  the  camp  if  only  for  a  day. 
On  June  23d  Dunkirk  capitulated,  and  on  the  25th 
Louis,  after  having  witnessed  the  garrison  marching 
out,  entered  the  town  accompanied  by  his  guards, 
his  principal  officers,  and  all  the  Court.  In  accord¬ 
ance  with  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  Dunkirk  was  to  be 
handed  over  to  the  English.  But  Louis  could  not 
conceal  his  chagrin  at  seeing  a  French  town  in  the 
hands  of  his  hereditary  foes.  He  refused  to  accept 
the  hospitality  of  Lockhart,  and  declined  to  stay  a 
night  in  the  town.  Cruel  necessity  had  inflicted  a 
hard  blow  on  French  patriotism,  and  one  of  Louis’ 
first  acts  after  the  death  of  Mazarin  was  to  recover 
Dunkirk.  Personally  he  paid  dearly  for  his  energy 
during  the  summer  of  1658.  He  was  twenty  years 
old,  his  constitution  was  good.  But  he  had  gone 
beyond  the  limits  of  prudence.  His  health  suffered 
through  over-fatigue  during  the  great  heat  of  June. 
He  was  so  anxious  to  witness  the  capture  of  Bergues 
and  to  accompany  the  army  to  Fumes,  that  for 
several  days  he  concealed  his  indisposition.  At 
length  on  June  30th  he  confessed  to  Mazarin  that  he 
felt  unwell,  but  insisted  on  staying  at  Mardyck.  It 
was  only  when  Mazarin  threatened  to  send  for  his 
mother  that  Louis  unwillingly  agreed  to  return  to 


70 


Lotiis  XIV. 


[1658 


Calais.  “  You  cannot  imagine,”  wrote  Mazarin,  “  the 
difficulty  I  have  had  to  make  him  go.” 

It  was  evident  at  the  beginning  of  July  that  Louis 
was  suffering  from  a  severe  attack  of  fever.  On  July 
/th  two  doctors  arrived  from  Paris  in  addition  to 
the  four  already  in  attendance.  On  July  8th  the 
King’s  life  was  in  danger,  but  from  that  day 
he  gradually  became  better.  On  July  22d  he  was 
well  enough  to  be  moved  from  Calais,  and  July  26th 
he  arrived  at  Compiegne.  During  his  illness  hos¬ 
tilities  continued,  and  on  August  27th  Gravelines 
was  taken  and  Turenne  continued  his  conquests  in 
Flanders.  Success,  too,  attended  the  French  army 
in  Italy,  and  Mazarin’s  hopes  of  a  speedy  peace 
seemed  likely  of  fulfilment.  The  Spaniards,  defeated 
in  Flanders  and  in  danger  in  Italy,  had  just  been 
defeated  by  the  Portuguese  near  Elvas. 

Mazarin  was  determined  to  force  Philip  to  demand 
peace  and  to  offer  the  Infanta  in  marriage  to  Louis. 
He  therefore  arranged  an  interview  at  Lyons  with 
the  Duchess  of  Savoy  in  order  to  negotiate  a  mar¬ 
riage  between  her  daughter,  Margaret  of  Savoy,  and 
Louis  XIV. 

On  October  26th  the  Court  left  for  Lyons  and 
arrived  there  on  November  24th.  It  was  on  this 
journey  that  Louis’  attachment  for  Marie  Mancini 
was  first  noticed.  Her  grief  during  the  King’s  illness 
was  most  demonstrative,  and  Louis  was  deeply 
touched  by  it.  From  that  time  dates  his  affection 
for  Marie  which  caused  Mazarin  so  much  anxiety. 
The  journey  to  Lyons  had  the  result  anticipated  by 
that  minister.  Though  the  Duchess  of  Savoy  and  her 


1658]  First  Experie7ices  of  Wa r  and  Politics.  7 1 


daughter  were  received  by  Louis  and  the  Court  with 
great  ceremony,  the  proceedings  had  no  reality  about 
them.  Philip  IV.  had  determined  to  demand  peace 
and  to  offer  the  hand  of  the  Infanta.  The  marriage 
of  Louis  XIV.  to  Margaret  of  Savoy  or  to  Marie 
Mancini  would  have  been  a  fatal  blow  to  the  hopes 
of  Anne  of  Austria  and  to  the  policy  of  Mazarin. 
For  years  past  the  Queen-Mother  had  looked  for¬ 
ward  to  the  re-establishment  of  harmonious  relations 
between  her  native  country  and  France.  Even 
during  the  darkest  period  of  the  war  she  had  never 
lost  hope.  As  early  as  1651,  according  to  Madame 
de  Motteville,  she  had  in  her  own  mind  fixed  on  the 
Infanta  as  the  future  bride  of  Louis  XIV.  That 
Marie  Therese  eventually  became  Queen  of  France 
was  due  in  great  measure  to  the  unceasing  efforts  of 
Anne  of  Austria. 

In  Lionne,  who  had  been  sent  to  Spain  in  1656  to 
try  and  arrange  the  basis  of  a  treaty,  she  found  an 
active  supporter  of  her  views,  and  to  Lionne  must 
belong  no  little  of  the  credit  of  bringing  about  the 
celebrated  marriage  alliance.  But  for  a  time  such  an 
event  seemed  out  of  the  question.  The  close  con¬ 
nection  existing  between  the  Courts  of  Spain  and 
Austria  rendered  it  unlikely  that  the  presumptive 
heiress  of  the  Spanish  Empire  would  be  allowed  to 
take  her  magnificent  prospects  to  the  House  of  Bour¬ 
bon,  especially  as  long  as  the  Spaniards  had  any 
chance  of  coming  out  of  the  war  as  victors. 

But  towards  the  end  of  1658  the  situation  was 
greatly  modified.  The  alliance  between  Mazarin 
and  Cromwell  had  had  instantaneous  effects  and  the 


72 


Louis  XIV. 


[1659 


Spanish  cause  had  suffered  check  after  check.  The 
League  of  the  Rhine  had  been  formed  under  the 
auspices  of  France  and  a  fresh  blow  inflicted  upon 
the  influence  of  the  Emperor  in  Germany,  Moreover 
there  was  apparently  no  chance  of  any  fresh  Fronde 
troubles  which  might  again  form  a  useful  diversion. 
The  birth  of  a  brother  on  November  28,  1657,  and 
the  expected  birth  of  another  infant,  rendered 
Marie  Th^rese’s  chances  of  ever  securing  the  Span¬ 
ish  Empire  improbable.  Her  marriage  therefore 
with  Louis  XIV.  did  not  in  1658  seem  likely  to  have 
the  dangerous  results  anticipated  in  1656. 

In  order  to  force  the  hand  of  the  Spaniards  and  to 
bring  Philip  to  a  decision,  Mazarin  had  opened  the 
negotiations  for  the  marriage  of  Louis  to  the  Princess 
of  Savoy.  Anne  of  Austria  was  in  despair,  though 
she  pretended  to  be  resigned  to  the  prospect  of 
having  a  Savoyard  daughter-in-law.  But  the  policy 
of  Mazarin  was  successful.  A  Spanish  envoy, 
Pimental,  met  the  French  Court  at  Lyons,  with 
offers  for  peace  and  a  marriage  alliance.  The  Duch¬ 
ess  of  Savoy  and  her  daughter  went  home  in  Decem¬ 
ber  and  serious  conferences  were  opened  at  Montargis 
and  Paris  between  Mazarin  and  Pimental  in  Feb¬ 
ruary,  1659.  A  suspension  of  arms  was  agreed 
upon  in  May,  1659,  and  the  final  negotiations  took 
place  later  in  the  year.  During  the  autumn  the 
passion  of  Louis  for  Marie  Mancini  reached  its 
height.  And  the  episode  has  attracted  more  atten¬ 
tion  perhaps  than  it  was  worth  owing  to  the  demon¬ 
strative  conduct  of  the  young  Italian  girl  and  the 
obstinacy  of  the  King.  Marie  had  worked  herself 


1659]  First  Experiences  of  War  and  Politics.  73 


up  into  a  state  of  fury  at  the  idea  of  Louis  marrying 
“  a  woman  as  ugly  as  Margaret  of  Savoy.”  After 
the  negotiations  with  Savoy  had  been  broken  off,  she 
undoubtedly  hoped  to  bring  to  a  similar  conclusion 
the  negotiation  for  Louis’  marriage  with  the  Infanta. 
Mazarin  was  as  strongly  opposed  to  the  idea  of  a 
marriage  between  the  King  and  his  niece  as  was  the 
Queen-Mother  herself.  The  King  was  resolved,  it 
is  said,  to  marry  Marie.  Mademoiselle  de  Montpen- 
sier  relates  how  he  threw  himself  on  his  knees  before 
Mazarin  and  his  mother  and  begged  to  be  allowed 
to  do  as  he  wished.  Without  the  least  hesitation 
Mazarin  determined  to  remove  the  object  of  Louis’ 
affections,  and  Marie  on  June  21st  had  to  depart  to 
Brouage.  He  then  set  out  for  Saint-Jean-de-Luz, 
where  he  arrived  on  July  28th.  On  the  journey  he 
wrote  to  Louis  urging  him  not  to  allow  himself  to  be 
mastered  by  every  passion,  but  to  be  a  great  King, 
and  in  a  later  letter  he  conjured  him  in  the  name  of 
glory,  honour,  and  God’s  service  to  act  wisely  in  this 
matter.  For  some  weeks,  however,  Louis,  backed  up 
by  a  small  Court  clique,  persisted  in  carrying  on  his 
suit  and  in  corresponding  with  Marie.  Mazarin 
therefore  wrote  several  more  letters  to  the  King  and 
the  Queen-Mother,  in  all  of  which  insisting  vehe¬ 
mently  on  the  damage  which  a  marriage  with  Marie 
would  inflict  on  France. 

On  August  13th  Louis  saw  her,  but  from  that  time 
his  passion  calmed,  and  he  entered  with  interest  into 
the  negotiation  for  his  marriage  with  the  Infanta.  It 
was  not  till  November  7th  that  the  peace  of  the 
Pyrenees  was  finally  signed  and  Mazarin’s  life-work 


74 


Louis  XIV. 


[1659 


was  completed.  France  gained  all  Artois,  except  Aire 
and  St.  Omer,  Roussillon  and  Cerdagne,  Gravelines, 
with  several  places  in  Flanders,  and  portions  of  Hai- 
nault  and  Luxemburg,  Though  the  Duke  of  Lor¬ 
raine  was  to  be  reinstated,  the  fortifications  of 
Nancy  were  to  be  destroyed.  Several  places  were 
to  be  ceded  to  France  and  Freneh  troops  were 
to  be  permitted  to  march  through  the  duchy.  This 
treaty  not  only  insured  the  preponderance  of  France 
in  Europe,  but  it  prepared  the  way  for  her  domina¬ 
tion  in  Europe  under  Louis  XIV.  But  the  peace  of 
the  Pyrenees  was  only  part  of  the  general  pacifica¬ 
tion  of  Europe.  A  great  northern  war  had  been 
raging  for  some  years,  intensified  by  the  ambition 
and  conquests  of  Charles  X.  of  Sweden.  In  Feb¬ 
ruary,  1658,  the  mediation  of  France  and  England 
had  brought  about  the  treaty  of  Roskild  between 
Sweden  and  Denmark,  but  war  broke  out  again  the 
same  year,  and  Charles  X.  spoke  of  annihilating  Den¬ 
mark  and  even  of  pillaging  Rome.  During  the  ne¬ 
gotiations  which  led  to  the  treaty  of  the  Pyrenees, 
Mazarin  discussed  the  affairs  of  the  north,  and  as 
soon  as  the  treaty  was  signed  intervened  ener¬ 
getically.  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  northern  war 
would  have  ended,  had  not  the  death  of  Charles  X. 
in  February,  1660,  simplified  the  situation.  In 
March,  1660,  under  the  mediation  of  England, 
France,  and  the  United  Provinces,  the  treaty  of 
Copenhagen  was  signed  between  Sweden  and  Den¬ 
mark,  and  in  May  of  the  same  year  the  influence  of 
Mazarin  was  again  conspicuously  shown  in  bringing 
about  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty  of  Oliva  between 


1659]  First  Experiences  of  War  and  Politics.  75 


Poland  and  Brandenburg.  In  the  pacification  of  the 
North  the  traditions  of  French  policy  were  preserved. 
Sweden,  the  ally  of  France,  continued  to  hold  her 
ancient  superiority  in  the  Baltic,  and  Mazarin  had 
the  glory  of  having  done  much  to  secure  the  peace 
of  Europe  in  both  the  North  and  the  South. 

From  Saint-Jean-de-Luz  Mazarin  proceeded  to 
Toulouse  to  join  the  Court  (November  2 1st).  The 
early  months  of  1660  were  spent  in  a  tour  through 
Languedoc  and  Provence.  It  was  desirable  that 
Louis  should  be  acquainted  with  the  south  of  France  ; 
his  presence  there  was  also  imperatively  demanded 
for  political  reasons. 

Provence  had  never  thoroughly  shaken  itself  free 
from  its  Fronde  leanings,  and  the  old  municipal  spirit 
of  independence  was  strong  in  the  cities.  Toulon 
had  with  difficulty  been  brought  to  obedience ; 
Marseilles  still  was  in  a  disturbed  state.  The 
presence  of  the  King  would  do  much  to  pacify 
the  turbulent  province.  For  many  years,  too,  the 
French  navy  had  been  neglected,  and  one  of  the 
principal  objects  of  Louis’  visit  to  Toulon  was  to 
superintend  measures  for  the  improvement  of  the 
navy,  for  the  overthrow  of  the  pirates  who  swarmed 
in  the  Mediterranean,  and  for  the  encouragement 
of  commerce  in  the  Levant. 

Louis  arrived  at  Aix  on  January  17,  1660.  There 
the  Prince  of  Conde  visited  him  and  was  reconciled. 
It  was  at  Ai.x  too  that  Louis  received  the  ratifica¬ 
tion  of  the  treaty  of  the  Pyrenees — an  event  cele¬ 
brated  on  February  3d  by  a  solemn  Te  Deum.  After 
visiting  many  interesting  places  in  Provence,  Louis 


76 


Louis  XfV. 


[1660 


proceeded  to  Toulon,  and  his  visit  undoubtedly 
gave  a  considerable  impetus  to  the  revival  of  the 
French  marine.  During  the  King’s  stay  at  Toulon, 
Marseilles  was  punished  by  the  Duke  of  Mercoeur, 
and  a  citadel  built  to  keep  the  population  in  order. 
After  the  return  of  the  Court  to  Aix  on  March 
8th,  Orange,  which  belonged  to  the  House  of  Orange- 
Nassau,  was  compelled  to  recognise  the  royal 
suzerainty. 

Having  pacified  the  southern  provinces,  Louis 
proceeded  to  Saint-Jean-de-Luz,  passing  through 
Avignon  and  Montpellier,  Narbonne,  Perpignan, 
Toulouse,  to  Bayonne,  where  he  arrived  on  May  1st. 
After  numerous  conferences  the  marriage  of  Louis 
with  the  Infanta  took  place,  the  marriage  ceremony 
being  performed  by  the  Bishop  of  Pampeluna  on 
June  7th  and  the  Bishop  of  Bayonne  on  June  9th. 
The  Court  then  returned  slowly  to  Paris,  the  royal 
entry  not  taking  place  till  August  26th,  and  then 
being  celebrated  in  a  most  magnificent  manner  with 
all  the  pomp  which  the  capital  and  Court  could 
command.  It  was  from  the  balcony  of  the  Hotel 
d’Aumont  that  Madame  Scarron  “  in  company  with 
the  Queen  Dowager,  the  Queen  of  England,  Princess 
Henrietta,  and  Cardinal  Mazarin  ”  witnessed  this 
triumphal  entry  into  Paris  of  Louis  and  his  Queen 
Marie  Thdrbse,  and  both  Racine  and  La  Fontaine 
marked  the  occasion  by  respective  productions,  the 
former  writing  an  ode  entitled  La  Nymphe  de  la 
Seine.  The  procession  lasted  through  the  long  hours 
of  a  beautiful  summer’s  day,  and  Madame  Scarron, 
who,  twenty-four  years  later,  was  to  be  Marie  Th6- 


1660]  First  Experiences  of  Wav  and  Politics.  77 


rese’s  successor,  declared  in  a  letter  to  a  friend  that 
“nothing  I  or  any  one  could  say  could  give  you  an 
idea  of  the  magnificent  spectacle ;  nothing  could 
surpass  it.” 

The  minority  of  Louis  XIV.  is  a  very  important 
period  in  his  long  reign.  It  is  impossible  to  under¬ 
stand  the  policy  of  the  great  King  without  carefully 
appreciating  the  atmosphere  in  which  he  passed  his 
early  years,  and  the  varied  circumstances  of  his  long 
minority.  Brought  up  amid  the  turbulent  scenes 
of  the  Fronde  he  learnt  to  estimate  at  its  true  value 
not  only  the  fidelity  of  the  fickle  populace  of  Paris, 
but  also  the  loyalty  of  a  large  portion  of  the  unstable 
nobility.  /The  influence  of  the  Fronde  struggle  upon 
Louis’  policy  in  later  years  was  not  wholly  beneficial. 
Much  of  his  impatience  of  any  opposition,  much  of 
his  intolerance  towards  those  who  held  religious  or 
political  views  different  from  his  own,  may  be  traced 
to  the  events  of  the  years  1648-1653.  Somewhat 
naturally  those  events  impressed  him  with  a  keen 
sense  of  the  importance  of  unity.  P'rance  divided 
against  itself  had  seemed  at  one  time  likely  to  be 
the  prey  of  the  Spani.sh  soldiery.  As  late  as  1659 
revolts  in  Normandy  and  Anjou,  Poitou  and  Sologne, 
came  to  justify  Mazarin’s  wisdom  in  making  the 
treaty  of  the  Pyrenees  ;  while  in  1660  it  was  thought 
advisable  that  Louis  should  make  a  progress  through 
Provence  to  allay  the  discontent  and  curb  the  inde¬ 
pendent  spirit  of  the  south  of  I'rance. 

If  there  was  one  lesson  more  likely  than  another 
to  be  engrained  upon  the  mind  of  a  young  ruler  in 
France  in  1660  it  was  the  necessity  of  unity.  The 


78 


Louis  XIV. 


[1660 


nobles  were  discredited,  tire  Parleinent  of  Paris  had 
been  unable  to  shake  itself  free  from  its  narrow  sur¬ 
roundings,  the  country  was  groaning  under  heavy 
taxation. 

The  only  hope  for  France  seemed  to  be  in  the 
establishment  of  a  paternal  despotism  which  should 
enforce  peace  on  the  warring  factions  within  the 
country,  and  ensure  the  return  of  prosperity  by  a 
firm  foreign  and  a  well  regulated  home  policy. 

To  repeat  the  common  remark  that  Mazarin 
neglected  Louis’  education  is  simply  to  repeat  what 
is  absolutely  untrue.  That  Louis  was  not  well  read, 
that  he  had  no  literary  tastes,  that  as  far  as  literary 
accomplishments  went  he  was  ignorant,  is  perfectly 
true.  But  was  it  no  education  to  be  from  the  year 
1653  constantly  with  the  most  astute  statesman  in 
Europe,  and  continually  to  hear  fall  from  his  lips 
remarks  teeming  with  political  wisdom  ? 

From  his  intercourse  with  Mazarin  Louis  learnt  the 
advisability,  while  profiting  by  the  advice  of  his  able 
ministers  and  generals,  of  keeping  the  direction  of 
affairs  in  his  own  hands.  The  necessity  of  prudence 
in  making  plans,  and  of  perseverance  and  tact  in 
carrying  them  out,  was  impressed  upon  Louis  during 
his  minority  with  great  assiduity  by  the  minister. 
No  little  of  Louis’  skill  in  managing  men  in  later 
years  was  due  to  the  principles  inculcated  by  Maza¬ 
rin.  For  France  as  she  then  was  Mazarin  could  not 
have  done  better  than  to  teach  the  King  to  love  an 
active  and  energetic  life,  to  be  his  own  master,  and 
to  govern  with  dignity  and  firmness. 

The  Venetian  ambassador  in  1660  professed  sur- 


1660]  First  Experiences  of  War  andPolitics.  79 


prise  at  the  dignity,  grace,  and  affability  of  the 
young  King;  but  if  Louis’s  firm  treatment  of  the 
Parlemcnt  of  Paris  at  the  Bed  of  Justice  in  April, 
1655,  is  borne  in  mind  there  is  no  need  for  sur¬ 
prise  when  we  find  that  he  was  quite  prepared  at 
the  time  of  Mazarin’s  death  to  take  up  the  metier  of 
a  king. 

The  turbulence,  want  of  patriotism,  and  general 
disorder  which  characterised  a  large  portion  of  his 
early  years  had  by  1661  stamped  firmly  upon  Louis’ 
mind  the  advantages  of  government  by  one. 

It  is  doubtful,  however,  if  these  conceptions  of 
government,  impressed  upon  him  as  they  were,  not 
only  by  his  own  experience,  but  also  by  Mazarin 
himself,  would  have  been  thoroughly  put  into  execu¬ 
tion  had  his  character  not  developed  in  the  right 
direction  owing  to  the  exigencies  of  the  war  with 
Spain.  Louis  was  naturally  susceptible  to  the 
temptations  of  a  Court.  He  was  always  liable  to  be 
drawn  by  “  the  silken  thread  ”  of  pleasure.  During 
those  important  years  of  a  man’s  life  when  boyhood 
gives  place  to  manhood,  the  enervating  atmosphere 
of  the  Court  and  its  surroundings  was  constantly  be¬ 
ing  replaced  by  the  bracing  atmosphere  of  the  camp. 
Ever  since  1649  Louis  had  lived  more  or  less  among 
his  troops,  and  the  enthusiasm  created  by  his  pres¬ 
ence  justified  Mazarin’s  policy.  The  victory  of 
Rethel  in  1650  was  in  part  due  to  that  enthusiasm. 

The  influence  of  the  war  with  Spain  upon  Louis’ 
character  was  thus  highly  beneficial.  Saved  from 
effeminacy,  he  never  yielded,  to  any  serious  extent, 
to  the  allurements  and  fascinations  of  Court  life. 


8o 


Louis  XIV. 


t1660 


Blessed  with  a  good  physique,  he  boylike  threw  him¬ 
self  with  the  utmost  readiness  into  military  life. 
Mazarin  encouraged  this  taste,  and,  as  we  have  seen, 
had  the  greatest  difificulty  in  checking  Louis  in  his 
constant  wish  to  be  at  the  front.  As  it  was,  he  saw 
real  warfare  as  practised  by  Turenne,  and  he  took 
part  in  sieges  as  well  as  in  military  progresses  through 
the  Spanish  Netherlands.  It  was  his  over-exertions 
during  the  campaign  against  the  maritime  towns  that 
brought  on  the  one  dangerous  illness  of  his  youth¬ 
ful  days. 

The  effect  upon  the  army,  and  indeed  upon  a 
nation  as  susceptible  as  the  French  to  military  glory 
of  having  among  them  a  young  King  anxious  to 
take  the  lead  in  warlike  enterprises,  cannot  be  over¬ 
estimated.  His  military  experiences  during  these 
years  not  only  gave  him  a  powerful  hold  upon  his 
subjects,  but  aided  him  in  conducting  the  numerous 
wars  in  which  France  played  so  leading  a  part  during 
the  ensuing  fifty  years. 

Mazarin  rightly  laid  great  stress  upon  this  practi¬ 
cal  side  of  the  King’s  education.  He  was  en¬ 
couraged  to  hunt  and  to  dance.  The  woods  at 
Vincennes  offered  plenty  of  opportunities  for  the 
chase  ;  the  annual  winter  festivities  of  the  Court 
resulted  in  Louis  becoming  a  very  graceful  and 
skilful  dancer. 

By  the  time  of  Mazarin’s  death  Louis  had  shown 
himself  worthy  of  all  the  care  bestowed  upon  him 
by  the  minister.  He  had  borne  willingly  the  fatigues 
and  privations  of  many  campaigns  ;  he  had  always 
shown  energy  and  vigour. 


1661]  First  Expericjices  of  War  arid  Politics.  8 1 

But  Mazarin  was  not  content  with  merely  watch¬ 
ing  over  the  physical  development  of  the  young 
King.  He  was  equally  careful  to  instruct  him  in 
diplomacy  and  in  knowledge  of  foreign  countries. 
To  the  Spanish  war  and  the  opportunities  it  offered 
for  discussing  foreign  relations  Louis  owed  much  of 
his  very  considerable  acquaintance  with  the  practice 
and  policy  of  the  leading  European  powers.  During 
his  stay  at  Metz  in  1657  he  received,  as  we  have 
seen,  invaluable  lessons  from  Mazarin  on  this  sub¬ 
ject,  which  were  supplemented  by  the  general  advice 
given  him  by  the  minister  when  on  his  death-bed. 

In  1661  Mazarin  could  truly  say  that  he  had  not 
only  given  France  peace  and  glory,  but  had  also  be¬ 
queathed  to  her  a  King  capable  of  continuing  and 

‘dig¬ 
nity,  his  power  of  application,  his  firmness,  had  all 
been  watched  over  and  developed  by  the  Cardinal 
who  had  also  wisely  accustomed  him  to  the  life  of  a 
soldier  and  had  impressed  upon  him  lessons  in 
diplomacy  and  worldly  wisdom. 

There  was  no  sudden  transformation  on  Mazarin’s 
death.  Louis  simply  stepped  into  his  minister’s 
place.  Hitherto  Mazarin  had  ruled.  Now  the  King 
ruled.  Hitherto  the  country  had  been  governed  by 
a  Prime  Minister.  After  Mazarin’s  death  Louis  be¬ 
came  his  own  Prime  Minister.  The  saying,  L'Etat, 
c'est  inoi  marks  accurately  the  character  of  his  gov¬ 
ernment  from  1661. 

6 


CHAPTER  III. 

LOUIS  XIV.  RULES. 

1661-1715. 

N  the  death  of  Mazarin  in  1661 
Louis  had  already  reigned 
eighteen  years.  He  was  now 
in  his  twenty-third  year,  and 
up  to  this  time  had  been  con¬ 
tent  to  let  the  Cardinal  rule. 
Under  the  regime  of  Mazarin 
and  Anne  of  Austria  the  King 
had  been  little  more  than  a 
cipher  to  his  subjects.  Men 
were  now  to  realise  that  a  new  epoch  had  been 
reached  in  the  history  of  France,  and  that  in  the 
development  in  store  for  this  country  the  personality 
of  their  sovereign  would  be  an  important  factor. 

In  appearance  Louis,  though  admirably  propor¬ 
tioned,  was  slightly  below  the  middle  height.  His 
eyes  were  blue,  his  nose  long  and  well  formed.  His 
hair,  which  was  remarkable  for  its  abundance,  was 


82 


1661] 


Louis  XIV.  Rules. 


83 


allowed  to  fall  over  his  shoulders.  With  his  hand¬ 
some  features  and  his  serious — perhaps  phlegmatic 
— expression  he  seemed  admirably  fitted  to^ay  the 
part  of  a  monarch.  He  had  all  the  kingly  gifts 
necessary  for  the  role.  He  was  dignified,  reserved, 
calm,  and  courteous.  Majestic  in  person,  his  man¬ 
ners  and  carriage  were  above  criticism.  He  was  a 
graceful  dancer  and  an  excellent  horseman.  His 
tact  even  in  the  smallest  matters  was  unerring,  and 
his  sense  of  propriety  and  order  unusual  in  so  young 
a  man.  He  had  cultivated  with  considerable  suc¬ 
cess  the  habit  of  self-control ;  he  rarely  laughed,  and 
seldom  gave  way  to  anger.  His  gravity  of  manner 
and  habitual  discretion  impressed  favourably  those 
with  whom  he  came  in  contact.  “  He  would  have 
been  every  inch  a  king,”  Saint-Simon  tells  us,  “  even 
if  he  had  been  born  under  the  roof  of  a  beggar,” 
and  Bolingbroke,  writing  from  personal  observation, 
declared  that,  “  if  he  was  not  the  greatest  king  he 
was  the  best  actor  of  majesty,  at  least,  that  ever 
filled  a  throne.” 

He  was,  however,  lacking  in  originality  ;  there  was^ 
in  him  no  spark  of  genius.  He  loved  details  for 
their  own  sake.  Flattery  of  the  most  exaggerated 
kind  was  ever  acceptable  to  him.  Though  the 
Jesuits  had  superintended  his  religious  training  he 
was  in  reality  ignorant  of  the  rudiments  of  Christi¬ 
anity,  and  his  general  education  had  been  scandal¬ 
ously  neglected  owing  to  the  incapacity  of  Villeroi 
and  P^r^fixe.  He  remained  ignorant  all  his  life. 
Bolingbroke  says  he  jested  sometimes  at  his  own 
ignorance;  on  the  other  hand,  Saint-Simon  tells  us 


84 


Loiiis  XIV. 


11661 


that  on  other  occasions  he  spoke  bitterly  of  his 
deficiencies.  He  certainly  was  inquisitive,  and  wrote 
to  his  agent  Comminges,  who  was  in  England  in 
1663,  for  a  report  on  English  men  of  letters.  “  My 
intention  is,”  he  said,  “  to  be  informed  of  all  that  is 
best  and  exquisite  in  all  countries  and  in  all  branches 
of  knowledge,  and  to  make  the  best  of  such  infor¬ 
mation  for  my  honour,  and  service,  and  glory.”  It 
followed  naturally  from  his  lack  of  knowledge  and 
limited  intelligence,  that  he  was  often,  though  un¬ 
consciously,  guided  by  those  who  had  stronger  wills 
and  more  capal^le  minds.  His  confessors,  who  were, 
as  a  rule,  able  and  well  cultivated  men,  shared,  in 
turn  with  Colbert,  Louvois,  and  Madame  de  Main- 
tenon,  a  powerful  influence  over  his  actions. 

As  long  as  Colbert  lived,  the  influences  brought 
to  bear  on  Louis  were  on  the  whole  beneficent,  but 
towards  the  end  of  his  reign  Louis  allowed  himself 
to  be  guided  at  times  by  the  judgment  of  Madame 
de  Maintenon,  who  herself  was  influenced  by  certain 
priests,  whose  opinions  often  lacked  wisdom  and 
discernment.  Freed  from  Colbert’s  advice,  Louis 
tended  to  promote  to  the  highest  offices  of  state 
men  often  incapable  or  untrustworthy.  He  always 
disliked  brilliance  of  intellect,  and  distrusted  men  of 
distinguished  abilities.  Like  Walpole,  he  preferred 
to  see  around  him  mediocrity  of  talent,  and  hated 
the  assertion  of  individuality  in  any  shape  or  form. 
When  Chamillard  was  allowed  to  rule  at  Versailles, 
and  Villeroi,  Tallard,  and  Marsin  were  preferred  to 
Catinat,  Vendome,  and  Villars,  it  was  evident  that 
Louis’s  successes  in  the  early  portion  of  his  reign 


i 


THE  KING;  LOUIS;  KING  LOUIS. 

(From  a  sketch  by  Thackeray  in  his  Paris  Sketch  Book.") 


€ 


\  . 
r 

i 


i  ' 


I  •; 


■1 


1661] 


Louis  XIV.  Rules. 


85 


were  due  in  great  measure  to  his  good  fortune  in 
finding  round  him  a  number  of  able  men,  trained 
under  Mazarin’s  regime.  It  must,  however,  be  remem¬ 
bered,  in  extenuation  of  Louis’  later  appointments, 
that  he  was  always  led  to  believe  that  the  genius  of 
Colbert,  Louvois,  and  Lionne  was  but  a  reflection  of 
his  own,  and  that  he  was  the  moving  spirit  in  all 
departments  of  government.  Accordingly,  when  a 
minister  died,  Louis,  convinced  that  all  his  sub¬ 
ordinates  were  equal  in  talent  and  looked  to  him  for 
the  initiative,  simply  handed  on  the  vacant  office 
to  a  relative  of  its  last  occupant.  What  aggravated 
the  faults  engendered  by  Louis’  bad  education  was 
his  pride.  This  feature  in  his  character  rapidly  be¬ 
came  very  prominent,  and  early  developed  into  the 
worst  form  of  arrogance.  It  led  him  to  consider 
himself;^^  oimiipotent)  and  to  delight  in  self-glorifica¬ 
tion.  Through  it  he  neglected  the  public  good,  and 
adopted  a  policy  of  mere  personal  passion  and  am¬ 
bition.  He  imagined  he  had  educated  all  his  min¬ 
isters,  and  that  France  owed  her  European 
position,  her  victories  by  sea  and  land,  and  her 
diplomatic  triumphs  entirely  to  his  own  skill, 
foresight,  and  resolution.  'As  he  grew  older,| 
the  flaws  in  his  character,  pardonable  as  they 
might  be  in  his  earlier  years,  degenerated  into  very 
serious  faults.  His  ignorance  grew  into  something 
like  stupidity,  his  firmness  developed  into  obstinacy,  ■ 
his  pride  became  mere  arrogance  and  selfishness. 
Hence  he  considered  himself  above  sworn  contracts, 
hence  he  showed  no  regard  for  human  life.  He 
believed  himself  to  be  under  the  special  care  of 


86 


Louis  XIV. 


[1661 


/Providence,  to  be  above  all  other  men  ;  to  be  a 
I  privileged  King  among  kings.  Caprice  at  times 
seems  to  have  dictated  many  of  his  actions.  He 
becomes  more  and  more  impatient  of  opposition,  and 
after  the  peace  of  Nimeguen  he  certainly  for  a  time 
laboured  under  the  delusion  that  he  was  permitted  by 
God  to  undertake  any  scheme  no  matter  how  daring. 
The  only  justification  for  Louis  is  to  be  found(i)  in  his 
early  education  and  surroundings, — even  at  an  early 
age  it  was  instilled  in  him  that  kings  might  do  as 
they  pleased  ;  (2)  in  the  attitude  of  the  clergy,  who 
from  Bossuet  downwards  vied  with  each  other  in  the 
most  abject  flattery  of  the  King;  (3)  in  the  atmos¬ 
phere  of  the  corrupt  Court  where  adulation  of  Louis 
grew  into  one  might  almost  say  idolatry.  He  was 
assured  that  all  his  wars  were  justifiable  ;  the  real 
condition  of  his  kingdom  was  never  brought  to  his 
notice  ;  he  was  always  ignorant  of  the  state  of  public 
opinion  ;  he  had  no  friend  in  whom  he  could  confide 
and  from  whom  he  could  learn  the  truth.  Like  all 
despotic  monarchs,  he  was  liable  to  be  influenced  by 
Court  intrigues.  Two  of  his  ablest  generals  were  the 
victims  of  Court  disfavour,  and  it  was  only  the  stress 
of  events  that  forced  them  into  prominence  in  the 
Dutch  and  Spanish  Succession  wars  respectively. 

His  strength  lay  in  his  firm  belief  in  himself,  in  his 
conviction  of  the  divine  origin  of  royalty,  in  his  de¬ 
termination  to  be  in  reality  a  King,  in  his  energy  and 
honest  desire  to  do  his  duty.  Only  a  few  of  those 
about  him  had  any  idea  of  his  true  character,  of  his 
sense  of  responsibility,  of  his  resolve  to  carry  out 
conscientiously  the  duties  of  kingship.  ]  He  was 


1661] 


Louis  XIV.  Rules. 


87 


known  to  be  fond  of  pleasure,  to  be  timid,  self-willed, 
and  ignorant.^  The  courtiers  naturally  looked  for¬ 
ward  to  the  reign  of  an  easy-going,  perhaps  of  a  lazy 
monarch,  to  an  age  of  fetes ;  while  the  country  hoped 
for  a  period  of  peace  and  prosperity  after  the  late 
internal  commotions  and  foreign  wars. 

But  keen  observers  had  already  formed  a  different 
opinion  of  the  King’s  aims  and  capacities.  Le  Tel- 
lier  had  noticed  “  the  basis  of  severity  and  serious¬ 
ness  with  which  Louis  knew  how  to  strengthen  the 
natural  kindliness  of  his  nature,”  and  Mazarin  had 
declared  that  “  he  will  set  off  later  but  will  go  further 
than  all  the  others,”  and  that  he  had  in  him  “  the 
making  of  four  kings  and  of  one  good  man.”  Before 
his  death,  Mazarin  had  moreover  taught  him  the 
duties  of  kingship  and  those  rules  of  kingcraft  to 
which  he  attached  great  importance.  He  had  laid 
great  stress  upon  the  necessity  of  defending  his 
crown  and  country  against  internal  factions  and  for¬ 
eign  interference  ;  he  had  induced  him  to  be  present 
at  meetings  of  the  royal  Council ;  in  a  word  he  did 
all  in  his  power  to  render  Louis  capable  of  taking 
the  government  into  his  own  hands.  And  Louis 
fulfilled  all  the  expectations  of  the  Cardinal.  He 
worked  five  hours  a  day  till  his  death.  “  I  gave  my¬ 
self  as  a  law,”  he  himself  says,  “  to  work  regularly 
twice  a  day  for  two  or  three  hours  each  time  with 
various  persons,without  speaking  of  the  hours  I  spent 
working  by  myself.  There  was  no  moment  when  it  was 
not  allowed  to  speak  to  me  about  business,  if  there 
was  any  urgency.”  “  Those  who  believed,”  wrote 
Lionne,  “that  our  master  would  soon  tire  of  business 


88 


Louis  XIV. 


[1661 


were  greatly  mistaken  ;  the  further  we  go,  the  greater 
pleasure  he  takes  in  devoting  himself  entirely  to  it.” 
The  lessons  of  Mazarin  had  soon  borne  fruit  and 
only  confirmed  the  previous  determination  of  the 
young  King  to  rule  absolutely  and  without  a  Prime 
Minister.  He  himself  tells  us  that  he  always  hated 
the  idea  of  any  limitation  to  his  power,  and  that  from 
his  infancy  the  names  of  king  faindant  and  mayors 
of  the  palace  were  very  distasteful  to  him.  The 
events  of  the  Fronde  struggle  had  strengthened  his 
resolution  to  make  himself  the'  real  head  of  France. 
He  never  forgot  the  troubles  of  his  minority,  and 
especially  that  January  night  in  1649,  spent  at  Saint- 
Germain,  when  the  members  of  the  Court  had  neither 
beds  nor  fires.  Deeply  impressed  on  his  mind,  too, 
was  the  connection  between  the  Jansenists  and  the 
Fronde  movement.  Hence  his  consistent  opposition 
to  the  Jansenist  party.  Under  Louis  XIV.  then  the 
absolute  monarchy  which  had  been  revived  by  Henry 
IV.  and  organised  by  Richelieu  was  definitel)'’  estab¬ 
lished.  Not  only  was  the  monarch  absolute  in  fact, 
but  a  definite  theory  of  absolutism  was  laid  down. 

The  theory  of  the  divine  origin  of  kingship  was 
firmly  held  by  Louis  and  generally  accepted  in 
France.  In  his  memoirs  Louis  lays  it  down  that 
kings  are  God’s  lieutenants,  answerable  to  him  alone. 
The  King  represents  the  nation,  and  all  authority 
lies  in  the  hands  of  the  King.  “  L’^tat,  c’est  moi  ” 
represents  accurately  Louis’  conviction  that  in  him 
were  centered  all  the  threads  of  internal  government 
as  well  as  of  foreign  policy,  and  that  all  Frenchmen 
were  merely  instruments  for  carrying  out  his  wishes. 


1661] 


Louis  XIV.  Rides. 


89 


He  was  the  embodiment  of  the  power  and  greatness 
of  France.  He  was  convinced  that  a  divine  instinct 
would  lead  him  to  make  right  decisions.  An  abso 
lute  unlimited  monarchy  was  especially  agreeable  to 
God.  Thus  Louis’  policy  both  at  home  and  abroad 
can  be  shown  to  have  a  distinctly  religious  basis. 
His  wars  of  aggrandisement  were  excused  on  the 
ground  that  the  victories  of  the  French  arms  would 
lead  to  the  advance  of  religion.  In  his  attacks  on 
the  Protestants,  Jansenists,  and  Quietists,  he  was 
merely  carrying  to  its  logical  conclusion  his  theory 
of  absolutism.  But  he  only  arrived  at  a  decision  in 
religious  matters  after  very  careful  consideration. 
Painfully  and  laboriously  he  came  to  his  conclusions, 
and  unfortunately  in  each  case — in  the  revocation 
of  the  Edict  of  Nantes,  in  the  exile  of  F^n^lon  from 
the  Court,  in  the  demolition  of  Port  Royal,  and  in 
the  introduction  of  the  Bull  Unigenitus  into  the  king¬ 
dom — Louis  made  a  wrong  decision,  and  inflicted  in 
rapid  succession  a  series  of  severe  blows  on  the  unity 
and  prosperity  of  France.  In  his  view  of  the  divine 
origin  of  the  royal  power  Louis  was  supported  by 
the  Church.  Bossuet’s  celebrated  declaration  of  the 
theory  of  divine  right  is  well  known.  He  asserted 
that  kings  were  gods,  that  they  carried  on  their  brows 
the  stamp  of  divine  authority,  and  that  they  had 
to  render  an  account  of  their  actions  to  no  man.  The 
adoption  of  this  theory  of  divine  right,  when  joined 
to  a  consciousness  of  unlimited  power,  brought  Louis 
to  believe  in  his  own  infallibility. 

On  these  principles  then  France  was  governed  fo 
nearly  a  century  and  a  half.  There  was,  however,  a 


90 


Louis  XIV. 


[1661 


striking  difference  between  the  reigns  of  Louis  XIV. 
euld  his  successors  which  was  well  expressed  by  the 
Mar^chale  de  Richelieu  when  he  said  that  “  under 
Louis  XIV.  one  dared  not  speak,  under  Louis  XV. 
one  spoke  low,  under  Louis  XVI.  one  spoke  loud.” 

Louis  XIV.  was  not  content  merely  to  accept  the 
theory  of  absolute  power ;  he  was  resolved  to  be  King 
in  fact,  and  carried  out  his  determination  during 
the  whole  of  his  long  reign.  The  first  half  of  the 
eighteenth  century  saw  the  government  of  France 
directed  by  two  prelates,  Dubois  and  Fleury,  while 
in  the  seventeenth  century  till  i66i  Richelieu  and 
Mazarin  had  controlled  the  destinies  and  adminis¬ 
tered  the  affairs  of  the  country.  Between  these  two 
periods,  that  is  from  the  death  of  Mazarin  to  the  rise 
of  Dubois,  Louis  governed  by  himself.  Under  him 
the  absolute  monarchy  became  definitely  a  distinct 
form  of  government  with  its  own  institutions,  organs, 
and  agents  responsible  to  the  King  alone.  All  rival 
authorities  and  jurisdictions  were  suppressed.  The 
States-General  were  never  summoned.  A  govern¬ 
ment  of  divine  origin  had  no  need  to  consult  the 
people,  and  Louis  himself  tells  us  in  his  memoirs  that 
it  is  certain  that  the  necessity  of  accepting  the  law 
from  the  people  is  the  worst  calamity  that  can  fall 
on  a  man  of  kingly  rank.  In  his  memoirs  too, 
he  notes  the  results  of  his  meditations  upon  Parlia¬ 
mentary  government  in  England.  “  This  subjection, 
which  places  the  sovereign  under  a  necessity  to 
receive  the  law  from  his  people,  is  the  worst  evil 
which  can  happen  to  a  man  in  our  position.”  And 
in  another  place  he  speaks  of  “  the  misery  of  those 


1661] 


Loiiis  XIV.  Rules. 


91 


who  are  abandoned  to  the  indiscreet  will  of  ttnc popu¬ 
lace  asscmblcc.”  Louis  could  never  understand  the 
English  government  by  King  and  Parliament,  and 
was  ever  urging  the  later  Stuarts  to  establish  a  des¬ 
potism  after  the  French  model.  He  was  himself 
convinced  that  an  absolute  monarchy  was  now  estab¬ 
lished  for  ever  in  France,  and  he  certainly  did  his 
best  to  prevent  his  successor  from  finding  in  exist¬ 
ence  any  authority  which  did  not  owe  its  origin  or 
character  to  the  King,  or  any  constituted  body  which 
wandered  “  from  the  bounds  of  respect.”  The  Par- 
Icincnt  oi  Paris,  which  in  spite  of  Richelieu’s  severe 
edict  of  1641  had  during  the  Fronde  period  made  an 
attempt  to  set  limits  to  the  royal  power,  was  not 
likely  to  escape.  The  pages  of  its  registers  contain¬ 
ing  an  account  of  its  action  during  the  late  troubles 
were  torn  out,  its  political  powers  were  taken  away, 
and  in  1673  an  edict  appeared  forbidding  the  Par  le¬ 
nient  to  make  any  remonstrance  until  the  royal  edicts 
were  registered.  Though  destined  in  the  eighteenth 
century  to  again  play  an  important  part  in  oppo¬ 
sition  to  the  royal  power,  the  Parleincnt  of  Paris  was 
compelled  during  the  latter  half  of  the  seventeenth 
century  to  submit  quietly  to  the  despotic  re'gime  of 
Louis  XIV. 

Nor  did  the  provincial  Estates  or  the  towns  escape. 
Richelieu  had  taken  advantage  of  the  want  of  union 
between  the  provinces,  and  had  struck  heavy  blows 
at  their  independence.  The  Estates  of  Languedoc, 
Burgundy,  and  Brittany  alone  preserved  any  sem¬ 
blance  of  their  former  influence,  and  these  were  com¬ 
pelled,  partly  by  corruption,  partly  by  intimidation. 


92 


Loziis  XIV. 


[1661 


to  submit  to  the  dictation  of  the  central  power. 
From  1672  to  the  Revolution  the  provincial  Estates 
have  practically  no  history.  In  that  year  Colbert 
crushed  some  signs  of  independence  in  Provence  and 
imprisoned  ten  deputies.  In  1673  similar  scenes 
were  enacted  in  Brittany.  A  royal  edict  was  suffi¬ 
cient  to  suppress  what  remained  in  France  of  the 
ancient  municipal  liberties.  The  task  of  securing  the 
complete  obedience  of  the  nobles  was  equally  easy. 
Louis  had  only  to  continue  and  develop  the  policy 
begun  by  Richelieu.  Their  powers  in  the  provinces 
were  jealously  watched  and  limited,  the  Princes  were 
not  placed  at  the  head  of  the  French  armies,  the 
privileges  of  the  great  officers  were  closely  curtailed. 
In  1662  the  title  of  Colonel-General  of  the  infantry 
was  suppressed  ;  and  the  powers  hitherto  entrusted 
to  the  Colonel-General  of  the  cavalry  were  curtailed. 
The  importance  of  the  marshals  was  lessened ;  the 
right  of  nominating  naval  officers  was  no  longer  to 
be  in  the  hands  of  the  Admiral  of  France,  fwhat  was 
more  important  was  the  exclusion  of  the  nobles  from 
all  government  offices.  While  preserving  their  ob¬ 
noxious  privileges,  the  nobles  ceased  to  be  a  political 
power;  nay  more,  the  King,  sympathizing  with  the 
financial  embarrassments  of  the  aristocracy,  was  not 
unwilling  to  increase  their  privileges.  They  became 
mere  courtiers  and  in  many  instances  the  King’s 
pensioners.  The  great  fault  of  the  seventeenth  cen¬ 
tury  was  that  as  a  result  of  this  policy  all  classes 
were  dislocated  and  could  not  work  together.  The 
principal  reason  why  the  Revolution  came  about  was 
not  because  the  privileged  classes  had  too  much 


1661] 


Louis  XIV.  Rules. 


93 


power  but  because  they  had  none  at  all.  The  cleav¬ 
age  between  classes  in  France  grew  wider  and  wider 
until  the  emigrations  in  1789,  and  the  succeeding 
years  forcibly  illustrated  the  real  drift  of  the  policy 
definitely  begun  by  Richelieu  and  continued  by  all 
future  rulers  of  France.  _ .  -  - 

The  power  of  the  Church  was  not  likely  to  inter¬ 
fere  with  Louis’  plans  for  the  establishment  of  a 
centralised  government.  On  the  contrary,  Louis 
derived  his  despotic  principles  in  great  measure  from 
the  Church.  To  him  the  clergy  looked  for  repres¬ 
sive  measures  against  the  Huguenots;  on  him  the 
Jesuits  relied  for  the  suppression  of  the  Jansenists, 
whose  sympathies  with  the  ParlemcJit  of  Paris  during 
the  Fronde  Louis  never  forgot;  from  him,  too,  the 
advocates  of  an  independent  Gallican  Church  hoped 
to  obtain  the  realisation  of  their  dreams.  The  estab¬ 
lishment  of  a  powerful  Christian  monarchy  bent  upon 
securing  unity  of  doctrine  was  Bossuet’s  ideal  govern¬ 
ment,  and  commended  itself  to  the  mass  of  the 
P'rench  clergy.  Louis’  reign  afforded  another  proof 
of  the  truth  of  the  dictum  that  “in  France  the 
Church  could  not  divorce  itself  from  the  Crown.’’ 

Thus  on  the  ruins  of  national,  provincial,  and 
municipal  liberties  was  raised  and  organised  a  new 
administrative  despotism  which  was  to  last  till  the 
Revolution.  At  the  head  of  this  royal  administra¬ 
tion  was  the  King,  and  under  him  the  ministers  and 
secretaries  of  state,  whose  powers  were  greatly  en¬ 
hanced  on  the  abolition  of  the  post  of  Prime  Minis¬ 
ter.  Over  all  the  province  were  placed  intendants, 
each  of  whom  had  under  him  assistants  or  S7tb- 


94 


Lotiis  XIV. 


[1661 


dclcguc's  in  each  of  his  districts.  These  intendants 
were  indefatigable  workers  taken  for  the  most  part 
from  the  middle  class.  Their  influence  was  felt  in 
all  directions,  and  their  supervision  extended  to  every 
part  of  the  province  which  was  under  their  control. 
Though  popular  with  the  nation  the  despotism  of 
Louis  XIV.  was  hard  upon  individuals.  A  system 
of  espionage  was  always  in  use  and  Icttres  de  cachet 
were  freely  used.  Liberty  of  the  subject  was  un¬ 
known.  The  well  known  incident  of  the  “  Man  with 
the  Iron  Mask  ”  is  an  illustration  of  the  tyrannical 
treatment  which  Frenchmen  had  to  puf  up  with 
under  the  Bourbon  absolutism.  In  1673  a  man  was 
arrested  by  Louvois  near  Peronne,  and  incarcerated 
in  the  Bastille.  He  was  taken  thence  to  Pignerol 
and  placed  under  the  care  of  Saint-Mars.  In  1674 
he  was  removed  to  Exilles,  and  after  thirteen  years’ 
imprisonment  there,  was  taken  to  the  Isle  of  St. 
Marguerite.  In  1698  Saint-Mars  brought  him  to  the 
Bastille,  where  he  died  in  1703.  The  name  of  this 
mysterious  prisoner  has  never  yet  been  ascertained. 
Among  numerous  suggestions  as  to  his  identity  it 
has  been  urged  that  he  was  Fouquet,  the  Armenian 
Patriarch ;  Avedie,  a  twin  brother  of  Louis  XIV., 
Colbert’s  son,  Cromwell’s  son  ;  Matthioli,  a  minister 
of  the  Duke  of  Mantua ;  De  Marchied,  a  Lorrainer, 
who  was  concerned  in  a  plot  to  murder  Louis  XIV. 
His  arrest  took  place  simultaneously  with  the  sup¬ 
pression  of  the  liberties  of  the  Parlements  and  the 
provincial  Estates,  and  marks  the  time  when 
Louis’  system  of  government  was  in  full  working 
order. 


1661] 


Louis  XIV.  Rules. 


95 


It  has  sometimes  been  urged  that  in  the  States- 
General,  in  the  Parlernent,  in  the  provincial  Estates, 
in  the  corporations,  and  in  the  members  of  the 
noblesse  and  Church  there  could  be  found  the  germs 
of  modern  constitutional  life.  “  The  various  institu¬ 
tions  existed  side  by  side,  complicated  and  clumsy 
in  their  form,  thwarting  or  supporting  one  another, 
according  to  the  positions  which  the  accident  of  their 
origin  had  given  them.”  Some  writers  lament  that 
no  attempt  was  made  to  develop  and  vivify  these 
.  germs  of  constitutional  life,  and  so  gradually  to  lead 
to  the  formation  of  a  limited  monarchy  in  which  the 
representative  principle  had  full  recognition.  The 
task  of  bringing  the  different  institutions  of  France 
into  harmony  and  friendly  action,  of  establishing  an 
equilibrium  between  the  prerogatives  of  the  Crown 
and  the  privileges  of  the  nobles,  could  only  have 
been  effected  by  the  King.  The  representative 
system  had  been  well  tried  during  the  religious  wars 
in  the  latter  half  of  the  previous  century,  and 
had  been  found  wanting.  It  had  then  been 
recognised,  even  by  advocates  of  constitutional 
government,  that  the  States-General  and  the  Parle- 
meiiiswere.  incapable  of  giving  France  a  good  govern¬ 
ment.  Henry  IV. ’s  accession  to  the  throne  marked 
the  desire  of  the  vast  majority  of  France  for  a  per¬ 
sonal  monarchy.  The  feeling  which  led  to  the  restora¬ 
tion  of  the  power  of  the  Crown  under  Henry  IV.  was, 
if  possible,  stronger  at  the  close  of  the  Fronde 
troubles.  Even  supposing  that  the  establishment  of 
constitutional  government  in  France  was  possible 
before  the  Revolution,  the  hour  and  the  man  had 


96 


Louis  XIV. 


[1661 


not  arrived  in  i66i.  To  begin  with,  the  task  of 
trusting  the  upper  classes  with  a  share  of  the  govern¬ 
ment,  and  teaching  them  to  prefer  well-regulated 
activity  to  selfishness,  and  the  task  of  raising  the 
nation  generally  to  a  sense  of  its  political  responsi¬ 
bilities,  required  a  man  of  different  calibre  from  Louis 
XIV.  The  policy  of  Richelieu  and  Mazarin,  too, 
had  rendered  any  attempt  to  remove  the  deep  divi¬ 
sions  which  sejjarated  the  different  classes  in  France 
peculiarly  difificult.  The  Fronde  had  clearly  demon¬ 
strated  the  worthlessness  of  the  nobles,  their  want  of 
any  statesmanlike  qualities,  their  sordid  selfishness. 
It  would  have  been  impossible  to  secure  their  co¬ 
operation  in  any  work  of  reform. 

Besides,  Louis’  whole  train  of  thought  took  him  in 
an  opposite  direction.  As  King  by  divine  right  his 
suppression  of  national  and  provincial  liberties  was 
merely  the  logical  outcome  of  his  opinions.  While 
vindicating  his  claims  to  absolute  authority  he  was 
fired  by  the  ambition  to  govern  his  country  benefi¬ 
cently  and  gloriously.  He  intended  to  give  France 
the  blessings  of  a  paternal  despotism  and  to  make 
her  the  leading  power  in  Europe.  There  were  many 
circumstances  that  tended  to  confirm  him  in  this 
resolution.  The  French  nation  supported  him  with 
enthusiasm.  They  had  no  wish  for  any  more  con¬ 
stitutional  experiments  ;  they  had  done  with  politi¬ 
cal  theories  and  anti-monarchical  sentiments.  They 
were  wearied  of  the  struggles  of  the  nobles  for  place 
and  power ;  they  were  sick  of  the  petty  ambitions 
of  such  men  as  Retz  and  Condd. 

A  hundred  years  later  the  struggles  and  divisions 


1661] 


Louis  XIV.  Rides. 


97 


among  the  Whigs  caused  the  English  people  to  show 
a  similar  enthusiasm  at  the  accession  of  George  III. 
Like  George  III.,  Louis  XIV.  had  a  firm  determina¬ 
tion  not  only  to  rule  but  also  to  rule  well.  Both 
kings  came  to  relieve  their  respective  kingdoms 
from  the  turmoil  of  factions  and  to  make  the  royal 
power  felt  through  the  length  and  breadth  of  the 
land.  The  factious  conduct  of  the  Whigs  brought 
about  the  restoration  of  authority  in  England  at  the 
hands  of  George  III.  The  confused  struggles  of  the 
Eronde  strengthened  and  firmly  established  the  ab¬ 
solute  monarchy  in  France.  From  Philippe  Augus¬ 
tus  to  Louis  XIV.  the  French  nation  had  looked  to 
their  kings  to  defend  them  from  invasion,  to  check 
internal  anarchy,  and  to  win  glory.  From  the  battle 
of  Bouvines  to  the  treaty  of  the  Pyrenees  royalty 
had  been  popular  in  France.  The  nation  now  ex¬ 
pected  at  the  hands  of  the  King  fresh  achievements 
and  more  military  glory,  and  Louis  found  on  Maza- 
rin’s  death  that  he  had  the  means  in  his  hand  of 
satisfying  the  national  aspirations. 

France  was  the  only  country  in  Europe  which  was 
capable  of  taking  the  initiative  in  Europe.  The  work 
of  Richelieu  and  Mazarin  had  been  thoroughly  done, 
and  there  was  practically  no  check  to  the  royal  power 
Louis  had  simply  to  follow  the  lines  of  their  policy 
which  in  itself  was  no  difficult  task,  for  France  pos 
sessed  in  Colbert  the  best  administrator,  in  Lionne, 
Servien,  Gremonville  the  best  diplomatists,  and  ii^ 
Conde  and  Turenne  the  best  generals  in  Europe. 
Corneille,  Moliere,  and  Descartes  too  were  supreme 
in  the  departments  of  heroic  poetry,  of  comedy,  and 


98 


Louis  XIV. 


[1661 


of  philosophy.  Louis  himself  was  as  firmly  bent  on 
preserving  the  dignity  of  his  Crown  and  on  securing 
glory  as  any  of  his  subjects  could  wish.  “  I  will  be 
found  ready,”  he  wrote  to  D’Estrades,  his  Ambassa¬ 
dor  in  England,  with  regard  to  a  point  d'honneiir  in 
1662,  “  to  put  my  own  state  in  jeopardy  rather  than 
tarnish  by  any  faintheartedness  the  glory  which  I  am 
seeking  in  all  things  as  the  principal  aim  of  my 
actions.”  Already  in  1661  D’Estrades,  when  estab¬ 
lishing  himself  in  England,  had  been  carefully  in¬ 
structed  “jealously  to  preserve  the  dignity  of  his 
Crown  in  any  Court  whither  he  is  going.”  He  was 
further  “  to  preserve  the  pre-eminence  to  which  the 
King  is  entitled,  allowing  no  ambassador  to  go  be¬ 
fore  him  except  the  Emperor’s  in  case  he  were  to 
send  one  to  England.”  The  famous  struggle  between 
the  French  and  Spanish  ambassadors  in  the  streets 
of  London  took  place  in  October,  1661,  and  though 
temporarily  defeated  Louis’  energetic  action  re¬ 
sulted  in  his  triumph.  No  Spanish  ambassador 
would  henceforth  compete  for  precedence  with  the 
most  Christian  King,  and  a  medal  was  struck  to 
commemorate  the  event.  In  August,  1662,  the  at¬ 
tack  of  the  Papal  guard  upon  Crequi,  the  French 
ambassador  at  Rome,  took  place,  and  again  Louis 
successfully  vindicated  his  honour  and  the  respect 
due  to  etiquette.  It  was  pretty  evident  to  France,  and 
indeed  to  Europe,  that  the  honour  of  his  country 
was  safe  in  the  hands  of  the  elegant  and  vigorous 
young  King. 

Let  us  then  sum  up  the  aims  of  Louis  XIV.  on 
Mazarin’s  death.  In  the  first  place  he  desired  to  give 


1661] 


Louis  XIV.  Rules. 


99 


France  a  good  government,  and  in  spite  of  the  many 
drawbacks  of  the  old  regime  he  may  be  said  to  have^ 
succeeded.  In  place  of  the  old  feudal  disorganisa¬ 
tion  and  independence  France  became  well  organised; 
and  well  administered.  The  royal  orders  to  the 
provinces  were  transmitted  with  rapidity  and  pre¬ 
cision.  Each  branch  of  the  administration  obeyed 
the  central  authority.  Justice  was  reorganised  and 
greatly  improved.  Louis’  code  of  civil  and  crimi¬ 
nal  law  was  in  many  ways  admirable.  The  army 
was  well  disciplined  and  ready  for  the  reforms  of 
Turenne  and  Louvois ;  the  finances  were  placed 
under  a  regular  system,  a  strong  naval  power  was 
created,  trading  companies  were  established,  the 
P'rench  colonies  in  North  America  were  strength¬ 
ened,  ports  were  opened,  canals  dug,  and  arsenals 
built.  Industry  and  commerce  were  vigorously  sup¬ 
ported,  manufacturing  companies  were  patronised, 
public  instruction  was  authorised,  and  literature  and 
arts  were  favoured.  The  royal  administration  un¬ 
doubtedly  did  great  things  for  France.  The  royal 
power  had  found  France  divided  ;  it  gave  her  union. 
It  found  France  a  mere  duchy;  it  made  her  a 
kingdom.  From  being  composed  of  nobles  and 
serfs,  France  became  consolidated  into  a  great 
nation. 

In  the  second  place  Louis  was  bent  on  jalacing 
France  in  the  forefront  of  European  nations,  and  on 
giving  to  his  House  the  position  held  in  Europe  by 
the  Hapsburg  dynasty  for  one  hundred  and  thirty 
years.  He  aspired  to  found  a  strong  Empire  which 
should  resemble  that  of  Charles  the  Great. 


lOO 


Louis  XIV. 


[1661 


Thus  on  the  death  of  Mazarin  the  French  nation 
looked  forward  to  a  period  brilliant  in  military  suc¬ 
cesses,  in  diplomacy,  and  marked  by  commercial  and 
industrial  development,  to  compensate  them  for  the 
confusion  which  had  characterised  the  government 
of  the  late  Cardinal.  In  the  young  King  the  nation 
saw  an  epitome  of  itself,  and  it  recognised  in  him  a 
man  who  sympathised  with  all  those  aspirations  which 
were  peculiarly  dear  to  the  genius  of  the  French 
people.  Louis’  youth,  his  handsome  and  attractive 
appearance,  his  dignified  and  royal  air,  appealed  to 
his  countrymen.  He  knew  that  their  admiration 
was  due  to  their  expectation  of  success  abroad,  and 
of  unity  and  prosperity  at  home.  During  the  period 
ending  with  the  death  of  Colbert  in  1683,  in  spite  of 
his  boundless  egotism  and  his  exaggerated  notion  of 
absolute  power,  he  satisfied  these  national  expecta¬ 
tions.  For  as  long  as  he  had  good  advisers,  Louis 
was  on  the  whole  free  from  the  commission  of  seri¬ 
ous  blunders  such  as  marked  the  latter  period  of  his 
life.  Colbert,  Turenne,  and  Vauban  all  belong  to 
this  period,  and  all  contributed  to  making  France 
the  leading  state  in  Europe.  From  1683  to  1715 
Louis  becomes  prematurely  old,  suffers  at  times 
from  bad  health,  allows  his  egotism  to  increase, 
while  freed  from  the  wise  counsels  of  his  great  Min¬ 
ister  he  yields  more  than  ever  to  the  advice  of 
Louvois,  of  Madame  de  Maintenon,  and  of  Le  Tel- 
lier.  He  advances  such  men  as  Chamillard  and 
Villeroi.  By  his  mistakes  he  endangers  the  po¬ 
litical  edifice  reared  in  the  earlier  portion  of  his 
reign.  On  the  other  hand  the  errors  in  taste  which 


1661] 


Lends  XIV.  Rules. 


lOI 


appear  again  and  again  between  his  mother’s  death 
and  the  death  of  his  Queen  are  not  repeated.  The 
La  Valliere  and  Montespan  episodes  are  closed,  and 
though  the  Court  may  become  dull  it  is  at  any  rate 
decorous.  Apart,  too,  from  his  many  mistakes,  his 
diplomatic  interests  are  as  keen  as  ever,  and  he  shows 
over  and  over  again  remarkable  insight  into  the 
position  of  European  politics.  His  courage  during 
the  Spanish  Succession  war  was  worthy  of  all  praise, 
and  it  received  its  reward  in  the  firm  establishment 
of  Philip  on  the  Spanish  throne. 

In  spite,  then,  of  much  that  goes  to  show  that 
Louis  was  a  second-rate  man  ;  in  spite  of  the  saying 
that  he  was  like  his  own  Versailles,  splendid,  showy, 
but  essentially  heavy,  commonplace,  and  vulgar,  in 
Louis’  character  can  be  found  many  elements  of 
greatness.  His  firm  belief  in  himself,  his  sense  of 
duty  which  led  him  to  bear  “  the  trade  of  kingship  ” 
on  his  shoulders  for  some  fifty-four  years,  the  pa¬ 
tience  with  which  he  carried  out  his  aim  of  making 
France  the  leading  power  in  Europe,  all  go  to  prove 
that  Louis  was  far  from  being  a  mere  commonplace 
man  whose  ideas  were  shallow  and  whose  acts  were 
showy  and  pretentious.  vHe  worked  regularly  and 
conscientiously  all  his  life.  He  had  a  very  elevated 
conception  of  the  responsibilities  of  the  kingly  office. 
No  amusement,  and  not  even  illness,  prevented  him 
from  performing  his  regular  duties.  “  We  are  not 
private  persons,”  he  once  said  ;  “  we  owe  ourselves 
to  the  public.”  In  his  private  life  he  was  during 
most  of  his  reign  considerate,  thoughtful  of  others, 
courteous  to  women.  He  had  all  those  qualities 


102 


Louis  XIV. 


[1661 


which  go  to  make  a  gentleman.  A  great  King  he 
was,  and  western  civilisation  owes  much  to  his  reign. 

Under  him  France  was  to  Europe  what  he  himself 
was  to  France.  She  gave  the  tone  to  European  so¬ 
ciety,  she  laid  down  the  canons  of  taste  in  literature 
and  the  arts,  she  spoke  the  decisive  word  in  politics. 

Note. — “The  Man  with  the  Iron  Mask”  (see  p.  94)  is  now  said 
to  have  been  a  certain  Lieutenant-General  de  Bulonde  who  was 
struck  with  panic  at  Coni  in  l6gi  and  raised  the  siege.  Louis  XIV. 
was  so  infuriated  at  his  conduct  that  he  incarcerated  him  in  Pignerol. 
The  literature  on  this  subject  is  considerable.  It  may  be  well  to 
remember  Louis  XIV. ’s  own  words  :  “If  you  knew  who  it  was,  you 
would  find  it  not  in  the  least  interesting.” 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  FALL  OF  FOUQUET  AND  THE  RISE  OF 
COLBERT. 

l66l. 

AZARIN  died  at  Vincennes 
between  two  and  three  o’clock 
on  the  morning  of  the  9th  of 
March,  1661.  On  being  in¬ 
formed  of  the  fact  Louis,  about 
two  hours  later,  held  his  first 
Council,  which  sat  for  some 
three  hours.  Only  three  min¬ 
isters  in  addition  to  Louis  were 
present :  Le  Tellier,  the  Secre¬ 
tary  for  War,  Lionne,  who  was  practically  the  Secre¬ 
tary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  Fouquet,  the  Procuretir- 
ge'ncral  and  the  Superintendent  of  Finance.  The 
latter  was  at  that  time  living  at  his  house  at  Saint- 
Mand^,  and  it  was  necessary  to  send  the  younger 
Brienne  to  summon  him.  Brienne  met  Fouquet  cross¬ 
ing  the  Park  in  great  haste,  and  very  angry  at  not 
having  been  told  of  the  Cardinal’s  serious  condition. 


103 


104 


Louis  XIV. 


[1661 


Later  in  the  day  the  King  returned  to  Paris,  and  the 
next  morning,  March  loth,  he  held  at  the  Louvre  a 
second  Council,  there  being  present,  in  addition  to  Le 
Tellier,  Lionne,  and  P'ouquet,  the  Chancellor  Seguier, 
the  two  Briennes,  and  the  other  Secretaries  of  State, 
Duplessis-Guenegaud,  and  La  Vrilliere.  At  this 
Council  Louis  made  his  memorable  declaration. 
“  Sir,”  he  said,  addressing  the  Chancellor,  “  I  have 
summoned  you  with  my  Ministers  and  Secretaries  of 
State  to  tell  you  that  hitherto  I  have  been  right  willing 
to  let  my  affairs  be  managed  by  the  late  Cardinal  ;  in 
the  future  I  shall  be  my  own  Prime  Minister  ( Je  serai 
a  V avenir  mon premier  ministre ) ."  He  then  forbade 
the  Chancellor,  the  Secretaries  of  State,  and  the 
Superintendent  of  Finance  to  seal  any  agreement,  to 
sign  any  despatch,  or  to  pay  any  money  without  his 
knowledge  and  order.  “  I  have  already  explained  to 
you  my  wishes,”  he  said  to  Fouquet ;  “  I  request  you 
to  make  use  of  Colbert,  whom  the  late  Cardinal  had 
recommended  to  me.”  At  this  meeting  of  the  Council 
Louis  arranged  the  order  of  each  day’s  work.  From 
nine  to  eleven  each  morning  his  inner  Council,  com¬ 
posed  of  Fouquet,  Le  Tellier,  and  Lionne,  should 
meet.  The  finances  should  be  dealt  with  in  the  after¬ 
noons.  Every  other  day  the  Chancellor  was  to  con¬ 
sult  with  him  on  judicial  matters.  Henceforward 
Louis  worked  about  five  hours  a  day  at  public  busi¬ 
ness,  never  allowing  himself  to  be  diverted  by  any 
amusement  whatever.  Henceforward  he  had  no 
Prime  Minister,  no  independent  statesman  near  him. 
The  government  was  carried  on  by  agents — gens 
d'affaires — who  were  merely  heads  of  departments 


1661] 


The  Fall  of  Fotiquct. 


105 


answerable  directly  to  himself.  George  III.  had  a 
somewhat  similar  ideal  in  part  realised  during  the 
administration  of  Lord  North. 

The  same  day  on  which  Louis  held  his  celebrated 
Council,  the  Archbishop  of  Rouen  had  an  audience. 
“  Sire,”  he  said,  “  I  have  the  honour  of  presiding  over 
the  Assembly  of  the  clergy  of  your  kingdom  ;  your 
Majesty  ordered  me  to  consult  the  Cardinal  on  all 
matters;  he  is  now  dead  ;  to  whom  does  your  Ma¬ 
jesty  wish  that  I  should  address  myself  in  the  fu¬ 
ture?  ”  “  To  me,”  was  the  reply  of  the  King. 

The  reign  of  Louis  had  in  reality  begun  ;  he  united 
in  his  own  person  the  power  and  prestige  of  the  mon¬ 
archy,  as  well  as  of  the  prime  ministership.  From 
his  ministers  he  could  expect  little  help.  Chancellor 
Seguier,  then  seventy-two  years  of  age,  had  no  states¬ 
manlike  qualities,  and  was  avaricious  and  wanting 
in  firmness.  Of  the  four  Secretaries  of  State,  La 
Vrilli^re  and  Duplessis-Guenegaud  were  trusted  by 
Louis,  but  had  no  great  capacity.  The  Count  of 
Brienne,  the  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  was  sixty- 
six  years  old  and  incapable.  His  son — a  mere  boy — 
had  the  right  of  succession  to  his  father’s  post.  For 
some  time  past,  owing  to  the  importance  of  the  for¬ 
eign  policy  of  France,  and  to  the  incajracity  of  Bri¬ 
enne,  Lionne  had  acted  as  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs.  And  he  was  now  confirmed  by 
Louis  in  his  position.  Le  Tellier,  the  Secretary  for 
War,  was  a  hardworking,  reserved  man,  more  attached 
to  his  own  interests  than  to  those  of  the  state.  He 
had  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  working  of  the 
governmental  machine,  but  he  was  essentially  a  sec- 


io6 


Louis  XIV. 


[1661 


ond-rate  man,  and  his  son-in-law,  Louvois,-  was  before 
long  associated  with  him  in  his  office.  Fouquet  re¬ 
mained  Superintendent  of  Finance.  He  knew  that 
Mazarin  had  mistrusted  him  ;  he  had  some  idea  that 
the  Cardinal  had  warned  Louis  against  him.  He 
therefore  acted  cautiously.  He  made  a  sort  of  confes¬ 
sion  to  Louis,  pointing  out  that  the  necessities  of  the 
time  were  in  great  measure  answerable  for  the  abuses 
that  had  crept  into  the  management  of  the  finances. 
Besides,  nothing  had  been  done  without  the  authority 
of  the  Cardinal.  Fouquet’s  vindication  of  himself 
was  accepted,  and  Louis,  apparently  satisfied  with 
his  promises  for  the  future,  evinced  no  desire  to  dis¬ 
inter  the  past.  The  King’s  attitude  was,  according 
to  Fouquet  himself,  benevolent  and  reassuring,  while 
his  words  were  clear,  precise,  noble,  and  worthy  of  a 
great  King. 

Louis  himself  says  that  Fouquet  was  indispensable 
to  him  at  that  moment.  He  was  aware  of  the  grave 
and  ruinous  defects  in  the  financial  system  of  France, 
but  Fouquet’s  credit  was  good,  and  the  death  of 
Mazarin  had  been  followed  by  what  amounted  to  a 
great  financial  crisis.  Till  the  new  government  was 
firmly  established,  men  were  indisposed  to  lend. 

Besides  Fouquet’s  acquaintance  with  the  internal 
economy  of  France,  he  had  also  a  very  considerable 
knowledge  of  foreign  affairs.  Louis  therefore  was 
willing  to  use  the  ablest  man  of  the  day  in  spite  of 
his  predisposition  against  him,  at  any  rate  till  the 
governmental  machine  was  in  full  working  order. 

To  guard  himself,  however,  from  any  deception, 
Louis  had  followed  the  dying  advice  of  Mazarin,  and. 


1661] 


The  Fall  of  Fouquet. 


107 


while  employing  Fouquet,  confided  in  Colbert.  By 
making  him  Intendant  of  Finance,  Louis  gave  him 
the  supervision  of  Fouquet’s  accounts.  The  day  of 
his  Council  at  the  Louvre,  the  King  had  a  secret  in¬ 
terview  with  Colbert,  who,  according  to  the  Abb^ 
Choisy,  informed  him  that  the  Cardinal  had  con¬ 
cealed  at  Sedan,  at  Brissac,  at  La  Fere,  at  Vincennes, 
and  in  the  Louvre  nearly  fifteen  millions  of  ready 
money  ;  that  apparently  his  intention  was  not  to 
leave  it  to  his  heirs,  and  that  therefore  he  intended 
it  for  the  King. 

Money  to  the  extent  of  about  eighteen  millions 
was,  it  is  said,  found  in  all  the  places  indicated,  with 
the  exception  of  the  Louvre.  This  discovery  was  of 
great  importance  in  two  ways :  in  the  first  place  it 
aided  the  advancement  of  Colbert  in  the  royal  fav¬ 
our,  but,  what  was  more  important  at  that  moment, 
it  rendered  Louis  independent  of  Fouquet. 

The  events  following  the  death  of  Mazarin  had 
taken  France  by  surprise.  Louis’  declaration  that 
henceforward  he  would  rule  without  a  Prime  Minister 
was  scoffed  at.  The  people  generally  applauded  his 
attitude,  but  those  about  the  Court  never  believed 
he  would  carry  out  his  intention.  After  the  first 
outburst  of  joy  at  the  death  of  Mazarin,  there  was  a 
widespread  feeling  that  France  had  been  deprived 
of  a  statesman  who,  by  giving  her  peace  with  Spain, 
had  begun  to  grapple  with  the  difficulties  from  which 
France  was  suffering. 

Though  at  peace  at  home  and  abroad,  France 
was  exhausted,  and  in  financial  matters  had  been 
scandalously  mismanaged.  Abuses  of  all  sorts  were 


io8 


Louis  XIV. 


[1661 


rampant ;  manufactures  and  commerce  languished  ; 
the  lower  orders  were  heavily  taxed,  justice  was  cor¬ 
rupt  at  its  source  ;  the  clergy  neglected  their  duties ; 
bands  of  discharged  soldiers  ravaged  the  country; 
the  finances  were  in  inextricable  confusion.  Gam¬ 
bling  was  popular,  and  licentious  manners  were  every¬ 
where  prevalent.  In  this  deplorable  state  of  things 
men  doubted  the  young  King’s  will  or  ability  to  re¬ 
store  prosperity  to  the  country.  He  was  apparently 
given  up  to  amusements  of  all  sorts.  It  was  also  to 
be  feared  that  under  the  influence  of  Conde  or  Tu- 
renne  he  might  plunge  France  into  war. 

The  King  being  an  unknown  quantity  to  his  sub¬ 
jects,  it  was  natural  they  should  doubt  if  he  would 
carry  out  his  resolution,  and,  breaking  with  the  tra¬ 
dition  of  the  last  fifty  years,  dispense  with  a  Prime 
Minister. 

They  did  not  know  that  for  some  time  Mazarin 
had  been  in  the  habit  of  giving  Louis  valuable  ad¬ 
vice.  They  had  no  idea  of  Louis’  resolution  not  to 
be  a  mere  roi  faineant.  They  were  also  unaware 
that  Louis’  attachment  to  Mazarin  was  the  sole 
reason  for  his  not  having  taken  the  government  of 
France  into  his  own  hands  sooner.  The  power  which 
the  courtiers  believed  would  be  wielded  by  Louis  for 
three  months  remained  in  his  hands  fifty-four  years. 

Not,  however,  till  the  fall  of  Fouquet  in  Sep¬ 
tember,  1 66 1,  was  it  realised  the  King  was  in 
earnest.  Till  then  the  ministerial  system  was  hanging 
in  the  balance.  With  the  arrest  and  overthrow  of 
Fouquet,  ministerialism  received  its  death-blow,  and 
the  re-establishment  of  the  royal  power  in  all  its  ful- 


1661] 


The  Fall  of  Fotiquet. 


109 


ness  was  effected.  Between  March  9th  and  Septem¬ 
ber  5th,  the  revolution  was  organised  and  carried 
out.  These  months  between  the  death  of  Ma- 
zarin  and  the  fall  of  Fouquet  constitute  a  most  mo¬ 
mentous  episode  in  the  history  of  France.  The 
circumstances  leading  to  his  fall,  the  greatness  of  the 
man,  his  magnificent  ideas,  the  splendour  of  his  pos¬ 
sessions,  the  blindness  of  his  confidence,  the  sudden¬ 
ness  of  his  overthrow,  and  his  weary  imprisonment, 
all  give  a  dramatic  and  melancholy  interest  to  the 
attempt  of  Fouquet  to  become  Prime  Minister. 

Till  Fouquet’s  fall  the  French  world  in  general 
showed  no  indication  that  it  realised  the  import  of 
the  King’s  firm  determination.  Convinced  that  he 
would  soon  tire  of  his  devotion  to  work,  the  cour¬ 
tiers  devoted  their  energies  to  discovering  the  suc¬ 
cessor  to  Richelieu  and  Mazarin.  Opinions  were 
widely  divided  on  this  question.  The  nobles  had 
hoped  to  see  Villeroi  or  Conde  take  the  first  place 
in  the  royal  Council.  When  neither  of  these  men 
was  summoned  to  advise  Louis,  it  was  thought  that 
the  Cardinal  de  Retz  would  be  chosen.  His  talents 
fitted  him  for  the  post,  he  was  the  one  man  in  France 
whose  power  Mazarin  dreaded  to  the  last.  But 
Louis  was  as  opposed  as  Mazarin  to  De  Retz  and  his 
friends  the  Jansenists.  Some  thought  that  the  solid 
qualities  of  Le  Tellier  marked  him  out  as  the  suc¬ 
cessful  candidate.  But  of  the  three  ministers  to 
whom  Louis  had  openly  given  his  confidence,  Li- 
onne,  Le  Tellier,  and  Fouquet,  the  last  named  was 
the  only  one  who  possessed  the  qualities  necessary 
for  a  Prime  Minister. 


I  lO 


Louis  XIV. 


[1661 


“  It  was  generally  believed,”  says  Madame  de  La 
Fayette,  “  that  the  Superintendent  would  be  called 
upon  to  take  the  Government  into  his  hands.”  There 
is  no  doubt  whatever  that  Fouquet  himself  expected 
eventually  to  succeed  Mazarin.  He  did  not  believe 
in  Louis’  perseverance  ;  he  was  convinced  that  in  a 
few  months  the  King  would  gladly  delegate  his 
power  to  a  minister.  What  rival  had  Fouquet  to 
fear?  He  was  well  aware  of  his  intellectual  superi¬ 
ority  to  Le  Tellier  and  Lionne  ;  he  had  already  been 
entrusted  with  important  matters  touching  not  only 
the  internal  condition  but  also  the  foreign  relations 
of  France;  he  had  frequent  confidential  interviews 
with  the  King.  His  relations,  too,  with  the  Court 
gave  him  every  confidence.  The  number  of  his 
friends  and  clients  and  pensioners  was  enormous ; 
he  was  favoured  by  the  Queen-Mother  ;  in  the  Coun¬ 
cil  itself,  though  Le  Tellier  might  be  hostile,  Lionne 
was  practically  in  his  pay. 

His  way  seemed  so  clear,  the  confidence  of  the 
King  so  assured,  that  Fouquet  neglected  to  take  any 
precautions,  and  believed  that  within  a  very  short 
time  he  would  be  at  the  head  of  affairs. 

As  first  minister  of  a  great  king  he  saw  opening 
out  before  him  a  wide  field  for  his  talents.  He  was 
resolved  to  begin  his  life  over  again,  to  make  a  fresh 
start,  to  enter  as  it  were  upon  a  new  career.  If  he 
could  only  become  Chancellor  he  would  have  a  splen¬ 
did  opportunity  of  carryingout  his  ambitious  projects. 
The  Chancellor  had  great  power ;  nothing  could  be 
be  done  without  his  knowledge,  for  he  signed  and 
sealed  all  documents.  He  was  present,  too,  at  the 


1661] 


The  Fall  of  Fotiqtiel. 


1 1 1 


meetings  of  \}s\&  Parlemeiit .  Fouquet  therefore  aimed 
at  ousting  Seguier  from  the  Chancellorship  as  soon 
as  possible. 

The  restoration  of  the  finances  begun  by  him 
shortly  after  the  peace  of  the  Pyrenees  was,  how¬ 
ever,  his  immediate  care.  He  aimed  at  nothing  less 
than  a  complete  reorganisation  of  the  whole  finan¬ 
cial  system.  He  drew  up  a  series  of  tables  showing 
the  expenditure  of  each  department  for  a  number 
of  years.  He  formed  plans  which  were  afterwards 
adopted  and  carried  out  by  Colbert  for  the  abolition 
of  many  glaring  abuses  in  the  system  of  taxation. 

But  he  took  no  precautions  against  the  machina¬ 
tions  of  his  enemies :  he  was  unaware  that  Colbert, 
implicitly  trusted  by  Louis,  was  occupied  in  point¬ 
ing  out  the  shortcomings  in  his  career,  and  un¬ 
doubtedly  making  the  worst  of  the  case  against  him. 
Colbert  also  watched  Fouquet’s  accounts  very  closely 
in  every  respect.  It  was  shown  at  a  Council  held  at 
Fontainebleau  for  the  reorganisation  of  colonial 
commerce  that  Fouquet  had  been  negligent  over 
details,  while  on  a  suggestion  made  by  him  that 
Belle-isle  could  provide  a  good  harbour  for  the  fleet, 
Colbert  sent  spies  to  Belle-isle  to  report  on  the  works 
then  in  progress. 

The  history  of  that  eventful  summer  of  iC6i  is 
then  full  of  interest.  The  continuous  series  of  gaie¬ 
ties  at  P'ontainebleau  proceeded  as  though  ministers 
and  King  were  not  simultaneously  engaged  in  labori¬ 
ous  and  anxious  work.  And  all  through  these  sum¬ 
mer  months  the  overthrow  of  P'ouquet  was  being 
quietly  planned,  while  the  minister  himself,  uncon- 


I  I  2 


Lotcis  XIV. 


[1661 


scious  of  the  seriousness  of  the  crisis,  was  counting 
the  days  to  the  time  when  he  should  govern  France 
as  the  Prime  Minister  of  Louis  XIV. 

On  April  20th  the  Court  moved  to  Fontainebleau, 
where  it  was  joined  a  few  days  later  by  Fouquet. 
The  memoirs  of  the  times  fully  describe  its  doings. 
Round  the  young  King  was  a  galaxy  of  rank  and 
beauty.  Anne  of  Austria,  the  King’s  mother,  and 
Marie  Th6rese,  his  wife,  were  there.  There,  too, 
was  Henrietta  of  England,  the  bride  of  the  King’s 
brother,  the  Duke  of  Orleans.  The  Duke  of  Lor¬ 
raine  was  there  to  render  homage  for  his  duchy,  and 
among  the  princes  and  nobles  were  to  be  seen  Beau¬ 
fort  and  Conde,  both  so  celebrated  during  the  King’s 
minority.  It  was  a  time  of  fetes  and  of  dances,  of 
expeditions  on  land  by  day,  and  of  entertainments 
on  the  lake  and  promenades  in  the  woods  by  night, 
these  latter  often  lasting  till  two  or  three  in  the 
morning.  The  future  was  bright  with  many  a  hope  ; 
the  present  was  dazzling  and  fascinating.  Men 
gambled  recklessly  with  borrowed  money  ;  the  King 
himself  was  not  averse  to  high  play.  A  theatre  was 
erected  in  the  park  at  Fontainebleau,  and  a  new 
comedy  was  played.  Lulli  was  installed  superin¬ 
tendent  of  the  royal  music.  In  the  Ballet  des  Sai- 
sons  the  King  himself  represented  Spring,  and  danced 
with  his  usual  grace  and  skill. 

This  mode  of  life  at  Fontainebleau — “a  delirium 
of  ambition,  pleasure,  and  love” — lasted  through  the 
summer  months.  The  King’s  open  admiration  for 
his  sister-in-law,  followed  by  his  attachment  to  Louise 
de  la  Valliere,  are  well  known  incidents  of  this  visit 
of  the  Court  to  Fontainebleau. 


LOUISE  DE  LA  VALLIERE. 


i 


1661] 


The  Fall  of  Fouqiiet. 


113 


The  other  side  of  the  picture  is  of  more  interest  to 
the  historian.  The  King  never  allowed  his  love  of 
pleasure  to  interfere  with  his  self-imposed  duties.  His 
persistent  will,  his  power  of  work,  his  delight  in  grap¬ 
pling  with  details,  his  untiring  energy,  and  withal  his 
capacity  for  dissimulation  was  never  so  clearly  evi¬ 
denced  as  during  the  summer  of  1661.  Workingwith 
his  ministers  five  or  six  hours  a  day,  he  read  all  let¬ 
ters  from  ambassadors  and  answered  them  himself. 

Negotiations  were  in  progress  with  Sweden,  Po¬ 
land,  Holland,  and  England.  Fouquet’s  acquaint¬ 
ance  with  foreign  affairs,  only  equalled  by  that  of 
Lionne,  was  fully  appreciated  by  Louis,  who  em¬ 
ployed  him  specially  in  the  attempt  to  bring  about 
a  marriage  alliance  between  England  and  Portugal. 

Both  Turenne  and  Fouquet  were  of  opinion  that 
greater  advantages  should  have  been  secured  to 
France  by  the  treaty  of  the  Pyrenees.  That  treaty 
rendered  France  unable  to  aid  Portugal  directly,  and 
it  was  of  great  importance  to  France  that  England 
should  aid  the  Portuguese  to  secure  their  inde¬ 
pendence.  On  June  22,  1661,  the  marriage  contract 
was  signed  between  Charles  H.  and  the  Infanta  of 
Portugal.  The  promise  of  large  subsidies  by  Louis 
had  won  over  the  English  King,  and  the  weight  of 
England  was  thrown  on  to  the  side  of  Portugal. 

In  Poland  Fouquet  aided,  with  men  and  money, 
the  party  headed  by  the  Queen,  who  had  been  a 
French  princess,  in  their  endeavours  to  get  the  Duke 
of  Enghien  named  as  successor  to  the  reigning  mon¬ 
arch.  With  Sweden  and  Holland  intimate  relations 
were  renewed,  though  with  the  latter  country  a 
treaty  was  not  made  till  the  following  year. 


114 


Louis  XIV. 


L1661 


The  internal  affairs  of  France  also  occupied  much 
of  the  King’s  attention.  He  gave  large  sums  to  the 
German  Princes;  he  enlarged  and  adorned  Fontaine¬ 
bleau,  Vincennes,  the  Tuileries,  and  Versailles. 
Fouquet  had  to  provide  for  this  expenditure,  and  all 
this  time  his  work  was  closely  supervised  by  Col¬ 
bert,  who  criticised  and  undoubtedly  made  the 
most  of,  any  shortcomings  in  the  Superintendent’s 
accounts.  The  Abbe  Choisy  declares  on  the  author¬ 
ity  of  Pellisson,  the  ablest  of  Fouquet’s  clerks,  that 
Fouquet  persisted  in  making  the  state  of  things 
worse  than  they  were,  that  Colbert  pointed  out  daily 
to  the  King  Fouquet’s  errors,  and  that  when  Fou¬ 
quet,  ignorant  and  unaware  of  Colbert’s  advice  to 
Louis,  adhered  to  his  original  statements,  the  King, 
not  unnaturally  enraged  at  this  trickery,  resolved 
on  his  overthrow  as  early  as  the  4th  of  May.  In 
writing  to  his  mother  on  the  evening  of  September 
5th,  the  date  of  the  arrest  of  Fouquet,  he  says  that 
the  Minister’s  overthrow  had  been  decided  upon  for 
four  months.  Fouquet  seems  to  have  had  no  no¬ 
tion  either  of  the  King’s  feelings  towards  him,  or  of 
the  schemes  of  his  enemies.  He  was  apparently 
trusted  by  the  King ;  he  saw  him  daily  in  the  course 
of  business.  Public  opinion  seemed  in  favour  of  his 
appointment  as  First  Minister.  The  leading  mer¬ 
chants  were  avowedly  convinced  that  he  was  the 
only  man  capable  of  restoring  order  in  the  finances. 

But  Fouquet  had  no  adequate  justification  for 
trusting  blindly  to  mere  appearances.  It  is  said  that 
on  the  occasion  of  his  so-called  confession  to  Louis, 
his  intimate  friends,  Pellisson,  who  acted  as  his  head 


1661] 


The  Fall  of  Fouquet. 


115 


clerk,  De  Lome,  and  Bruant,  urged  him  to  give  the 
King  a  full  and  accurate  account  of  the  financial 
state  of  the  kingdom. 

Though  Fouquet  ridiculed  the  idea  of  any  danger, 
he  received,  about  the  time  of  the  arrival  of  the 
Court  at  Fontainebleau,  two  very  distinct  warnings. 
The  appointment  of  Colbert  to  the  post  of  Co7i- 
troleur-gdneral  and  the  presentation  of  the  govern¬ 
ment  of  Touraine  to  the  Due  de  Saint-Aignan  in 
preference  to  Fouquet’s  brother,  Gilles,  should  have 
been  sufficient  to  show  him  that  it  was  advisable  to 
walk  warily.  Many  indirect  warnings  had  already 
reached  him.  One  of  Colbert’s  clerks  had  asserted 
that  his  master  would  be  the  next  Superintendent ; 
another  had  in  a  wine-shop  declared  that  Fouquet’s 
fall  was  imminent,  and  that  the  Superintendent  him¬ 
self  neglected  his  duties  and  allowed  his  underlings 
to  rob  the  State.  On  another  occasion  several  mem¬ 
bers  of  the  household  of  the  Prince  of  Conde  boldly 
said  that  France  had  never  been  governed  more  dis¬ 
astrously,  and  that  they  were  a  hundred  times  worse 
off  than  in  the  days  of  Mazarin.  These  vague  ac¬ 
cusations  and  still  vaguer  threats  were  in  the  air. 
They  came  no  one  exactly  knew  whence,  but  they 
were  taken  up  and  repeated  even  in  the  ante-cham¬ 
bers  of  the  Queen,  and  of  Anne  of  Austria. 

In  those  days,  owing  to  the  absence  of  a  free 
press,  it  was  difficult  to  obtain  accurate  information. 
Hence  it  was  absolutely  necessary  for  a  minister  to 
provide  himself  with  spies,  taken,  not  only  from  the 
lower  orders,  but  also  from  the  royal  attendants. 
Ladies-in-waiting  were  much  sought  after  for  espion- 


Louis  XIV, 


[1661 


1 16 


age  purposes,  as  they  possessed  unrivalled  opportuni¬ 
ties  for  observation.  Fouquet,  though  over-confident 
to  an  extraordinary  extent,  had  not  entirely 
neglected  this  valuable  source  of  information.  He 
had  already  in  his  employ  Mademoiselle  de  Menne- 
ville,  whom  he  interviewed  secretly  in  Paris  at  his 
hotel  in  the  Rue  Croix-des-Petits-Champs,  and  at 
Fontainebleau,  at  the  house  of  a  woman  called  La 
Coz,  who  lived  on  the  canal.  In  addition,  he  em¬ 
ployed  Mademoiselle  du  Fouilloux,  who  also  be¬ 
longed  to  the  Court. 

But  with  his  hands  full  of  business,  and  his  mind 
undisturbed  by  any  presages  of  coming  evil,  Fou¬ 
quet  was  hopelessly  beaten  in  the  game  of  intrigue, 
and  by  his  mistakes  played  into  the  hands  of 
his  enemies.  He  was  engaged,  though  he  was  un¬ 
aware  of  its  significance,  in  a  struggle  for  supremacy 
with  Le  Tellier  and  Colbert.  Of  these  the  former, 
a  prudent,  hard-working,  avaricious  man,  had  little 
in  common  with  the  audacious  Fouquet.  Nothing 
could  be  more  repugnant  to  him  than  the  possibility 
of  working  under  the  Superintendent.  “  He  thought 
moreover,”  says  Madame  de  Motteville,  “  that  Col¬ 
bert,  who  had  been  his  agent,  would  always  refer  to 
him.”  He  therefore  warmly  supported  Louis’  inten¬ 
tion  of  having  no  Prime  Minister,  and  joined  with 
Colbert  in  a  great  effort  to  overthrow  their  common 
rival.  The  latter  had,  on  Fouquet’s  appointment  in 
1653  to  the  post  of  Superintendent  of  Finance,  become 
his  enemy  and  rival.  During  the  last  year  of  Mazar- 
in’s  life,  the  struggle  between  the  two  had  become 
fiercer  than  ever ;  Colbert  had  gone  so  far  as  even  to 


1661] 


The  Fall  of  Fouquet. 


117 


demand  a  Chamber  of  Justice  to  overhaul  the 
finances.  In  his  celebrated  memoir  of  September, 
1659,  he  openly  accused  Fouquet  of  malversation, 
and  of  advancing  his  relatives  and  friends  by  means 
of  the  public  money.  It  required  all  the  arts  of 
Mazarin  to  patch  up  this  quarrel.  Whatever  were 
the  faults  of  Fouquet,  whatever  the  merits  of  the 
memoir,  Colbert’s  hostility  stood  revealed.  After  the 
death  of  Mazarin,  Colbert,  as  Intendant  of  Finance, 
had  excellent  opportunities  for  undermining  his 
rival.  In  fact,  between  Louis,  Colbert,  and  Le  Tel- 
lier,  there  was  practically  a  conspiracy,  (though  Louis 
asserts  in  his  letter  to  his  mother  on  September  5th, 
that  she  and  Le  Tellier  alone  know  of  his  project, 
and  the  latter  only  two  days  before  its  execution), 
and  probably  as  early  as  the  beginning  of  May  the 
fall  of  Fouquet  was  determined  upon.  Unfortu¬ 
nately  for  Fouquet,  a  powerful  cabal  had  been  formed 
against  him  by  the  famous  intriguer  of  the  seven¬ 
teenth  century,  the  Duchess  of  Chevreuse.  Nothing 
is  known  definitely  of  the  motives  which  prompted 
this  lady,  now  sixty  years  of  age,  to  take  the  lead  in 
the  plot.  The  only  clue  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact 
that  in  1657  she  had  married  for  the  third  time  a 
certain  De  Laigne  who  had  a  grudge  against  Fouquet. 
On  June  27th,  Anne  of  Austria  paid  the  Duchess  a 
visit  at  Dampierre,  where  it  is  said  she  met  Le  Tel¬ 
lier  and  Colbert.  At  any  rate,  the  Queen-Mother 
was  won  over  to  the  ranks  of  Fouquet’s  enemies. 
Warned  by  Pellison,  Gourville,  and  other  friends,  of 
the  intrigues  of  the  Duchess,  the  infatuated  Fouquet 
made  two  great  blunders.  In  the  first  place,  he  taxed 


ii8 


Louis  XIV 


[1661 


Anne  with  caballing  with  his  enemies.  So  cutting 
was  his  language  that  Anne  refused  to  hold  any 
further  intercourse  with  him.  And  secondly,  though 
warned  by  Madame  de  Fouilloux  of  the  relations 
existing  between  the  King  and  Louise  de  la  Valliere, 
he  endeavoured  to  gain  over  the  latter  to  his  inter¬ 
est.  So  clumsily  did  he  make  the  attempt,  so  en¬ 
tirely  did  he  misjudge  the  character  of  the  young 
maid  of  honour,  that,  regarding  herself  insulted  by 
his  remarks,  Louise  de  la  Valliere  complained  bit¬ 
terly  to  the  King.  Louis  was  hurt  in  his  tenderest 
point,  and  from  that  moment  Fouquet’s  overthrow 
was  certain.  Colbert,  Le  Tellier,  and  Seguier  were 
opposed  to  him  ;  he  had  broken  with  Anne  of 
Austria ;  he  had  mortally  insulted  Louis.  Had  he 
been  simply  Superintendent  of  Finance,  he  could 
have  been  attacked  and  overthrown  at  once  ;  but 
being  Procureur-gineral,  he  was  under  the  protection 
of  the  Parlement^  and  could  only  be  attacked 
through  the  Parlement.  As  long  as  he  remained 
Procureur-general  he  was  safe.  In  order  to  induce 
him  to  resign  his  office  of  Procureur-general,  the 
King  and  Colbert  resorted  to  a  stratagem.  It  was 
pointed  out  to  Fouquet  that  it  was  desirable  to  re¬ 
duce  the  power  of  the  Parlement,  that  in  this  work 
the  King  relied  on  Fouquet’s  assistance,  and  that 
obviously  it  was  inconvenient  for  him  to  continue  to 
hold  the  office  of  Procureiir-gMral  during  an  attack 
on  the  Parlement' s  privileges.  It  was  hinted,  more¬ 
over,  that  he  could  not  be  Chancellor  and  Procureur- 
gMral  at  the  same  time,  and  it  was  openly  spread 
abroad  that  he  was  to  be  appointed  Chancellor.  In 


1661] 


The  Fall  of  Fouqitet. 


119 


spite  of  the  warnings  of  his  friends,  Fouquet,  on 
August  1 2th,  sold  his  office  to  M.  de  Harlay,  and 
presented  the  King  with  a  million  livres.  “  Tout  va 
bien,”  said  Louis  to  Colbert,  “  il  s’enterre  de  lui- 
meme.” 

On  August  17th  Louis  was  present  at  the  cele¬ 
brated  fete  given  in  his  honour  by  Fouquet  at  his 
splendid  residence  of  Vaux.  Even  if  the  story  of 
the  discovery  by  Louis  of  a  picture  of  La  Valliere 
in  one  of  the  rooms  be  not  true,  the  magnificence 
displayed  on  all  sides  only  Increased  further  the 
determination  of  the  King  to  ruin  his  powerful 
subject. 

After  three  weeks  of  intermittent  anxiety  on  the 
part  of  Fouquet,  who,  tilt  the  last,  was  uncertain 
whether  he  was  going  to  be  Prime  Minister,  or 
whether  his  fall  was  imminent,  whether  he  should 
fly  to  Venice,  or  whether  he  should  remain,  the 
blow  fell  on  September  5th  at  Nantes,  whither 
Louis  had  gone  to  meet  the  Estates  of  Brittany. 

The  arrest  itself  was  organised  by  Louis.  In 
order  to  lull  the  suspicions  of  Fouquet,  he  gave  his 
orders  verbally  to  a  subaltern,  D’Artagnan,  on  thd” 
morning  of  Sunday,  the  4th  of  September.  The 
next  day,  under  pretence  of  hunting,  the  King  held 
his  Council  earlier  than  usual.  After  a  short  meet¬ 
ing,  Colbert,  Lionne,  and  Tellier  retired,  but  the 
King  kept  Fouquet  back  for  a  short  time  under  vari¬ 
ous  pretexts,  pretending  to  look  for  papers,  until  he 
saw  from  the  window  that  D’Artagnan  was  at  his 
post.  But  whether  he  had  been  warned  or  not,  cer¬ 
tain  it  is  that  Fouquet  escaped  the  notice  of  D’Ar- 


I  20 


Louis  XIV 


[1661 


tagnan,  who  thereupon  sent  a  messenger  to  Louis 
informing  him  of  the  Superintendent’s  escape. 

Louis  fell  into  a  violent  rage ;  but  was  relieved 
shortly  afterwards  by  hearing  that  D’Artagnan  had 
succeeded  in  arresting  Fouquet  in  the  “  Place  de  la 
Cathedrale.”  Thus  fell  Fouquet  on  the  third  anni¬ 
versary  of  his  acquisition  of  Belle-isle.  The  forma¬ 
tion  of  a  special  court  to  try  him,  the  length  of  his 
trial,  which  lasted  three  years,  the  obvious  falseness 
of  most  of  the  charges,  the  influence  exercised  by 
Louis  over  the  judges,  the  courage  and  ability  shown 
by  the  prisoner,  his  intimate  relations  with  all  the 
ablest  men  of  the  day,  his  numerous  and  varied  in¬ 
terests,  all  combined  to  focus  the  interest  and  the 
sympathy  of  France  upon  Nicolas  Fouquet.  This 
sympathy  was  considerably  augmented  when  Louis 
refused  to  abide  by  the  verdict  of  the  judges,  and 
changed  the  sentence  of  exile  to  one  of  perpetual 
imprisonment. 

The  charges  fell  roughly  into  two  heads,  malver¬ 
sation  and  treason.  He  was  accused  of  corruption 
and  dishonesty  in  the  management  of  the  finances, 
of  appropriating  to  himself  public  money,  of  pre¬ 
paring  to  revive  civil  war  in  France,  and  for  that 
purpose  of  fortifying  Belle-isle.  The  charges  for 
treason  were  absurd,  those  of  malversation  were  to 
some  extent  true.  But  dishonesty  was  rife  among 
all  the  official  and  ministerial  class.  Judged  by 
modern  standards,  Mazarin  was  as  guilty  as  Fou¬ 
quet.  The  whole  financial  system  was  rotten,  and 
remained  so,  with  intervals  of  improvement,  until 
the  Revolution  and  after. 


1661] 


The  Fall  of  FoiiqueL 


I  2  I 


The  trial  of  Fouquet  was  a  seventeenth-century 
Warren  Hastings  trial.  It  was  necessary  to  make  an 
example  in  the  case  of  the  French  Finance  Minister 
as  it  was  in  the  case  of  the  Indian  Governor-General. 
Had  Fouquet  been  proved  innocent  it  would  have 
been  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  punish  smaller 
men,  or  to  annul  the  ruinous  engagements  into 
which  he  had  entered.  Louis,  moreover,  simply 
dared  not  allow  Fouquet  to  be  at  large.  He  feared 
that  the  powerful  and  captivating  minister  might 
somehow  interfere  with  his  scheme  of  governing 
France  after  his  own  method.  Of  Fouquet’s  many 
friends  La  Fontaine  remained  especially  faithful  to 
him  in  his  misfortunes,  and  dared  to  address  Louis 
in  favour  of  the  fallen  minister  now  about  to  undergo 
imprisonment  for  the  rest  of  his  life. 

“  Lorsque  sur  cette  mer  on  vogue  a  pleines  voiles, 

Qu’on  croit  avoir  pour  soi  les  vents  et  les  etoiles, 

II  est  bien  malaise  de  regler  ses  desirs  : 

Le  plus  sage  s’endort  sur  la  foi  des  Zephyrs. 

II  est  assez  puni  par  son  sort  rigoureux, 

Et  e’est  etre  innocent  que  d’etre  malheureux.  ” 

The  fall  of  Fouquet  marks  an  epoch  in  the  history 
of  France.  The  reign  of  Louis  XIV.  really  began 
from  the  date  of  the  Superintendent’s  arrest.  The 
fall  of  Fouquet  was  not  the  fall  of  an  ordinary  min¬ 
ister,  it  was  the  fall  of  a  system  of  government  which 
had  lasted  half  a  century.  It  was  the  end  of  the 
period  of  Richelieu  and  of  Mazarin,  of  the  Hotel  de 
Rambouillet  and  of  the  Fronde,  with  all  the  in¬ 
trigues  and  activities  of  that  time.  Resistance  to 


122 


Lords  XIV. 


[1661 


Louis’  scheme  of  government  was  now  over.  Hence¬ 
forward  he  could  exercise  his  power  without  control 
or  interference.  Louis’  determination  to  have  no 
Prime  Minister  was  revealed  to  the  world.  The 
manner  in  which  Fouquet’s  overthrow  was  brought 
about  throws  much  light  on  the  King’s  character. 
During  the  period  from  April  to  September,  Louis’ 
capacity  for  combining  work  and  amusement  re¬ 
ceives  abundant  illustrations.  The  whole  episode 
too  proves  that  Louis  had  not  only  thoroughly 
imbibed  Mazarin’s  lessons  on  statecraft,  but  had 
also  a  natural  gift  for  dissimulation  which  the  Car¬ 
dinal  himself  might  have  envied.  His  dislike  of  any¬ 
body  who  had  been  connected  with  the  Fronde 
movement  was  strong,  and  this  no  doubt  affected 
his  attitude  towards  Fouquet  as  it  did  his  relations 
with  De  Retz  and  the  Jansenists.  And  Louis  had 
ample  justification  for  his  watchful  and  suspicious 
attitude.  Even  as  late  as  1659  the  spirit  of  insub¬ 
ordination  had  reappeared  during  the  negotiations 
with  Spain.  Normandy  was  averse  to  the  treaty  of 
the  Pyrenees,  and  gave  Mazarin  no  little  anxiety. 
Turenne,  in  direct  contravention  to  Mazarin’s 
orders,  had  sent  money  and  men  to  the  Duke  of 
York  to  aid  the  restoration  of  Charles  H.  In  order 
to  check  any  reawakening  of  the  old  Fronde  spirit, 
it  was  necessary  to  strike  hard.  The  whole  tenour  of 
Louis’  policy  towards  the  great  nobles  forbade  the 
existence  in  France  of  a  man  as  powerful  and  inde¬ 
pendent  as  Fouquet.  Dependence  on  the  King  was 
to  be  the  sole  avenue  to  advancement  open  to  the 
noble  class. 


1661] 


The  Fall  of  Fouquct. 


123 


The  precautions  adopted  by  Louis  to  avoid  failure, 
and  the  measures  taken  after  the  arrest  to  secure 
Fouquet’s  papers,  would  seem  to  show  that  Louis 
either  tended  to  overrate  the  influence  of  Fouquet 
in  the  West,  or  was  only  dimly  conscious  of  the  ex¬ 
tent  of  his  own  power.  The  influence  of  women, 
and  the  constant  use  of  intrigue  in  this,  as  in  most 
periods  of  French  history,  is  amply  exemplified 
during  the  months  preceding  Fouquet’s  fall,  while 
the  practical  impossibility  of  arresting  the  Minister 
as  long  as  he  was  Proctireur-gcncral  shows  that  the 
privileges  of  that  legal  corporation,  the  Parlement 
of  Paris,  could  not  lightly  be  infringed,  even  by  the 
most  despotic  of  kings. 

Fouquet’s  fall  may  unquestionably  have  been 
hastened  by  the  machinations  of  his  enemies  who 
kept  in  the  background.  For  while  these  three 
months  can  be  characterised  as  a  struggle  between 
the  King  and  the  ministerial  system  as  it  existed 
under  Richelieu  and  Mazarin,  they  can  also  be 
described  as  a  struggle  for  supremacy  between  rival 
ministers.  The  Dutch  envoy  had  noted  that  Fou¬ 
quet  was  the  most  formidable  man  in  France:  the 
merchants  were  agreed  that  he  alone  could  restore 
order  in  the  finances. 

So  formidable  a  subject  could  not  exist  in  the  new 
monarchical  system  which  Louis  intended  to  inaugu¬ 
rate.  And  the  justification  of  Fouquet’s  fall  is  to 
be  found  in  Colbert’s  administration,  which  conclu¬ 
sively  proved  that  the  opinion  of  the  leading  mer¬ 
chants  in  France  was  erroneous. 

Fouquet  was,  with  all  his  faults,  a  magnificent 


Louis  XIV. 


[1661 


I  24 

figure.  But  while  he  essentially  belonged  to  the 
Fronde  period,  Colbert  was  a  man  after  Louis’  own 
heart.  He  represented  what  was  dear  to  Louis — 
precision,  order,  regularity,  and  certainty.  He  was, 
moreover,  honest  and  exact.  Whatever  were  his 
motives  in  attacking  Fouquet  in  1659,  he  had  at  any 
rate  justified  that  attack  by  showing  in  his  memoir 
to  Mazarin  that  not  half  of  the  taxes  reached  the 
King. 

The  existing  financial  system,  for  which  no  one 
was  especially  responsible,  was  an  utterly  rotten  one. 
The  country  was  going  through  a  period  of  financial 
chaos.  Those  who  had  the  fiscal  administration  in 
their  hands,  from  the  Superintendent  to  the  meanest 
of  the  tax-farmers,  robbed  and  misappropriated  just 
as  they  pleased.  The  government  loans  were  ar¬ 
ranged  so  as  to  aggrandise  most  the  individuals  who 
were  interested  in  them,  while  not  only  the  nobles, 
but  many  others  who  had  no  legal  exemption  from 
taxation,  paid  no  taxes. 

It  is  true  that  Colbert,  in  his  anxiety  to  succeed 
Fouquet  as  Finance  Minister,  made  the  worst  of  the 
case  against  his  rival.  There  is  no  doubt,  however, 
that  France  benefited  enormously  from  the  change 
of  ministers,  and  the  years  from  1661  to  1672  were 
among  the  most  prosperous  that  France  had  ever 
seen.  In  1665  Colbert  was  made  Contrdleur-gc'neral 
and  in  1669  Minister  of  the  Marine,  and  also  Minister 
of  Commerce,  of  the  Colonies,  and  of  the  Royal  Build¬ 
ings.  Over  every  department  except  that  of  War, 
Colbert  was  practically  supreme.  And  Louis  was 
justified  in  placing  this  confidence  in  his  minister. 


1661] 


The  Rise  of  Colbert. 


125 


To  Colbert  Louis  owed  much  of  his  military  and 
other  successes,  to  Colbert  was  due  the  immense 
impetus  now  given  to  the  manufactures  and  the 
commerce  of  France.  Colbert  first  set  to  work  to 
establish  order  in  the  finances,  to  “unravel  the  terri¬ 
ble  confusion  in  which  Fouquet  had  entangled  his 
affairs,”  and  to  reorganise  the  system  of  taxation. 
But  though  he  could  not  diminish  the  number  of 
privileged  individuals,  he  resisted  fraudulent  claims 
to  exemption  from  taxation,  he  lightened  direct  by 
an  increase  of  indirect  taxation,  from  which  the 
privileged  classes  could  not  escape,  he  improved  the 
methods  of  collection,  and  by  these  means  he  intro¬ 
duced  order  and  economy  where  chaos  had  before 
reigned.  Not  content  to  merely  reorganise  the 
finances,  he  turned  his  attention  to  augmenting  the 
sources  of  national  wealth,  and  determined  to  enrich 
France  by  improving  her  trade  and  commerce.  In 
1665  the  Council  of  Commerce  was  reorganised,  and 
Colbert  began  his  great  work.  Manufactures  were 
fostered  and  new  industries  were  introduced,  inven¬ 
tions  were  protected,  foreign  workmen  were  invited 
into  the  country,  and  French  workmen  were  for¬ 
bidden  to  emigrate.  Good  roads  and  canals  were 
projected,  Dunkirk  and  Marseilles  were  declared 
free  ports,  and  the  duties  levied  on  the  passage  of 
goods  between  the  several  French  provinces  were 
equalised.  Unfortunately,  he  did  little  for  agricul¬ 
ture,  in  which  lay  the  true  wealth  of  France.  More¬ 
over,  he  maintained  the  old  corporation  system  by 
which  each  industry  remained  in  the  hands  of  a  cer¬ 
tain  number  of  privileged  bourgeois,  and  thus  the 


Louis  XIV. 


[1661 


I  26 


lower  orders  had  no  opportunities  for  advancement. 
But  apart  from  his  steady  encouragement  of  manufac¬ 
tures,  Colbert  certainly  did  much  for  French  com¬ 
merce.  He  was  ever  an  advocate  of  hostile  tariffs 
and  protection,  but  he  encouraged  trade  and  sup¬ 
ported  the  colonies.  Several  new  companies  were 
founded.  A  privileged  East  India  Company  was 
formed  in  1664,  followed  in  the  same  year  by  a 
West  India  Company,  and  later  by  the  Company  of 
the  West,  and  commercial  companies  to  trade  in  the 
North  and  in  the  Levant. 

The  colonies  were  equally  cared  for  and  extended. 
In  the  West  Indies  France  held  St.  Domingo,  Mar¬ 
tinique,  Guadaloupe,  Tobago,  Grenada,  and  the  Bar- 
badoes ;  in  Africa,  Senegal,  as  well  as  interests  in 
Madagascar ;  in  America,  Canada,  Nova  Scotia,  New¬ 
foundland,  Louisiana. 

Colbert’s  schemes  of  placing  the  West  India 
Islands  under  a  company  failed.  The  company  was 
dissolved  in  1674,  the  islands  were  put  under  a  Gov¬ 
ernment  department,  and  the  administration  was 
given  to  the  Minister  of  Marine.  The  French  plan¬ 
tations,  however,  grew  steadily  and  flourished  more 
than  did  the  English  ones.  In  their  struggling  in¬ 
fancy  Colbert  relieved  them  of  taxation,  gave  lands 
to  poor  and  industrious  emigrants,  and  advanced 
money  to  the  planters.  He  defended  their  trade 
and  built  fortifications.  In  the  East  Indies  he  was, 
if  possible,  more  active,  and  success  seemed  likely  to 
attend  his  efforts.  The  East  India  Company  re¬ 
ceived  special  encouragement  from  Louis  XIV.  and 
his  minister.  It  was  declared  that  trade  with  India 


COLBERT. 

(From  an  old  portrait  reproduced  in  Philippson’s 
Das  /.eitalter  Litdivigs  JCIV.') 


1661] 


The  Rise  of  Colbert. 


127 


was  not  derogatory  to  a  man  of  noble  birth,  and 
nobles  were  persuaded  to  participate  in  the  enter¬ 
prise.  In  1668  a  French  factory  was  established  at 
Surat,  the  richest  mart  in  India ;  in  1669  another  fac¬ 
tory  was  established  at  Masulipatam,  and  in  1674 
Pondicherry  was  founded.  But  other  European 
nations  had  interests  in  the  East  and  the  monarchy  of 
Aurungzebe  was  at  the  height  of  its  power.  It  was 
not  till  the  break-up  of  the  Mogul  Empire  that  there 
was  room  for  the  schemes  of  a  Dupleix.  As  it  was, 
the  French  were  obliged  to  confine  themselves  to 
trade  and  to  safeguarding  their  interests  in  the  face 
of  European  competition.  Throughout  the  century 
the  interests  of  the  French  and  Dutch  clashed  in 
India  and  Siam,  and  though  the  latter  at  one  time 
took  Pondicherry,  the  French  regained  it  at  the 
peace  of  Ryswick. 

An  attempt  was  made  in  1665  to  colonise  Mada¬ 
gascar,  but  the  climate  and  the  hostility  of  the  na¬ 
tives,  which  showed  itself  in  a  massacre  of  many  of 
the  colonists  in  1672,  practically  ruined  all  Colbert’s 
hopes  of  carrying  out  his  scheme  successfully.  Col¬ 
bert’s  greatest  colonial  success  was  in  North  Amer¬ 
ica.  In  1664  the  famous  Company  of  the  West  was 
formed,  and  a  serious  effort  was  made  to  expand  the 
French  colonies  in  New  France.  But  though  the 
structure  of  power  was  imposing,  it  was  always  a 
creation  lacking  in  real  vitality.  The  emigration  was 
nearly  always  forced,  the  administration  of  New 
France  was  venal  and  bad,  the  home  government  was 
continually  meddling,  feudalism  was  introduced  and 
proved  ruinous  to  the  young  colony,  and  the  Crown 


128 


Lo^iis  XIV. 


[1661 


and  the  Church  kept  the  people  in  leading-strings 
and  prevented  self-dependence.  For  a  time  indeed 
N ew  F ranee  seemed  to  flourish,  and  towards  the  end  of 
the  century  the  French  claimed  all  the  country  from 
the  Mississippi  to  the  St.  Lawrence,  and  formed  the 
famous  plan  of  uniting  Louisiana  and  Canada. 

For  the  protection  of  French  commerce  and  col¬ 
onies  a  strong  navy  was  required,  and  Colbert  pro¬ 
ceeded  at  once  to  form  a  strong  fleet.  The  King 
only  cared  for  the  army,  and  to  Colbert  the  French 
navy  owes  everything.  With  the  aid  of  Vauban  he 
made  and  fortified  the  ports  of  Calais,  Dunkirk, 
Brest,  Havre  and  others  ;  he  reconstituted  the  arsenal 
of  Toulon,  founded  a  port  and  arsenal  at  Rochefort, 
and  established  naval  schools  at  Rochefort,  Dieppe, 
and  St.  Malo. 

In  i66i  France  possessed  but  few  ships ;  in  1667 
she  had  50  men-of-war ;  in  1672,  196;  in  1683,  276; 
in  1690,  760,  and  she  could  hold  her  own  against  the 
English  fleet. 

Colbert  was  equally  active  in  other  departments. 
He  interfered  in  ecclesiastical  matters,  and  though 
he  well  appreciated  the  industry  and  value  to  France 
of  the  Huguenots,  he  supported  Louis  in  his  attempts 
to  secure  their  conversion.  He  improved  the  system 
of  justice,  codifying  the  laws,  diminishing  the  num¬ 
ber  of  the  judges,  lessening  the  expense  and  length 
of  trials,  and  establishing  an  organised  s)^stem  of 
police.  He  improved  the  buildings  of  Paris,  erect¬ 
ing  the  Colonnade  of  the  Louvre,  and  some  boule¬ 
vards  and  quays.  But  here  he  was  checked  by  Louis, 
who  preferred  that  Marly  and  Versailles  should  re- 


1661] 


The  Rise  of  Colbert. 


129 


ceive  more  attention  than  Paris.  He  also  encour¬ 
aged  art  and  literature,  founding  the  Academy  of 
Sciences,  now  known  as  the  Institute  of  France,  the 
Academy  of  Inscriptions  and  Medals,  the  Academy 
of  Architecture  and  Music,  and  French  academies  at 
Rome,  Arles,  Soissons,  Nimes,  and  other  places. 
Painting  and  sculpture  were  patronised,  and  pensions 
were  given  to  literary  men  such  as  Moliere,  Racine, 
and  Boileau.  It  is  easy  to  criticise  his  administra¬ 
tion.  It  was  characterised  throughout  by  the  spirit 
of  protection,  it  was  a  system  of  order  and  super¬ 
vision.  France  was  treated  as  if  she  was  a  large 
school. 

But  in  spite  of  his  many  errors,  Colbert  raised 
France  to  the  first  rank  among  commercial  nations. 
He  increased  her  wealth,  he  successfully  established 
manufactures,  he  raised  the  credit  of  the  nation.  In 
1678  Sir  William  Temple  was  much  impressed  by 
the  wealth  and  prosperity  of  P'rance,  and  this  was 
due  entirely  to  Colbert.  He  may  have  seized  every 
opportunity  for  personal  advancement,  but  France 
profited  immensely  from  his  administration.  He 
was  distinctly  a  statesman,  for  he  conceived  a  mag¬ 
nificent  and  at  the  same  time  a  practicable  scheme 
for  making  France  the  leading  power  among  Euro¬ 
pean  nations.  And  he  was  above  all  admirably 
suited  to  Louis  XIV.  Like  his  master,  he  had  a 
matchless  faculty  for  work,  not  scorning  the  smallest 
details,  nor  shrinking  from  the  vastest  undertakings. 
To  his  ability,  energy,  and  laboriousness  he  owed  a 
position  for  which  he  was  admirably  adapted.  To 

Colbert  Louis  was  indebted  for  much,  if  not  all,  of 
9 


130 


Loitis  XIV 


11661 


the  success  of  his  enterprises  during  the  twenty-five 
years  succeeding  Mazarin’s  death.  In  i66i  the  re¬ 
ceipts  were  eighty  millions  of  livres,  of  which  thirty- 
one  millions  reached  the  Treasury.  The  expendi¬ 
ture  was  fifty-four  millions,  and  the  deficit  was 
therefore  twenty-two  millions.  In  1667  the  receipts 
amounted  to  sixty-one  millions,  and  the  expendi¬ 
ture  to  thirty-two  and  a  half,  leaving  a  surplus  of 
thirty-one  millions.  With  such  a  minister  Louis 
XIV.  felt  justified  in  carrying  out  an  ambitious  and 
a  not  wholly  impracticable  foreign  policy. 


CHAPTER  V. 

LOUIS’  FOREIGN  POLICY  TO  THE  END  OF  THE 
DEVOLUTION  WAR. 

1662-1668. 

T  is  difficult  to  describe  accurate¬ 
ly  the  drift  of  Louis’  foreign 
policy.  Religious  interests 
were  so  continually  mixed  up 
with  the  question  of  Euro¬ 
pean  supremacy  that  it  is 
dangerous  to  make  definite 
generalisations.  That  France 
was  the  first  state  in  the  world 
from  1661  to  1700  is  undisput¬ 
ed  ;  that  she  owed  her  position  in  great  measure  to 
Louis’  consummate  diplomatic  skill  is  equally  true. 
He  undoubtedly  intended  that  France  should  be 
supreme  on  land  and  on  sea ;  he  looked  forward  to 
the  time  when  he  should  succeed  to  Leopold  as 
Emperor.  With  a  royal  disregard  of  all  the  teach¬ 
ings  of  history  he  regarded  himself  as  the  true 

131 


132 


Lozlis  XIV. 


[1662 


descendant  of  Charles  the  Great.  He  'wished  to  be 
the  leader  and  protector  of  Catholic  Europe. 

That  France  should  be  mistress  of  the  world,  that 
a  great  French  Empire  should  rise  on  the  continent 
which  should  dictate  the  law  to  Europe  was  un¬ 
doubtedly  the  central  idea  of  Louis’  policy.  But  the 
means  requisite  for  the  consummation  of  this  ideal 
varied  as  his  reign  proceeded.  From  i66l  to  1700 
is  a  period  distinct  from  that  extending  from  1700 
to  1715-  In  the  latter  period  his  efforts  were 
directed  to  preserving  the  Spanish  Empire  intact 
for  his  grandson,  and  by  uniting  in  close  alliance 
Spain  and  France,  to  secure  for  the  Bourbons  the 
supremacy  of  Southern  Europe. 

During  the  earlier  period  his  aims  and  hopes  lay 
in  a  different  direction.  He  seems  to  have  wished  : 

(1)  To  extend  the  French  frontier  to  the  Rhine, 
by  completely  absorbing  Lorraine  and  by  the  con¬ 
quest  of  Franche  Comte.  Though  he  failed  during 
his  reign  in  securing  Lorraine  he  succeeded  in  ac¬ 
quiring  Franche  Comt^,  and  Alsace  with  Strasburg. 

(2)  To  extend  the  French  frontier  to  the  Scheldt. 
The  French  frontier  was  w.eak  on  the  north-east. 
To  make  Paris  safe  against  a  sudden  attack,  and  to 
give  her  a  complete  barrier  had  been  one  of  the 
aims  of  Mazarin’s  foreign  policy.  He  had  failed  to 
carry  out  his  design,  and  thus  entailed  on  Europe 
long  wars,  for  until  Paris  had  secured  a  strong  bar¬ 
rier  on  the  north-east  frontier  there  could  be  no  last¬ 
ing  peace  between  Spain  and  France. 

(3)  To  extend  the  colonial  Empire  of  France  by 
fresh  acquisitions  in  the  West  Indies,  in  Madagascar 


1662] 


The  Foreign  Policy  of  Louis. 


133 


and  in  North  America,  and  to  increase  her  trade  and 
possessions  in  the  East  Indies. 

(4)  To  secure  the  Imperial  title  and  to  pose  as 
the  head  of  the  Catholic  Church. 

In  attempting  to  extend  the  French  boundary  in 
the  direction  of  the  Rhine  Louis  was  simply  con¬ 
tinuing  the  policy  of  Richelieu  and  Mazarin.  Cer¬ 
tain  risks  would  have  to  be  faced  and  definite  prep¬ 
arations  would  have  to  be  made.  In  carrying  out 
this  policy  he  would  again  find  himself  in  conflict  with 
the  Empire  and  with  Spain  ;  he  ran  the  risk  of  in¬ 
curring  the  hostility  of  the  Swiss.  To  neutralise  the 
opposition  of  the  Emperor  it  would  be  necessary  to 
preserve  the  French  connection  with  Turkey,  Po¬ 
land,  and  Sweden,  and  by  stirring  up  those  powers 
in  the  rear  of  Austria  to  paralyse  her  efforts  on  the 
Rhine.  It  might  be  advisable  to  develop  the 
policy  of  Richelieu  and  Mazarin  towards  the  North 
German  Princes  and  to  pay  large  subsidies  as  a  price 
of  neutrality.  It  was  advisable  and  also  possible  to 
gain  Bavaria. 

But  a  move  in  the  direction  of  the  Scheldt  was  a 
far  more  hazardous  undertaking.  It  implied  the  con¬ 
quest  and  inclusion  into  the  French  monarchy  of  that 
county  known  then  as  the  Spanish  Netherlands,  now 
as  Belgium.  Mazarin  had  made  a  definite  attempt 
to  effect  this  conquest,  and  by  reviving  the  theory 
that  the  Scheldt  and  the  Rhine  were  the  natural 
boundaries  of  France  he  bequeathed  to  Louis  XIV. 
2.damnosa  hcreditas'N'W\(L\  has  affected  French  foreign 
policy  to  the  present  day.  Mazarin’s  attempt  not 
only  failed  but  resulted  in  the  loss  of  the  friendship 


134 


Louis  XIV 


[1662 


of  Holland.  That  country,  alarmed  at  the  prospect 
of  a  strong  power  like  France  on  her  borders,  made 
the  treaty  of  Munster  with  Spain  in  January  1648. 
Checkmated  for  the  moment,  France  under  Louis 
XIV.  again  returned  to  the  policy  of  Mazarin.  The 
Powers  firmly  opposed  to  any  fresh  advance  of  the 
French  towards  the  Scheldt  were  the  Empire,  Spain, 
and  Holland;  and  French  statesmen  had  always  to 
reckon  with  the  fact  that  England  might  in  pursu¬ 
ance  of  her  true  policy,  as  she  did  in  1667,  and  again 
after  the  Revolution  of  1688,  enter  the  lists  against 
France.  But  Mazarin  by  the  marriage  of  Louis  XIV. 
to  Maria  Theresa  of  Spain  had  bequeathed  to  the 
King  that  policy  of  uniting  France  and  Spain  which 
coloured  to  a  more  or  less  extent  the  whole  of  Louis’ 
reign.  Had  Louis  indeed  foregone  his  policy  of 
aggrandisement  in  Europe  for  a  time  and  devoted 
himself  to  the  acquisition  of  a  colonial  empire  he 
would  have  been  consulting  the  true  interests  of 
France.  Colbert  had  already  done  much  for  her 
colonial  development,  and  France  had  entered  into 
competition  for  the  New  World  with  England.  To 
gain  any  real  success  in  this  struggle  France  would 
have  to  concentrate  all  her  energies  and  husband 
Ml  her  resources. 

Louis  XIV.  had  like  his  successor  in  1740  and  again 
in  1756  to  decide  between  two  lines  of  policy.  The 
choice  lay  between  the  policy  advocated  by  Colbert 
and  that  of  which  Louvois  was  the  chief  representa¬ 
tive.  Colbert’s  policy  meant  careful  abstention  from 
all  European  entanglements,  a  commercial  war  with 
England  and  Holland  by  means  of  hostile  tariffs,  the 


1662J 


The  Foreign  Policy  of  Lonis. 


135 


extension  and  development  of  the  French  colonies, 
the  increase  of  the  French  navy,  and  if  necessary  war 
by  sea.  On  the  other  hand  the  policy  represented  by 
Louvois  was  one  of  aggrandisement  in  Europe,  and 
of  the  extension  of  the  French  frontiers  at  the  ex¬ 
pense  of  the  Empire  and  Spain.  It  was  only  to  be 
expected  that  a  young  and  enterprising  monarch,  who 
in  his  desire  for  glory  accurately  expressed  the 
national  passion  of  the  French  nation  for  feats 
of  arms  and  foreign  wars,  should  prefer  to  fol¬ 
low  the  policy  which  had  already  brought  France 
glory,  increase  of  territory,  and  a  great  European 
position,  to  the  slower,  more  inglorious,  though 
safer  methods  of  Colbert.  Till  1685  Louis  followed 
successfully  the  former  policy,  which  gratified  his  love 
of  conquest  and  popular  worship  and  more  than  sat¬ 
isfied  the  national  thirst  for  military  successes.  The 
frequent  assertions  of  French  supremacy,  the  pur¬ 
chase  of  Dunkirk,  the  Devolution  War,  the  attack 
on  Holland,  the  Reunions,  the  seizure  of  Strasburg, 
the  war  in  the  Spanish  Netherlands  in  1682-4,  the 
apathy  of  Louis  at  the  time  of  the  siege  of  Vienna, 
his  intrigues  or  alliances  with  Sweden,  Poland,  Hun¬ 
gary,  Turkey,  and  the  German  Princes,  are  but  a  few 
illustrations  to  show  how  thoroughly  the  King  pursued 
a  policy  of  aggrandisement  at  the  e.xpense  of  Spain 
and  the  Empire.  Till  1685  though  at  times  he 
neglected  the  methods  of  Richelieu  and  Mazarin  and 
seemed  to  desert  the  lines  which  they  laid  down,  as 
when  he  invaded  Holland  in  1672,  he  carried  on  their 
policy.  He  endeavoured  to  force  from  Spain  a  com¬ 
plete  rampart  for  Paris  on  the  north-east  frontier, 


Louis  X/V. 


[1662 


136 

and  he  ostensibly  continued  to  carry  out  the  old 
axiom  in  French  politics  of  being  Catholic  at  home 
and  Protestant  abroad.  “  The  principal  object  of  the 
foreign  policy  of  Louis  XIV.  during  this  period  of 
his  personal  government  was  the  development  of 
the  two  treaties  of  Westphalia  and  Pyrenees.”  He 
always  however  looked  forward  to  the  time  when  he 
could  throw  over  his  Protestant  allies  in  Germany 
and  appear  to  the  world  as  the  zealous  leader  of  the 
Catholic  party  in  Europe.  It  was  not  till  the  death 
of  Colbert  in  1683  that  he  cast  aside  that  policy  of 
religious  toleration  at  home  and  abroad  which  had 
been  so  successfully  followed  by  Henry  IV.  All 
through  these  twenty-five  years  from  1660  to  1685 
there  are  numerous  examples  to  be  found  bearing 
evidence  of  Louis’  anxiety  to  aid  the  extension  of 
Catholicism.  His  desire  to  secure  the  conversion  of 
England  and  his  bitter  hatred  of  the  Dutch  both  show 
how  little  he  sympathised  with  the  tolerant  policy  of 
his  predecessors  Richelieu  and  Mazarin.  Till  1685, 
too,  the  interests  of  the  navy  and  of  the  colonies 
were  not  neglected,  though  with  the  opening  of  the 
Dutch  war  of  1672  there  is  a  distinct  tendency  to 
starve  the  navy  and  relegate  colonial  expansion  to 
the  background.  But  with  the  ministry  of  Seignelay 
the  navy  again  took  an  important  position  till  La 
Hogue  dealt  a  serious  blow  at  its  attempt  to  rival  the 
English  fleet.  During  these  years  Louis’  startling  and 
almost  uniform  series  of  successes,  won  often  in  spite 
of  the  baneful  effects  of  his  personal  influence,  were 
in  great  measure  due  to  the  admirable  instruments 
which  he  possessed  in  the  generation  of  men  formed 


1662] 


The  Foreign  Policy  of  Louis. 


137 


during  the  years  of  his  minority  and  inheriting  the 
traditions  of  the  days  of  Richelieu.  But  with  the 
death  of  Colbert,  and  with  the  Revocation  of  the 
Edict  of  Nantes,  a  marked  change  passes  over  his 
fortunes.  He  had  reached  the  high-water  mark  of 
prosperity.  From  1685  to  1697,  he  found  that  the 
results  of  his  championship  of  the  Catholic  Church 
at  home  and  abroad,  were  distinctly  disastrous  for 
France,  and  that  his  audacious  aggressions  in  the 
direction  of  the  Rhine  had  aroused  universal  suspi¬ 
cion.  The  revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes  dealt 
a  serious  blow  at  French  prosperity  ;  the  devastation 
of  the  Palatinate  completed  the  alienation  of  his  Ger¬ 
man  allies,  already  alarmed  by  the  seizure  of  Stras- 
burg  and  his  other  high-handed  acts.  At  the  conclu¬ 
sion  of  the  war  against  the  European  coalition  brought 
together  by  the  League  of  Augsburg  he  found  him¬ 
self  while  supported  by  the  Pope  compelled  to  give 
up  territory  and  postpone  indefinitely  his  scheme  for 
extending  the  boundary  of  France  to  the  Scheldt. 
As  opposition  to  Spain  was  the  necessary  result  of 
attempts  to  seize  the  Spanish  Netherlands,  Mignet’s 
statement,  that  the  “  Spanish  Succession  question 
was  the  pivot  which  turned  the  whole  foreign  policy 
of  Louis  XIV.,”  is  apt  to  prove  misleading. 

There  is  no  doubt  that,  owing  to  the  weak  health 
of  Charles  IL,  the  Spanish  Succession  question  might 
be  opened  any  day  ;  it  is  quite  true  that  for  some  forty 
years  Louis  looked  forward  to  the  opening  of  that 
question,  and  that  in  his  dealings  with  the  Elector  of 
Bavaria,  with  the  Hapsburgs,  and  even  with  Rome  he 
always  kept  the  question  before  his  eyes. 


Louis  XIV. 


L1662 


But  till  1700  he  never  allowed  the  seeming  immi¬ 
nence  of  the  question  to  interfere  with  his  schemes 
in  other  directions.  His  attitude  towards  the  whole 
matter  was  very  different  to  that  adopted  after  the 
acceptance  of  the  famous  Will  of  Charles  11.  of  Spain. 
Till  the  death  of  that  monarch  he  was  resolved  to 
take  advantage  of  the  weakness  of  his  kingdom,  and 
while  on  the  one  hand  appropriating  portions  of  the 
great  Spanish  Empire,  on  the  other  hand  by  treaty 
arrangements  to  provide  for  the  partition  of  the 
bulk  of  the  Spanish  possessions.  The  war  of  Devo¬ 
lution,  the  French  gains  at  Nimeguen,  the  war  of 
1682,  all  illustrate  his  determination  to  seize  as 
much  as  possible  of  the  Spanish  Netherlands,  while 
his  secret  treaty  of  Partition  in  1668  with  Leopold, 
his  treaty  of  1670,  his  negotiations  in  1687  with 
Bavaria,  followed  later  by  the  two  famous  Partition 
treaties,  show  plainly  that  though  the  question  of 
the  Spanish  succession  was  before  his  eyes,  though 
it  entered  into  his  negotiations  with  European 
powers,  it  had  not  assumed  the  great  importance 
which  it  did  after  the  peace  of  Ryswick. 

Louis’  refusal  to  recognise  his  wife’s  renunciations 
and  his  long  negotiations  on  the  subject  tended  un¬ 
doubtedly  to  familiarise  Europe  with  the  French 
claims  to  the  Spanish  inheritance,  while  the  forma¬ 
tion  at  Madrid  of  a  French  party  ready  to  support 
the  interests  of  France  in  Spain  and  the  pretensions 
of  the  French  Crown,  testifies  to  the  fact  that  Louis 
was  fully  alive  to  the  importance  of  the  Spanish 
Succession  question.  In  1667  he  openly  asserted  his 
wife’s  claim,  not  only  to  the  greater  part  of  Flanders 


1662] 


The  Foreign  Policy  of  Lonis. 


139 


and  to  Franche  Comte  by  the  Jus  Devohitionis,  but 
also  in  the  event  of  Charles  II.’s  death  to  the  Span¬ 
ish  Empire,  But  the  failure  of  his  attempts  to  get 
his  wife’s  renunciation  formally  annulled,  the  mar¬ 
riage  of  the  Infanta  Margaret  to  Leopold,  the  possi¬ 
bility  that  Charles  II.  might  live  long,  all  confirmed 
Louis  in  his  intention  of  strengthening  the  position 
of  F" ranee  on  the  north-east  by  seizing  a  part,  if  not 
all,  of  the  Spanish  Netherlands,  and  of  devoting 
himself  to  his  general  schemes  of  religious  and  polit¬ 
ical  aggrandisement.  Upon  the  formation  of  the 
League  of  Augsburg  in  1686  it  was  far  more  impor¬ 
tant  for  Louis  to  assure  himself  of  the  neutrality  of 
Spain  than  to  make  preparations  for  the  close  union 
of  the  two  countries  in  the  event  of  Charles  IL’s 
death. 

In  carrying  out  his  policy,  Louis  was  greatly  aided 
by  the  position  in  which  he  found  France  on  Maza- 
rin’s  death,  by  the  weakness  of  some  of  the  Euro¬ 
pean  powers,  by  the  isolation  and  neutrality  of 
others.  The  Emperor  was  hampered  at  home  by 
the  League  of  the  Rhine,  and  was  already  occupied 
on  his  eastern  frontiers  by  an  attempt  of  the  Turks 
to  seize  the  whole  of  Hungary.  England,  under 
Charles  II.,  was  about  to  retire  from  the  command¬ 
ing  position  in  Europe  which  she  owed  to  the  firm¬ 
ness  of  Cromwell.  Spain  was  so  weak  that  she 
could  not  reduce  the  revolted  Portuguese,  while 
Italy,  Denmark,  and  Sweden  were  from  different 
reasons  unable  to  interfere,  much  less  thwart  any 
scheme  of  foreign  policy  which  Louis  might  enter¬ 
tain.  Louis’  first  object  was  to  illustrate  in  a  very 


140 


Louis  XI I \ 


[1662 


practical  way  his  own  views  as  to  the  position  which 
he  proposed  that  the  monarchy  of  France  should 
take  in  Europe.  He  claimed  and  secured  the  right 
of  his  ambassador  to  take  precedence  of  the  Spanish 
ambassador  in  London ;  he  forced  Alexander  VII. 
to  make  ample  reparation  for  an  insult  offered  to  his 
envoy,  Crequi,  at  Rome ;  he  successfully  obtained 
from  England  a  declaration  that  her  claims  to  the 
supremacy  over  the  sea  should  not  extend  beyond 
Cape  Finisterre.  Before  the  end  of  1662  Europe 
recognised  that  the  French  preponderance  was  an 
accomplished  fact,  while  the  aid  given  by  Louis  to 
the  Emperor  in  1664  at  the  battle  of  St.  Gothard, 
and  the  successful  expeditions  against  the  Barbary 
Corsairs  in  1665,  demonstrated  clearly  the  military 
power,  as  well  as  the  active  Christian  character  of 
the  new  regime  in  France. 

In  1665  the  death  of  Philip  IV.  of  Spain  gave  a 
definiteness  to  Louis’  foreign  policy,  and  brought 
out  clearly  and  distinctly  his  views  with  regard  not 
only  to  the  Spanish  succession,  but  also  with  regard 
to  the  future  development  and  extension  of  France. 
He  at  once  determined  to  occupy  the  whole  of  the 
Spanish  Netherlands  on  behalf  of  his  wife,  whose 
claims  were  formulated  in  a  most  elaborate  manner 
for  the  benefit  of  the  astounded  European  nations. 

Louis  claimed  the  Spanish  Netherlands  on  the 
ground  that  by  the  Jus  Devolutionis,  a  local  custom, 
his  wife,  who  was  the  only  daughter  of  Philip  IV. 
by  his  first  marriage,  was  the  heiress  of  the  Low 
Countries,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  Infanta  and 
Charles  IL,  the  children  of  Philip’s  second  marriage. 


LOUIS  X(V.  AT  THE  AGE  OF  41. 

(From  an  illustration,  based  on  an  old  print,  in  Philippson’s 
Das  Zeitalter  Ludivigs  A’/y.) 


1662] 


The  Foreign  Policy  of  Lonis. 


141 


Now  this  custom,  in  accordance  with  which,  if  a 
man  married  twice,  the  succession  went  to  the  chil¬ 
dren  of  the  first  wife  to  the  exclusion  of  those  of 
the  second,  referred  only  to  private  property,  was  a 
purely  local  custom,  and  was  in  force  in  Brabant, 
Malines,  Namur,  Hainault,  and  perhaps  one  other 
province.  In  Luxemburg,  according  to  the  custom 
then  in  vogue,  two  parts  would  go  to  Charles  II., 
and  one  part  to  each  daughter.  In  Franche  Comtd 
the  custom  was  gavelkind.  So  even  allowing  that 
Louis  was  right  in  appealing  to  a  local  and  private 
custom  as  holding  good  with  regard  to  the  succes¬ 
sion,  he  could  only  enforce  it  in  the  case  of  a  very 
few  of  the  provinces,  and  not  throughout  the  Low 
Countries. 

Thus,  then,  the  objections  to  Louis’  claim  were 
absolutely  unanswerable.  His  claim,  such  as  it  was, 
was  abrogated  by  the  Act  of  Renunciation,  which 
annulled  all  the  rights  of  succession.  It  only  rested 
on  a  custom  applicable  to  private  rights  and  did  not 
refer  to  political  rights,  and  moreover  the  Law  of 
Devolution  had  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the 
succession  to  Brabant.  But  even  in  modern  times 
flimsier  claims  have  often  been  successfully  upheld 
if  made  with  sufficient  audacity  and  supported  by 
clever  diplomacy.  And  at  this  epoch  Louis  was 
fortunate  in  his  ministers  and  diplomatic  agents, 
while  the  political  condition  of  Europe  favoured  the 
success  of  schemes  of  a  filibustering  and  blackmail¬ 
ing  character.  French  diplomacy  was  directed  by 
the  capable  Lionne,  whose  ability  renders  him  almost 
worthy  of  being  ranked  with  Mazarin.  And  it  was 


142 


Louis  XIV 


[1662 


Lionne  who,  by  his  ever  watchful  diplomatic  skill 
and  extraordinary  energy  and  activity,  removed 
many  of  the  difficulties  during  the  ten  years  from 
1661-1671,  and  contributed  very  largely  to  Louis’ 
successes  during  that  period. 

The  object  of  this  diplomacy  was,  while  advancing 
French  interests  in  the  Netherlands  and  elsewhere, 
to  keep  England  and  Holland  neutral,  to  aid  Por¬ 
tugal  in  its  revolt  against  Spain,  to  conciliate  the 
Emperor,  and  to  overawe  or  gain  Sweden,  Denmark, 
and  the  German  Princes. 

After  Mazarin’s  death  French  diplomacy  certainly 
did  not  sleep.  During  the  years  1661  and  1662 
Louis  at  first  endeavoured  to  induce  Spain  to  annul 
Maria  Thdrbsa’s  renunciations,  and,  beaten  on  this 
point,  he  used  every  effort  to  make  himself  safe  on 
the  side  of  England.  He  employed^^^^^o^u^  to 
assure  Charles  H.  that  he  would  not  combine  with 
Philip  IV.,  and  that  he  regarded  a  marriage  between 
Charles  and  the  Infanta  Catherine  of  Portugal  and 
an  Anglo-Portuguese  alliance  with  favour.  Both 
England  and  France  were  enemies  of  Spain,  and 
both  were  friendly  to  Portugal.  So,  in  spite  of  a 
feeling  of  displeasure  at  Louis’  amicable  attitude 
towards  the  Dutch,  there  was  little  reason  for  fearing 
that  Charles  H.  would  oppose  any  scheme  against 
the  Spanish  Netherlands,  especially  as  Louis  had 
already  intimated  that  he  would  be  prepared  to 
make  Charles  independent  of  the  grants  of  Parlia¬ 
ment.  In  November,  1662,  England  had  sold  Dun¬ 
kirk  to  the  French,  and  though  the  Protestant  world 
were  alarmed,  Charles  H.  was  delighted  at  the  price 


1663] 


The  Foreign  Policy  of  Lottis. 


H3 


paid,  and  Louis  acquired  fresh  popularity  in  France. 
During  the  years  1663  to  1664  the  main  effort  of 
Louis’  diplomacy  lay  in  the  direction  of  Holland. 
He  hoped,  as  Richelieu  and  Mazarin  had  hoped  be¬ 
fore  him,  to  persuade  the  Dutch  to  agree  to  a  par¬ 
tition  or  to  some  arrangement  favourable  to  the 
French  plans  with  regard  to  the  Spanish  Nether¬ 
lands.  The  neutrality  of  Holland  was  of  even 
greater  importance  than  that  of  England.  DeWitt 
was  ready  to  ally  with  Louis  if  certain  obstacles 
could  be  cleared  away.  In  1661  the  Republic  had 
made  a  treaty  with  Portugal,  and  in  1662  one  with 
England.  But  up  to  1662  the  attitude  of  France 
had  been  hostile.  Lionne  opposed  the  Republic  on 
political,  Colbert  on  commercial  grounds.  Between 
a  despotic  and  a  free  government,  a  Catholic  and  a 
Protestant  people,  there  was  little  in  common.  There 
were  outstanding  difficulties  about  fishing  rights, 
tonnage  duties,  and  the  Dutch  claims  on  Rhynberg 
and  Ravenstein.  Louis’  anxiety,  however,  to  gain 
the  Dutch,  caused  these  difficulties  to  be  smoothed 
over,  and  in  April,  1662,  the  treaty  of  Paris  was 
made.  It  was  a  mere  nominal  alliance,  it  is  true,  but 
it  now  became  of  great  importance  to  the  Dutch  to 
know  precisely  the  nature  of  Louis’  schemes  on  that 
debateable  land — the  Spanish  Netherlands.  Rich¬ 
elieu  had  desired  in  1635  either  the  establishment  of 
an  independent  Belgium  or  a  partition  of  the  Low 
Countries  between  Holland  and  France;  Mazarin 
had  thought  of  annexing  the  country  to  P'rance  as  a 
rampart  of  Paris,  and  had  attempted  to  exchange 
Catalonia — then  in  the  hands  of  the  French — for  the 


144 


Louis  XIV. 


[1664 


Spanish  Low  Countries  and  Luxemburg.  The 
Treaty  of  Munster,  in  January,  1648,  between  Hol¬ 
land  and  Spain,  had  ruined  this  plan,  and  he  had 
then  fallen  back  on  Richelieu’s  idea. 

DeWitt  was  in  favour  of  a  modern  Belgium.  Real¬ 
ising  that  the  security  of  the  United  Provinces 
demanded  the  establishment  of  a  free  and  indepen¬ 
dent  country  between  them  and  France,  he  wished 
to  take  the  debateable  Provinces  away  from  Spain, 
but  did  not  propose  to  hand  them  over  to  France. 
Towards  that  country  his  policy  may  be  summed  up 
in  the  words  Galium  amicum  sed  non  vicinuni.  H  is 
constant  fear  was  lest  Spain  should  exchange  the 
Provinces,  or  should  be  powerless  to  prevent  their 
annexation  by  France.  Louis’  policy,  on  the  other 
hand,  was  either  to  annex  all  the  country,  or  at  any 
rate  to  arrange  a  partition  with  Holland  which  would 
destroy  the  buffer  between  the  Republic  and  the 
French  monarchy.  DeWitt’s  fears  were  thus  amply 
justified,  and,  moreover,  when  he  had  cleverly  ob¬ 
tained  a  declaration  of  the  Devolution  plan  from 
Louis,  he  found  that  his  fears  were  fully  confirmed. 
Though  he  boldly  objected  to  the  scheme  he  could 
do  nothing  more,  and  in  1664  the  negotiations  came 
to  an  end.  He  hoped,  however,  by  remaining  loyal  to 
the  French  alliance  to  impose  on  Louis  the  necessity 
of  making  concessions,  to  prevent  him  from  precipi¬ 
tating  the  execution  of  his  plans,  and  generally  to 
arrest  or  restrain  his  ambition.  These  negotiations, 
like  those  with  Spain,  had  one  effect  anticipated  by 
Louis.  Europe  became  accustomed  to  the  evidence 
of  the  French  claims,  and  “  the  most  intelligent  fore- 


1665] 


The  Foj'cigri  Policy  of  Louis. 


H5 


saw  that  Louis  XIV.  would  take  the  first  oppor¬ 
tunity  of  conquering  the  Spanish  Netherlands.” 
His  diplomacy,  too,  had  another  important  effect. 
By  his  nominal  alliance  with  the  Dutch  he  had  pre¬ 
vented  them  from  making  any  preparations  against 
his  aggressions,  while  by  placing  obstacles  in  the 
way  of  the  conclusion  of  peace  between  Spain  and 
Portugal  the  former  was  hindered  from  offering  any 
resistance  to  his  schemes. 

From  1664  to  1667  Louis  endeavoured  to  gain  the 
Emperor.  Leopold  had  in  1663  arranged  to  marry 
the  Infanta  Margaret,  and  naturally  was  expected 
to  support  Spain  in  opposing  the  policy  of  the 
French  Court.  But  Louis’  diplomacy  hampered 
the  Emperor  at  every  turn.  In  1664  Louis  had 
concluded  treaties  with  Sweden,  Brandenburg, 
Saxony,  and  Mainz.  In  1667  he  stirred  up  Leo¬ 
pold’s  Hungarian  subjects  to  rebellion,  and  after  the 
outbreak  of  the  Devolution  War  he  made  fresh 
alliances  with  Mainz,  Cologne,  Neuburg,  and  the 
Bishop  of  Munster,  so  as  to  check  the  passage  of 
the  Austrian  troops  into  the  Spanish  Low  Countries. 

Not  only  was  Spain  helpless  by  her  defeat  at  Villa 
Viciosa,  the  death  of  Philip  IV.,  and  the  continued 
struggle  with  the  Portuguese,  not  only  was  the  Em¬ 
peror  neutralised,  but  the  outbreak  of  the  war  be¬ 
tween  England  and  Holland  tended  still  further  to 
aid  Louis.  It  was  distinctly  for  the  interests  of 
France  that  this  war  should  last  as  long  as  possible. 
Its  prolongation  would  weaken  both  countries,  and 
during  its  continuance  the  Spanish  provinces  would  be 
left  defenceless  and  open  to  Louis’  attacks.  Though 


146 


Louis  XIV. 


[1666 


bound  by  treaty  to  Holland,  he  pursued  a  hesi¬ 
tating  policy  till  he  was  forced,  by  fear  of  reconcilia¬ 
tion  between  the  belligerent  powers,  to  declare  war 
on  England  in  January,  1666,  and  to  send  a  force 
against  the  Bishop  of  Munster.  The  French  assist¬ 
ance  was  in  itself  of  little  value  to  the  Dutch.  But 
indirectly  it  led  to  some  not  unimportant  develop¬ 
ments. 

The  Swedes  decided  to  join  the  English,  the  Danes 
allied  with  the  Dutch.  The  Great  Elector  became 
alarmed  at  the  prospect  of  Dutch  dependence  on  the 
French,  made  a  treaty  with  Holland  in  February, 
1666,  and  in  October  a  quadruple  alliance  was  formed, 
consisting  of  Holland,  Brandenburg,  Liineburg,  and 
Denmark,  the  object  of  which  was  to  relieve  Holland 
of  the  necessity  of  having  to  place  so  much  reliance 
on  the  French  power.  But  both  England  and  Hol¬ 
land  were  ready  for  peace  at  the  beginning  of  1667, 
and  in  May  a  conference  at  Breda  was  opened. 
Louis  realised  that  it  was  time  for  him  to  begin  his 
invasion  of  the  Spanish  Low  Countries.  Death  had 
lately  freed  him  from  the  restraining  influence  which 
Anne  of  Austria  might  have  exercised  upon  his 
schemes,  France  was  prosperous,  the  Spanish  Nether¬ 
lands  were  practically  defenceless,  while  Spain  was 
exhausted,  at  war  with  Portugal,  and  governed  by 
Pere  Nithard,  the  confessor  of  the  Regent.  There 
was  no  immediate  danger  to  be  anticipated  from 
England,  but  it  was  important,  even  though  Charles 
11.  had  as  early  as  February,  1666,  secretly  en¬ 
gaged  not  to  interfere  with  Louis’  designs,  to  strike 
the  expected  blow  before  peace  had  actually  been 


1667] 


The  War  of  Devolution. 


147 


concluded  between  England  and  Holland.  Louis  was 
himself  extremely  desirous  to  win  some  military 
successes.  He  never  considered  that  the  glory  of 
the  battles  won  and  the  towns  taken  during  Maza- 
rin’s  belonged  to  himself.  Already  in  1666  he 

had  begun  to  hold  inspections  of  his  troops,  and  at 
Saint-Germain,  at  Fontainebleau,  and  at  Vincennes 
military  spectacles  were  included  in  the  programme 
of  amusements.  With  these  serious  preoccupations 
he  combined,  as  he  always  did  during  most  of  his 
reign,  a  participation  in  the  carnivals  and  fetes  which 
took  place  almost  every  winter.  The  following  list 
is  a  good  example  of  the  sort  of  life  led  by  Louis 
during  these  years:  1667,  Jan.  5,  A  Pastoral  Ballet ; 
Jan. 6,  Expedition  to  Versailles;  Jan.  6-10,  Ballet  of 
the  Muses;  Jan.  12,  Ballet  at  Paris;  Jan.  22,  A  Re¬ 
view  at  Houilles  ;  Jan.  24,  Ball  at  Versailles  ;  Jan.  25, 
Ballet  of  the  Muses;  Jan.  30,  Grand  Ball  at  Saint- 
Germain  in  the  Chateau  Neuf-,  Jan.  31,  Ballet  of 
the  Muses;  Feb.  4,  Review;  Feb.  5,  14,  16,  19,  Ballet 
of  the  Muses;  Feb.  20,  28,  Carnival  at  Versailles. 
This  Ballet  of  the  Muses  was  first  produced  in  Paris 
on  January  2,  and  the  King  had  intended  to  dance 
in  it  himself.  But  at  the  last  moment,  when  he  was 
already  in  costume,  he  was  compelled  to  hurry  off 
to  see  his  mother,  who  had  been  taken  suddenly  ill. 

On  the  1 8th  of  May  Louis  left  Saint-Germain  to 
join  the  army  under  Turenne  at  Amiens.  Turenne 
had  formed  his  force  into  three  divisions  :  the  central 
body  of  35,000  men  was  to  operate  between  the  Lys 
and  the  Meuse,  and  to  move  in  the  direction  of 
Brussels;  8000  men  under  Marshal  D’Aumont  were 


148 


Louis  XIV 


[1667 


to  operate  between  the  Lys  and  the  sea ;  while,  to 
another  corps  of  about  the  same  strength  under 
Crequi  devolved  the  duty  of  covering  the  right 
flank,  and  of  observing  the  movements  of  Germany 
in  the  direction  of  Luxemburg. 

In  this  war  there  were  two  distinct  ^cmnpaigns ; 
the  flrst  in  the  Low  Countries  during  the  summer  of 
1667.  the  second  in  Franehe  Comtd  iiLtlie  early' part 
of  1668.  The  war  is  remarkable  on  account  of  the 
ease  with  which  the  French  reduced,  not  only  a  large 
number  of  towns  in  the  Spanish  Netherlands,  but 
also  a  populous  and  wealthy  province.  It  is  interest- 
i n g_as  being  the  flr^t  wajia-w-ln^h-LewsdwmieHTbgk., 
a  leading  part,  and  during  its  continuance  Louis’ 
aptitude  for  rniriTiriTiTfg  wnilT'  and  plyagiirp  as 
clearly  illustrated  as  are  the  military  skill  of  Tu- 
renne,  the  diplomacy  of  Lion  he,  fTie~admmistTative 
ability  of  TTouvois,  and  the  engineering  talent  of 
VatTbarr:  :  ' 

•  Tballay  the  apprehensions  of  Europe,  Louis  spoke 
of  the  invasion  of  the  Spanish  Low  Countries  as  a 
journey  he  was  taking  in  order  to  obtain  possession 
of  his  wife’s  inheritance,  and  no  declaration  of  war 
wa^  made._-CEyefvtlTTTTg~senhed  to  augur  success. 
Spain,  taken  by  surprise,  could  send  no  succours; 
there  was  little  to  fear  from  any  resistance  in  the 
Low  Countries.  Castel  Rodrigo  indeed  some  time 
previously  had  attempted  to  raise  troops  in  Germany 
in  order  to  be  in  a  position  to  offer  some  opposition 
to  the  invasion  which  he  had  long  foreseen.  But 
Louis’  representations  at  Madrid,  coupled  with  the 
blindness  and  lethargy  of  the  Spanish  Court  itself, 


1667] 


The  War  of  Dcvohitio^i. 


149 


had  rendered  ineffectual  these  and  other  attempts  of 
Rodrigo  to  prepare  for  the  inevitable  struggle. 

He  had,  moreover,  neglected  to  seek  allies,  and 
had  not  taken  any  steps  to  utilise  the  services  of  the 
Count  de  Marsin,  then  in  command  of  the  Spanish 
forces  in  the  Spanish  Netherlands.  With  only 
20,000  men  at  his  command,  and  those  scattered 
throughout  the  country,  it  was  impossible  for 
Rodrigo  to  attempt  to  defend  every  strong  place. 
He  therefore  determined  to  concentrate  the  larger 
part  of  his  available  forces  for  the  defence  of  Brus¬ 
sels,  and  to  dismantle  the  fortifications  of  many  of 
the  towns,  such  as  Cond^,  Armentiferes,  Charleroi, 
and  others  which  for  lack  of  troops  could  not  be 
defended. 

On  the  24th  of  May,  two  days  after  the  election 
of  Alexander  VIL,  a  French  candidate,  to  the  Papacy, 
the  central  portion  of  the  forces,  under  the  nominal 
command  of  the  King,  crossed  the  frontier  and  oc¬ 
cupied  Armentieres.  Then  Turenne,  in  order  to 
mislead  the  enemy,  left  untouched  the  strong  places 
of  the  Scheldt,  Cambrai,  Bouchain,  Valenciennes, 
and  Cond^,  and  meeting  with  no  resistance,  led  the 
army  to  the  Sambre,  taking  Bincheon  May  31st  and 
Charleroi  on  June  2nd,  six  days  after  its  evacuation 
by  the  Spaniards. 

The  outer  works  were  still  intact,  and  Turenne  was 
so  impressed  by  the  strength  of  the  place,  lying  as  it 
does  between  Namur  and  Mons,  that  he  advised 
Louis  to  remain  the’re  while  the  defences  were  re¬ 
stored  under  the  direction  of  Vauban.  Fifteen  days 
later,  on  June  i6th,  a  powerful  garrison  being  left 


Lonis  XIV. 


[1667 


150 

under  the  Count  de  Montal  in  Charleroi,  the  French 
army  fell  back  on  the  Scheldt  and  in  a  fortnight  cap¬ 
tured  a  number  of  strong  places.  D’Aumont  had 
taken  Bergues  and  Fumes,  and  Turenne  now  took 
Ath  and  Tournai  before  the  end  of  June.  Douai 
yielded  on  July  6th,  and  with  its  fall  the  active  opera¬ 
tions  of  Turenne’s  force  came  to  an  end  for  a  short 
time.  While  D’Aumont  was  employed  in  investing 
Courtrai,  the  capture  of  which  was  effected  on  July 
1 8th,  Turenne’s  army  was  taking  a  well-earned  rest, 
and  Louis  returned  to  Compiegne  in  order  to  escort 
the  Queen  and  Court  back  with  him  to  Flanders. 
Douai,  D’Orchies,  and  Tournai  were  enabled  to  appre¬ 
ciate  in  some  measure  the  glories  of  Saint-Germain 
and  of  Versailles,  when  they  witnessed  the  arrival  in 
their  midst  of  the  pageant  of  the  French  Court. 

As  soon  as  the  Court  had  departed  to  Arras,  opera¬ 
tions  of  war  recommenced.  Oudenarde,  after  two 
days’  siege,  fell  on  July  31st,  and  a  detachment  of 
troops  was  sent  to  take  Dendermonde,  the  key  of 
Brussels,  Ghent,  Malines,  and  Bruges.  But  here  the 
Spaniards  showed  timely  energy:  fifteen  hundred 
men  were  thrown  into  the  town  and  the  sluices  were 
opened.  Turenne,  on  his  arrival  on  August  3rd,  found 
that  the  approaches  were  cut  off  by  the  water,  and 
after  two  days  was  forced  to  retire.  Dendermonde, 
like  Amsterdam  a  few  years  later,  was  saved  by  an 
inundation.  This  check  to  the  French  arms  was 
magnified  in  Vienna,  and  Louis’  pride  was  wounded 
by  his  failure.  But  Europe  had  little  time  to  con¬ 
gratulate  itself  on  the  Dendermonde  episode.  On 
August  loth,  Turenne,  who  had  rapidly  redescended 


the: 

AUSTRIAN  NETHKRLVNDS 

WITH  THE 

rRONT/ER  LINE  BARRIER  TOWNS 
OF  1713 


< 


1 


\ 


1667]  The  War  of  Devolution.  15 1 

the  Scheldt  and  effected  a  junction  with  D’Aumont, 
invested  Lille,  a  place  of  great  importance  and  hith¬ 
erto  deemed  impregnable.  The  siege  lasted  seven¬ 
teen  days.  It  was  defended  by  2500  foot  and  about 
650  horse.  The  Governor,  the  Count  de  Brouay,  a 
man  of  energy  and  resource,  was  aided  by  able  officers 
and  supported  by  the  burgher  guard,  which  numbered 
1 500  men.  It  was  known  that  Castel  Rodrigo  would 
do  all  in  his  power  to  succour  the  besieged  town,  and 
as  a  matter  of  fact  12,000  men  had  been  collected  by 
Marsin  at  Ypres  for  that  purpose.  But  Turenne  was 
also  aware  of  the  possibility  of  relief  being  sent  to 
Lille.  Crequi  was  ordered  to  bring  his  men  from  the 
Moselle  to  reinforce  the  royal  army,  and  the  siege, 
under  the  superintendence  of  Vauban,  was  opened 
with  vigour.  The  latter’s  mode  of  investing  a  town 
showed  a  great  advance  on  previous  methods,  and 
such  was  the  rapidity  with  which  the  works  were 
carried  on  that  in  a  fortnight  further  resistance  was 
seen  to  be  impossible.  Early  on  the  27th,  the 
burghers  realising  that  there  was  no  hope  of  the 
arrival  of  reinforcements  from  Castel  Rodrigo  and 
dreading  the  pillage  which  always  in  those  days  fol¬ 
lowed  a  successful  assault  on  a  town,  begged  the 
Governor  to  surrender. 

On  his  refusal  they  manned  the  ramparts  and 
stopped  the  firing.  The  Governor  then  yielded  to 
their  demand,  opened  the  gates,  and  Louis  made  a 
triumphal  entry.  Marsin,  with  some  Spanish  cavalry, 
arrived  too  late  to  prevent  the  capitulation  of  the  city 
and  retired  northwards.  Turenne,  however,  had  ar¬ 
ranged  for  the  annihilation  of  Marsin’s  horsemen  at 


152 


Lends  XIV. 


[1667 


the  hands  of  Cr^qui  and  Bellefonds.  These  officers 
succeeded  in  surrounding  Marsin,  cut  a  portion  of 
his  force  to  pieces,  and  captured  fifteen  hundred 
prisoners.  The  unexpected  success  of  Turenne  at 
Lille  so  alarmed  Leopold  that  he  consented  to  send 
troops  to  oppose  the  French,  and  ordered  levies  to 
be  prepared.  The  French  envoy  at  Vienna,  Gre- 
monville,  at  once  took  a  high  tone  and  made  him 
rescind  the  order.  Delighted  with  his  brilliant  suc¬ 
cess  at  Lille,  Louis  retired  to  Saint-Germain,  and 
Turenne  completed  his  share  of  the  campaign  by  the 
capture  of  Alost  on  September  I2th,  after  a  sharp 
struggle,  in  which  five  or  six  hundred  French  soldiers 
were  killed  or  wounded.  The  defeat  of  the  garrison 
of  Mons  at  the  end  of  October  by  Bellefonds,  then 
in  command  of  a  detachment  on  the  frontier  of 
Hainault,  definitely  brought  the  campaign  to  a  con¬ 
clusion. 

France  had  gained  a  line  of  strong  places  which, 
fortified  by  Vauban,  would  give  her  an  “  iron  fron¬ 
tier  ”  on  the  north-east.  Early  in  September  Louis 
joined  the  Queen  at  Arras,  and  then  returned  in 
triumph  to  Saint-Germain.  Though,  according  to 
eye-witnesses,  he  bore  his  success  with  great  modesty, 
a  marked  change  was  observed  in  his  manner.  Pre¬ 
vious  to  this,  his  first,  real  experience  of  war  he 
had  shown  shyness,  especially  when  in  the  company 
of  the  Court  ladies.  This  shyness  and  awkward¬ 
ness  now  disappeared  ;  he  began  like  other  men 
to  take  the  lead  in  conversation.  His  youthful 
period  had  come  to  an  end  ;  Louis  was  now  a  man. 
This  change  may  be  partly  attributed  to  his  cam- 


1668] 


The  IVar  of  Devolution. 


153 


paigning  in  the  Low  Countries  ;  it  was  in  some 
measure  due  to  the  influence  of  Madame  de  Mon- 
tespan,  who  was  rapidly  supplanting  Louise  de  la 
Vallifere  in  his  favour. 

Throughout  the  latter  half  of  1667  the  diplomatic 
activities  of  Louis  never  slackened.  It  was  of 
supreme  importance  that  the  Rhine  and  its  various 
passages  should  be  closed  against  the  possible  arrival 
of  the  Austrian  troops.  It  was  requisite  to  allay  by 
bribes  or  threats  the  uneasiness  shown  by  Branden¬ 
burg  and  Sweden  at  the  successes  of  the  French. 

In  August  the  Duke  of  Neuburg  signed  a  treaty 
with  Louis,  in  October  the  Elector  of  Cologne  did 
the  same,  while  at  the  same  time  the  Diet  at  Ratisbon 
refused  to  oppose  him.  Brandenburg,  won  over  by 
gold,  and  Sweden,  influenced  by  threats,  declared 
their  neutrality,  and  in  January  and  February,  1668, 
Louis  made  treaties  with  Munster  and  the  Elector 
of  Mainz.  These  alliances  were  secured  at  a  very 
heavy  cost.  French  gold  was  not  only  poured 
into  the  pockets  of  German  politicians,  but  Louis 
agreed  to  withdraw  the  candidature  of  Condd  for 
the  Polish  throne  on  the  abdication  of  Casimir,  and 
to  support  that  of  the  Duke  of  Neuburg,  a  relation 
of  Brandenburg. 

Lastly  he  brought  to  a  conclusion  his  negotia¬ 
tions  with  the  Emperor  Leopold,  and  on  January 
19,  1668,  a  secret  treaty  of  Partition  was  signed. 
By  it  it  was  agreed  that,  on  the  death  of  Charles  II. 
of  Spain,  Leopold  was  to  have  Spain,  the  West 
Indies,  Milan,  and  the  Tuscan  Ports;  Louis  was  to 
receive  Naples  and  Sicily,  the  Low  Countries  and 


154 


Louis  XIV. 


[1668 


Franche  Comte,  Navarre  and  Rosas,  the  Eastern 
Philippines  and  the  Spanish  possessions  in  Africa. 

Thus  secure  against  the  intervention  of  Leopold, 
Louis  was  in  a  position  to  enter  upon  the  second 
campaign  of  the  Devolution  war,  and  to  carry  out 
his  projects  on  Franche  Comt6.  It  was  well  known 
in  Paris  that  negotiations  between  London  and 
Amsterdam  were  in  progress ;  Castel  Rodrigo,  too, 
had  adopted  a  confident  tone,  and  had  haughtily 
refused  the  offer  of  a  truce.  A  sudden  attack  on 
Franche  Comte  would,  it  was  thought,  astonish  the 
world,  punish  the  Spaniards,  and  prevent  a  coalition 
between  England  and  Holland.  During  the  winter 
of  1667-68  preparations  were  made  rapidly,  and 
with  the  utmost  secrecy.  Conde,  the  Governor  of 
Burgundy,  was  received  into  the  royal  favour,  and 
entrusted  with  the  execution  of  the  -design.  Early 
in  December  he  returned  from  the  Court  to  Bur¬ 
gundy  and,  with  Louvois,  made  most  elaborate 
preparations.  He  informed  himself  of  the  condition 
of  the  principal  towns  in  Franche  Comtd,  and  of  the 
number  and  character  of  the  troops  available  for  the 
defence  of  the  Province.  From  the  Swiss  alone  was 
there  any  chance  of  real  opposition  to  Louis’  attack 
on  Franche  Comte,  and  very  explicit  warnings  had 
reached  the  Swiss  Cantons  from  Paris.  The  Swiss 
were  very  sensitive  on  the  subject  of  Franche 
Comte,  for  they  regarded  it  as  a  valuable  barrier 
against  French  aggression.  But  the  Swiss  were,  like 
the  rest  of  Europe,  completely  taken  by  surprise. 
Winter  campaigns  were  practically  unknown  in 
European  warfare.  The  measures  of  Louvois  had 


1668] 


The  War  of  Devoltttion. 


155 


been  skilfully  prepared,  and  the  victor  of  Rocroi  was 
again  to  electrify  Europe.  He  had  collected  in 
Burgundy  a  force  of  fifteen  thousand  picked  men, 
and  on  February  3rd  he  crossed  the  frontier.  Within 
a  fortnight  Franche  Comte  was  in  his  hands.  On 
January  i8th  the  serious,  indefatigable,  and  hard¬ 
working  Louis  danced  as  Pleasure  in  a  royal  mas¬ 
querade,  and  as  in  the  winter  of  1666-67  concealed 
under  the  appearance  of  devotion  to  amusement 
his  design  of  taking  an  active  part  in  the  ensuing 
campaign.  On  the  2nd  of  February  he  left  Paris, 
and  arrived  at  Dijon  on  the  7th,  having  performed 
on  horseback  the  journey  of  eighty  miles  in  five 
days  by  roads  more  than  usually  detestable,  owing 
to  the  winter  season.  Rochefort,  Besangon,  and 
Salins  had  already  capitulated,  and  Louis  received 
at  Dijon  their  submission.  On  February  13th  he  was 
himself  present  at  the  capitulation  of  Dole,  the 
capital.  The  fall  of  Gray,  on  the  i8th,  was  the  final 
blow  to  the  Spanish  rule.  On  the  igth,  the  con¬ 
quest  of  Franche  Comt6  being  completed,  he 
returned  to  Saint-Germain,  leaving  to  Conde  as  Gov¬ 
ernor  of  the  two  Burgundies  and  to  Louvois  the 
task  of  organising  the  administration  of  the  new 
Province,  which,  as  if  by  magic,  in  less  than  three 
weeks  had  been  won  by  France.  A  populous  coun¬ 
try  had  been  freed  from  its  artificial  connection  with 
Spain,  a  continual  danger  to  the  French  capital 
had  been  removed,  and  a  fresh  proof  had  been 
given  of  the  power  and  resources  of  the  French 
monarchy. 

Louis’  schemes  did  not  end  with  the  conquest  of 


156 


Lotiis  XIV. 


[1668 


Franche  Comt^.  He  meditated  a  further  advance 
into  the  Low  Countries,  and  a  large  army  was  rapidly 
concentrated  on  the  frontier  ready  to  operate  in 
April. 

But  these  aggressive  designs  were  suddenly 
checked.  Louis’  rapid  successes  had  alarmed  Eu¬ 
rope,  and  resistance  to  his  schemes  was  openly  pre¬ 
pared.  He  now  found  opposed  to  him  not  merely 
Castel  Rodrigo’s  men  of  straw,  but  a  great  European 
coalition.  On  his  return  to  Paris  from  Franche 
Comte  he  received  the  formal  announcement  of  a 
Triple  Alliance  concluded  on  January  13th  between 
England,  Holland,  and  Sweden. 

De  Witt  had  long  been  convinced  that  the  pos¬ 
session  of  Spanish  Flanders  by  the  French  would 
mean  destruction  to  the  prosperity  of  the  United 
Provinces.  The  hostile  tariff  imposed  by  Colbert  in 
1667  had  roused  the  strongest  opposition  in  Hol¬ 
land,  and  the  Dutch  agreed  with  De  Witt  that  it 
was  absolutely  necessary  to  arrest  at  once  the 
progress  of  the  French  arms.  A  coalition  alone 
could  resist  Louis  successfully.  And  De  Witt 
turned  to  Sweden  and  England. 

In  the  former  country  a  strenuous  opposition  had 
arisen  to  the  policy  of  friendship  with  France,  and 
De  Witt  succeeded  in  securing  the  promise  of  adhe¬ 
sion  to  any  alliance  formed  by  England  and  Holland 
in  favour  of  Spain.  With  England  his  task  was 
equally  easy.  Alarmed  by  the  attack  on  the  Low 
Countries,  England  and  Holland  had  hastened  to 
conclude  the  Peace  of  Breda  in  the  summer  of  1667, 
and  a  sense  of  common  danger  tended  to  draw  the 


THE  GREAT  CONDI 

(From  an  engraving  reproduced  in  Philippson’s 
Das  Zeitalter  L  udwigs  XII 


I 

.1 


I 


i 


1668] 


The  War  of  Devohition. 


157 


two  countries  still  closer  together.  The  fall  of  Clar¬ 
endon  lost  to  Louis  his  most  powerful  English  sup¬ 
porter  just  when  the  national  feeling  in  England, 
irritated  by  the  sale  of  Dunkirk,  was  showing  itself 
fiercely  opposed  to  the  conquest  of  the  Nether¬ 
lands  by  the  French.  [The  Triple  Alliance  arranged 
by  Sir  William  Temple,  John  De  Witt,  and  Count 
Dohna  expressed  a  firm  determination  on  the  part 
of  England,  Holland,  and  Sweden  to  resist  any  fur¬ 
ther  encroachments  of  Louis  XIV. ^  The  three 
powers  bound  themselves  to  obtain  a  cessation  of 
arms  till  the  end  of  May,  on  the  basis  of  the  propo¬ 
sals  already  made  by  Louis  for  the  restoration  of 
peace  between  Spain  and  France,  to  prevent  any 
further  extension  of  the  French  conquests,  and 
agreed,  if  Louis  refused  to  adopt  their  proposals,  to 
attack  him  by  sea  and  land. 

y"he  three  powers  had,  however,  a  difficult  task 
ore  them.  To  induce  Spain  to  allow  the  greater 
part  of  the  Low  Countries  to  be  saved  from  con¬ 
quest  was  as  difficult  a  task  as  to  check  a  powerful 
king  like  Louis  in  his  victorious  career.  Fully  con¬ 
scious  of  the  seriousness  of  a  crisis  which  had  be¬ 
come  of  European  importance,  the  allies  compelled 
Spain  to  agree  to  peace  and  to  accept  one  of  the 
“  alternatives  ”  already  proposed  by  Louis  six 
months  previously,  viz.,  that  he  should  either  keep 
his  conquests  in  the  Netherlands,  or  receive  Franche 
Comt6  with  Aire,  St.  Omer,  and  Cambrai.  After 
many  delays  Castel  Rodrigo,  who  was  averse  to 
peace  and  hoped  to  continue  the  war  with  the  as¬ 
sistance  of  England  and  Holland,  decided  to  leave 


158 


Louis  XIV. 


[1668 


to  Louis  the  towns  which  he  had  already  conquered. 
While  the  country  which  was  being  saved  against  its 
will  was  accepting  the  terms  of  peace  with  a  very 
bad  grace,  the  negotiations  at  Paris  were  beset  with 
difficulties.  Louis’  advisers  were  divided  on  the 
question  of  peace  or  war.  Turenne,  Conde,  and 
Louvois  were  anxious  to  take  the  allies  by  surprise, 
to  overrun  the  Netherlands,  and  to  refuse  the  pro¬ 
posals  of  the  Triple  Alliance ;  Colbert  and  Lionne 
advised  moderation  on  the  ground  that  for  a  general 
European  war  France  was  not  prepared  in  the  mat¬ 
ter  of  funds,  military  stores,  or  alliances.  Finally, 
after  much  doubt  and  deliberation,  Louis  consented 
to  treat  on  the  basis  which  he  had  already  indi¬ 
cated,  but  only  agreed  to  a  cessation  of  arms  till  the 
end  of  March.  A  large  and  imposing  army  in  sev¬ 
eral  divisions  was  assembled  on  the  frontier  ready 
to  march  as  soon  as  the  negotiations  broke  down. 
The  feeling  in  Paris  was  decidedly  warlike.  Louis 
was  furious  on  discovering  the  existence  of  the  arti¬ 
cle  in  the  secret  treaty  in  which  the  allies  had  agreed, 
if  Louis  refused  their  proposals,  to  attack  him  by 
land  and  sea,  and  he  was  especially  irritated  at  the 
attitude  taken  up  by  a  small  republic  like  Holland. 
Hence  he  readily  listened  to  the  counsel  of  those 
who  pointed  out  that  Spain  was  exhausted  and 
could  not  send  any  reinforcements,  that  the  allies 
would  be  powerless  to  prevent  the  entire  conquest 
of  the  Netherlands,  and  that  he  could  trust  to  his 
diplomacy  to  sow  discord  and  dissension  among  his 
foes. 

On  the  other  hand  there  was  much  in  the  condi- 


1668] 


The  IVar  of  Devohition. 


159 


tion  of  Europe  to  make  Louis  hesitate  before  unit¬ 
ing  the  great  powers  against  him  in  a  strong  coali¬ 
tion.  Spain  had  on  February  13,  1668,  hastened  to 
make  peace  with  and  to  recognize  the  independence 
of  Portugal.  The  influence  of  France  in  the  latter 
country  had  been  replaced  by  that  of  England. 
Sweden  had  definitely  confirmed  the  engagement 
already  provisionally  made  to  join  England  and 
Holland,  and  the  Triple  Alliance  had  become  an  ac¬ 
complished  fact.  Moreover  military  operations  in 
Spain,  England,  and  Holland  were  being  steadily 
pushed  on,  and  this  fact  undoubtedly  contributed 
to  decide  Louis  to  postpone  the  continuance  of  the 
war  and  the  attempted  realisation  of  his  plans  to  a 
season  when  there  should  be  less  unanimity  among 
the  great  European  states. 

Holland,  England,  and  Spain  were  indeed  fully 
aroused,  and  Louis’  decision  was  probably  a  wise 
one.  In  Holland  naval  and  military  preparations 
went  hand  in  hand,  in  England  the  Parliament  was 
prepared  to  vote  large  additional  sums  for  the 
equipment  of  the  fleet,  even  in  Spain  it  was  arranged 
that  Don  John  of  Austria  as  Governor  of  the 
Netherlands  should  at  once  take  ten  thousand  men 
with  him  to  the  Low  Countries  and  offer  a  strenu¬ 
ous  resistance  to  the  French  armies. 

But  what  probably  weighed  more  than  anything 
with  Louis  in  favour  of  a  peaceful  solution  was . his 
secret  treaty  of  January  19,  1668,  with  Leopold. 
Charles  H.  of  Spain  seemed  likely  to  die  any  day; 
he  had  no  children,  and  in  the  event  of  his  death 
the  succession  to  the  Spanish  dominions  would  be 


i6o 


Lotiis  XIV. 


[1668 


thrown  open.  For  this  contingency  Louis  was 
ready.  He  and  Leopold  had  agreed  upon  the  terms 
of  the  division  and  by  those  terms  Louis  would 
become  owner  of  Franche  Comte  and  the  Low 
Countries, 

At  length  on  the  acceptance  by  Castel  Rodrigo  of 
the  second  alternative,  the  treaty  of  Aix-la-Cha- 
pelle  was  signed  on  May  29,  1668,  and  the  war  which 
had  fallen  so  suddenly  upon  Europe  came  almost 
as  unexpectedly  to  an  end.  Louis’  wisdom  in  mak¬ 
ing  peace  admits  of  little  doubt.  Had  he  persisted 
in  war  he  would  most  certainly  have  brought  upon 
himself  a  powerful  coalition  of  which  England  would 
have  been  a  leading  member.  English  and  Dutch 
writers  have  till  quite  lately  been  almost  unanimous 
in  ascribing  Louis’  decision  in  favour  of  peace  to  the 
efforts  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  French  writers  are 
equally  certain  that  the  existence  of  the  secret  treaty 
with  Leopold  was  the  main  cause  of  Louis’  modera¬ 
tion.  The  truth  probably  lies  between  the  two  as¬ 
sertions.  The  Triple  Alliance  gave  force  to  the  advice 
of  Colbert  and  Lionne  ;  the  knowledge  of  his  treaty 
with  Leopold  decided  Louis  to  postpone  for  a  short 
while  the  realisation  of  his  schemes  and  to  take  what 
seemed  to  be  a  step  backward  ;  the  peace  between 
Spain  and  Portugal  impressed  upon  him  the  advisa¬ 
bility  of  waiting  till  he  could  by  diplomacy  break 
up  the  coalition  which  had  been  formed  against 
him,  while  the  fear  of  a  rising  of  the  Huguenots  in 
France  may  have  strengthened  his  decision  in  favour 
of  peace.  The  peace  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  was  only 
an  armistice,  but  an  armistice  which  proved  invalu- 


1668] 


The  War  of  DcvohUion. 


i6i 


able  to  France  and  disastrous  to  the  United 
Provinces.  The  Triple  Alliance  had  been  the  re¬ 
sult  of  a  combination  of  circumstances  which  were 
not  likely  to  repeat  themselves.  Of  the  three  allies 
Holland  had  by  her  action  incurred  the  greatest 
risk,  for  Holland  lay  in  a  precarious  position  be¬ 
tween  the  commercial  hostility  of  England  and  the 
political,  religious,  and  commercial  antagonism  of 
France.  Louis  had  every  intention  of  continuing 
his  annexations  at  a  very  early  date  and  indeed  at 
the  expense  of  the  United  Provinces.  When  the 
hour  of  her  trial  came  Holland  was  to  find  that  of 
the  great  European  nations  the  only  ally  on  whom 
she  could  depend  was  her  former  enemy  Spain. 

II 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE  WAR  OF  1 672. 

1672-1678. 

HE  treaty  of  Aix-la-Chapelle 
was  merely  a  truce.  The  alli¬ 
ance  between  England,  Hol¬ 
land,  and  Sweden  was  built 
upon  no  sure  foundation,  and 
was  unlikely  to  hold  good  for 
any  length  of  time.  The  inter¬ 
ests  of  England  and  Holland 
were  in  the  matter  of  trade  di¬ 
ametrically  opposed ;  Charles 
H.  himself  disliked  the  Dutch  on  account  of  their 
republican  tendencies ;  the  necessity  of  offering  a 
determined  resistance  to  French  policy  was  by  no 
means  fully  realised  in  England,  and  the  aims  and 
general  tendency  of  Louis’  schemes  were  in  no 
degree  understood.  Sweden  had,  as  it  were,  been 
accidentally  drawn  into  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  it 
was  unlikely  that  Sweden,  since  Richelieu’s  days  so 

162 


1672] 


The  JVar  of  id'/ 2. 


163 


closely  allied  to  France  and  always  so  keenly  appre¬ 
ciative  of  the  pecuniary  advantages  of  the  French 
connection,  would  long  remain  in  a  position  from 
which  she  could  gain  little  or  nothing.  Though  it 
is  easy  at  the  present  day  to  analyse  the  causes  for 
the  isolation  of  Holland  in  1672,  he  would  have 
been  a  very  wise  man  who  could  at  that  time  have 
foretold  that  within  three  years  a  League  which  had 
been  celebrated  with  bonfires  would  be  broken  up, 
and  two  of  its  members  in  open  hostility  to  the 
third.  Clifford  had  indeed  asserted  that  there  must 
be  another  war,  but  he  never  for  a  moment  expected 
that  the  Triple  Alliance  would  crumble  away  so 
soon.  The  men  of  that  day  had  not  yet  realised  the 
extent  of  the  resources  of  Louis  XIV.  Though 
throughout  his  long  reign  Louis  showed  an  extraordi¬ 
nary  aptitude  for  diplomacy  and  remarkable  wisdom 
in  his  choice  of  agents,  he  never  showed  more  consum¬ 
mate  diplomatic  skill  than  when  he  set  to  work  to 
isolate  the  Dutch  Republic.  Everything  connected 
with  the  war,  the  diplomacy  that  preceded  it,  the 
elaborate  military  preparations,  the  skilful  manner 
in  which  the  peace  of  Nimeguen  was  concluded,  the 
constant  ebb  and  flow  of  the  struggles  between  rival 
cliques  at  the  Court  interfering  often  considerably 
with  successes  in  the  field — all  admirably  illustrate 
Louis’  strength  and  weakness.  We  note  the  enor¬ 
mous  trouble  taken  about  the  smallest  details,  the 
precision  with  which  the  carefully  planned  arrange¬ 
ments  were  carried  out,  and  the  bombastic  manner 
with  which  small  successes  were  translated  into  bril¬ 
liant  victories. 


164  Louis  XIV.  [1672 

The  motives  which  led  Louis  into  makinsf  his 
famous  attack  on  the  Dutch  well  exemplify  the 
curious  mixture  of  greatness  and  pettiness  which 
meet  us  at  every  turn  in  studying  the  life  of  the 
Grand  Monarqne. 

Though  the  Dutch  had  frequently  proved  most 
useful  allies  of  France,  they  had  incurred  the  resent¬ 
ment  of  Louis  for  their  action  on  two  occasions.  By 
making  with  Spain  the  treaty  of  Munster  in  January, 
1648,  they  had  checkmated  Mazarin  and  saved  the 
Spanish  Netherlands  from  annexation  or  partition. 
Again,  in  1668,  by  joining  in  the  Triple  Alliance 
they  had  checked  France  in  the  I'ealisation  of  her 
schemes  against  the  Low  Countries.  In  addition, 
the  close  proximity  to  France  of  republicans  whose 
publications  were  strongly  antimonarchical,  and 
whose  commerce  had  brought  their  country  to  a 
high  pitch  of  prosperity,  jarred  upon  Louis’  ten- 
derest  feelings.  The  republic  was  founded  upon  a 
revolt  from  the  King  of  Spain  and  from  the  Church 
of  Rome.  Colbert  had  already  attacked  the  United 
Provinces  by  hostile  tariffs,  which,  he  expected, 
would  ruin  their  trade.  To  destroy  this  republican 
nest  and  to  restore  the  Catholic  religion  seemed  to 
Louis  an  object  worthy  of  a  Catholic  king. 

But  behind  the  political  and  commercial  jealousy 
and  the  intolerant  hatred  which  made  the  attack  on 
the  United  Provinces  seem  a  mere  act  of  revenge, 
there  were  deeper  and  more  statesmanlike  forces  at 
work.  The  object  of  the  Devolution  war  had  been 
to  acquire  the  Spanish  Netherlands,  and  the  four 
years  succeeding  the  treaty  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  had 


1672J 


The  War  of  1 6'/ 2. 


165 


only  increased  the  determination  of  Louis  and  his 
advisers  to  annex  that  country,  ^he  real  object  of 
.  the  war  against  the  Dutch  was  the  annexation  of 
the  Spanish  Low  Countries,  though  the  various  cir¬ 
cumstances  already  mentioned  diverted  attention 
from  the  real  meaning  of  the  attack.  "J 

Had  the  ultimate  intention  of  Louis  been  even 
suspected,  his  carefully  erected  system  of  alliances 
would  have  fallen  like  a  pack  of  cards.  His  plan  of 
operations  was,  however,  so  arranged  as  to  hood¬ 
wink  Europe,  ^'he  surest  way  to  annex  the  Span¬ 
ish  Netherlands  was  first  of  all  to  conquer,  if  possi¬ 
ble,  the  Dutch,  and  that  being  accomplished  the 
helpless  Spanish  Provinces  could  offer  but  a  feeble 
resistance  to  the  French  arms.J^  Viewed  in  its  rela¬ 
tion  to  the  ultimate  annexation  of  the  Spanish 
Netherlands  by  France  the  Dutch  war  was  a  mere 
continuation  of  the  war  of  Devolution,  and  Louis 
was  carrying  on  by  new  methods  the  policy  of 
Richelieu  and  Mazarin.  In  1672  Holland  was  the 
only  obstacle  in  the  way  of  the  realisation  of  the 
policy  of  extending  the  French  boundaries  on  the 
north-east.'^  But  after  the  campaign  was  begun  pas¬ 
sion  and  arrogance  carried  Louis  and  Louvois  too 
far,  and  instead  of  being  content  with  weakening 
Holland  to  the  extent  of  rendering  her  unable  to 
aid  or  to  defend  the  Spanish  Netherlands,  they  ap¬ 
peared  to  Europe  to  be  bent  on  the  annihilation  of 
a  Protestant  country  merely  on  grounds  of  political, 
commercial,  and  religious  jealous}^ 

Neither  Richelieu  nor  Mazarm  would  probably 
have  attacked  the  United  Provinces.  Not  being 


Louis  XIV. 


[1672 


1 66 


blinded  by  religious  enthusiasm  they  were  able  to 
appreciate  the  effect  of  religious  forces  upon  the 
stability  of  old  alliances.  It  was  Louis’  inability 
to  gauge  the  strength  of  religious  conviction  that 
resulted  in  his  failure  to  secure  the  main  object  of 
the  war,  and  in  his  ultimate  desertion  of  many 
of  the  principles  which  had  guided  Richelieu  and 
Mazarin. 

In  arriving  at  the  determination  to  subdue  Hol¬ 
land,  Louis,  though  acting  consistently  with  his  own 
programme,  was  in  part  deserting  the  policy  inaug¬ 
urated  by  Francis  1.  and  followed  by  Richelieu  and 
Mazarin.  Hitherto  France  had  taken  up  a  moderate 
position — Catholic  at  home  and  Protestant  abroad. 
She  had  held  the  balance  between  Protestantism 
and  Catholicism  on  the  continent.  She  had  been 
careful  to  ally  with  the  Dutch  and  to  keep  up 
friendly  relations  with  the  North  German  princes, 
and  by  this  means  to  hamper  and  weaken  the  House 
of  Hapsburg. 

In  attacking  Holland  Louis  was  adopting  a  policy 
which  was  sure  in  the  end  to  alienate  his  North 
German  allies.  It  was  just  at  this  time,  too,  that 
Louis,  deserting  the  tolerant  policy  of  his  predeces¬ 
sors,  began  that  course  of  persecution  of  the  Hugue¬ 
nots  which,  culminating  with  the  revocation  of  the 
Edict  of  Nantes,  entirely  alienated  Protestant 
Europe.  The  process  of  converting  France  into  a 
Catholic  as  well  as  an  absolute  monarchy,  went  on 
simultaneously  with  his  attempt  to  undermine  if 
not  to  annihilate  Protestantism  on  the  continent. 

Carried  away  by  a  sincere  desire  to  win  brilliant 


1672] 


The  IVar  of  16^2. 


167 


triumphs  for  the  Church  and  by  a  wish  to  pose  as 
the  leading  supporter  and  benefactor  of  the  Church, 
he  entered  upon  a  course  which  was  destined  to 
bring  immeasurable  evils  upon  France,  and  to  unite 
Europe  in  a  determination  which  grew  in  intensity 
from  1672  to  1713  to  repress  the  Bourbon  power. 
“In  Holland,”  says  Mignet,  “the  old  political  sys¬ 
tem  of  France  made  shipwreck.” 

But  Louis,  young,  ardent,  surrounded  by  flatter¬ 
ers,  and  well  served  by  generals  and  able  ministers, 
recked  of  none  of  these  things.  No  sooner  was  the 
peace  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  signed  than  he  began  to 
undermine  it.  “  The  years  between  1668  and  1672,” 
says  Camille  Rousset,  “  were  years  of  preparation, 
when  Lionne  was  labouring  with  all  his  might  to  find 
allies,  Colbert  to  find  money,  and  Louvois  soldiers 
for  Louis.”  England  was  first  gained.  But  the 
secret  negotiations  which  were  undertaken  in  this 
important  affair  lasted  two  years.  Charles  11.  was 
convinced  that  he  could  never  hope  to  be  absolute 
until  Catholicism  was  tolerated  and  recognised  in 
England.  He  himself  followed  the  example  of 
his  brother  James,  and  became  a  Catholic  early  in 
1669,  and  that  step  taken  Louis  at  once  offered  him, 
on  condition  of  aid  against  the  Dutch,  every  possi¬ 
ble  assistance  in  establishing  despotic  government  in 
England. 

The  conduct  of  the  English  Parliament  in  voting 
him  an  inadequate  sum  of  money  in  the  autumn  of 

1669,  and  the  influence  of  Henrietta  of  Orleans 
swept  away  Charles’  last  scruple,  and  on  June  i, 

1670,  the  treaty  of  Dover  marked  Louis’  great  diplo- 


i68 


Lotiis  XIV. 


[1672 


matic  triumph  and  the  break  up  of  the  Triple  Alli¬ 
ance.  Without  England  a  successful  attack  on 
Holland  would  have  been  impossible.  The  English 
ships  alone  were  capable  of  coping  with  the  Dutch 
fleet,  which  could  easily  have  destroyed  the  French 
commerce.  The  alliance  with  England*  was,  indeed, 
of  incalculable  value  to  Louis,  who  would  have  had 
little  chance  of  carrying  out  his  schemes  had  Crom¬ 
well  and  not  Charles  II.  ruled  in  London.  Thus  was 
accomplished  the  first  and  most  important  step  in 
the  realisation  of  a  policy  of  shattering  the  Triple 
Alliance,  gaining  or  neutralising  the  European 
states,  and  destroying  a  small  republic. 

Lionne  was  largely  responsible  for  the  success  of 
the  negotiations  for  securing  England’s  withdrawal 
from  the  Triple  Alliance,  but  the  final  scenes  of  the 
drama  which  ended  with  Charles’  assent  to  the 
treaty  were  enacted  by  Henrietta  of  Orleans.  To 
cover  her  mission  to  England,  Louis  made  a 
triumphal  progress  through  the  newly  conquered 
towns  in  the  north,  taking  with  him  his  Queen  and 
Madame  de  Montespan. 

Greater  difficulty  was  experienced  in  detaching 
Sweden  from  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  Lionne  died 
before  his  negotiations  had  been  brought  to  a  suc¬ 
cessful  issue.  But  the  ill-judged  economy  of  the 
Dutch  and  the  efforts  of  Lionne’s  successor,  Arnauld 
de  Pomponne,  ably  supported  by  Courtin  and  the 
English  Coventry,  at  last  won  an  important  diplo¬ 
matic  victory  over  the  ambassadors  of  Austria,  Bran¬ 
denburg,  Spain,  and  Holland.  Sweden,  poor  and 
intensely  jealous  of  Denmark,  was  to  receive  a  large 


16721 


The  Wai"  of  i6'j2. 


i6g 


sum  of  money  down  and  an  annual  subsidy  of 
50,000,  and  Denmark  was  not  to  be  included  in 
the  alliance.  For  this  she  was  to  hold  North  Ger¬ 
many  in  check,  and  to  send  an  army  into  Pomerania. 
The  treaty  was  only  signed  in  May,  1672 — a  month 
before  the  attack  on  Holland  began. 

The  untimely  death  of  the  attractive  Duchess  of 
Orleans  hardly  a  month  after  the  completion  of  the 
treaty  of  Dover,  had  not  checked  Louis’  prepara¬ 
tions  in  the  slightest  degree.  In  August  he  occupied 
Lorraine,  asserting  as  a  justification  the  Duke’s  in¬ 
trigues  with  Holland.  He  had  already  succeeded — 
where  Mazarin  had  failed — in  securing  the  neutrality 
of  Bavaria,  and  hoped  to  obtain  the  Elector’s  assist¬ 
ance  in  the  execution  of  his  schemes  with  regard 
to  the  Imperial  throne  and  the  Spanish  succession. 
In  October,  1671,  Osnabriick  promised  aid,  and  in 
November  of  the  same  year  the  Emperor  Leopold 
signed  a  treaty  of  neutrality.  In  the  early  months 
of  1672,  the  alliance  with  England  was  drawn  still 
closer,  and  Cologne  and  Munster  made  offensive 
treaties  with  Louis.  The  Elector  Palatine  was 
secured,  and  at  the  end  of  the  year  Brunswick- 
Liineburg  joined  in  the  opposition  to  Holland. 
Louis  had  nothing  to  fear  from  Germany  ;  Mainz  and 
Treves  were,  like  Denmark  and  Saxony,  neutral, 
though  the  neutrality  of  the  two  latter  was  of  a  hos¬ 
tile  character.  The  Dutch  could  do  little  to  avert 
the  storm,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  De  Witt  had  been 
from  1671  well  aware  of  the  attack  about  to  be  made 
on  his  country.  In  March,  1672,  a  Dutch  merchant 
fleet  was  attacked  by  Admiral  Homes  without  warn- 


170 


Louis  XIV. 


[1672 


ing,  and  four  days  later  England  declared  war.  The 
Dutch  could  only  rely  on  Brandenburg  and  Spain. 
The  latter  had  made  a  defensive  treaty  with  Holland 
in  December,  1671,  and  the  former  promised,  on  May 
2,  1672,  to  bring  to  their  assistance  22,000  men. 

Louis’  military  preparations  were  no  less  minute 
than  his  political  arrangements  had  been.  The  occu¬ 
pation  of  Lorraine  assured  him  the  frontier  on  the 
side  of  Germany,  and  a  quarrel  between  the  inhabi¬ 
tants  of  Cologne  and  their  Archbishop  gave  Lou- 
vois  an  excuse  for  making  the  strong  positions  of 
Neuss  and  Kaiserwerth  depots  for  the  French  army. 
There,  after  three  skilfully  contrived  treaties  with  the 
Elector  of  Cologne,  he  had  stored  in  1671  large  quan¬ 
tities  of  grain,  powder,  and  arms  of  all  kinds. 

Just  before  the  actual  outbreak  of  the  war  a  curi¬ 
ous  attempt  was  made  to  divert  the  elaborate  prepa¬ 
rations  into  another  channel.  The  philosopher 
Leibnitz  was  sent  by  the  Elector  of  Mainz  to  present 
to  Louis  a  scheme  for  the  conquest  of  Egypt — the 
Holland  of  the  East — and  of  the  Indies.  Had  Louis 
followed  the  advice  of  Leibnitz  the  control  of  the 
Mediterranean  trade  would  have  fallen  into  French 
hands.  Bonaparte’s  famous  attempt  to  ruin  the 
British  Empire  by  occupying  Egypt  came  too  late. 
We  have  no  proof  that  Louis  gave  any  attention  to 
this  proposal  of  Leibnitz.  Pomponne,  however,  wrote 
to  the  Elector  that  “  projects  for  holy  wars  had  ceased 
to  be  fashionable  since  the  days  of  Saint  Louis.” 
Having  thus  failed  in  his  endeavour  to  preserve  the 
peace  of  Europe  the  Elector  took  up  the  cause  of 
the  Dutch  and  prepared  to  aid  them  by  diplomacy. 


1672] 


The  IVar  of  i6’j2. 


171 


War  was  declared  against  the  United  Provinces  on 
April  6th  and  a  medal  was  struck  commemorating 
the  victory  which  Louis  was  about  to  win.  The  in¬ 
scription  bore  the  motto  Evexi  scd  disciitiam  and  the 
medal  represented  the  sun  dispersing  by  his  beams 
the  vapours  from  a  morass.  On  April  28th  Louis  left 
Saint-Germain,  and  went  by  Nanteuil,  Soissons,  Laon, 
Marie,  and  Aubenton  to  Rocroi,  arriving  there  on 
May  2d.  From  Rocroi  were  issued  the  first  set  of 
the  elaborate  orders  which  regulated  the  campaign 
of  1672. 

The  army,  a  portion  of  which  Louis  met  at 
Rocroi,  was  worthy  of  a  mightier  foe  than  Holland. 
Under  Louvois  and  Turenne  it  had  been  completely 
reorganised  and  was  in  a  high  state  of  discipline. 
After  the  conclusion  of  the  peace  of  the  Pyrenees 
very  drastic  changes  had  been  brought  about.  Up 
to  this  time  the  armies  were  either  bodies  of  free 
lances  collected  round  a  particular  general,  and  look¬ 
ing  to  him  for  pay,  or  a  kind  of  armed  militia  which 
regarded  soldiering  as  a  sort  of  interlude,  not  as  a 
profession.  The  army  was  now  improved  at  the  ex¬ 
pense  of  the  militia  and  organised  into  a  standing 
force.  It  was  divided  into  brigades,  regiments,  bat¬ 
talions,  and  squadrons.  Generals  were  given  abso¬ 
lute  powers  and  the  officers  were  placed  under  careful 
supervision.  The  household  troops  had  been  sub¬ 
jected  to  drastic  reforms  and  were  now  an  effective 
branch  of  the  service,  and  a  body  of  engineers  was 
being  organised  by  Vauban.  Louvois  also  insisted 
upon  the  forcible  enrolment  of  the  nobility  and  gen¬ 
try,  he  introduced  a  new  system  of  drill  which  was 


Louis  XIV. 


[1672 


I  72 


perfected  by  Martinet,  he  began  a  system  of  pay¬ 
ment,  he  formed  a  commissariat,  and  made  hospital 
arrangements  suitable  for  large  armies. 

Carefully  trained  under  the  eye  of  Turenne  the 
French  infantry  had  become  the  best  in  Europe.  It 
had  nearly  trebled  in  numbers;  and  was  far  superior 
to  the  cavalry  in  importance.  As  a  fighting  machine 
the  French  army  had  no  equal  and  Europe  was  soon 
to  recognise  and  imitate  the  changes  which  had 
so  completely  transformed  the  military  system  of 
France.  The  campaign  of  1667  had  first  shown  the 
enormous  progress  made  by  the  French  army  since 
the  death  of  Mazarin,  but  it  was  not  till  the  Dutch 
war  that  the  full  import  of  the  reforms  of  Louvois 
and  Turenne  was  realised.  The  excellence  of  the 
arrangements,  the  discipline  of  the  regiments,  and 
the  preponderance  of  infantry  were  clearly  mani¬ 
fested  during  the  invasion  of  the  Dutch  Provinces. 
“  It  was,”  said  Napoleon,  “  a  new  era  in  war.” 

Turenne  and  Conde  were  placed  in  command  of 
the  forces  and  Vauban  accompanied  the  army  to 
direct  the  capture  of  towns.  Turenne’s  plans  were 
admirable  and  the  campaign  was  in  its  earlier  phases 
one  triumphal  march.  The  King  marched  down  the 
Sambre  and  Meuse.  At  Viset  he  crossed  the  river 
while  Turenne  masked  Maestricht  by  capturing 
Maseick  and  Tongres. 

On  the  31st  of  May,  the  main  French  army  was  at 
Neuss  and  moving  down  the  Rhine  rapidly  crossed 
that  river  at  Tolhuys  on  June  12th,  after  a  slight 
skirmish  with  the  Dutch.  Though  Napoleon  spoke 
of  this  fact  as  “  an  operation  of  the  fourth  class,”  it 


THE  PASSAGE  OF  THE  RHINE. 

(From  a  collection  of  prints  of  Louis  XIV. ’s  campaigns.) 


1672] 


The  War  of  i6'/2. 


1/3 


was  regarded  by  the  inhabitants  of  Paris  as  a  bril¬ 
liant  feat  of  arms.  Up  to  this  point  the  advice  of 
Turenne  had  been  followed.  Had  the  army  or  even 
a  small  portion  of  it  advanced  rapidly  the  war  would 
have  been  over  in  a  few  days.  The  Yssel  had  been 
crossed  and  there  was  practically  no  serious  obstacle 
to  the  capture  of  Amsterdam.  But  the  influence  of 
Louvois  acting  upon  the  predilections  of  the  King 
for  siege  warfare  saved  Holland  and  averted  a  step 
which  would  have  changed  the  whole  course  of 
European  history. 

Against  the  advice  of  Turenne  who  rightly  wished 
to  push  on  and  take  Utrecht  and  Amsterdam,  Louis 
insisted  on  turning  aside  and  wasting  precious  time 
in  reducing  the  forts  on  the  Yssel — an  easy  way  of 
securing  certain  triumphs  which  enabled  him  to  pose 
as  a  great  warrior.  He  failed  at  a  critical  moment 
to  grasp  the  position  and  laid  himself  open  to  the 
charge  of  being  defective  in  understanding  and  cour¬ 
age.  Louvois  must  also  take  his  share  of  the  blame 
for  this  extraordinary  blunder.  Carried  away  by  the 
mere  pride  of  power,  he  seems  to  have  thought  that 
the  complete  overthrow  of  Holland  was  assured.  His 
advice  to  Louis  at  this  juncture  proved  most  disas¬ 
trous,  and  his  presumption  may  be  said  to  have 
destroyed  all  chance  of  a  successful  campaign. 

It  is  difficult  to  understand  why  Turenne  was  un¬ 
able  to  protest  successfully  against  what  he  must 
have  known  was  a  most  fatal  blunder.  But  he  had 
been  sent  to  watch  the  movements  of  the  Great 
Elector,  while  Louis  who  took  up  his  quarters  at 
Utrecht,  failed  to  see  the  importance  of  seizing 


174 


Louis  XIV. 


[1672 


Muyden,  which  commanded  the  chief  sluices  of  the 
district,  and  before  his  advisers  themselves  had  real¬ 
ised  the  effects  of  delay  the  dykes  had  been  cut,  the 
sluices  had  been  opened,  and  Amsterdam  was  saved. 

Three  things,  it  has  been  said,  saved  the  Dutch — 
an  inundation,  a  revolution,  and  a  coalition.  No 
one  could  possibly  have  foreseen  any  one  of  these  at 
the  beginning  of  the  year.  Up  to  the  “  passage  of 
the  Rhine  ”  the  Dutch  Republic  had  ranked  with  the 
great  monarchies  of  Christendom,  the  rule  of  John 
de  Witt  seemed  well  established,  and  Europe  gener¬ 
ally  never  dreamt  of  a  sudden  catastrophe  coming 
upon  so  prosperous  and  stable  a  government  as  was 
that  of  the  United  Provinces. 

But  Louis’  rapid  and  successful  march  upset  all 
calculations.  A  month  sufficed  to  place  at  his  mercy 
the  flourishing  republic.  History  affords  few  ex¬ 
amples  of  so  sudden  a  downfall  of  a  hitherto  prosper¬ 
ous  state.  “  The  great  and  astonishing  progress 
which  my  armies  had  made  in  so  short  a  time,” 
writes  Louis  XIV.,  “  the  idea  and  forebodings  of  cer¬ 
tain  ruin  and  the  general  overthrow  of  the  republic, 
the  small  reliance  there  was  to  be  placed  in  a  new  and 
depreciated  army,  commanded  by  an  inexperienced 
young  man,  all  these  sad  and  hopeless  reflections  be¬ 
wildered  the  Dutch,  and  put  them  beside  them¬ 
selves.”  This  was  no  doubt  true  as  far  as  the  Dutch 
population  was  concerned,  but  John  de  Witt  had  at 
an  early  period  seriously  considered  the  possibility 
of  having  to  defend  Holland  by  means  of  inunda¬ 
tions.  After  the  “  passage  of  the  Rhine  ”  the  Coun¬ 
cil  of  Amsterdam  themselves  admitted  the  seriousness 


1672] 


The  War  of  i6y2. 


175 


of  the  crisis,  but  it  was  not  till  June  15th  that  it  was 
decided  that  the  country  surrounding  Amsterdam 
was  to  be  inundated.  The  inundation  begun  on 
June  15th  was  nearly  completed  by  June  20th.  Such 
an  act  of  heroism  had  not  been  expected  by  Louvois. 
“  His  Majesty,”  he  had  written  shortly  before  the 
cutting  of  the  dykes,  “  will  be  able  in  eight  days  to 
send  troops  to  pillage  The  Hague  and  the  towns  of 
Holland  which  cannot  be  inundated  in  the  dry 
weather  we  have  now.”  Gr^monville,  the  French 
ambassador  at  Vienna,  was  furious  at  the  audacity 
of  the  Dutch  in  preferring  “  to  ruin  and  destroy  their 
country  and  their  subjects,  and  to  expose  themselves 
to  the  danger  of  being  drowned,  rather  than  submit 
to  so  glorious  and  triumphant  a  conqueror.” 

Louis  himself  recognised  the  courage  and  heroism 
of  the  Dutch.  “  The  determination  to  flood  the 
whole  country,”  he  writes,  “  was  certainly  rather 
violent,  but  what  would  not  one  do  to  save  oneself 
from  foreign  domination.” 

The  immediate  ruin  of  the  republic  had  indeed 
been  averted.  She  could  now  await  the  continuance 
of  the  war  or  make  proposals  of  peace.  But  public 
opinion  in  Holland  demanded  a  change  of  govern¬ 
ment.  On  July  3d  the  Perpetual  Edict  was  abro¬ 
gated,  and  on  the  4th  the  Prince  of  Orange  was 
proclaimed  Stadtholder  and  Captain,  and  Admiral- 
General  of  Holland.  On  June  26th  the  States- 
General  had  unanimously  voted  for  making  peace 
with  the  King  of  France,  and  though  the  change  of 
government  implied  a  rising  feeling  in  favour  of 
resistance,  William  felt  bound  to  continue  the  nego- 


Louis  XIV. 


[1672 


I  76 

tiations.  But  the  baneful  influence  of  Louvois  was 
once  more  seen  to  the  great  disadvantage  of  France. 
The  Dutch  plenipotentiaries  on  behalf  of  theStates- 
General  offered  to  Louis,  who  was  then  at  Ameron- 
gen  near  Utrecht,  Maestrecht  and  the  Rhine  towns, 
undertaking  also  to  pay  600,000  francs  towards  the 
cost  of  the  war. 

When  Louvois  treated  these  offers  with  scorn  they 
increased  their  concessions.  Louis  in  exchange  for 
the  towns  conquered  in  the  provinces  of  Utrecht, 
Oberyssel,  and  Guelders  should  have  not  only  Maes- 
tricht  and  the  towns  on  the  Rhine,  but  also  all  towns 
held  by  the  Dutch  outside  the  seven  provinces,  such 
as  Breda,  Bois-le-Duc,  and  Bergen-op-Zoom.  The  sum 
offered  should  also  be  increased  to  10,000,000  francs. 

Had  Louis  accepted  these  terms  he  would  have 
secured  the  country  separating  the  United  Provinces 
from  the  Spanish  Netherlands  from  the  Meuse  to 
the  mouth  of  the  Scheldt,  the  subjugation  of  the 
Spanish  Netherlands  would  only  have  been  a  matter 
of  time,  and  ample  vengeance  would  have  been 
Avreaked  upon  the  Dutch.  Pomponne  strongly 
urged  the  acceptance  of  these  terms.  But  by 
Louvois’  advice  Louis  made  additional  demands. 
The  frontier  of  the  United  Provinces  was  to  be  with¬ 
drawn  to  the  Wahal,  and  all  fortified  towns  on  the 
river  were  to  be  placed  at  his  disposal,  or  dismantled. 
Delfzyl  and  its  dependencies  were  also  to  be  given 
up  and  transferred  by  him  to  England.  All  edicts 
unfavourable  to  French  commerce  were  to  be  re¬ 
voked,  and  a  treaty  of  commerce  was  to  be  concluded 
regulating  the  interests  of  the  East  and  West  India 


1672] 


The  War  of  i6y2. 


177 


Companies  of  France  and  Holland.  A  war  in¬ 
demnity  of  10,500,000  florins  was  to  be  paid,  and 
lastly  an  embassy  was  to  be  sent  to  France  once 
a  year  to  present  Louis  with  a  gold  medal,  the 
motto  on  which  was  to  convey  to  him  thanks  for 
having  “  left  to  the  United  Provinces  the  inde¬ 
pendence  which  the  kings,  his  predecessors,  had 
enabled  her  to  acquire.”  These  demands  would  if 
complied  with  have  destroyed  the  colonial  power  of 
the  United  Provinces,  ruined  their  trade,  and  over¬ 
thrown  their  constitution. 

There  was  a  general  impression  at  the  French 
camp  and  also  in  Paris  that  the  King  would  obtain 
all  these  demands.  “  The  King  will  return  Count 
of  Holland,”  wrote  Madame  de  Sevign^ — “  the  only 
impossibility  to  his  Majesty  is  to  find  enemies  to 
resist  him.”  Louvois  too  was  confident  that  the 
Dutch  dared  not  refuse  the  French  terms.  But 
Louvois  entirely  misunderstood  the  character  of  the 
Dutch  people.  In  breaking  off  the  negotiations  with 
Louis  the  States-General  fully  endorsed  the  avowed 
opinion  of  De  Groot  that  he  “  would  sooner  die  than 
accept  such  terms  from  France.”  Louis  had  taken  a 
false  step  and  the  consequences  were  serious.  From 
a  military  point  of  view  the  operations  against  the 
Dutch  will  always  be  interesting.  Turenne’s  plans 
for  the  invasion  of  the  United  Provinces,  the  mask¬ 
ing  of  Maestricht  and  the  capture  of  Nimeguen  are 
in  themselves  sufficient  to  make  the  campaign  cele¬ 
brated.  But  the  real  object  of  the  war  had  not  been 
gained,  and  a  series  of  political  blunders  of  the  first 
magnitude  had  been  perpetrated. 


12 


178 


Louis  XIV. 


[1672 


Louis  had  failed  through  yielding  to  the  advice  of 
Louvois.  His  original  intention  had  been  to  rest 
satisfied  with  a  reasonable  triumph.  “  The  daily 
progress  of  my  army,”  he  had  written  to  Gr^mon- 
ville,  “  puts  me  in  a  position  to  impose  any  conditions 
I  please  on  the  States,  but  I  wish  to  listen  to  the 
promptings  of  my  own  generosity  so  far  as  is  con¬ 
sistent  with  authority  and  the  just  rights  of  victory.” 

Even  when  he  had  had  ample  proof  of  the  des¬ 
perate  resistance  which  the  country  was  prepared 
to  make  he  seems  to  have  been  carried  away  and 
intoxicated  by  success.  This  is  his  own  explanation 
of  the  mistake  he  made  in  not  accepting  the  terms 
offered  him  by  the  Dutch  plenipotentiaries.  “  The 
proposals  made  to  me,”  he  wrote  in  later  days, 
“  were  very  advantageous,  but  I  never  could  make 
up  my  mind  to  accept  them.”  And  as  a  further 
explanation  he  again  wrote  in  his  account  of  the 
campaign  of  1672: — “Posterity  may  believe  if  it 
choose  in  my  reasons  for  so  acting,  and  can  at  its 
pleasure  ascribe  my  refusal  to  my  ambition  and  the 
desire  for  vengeance  for  the  injuries  I  had  sustained 
from  the  Dutch.  I  shall  not  justify  myself.  Ambi¬ 
tion  and  glory  are  always  pardonable  in  a  prince, 
and  particularly  in  a  prince  so  young  and  so  well 
treated  by  fortune  as  I  was.” 

By  the  end  of  July  the  inundations  had  brought 
military  operations  for  the  moment  to  a  standstill, 
while  the  rejection  by  William  of  the  proposals  of 
peace  and  the  gathering  together  of  an  alarmed 
Europe  necessitated  Louis’  return  to  France.  But 
before  he  departed  he  again  yielded  to  Louvois’ 


16721 


The  JVar  of  16'/ 2. 


179 


baneful  advice  and  released  some  twenty  thousand 
Dutch  prisoners.  This  course  was  adopted  contrary 
tQ  the  counsel  of  Cond^  and  Turenne,  but  appar¬ 
ently  thinking  he  had  nothing  to  fear  from  so  feeble 
a  power  as  Holland  had  proved  itself,  Louis  with  a 
misplaced  generosity  which  some  writers  have  de¬ 
scribed  as  bravado  followed  the  recommendation  of 
Louvois,  though  he  soon  regretted  his  resolution. 

“  I  took  my  departure  for  France,”  he  wrote, 
“  having  nothing  to  reproach  myself  with  excepting 
the  extreme  indulgence  which  I  showed  to  nearly 
twenty  thousand  prisoners  of  war  by  sending  them 
back  to  Holland,  where  they  formed  the  principal 
force  which  that  republic  has  since  employed  against 
me.”  With  this  last  blunder  to  ponder  over  Louis  re¬ 
turned  early  in  August  to  Saint-Germain,  leaving 
Turenne  in  command  of  the  army,  Luxemburg  gov¬ 
ernor  of  Utrecht,  Lorge  governor  of  Guelders,  and 
d’Estrades  governor  of  the  Rhine  towns.  He  received 
an  enthusiastic  welcome,  as  a  conqueror  returning 
from  his  victorious  campaign.  A  triumphal  arch 
was  erected  in  Paris,  while  a  gate  at  Saint-Denis 
and  paintings  in  Versailles  perpetuated  the  remem¬ 
brance  of  his  victories.  Medals,  too,  were  struck  in 
his  honour,  one  of  which  represented  him  “  mounted 
on  the  Chariot  of  the  Sun  passing  rapidly  through 
its  twelve  houses  exemplified  by  twelve  of  the  towns 
he  had  conquered.” 

But  fetes  could  not  conceal  the  real  failure  of  the 
French  policy  and  the  dangers  which  in  consequence 
threatened  France.  Louis  had  indeed  lost  a  mag¬ 
nificent  chance  of  bringing  the  war  to  a  glorious 


i8o 


Louis.  XIV. 


[1673 


conclusion,  and  he  had  now  to  face  the  results  of 
that  mistake. 

The  safety  of  the  republic  which  had  been  partly 
provided  for  by  the  inundation  and  the  revolution 
was  now  to  be  amply  secured  by  the  formation 
of  a  powerful  European  coalition.  In  face  of  the 
alliances  which  were  being  made  to  aid  the  United 
Provinces  Louis’  presence  at  Saint-Germain  was  im¬ 
peratively  demanded.  “  The  entry  of  Louis  XIV. 
into  the  Spanish  Low  Countries  (in  1667)  had,”  says 
Mignet,  “alarmed  the  United  Provinces;  the  in¬ 
vasion  of  the  United  Provinces  alarmed  Europe.” 

Leopold  had  already  on  June  23d  made  an  alli¬ 
ance  with  the  Great  Elector  for  the  preservation  of 
the  peace  of  Westphalia,  and  in  October  he  made 
another  with  the  States-General.  Henceforward  the 
object  of  the  war  is  changed.  It  is  no  longer  a  mere 
contest  against  Holland  ;  it  becomes  a  war  between 
France  and  a  European  coalition.  In  this — a  prac¬ 
tically  new  war  in  which  Europe  showed  that  it 
fully  realised  the  danger  from  the  French  monarchy, 
Louis  worked  to  achieve  military  glory,  and  he  had 
the  satisfaction  in  the  summer  of  1673  of  being 
present  when  Vauban  besieged  and  took  Maestricht. 
It  was  unlikely  after  such  an  event,  and  especially 
when  Turenne  had  compelled  the  Elector  of  Bran¬ 
denburg,  who  believed  himself  abandoned  by  the 
Emperor  and  feared  for  his  possessions  in  West¬ 
phalia,  to  make  peace  in  July,  that  Louis  would  con¬ 
sent  to  any  reasonable  arrangement  with  the  Dutch, 
such  as  might  have  been  come  to  through  the 
mediation  of  Sweden  at  the  Conference  of  Cologne, 


1673] 


The  War  of  i6'/2. 


i8i 


which  sat  from  June,  1673,  to  March,  1674.  And  so 
the  war  went  on  fiercely  at  three  centres,  in  the  Low 
Countries,  in  Franche-Comte,  and  in  Alsace  and  the 
Palatinate. 

A  new  coalition  was  formed  in  August,  1673,  con¬ 
sisting  of  the  Emperor,  the  Dutch,  Lorraine,  and 
Spain.  The  capture  of  Bonn  by  the  allies  in  No¬ 
vember  was  an  event,  the  importance  of  which  can¬ 
not  be  overestimated.  Cologne  and  Munster  were 
forced  to  withdraw  from  their  association  with 
Louis,  while  Treves  and  Mainz  readily  joined  the 
coalition.  The  whole  of  Germany  began  to  show 
signs  of  opposition  and  England’s  alliance  wavered. 
In  spite,  however,  of  these  defections,  in  spite  of 
the  adhesion  of  Denmark  to  the  coalition  in  January, 
1674,  and  in  spite  of  the  still  more  important  fact 
that  Charles  11.  in  February  was  compelled  by 
Parliament  to  make  peace  with  the  Dutch,  Louis 
entered  lightly  upon  the  celebrated  campaign  of 
1674. 

The  great  event  of  the  early  portion  of  the  year 
was  the  invasion  of  Franche-Comt^,  while  in  the 
later  portion  the  strategy  of  Turenne  was  in  itself 
sufficient  to  create  and  establish  a  reputation.  The 
King  himself  took  part  in  the  reconquest  of  Franche- 
Comte  and  enjoyed  to  the  full  his  favourite  amuse¬ 
ment  of  town-taking.  After  the  French  troops  had 
retired  in  1668,  the  province  suffered  at  the  hands 
of  the  Spaniards,  who  attacked  all  French  partisans 
and  increased  the  taxation.  When  the  Dutch  war 
broke  out  it  was  felt  that  a  French  invasion  was  in¬ 
evitable.  The  towns  were  only  half  fortified,  the 


i82 


Louis  XIV. 


[1674 


troops  few  in  number  and  mostly  composed  of  re¬ 
cruits.  In  spite,  however,  of  the  general  feeling  of 
the  hopelessness  of  resisting  the  inevitable,  and  in 
spite  of  the  weakness  of  the  military  arrangements, 
the  second  conquest  of  Franche-Comtd  was  only 
completed  after  a  struggle  of  six  months  and  after 
the  French  had  experienced  severe  losses. 

The  operations  were  conducted  by  Enghien,  Lux¬ 
emburg,  Vauban,  de  la  Feuillade,  Duras,  and  Resnel, 
and  were  seriously  hampered  by  the  stern  resistance 
of  such  towns  as  Arbois,  Salins,  Besan^on,  Ornans, 
and  Dole,  ably  seconded  by  the  guerilla  warfare 
of  bands  of  peasants.  At  the  siege  of  Arbois  the 
women  and  girls  fought  side  by  side  with  the  men, 
and  the  same  spirit  animated  the  defenders  of  most 
of  the  towns  in  Lorraine. 

The  campaign  which  began  in  February,  1674, 
was  at  its  height  when  Louis  left  Versailles  on  April 
19th  and  proceeded  to  Besangon.  Gray,  Vesoul, 
and  Lons-le-Saunier  had  fallen  and  Besan^on  was 
now  besieged  by  the  Due  d’Enghien.  The  Prince  of 
Vaudemont,  son  of  the  Duke  of  Lorraine,  conducted 
the  defence  ably  supported  by  the  population  and 
notably  by  one  Pere  Schmidt  who  commanded  the 
artillery  with  such  success  that  two  hundred  French 
soldiers  were  killed  and  Vauban’s  efforts  were  for 
the  moment  foiled.  For  twenty-seven  days  Besan- 
gon  defended  itself  and  only  yielded  when  Vauban 
succeeded  in  placing  forty  cannon  on  the  heights 
overlooking  the  town  and  so  rendered  further  resist¬ 
ance  impossible.  It  was  feared  that  an  army  of 
Austrians  and  Lorrainers  under  the  Duke  of  Lorraine 


1674] 


The  War  of  1 6y 2. 


183 


might  now  arrive  and  interfere  with  the  subjugation 
of  Franche-Comte,  but  the  skill  of  Turenne  pre¬ 
vented  the  Duke  from  carrying  out  his  purpose,  and 
the  capitulation  of  Dole  on  June  7th,  and  of  Salins 
on  the  22nd  marked  the  close  of  the  sharp  struggle 
for  Lorraine. 

During  this  time  the  Duke  of  Luxemburg  had 
taken  Ornans  on  May  5th  and  Pontarlier  on  May 
8th.  The  conquest  of  Franche-Comte  was  practi¬ 
cally  accomplished  and  Louis  left  the  seat  of  war  on 
June  19th  and  arrived  at  Fontainebleau  on  the  25th. 
He  had  intended  to  proceed  to  Flanders,  but  satis¬ 
fied  with  the  news  received  from  Conde  and  with 
the  submission  of  Franche-Comte  he  decided  not  to 
appear  again  that  year  at  the  head  of  his  troops. 
The  importance  of  the  capture  of  Franche-Comte 
was  very  great,  and  at  the  peace  of  Nimeguen  it  re¬ 
mained  part  of  P" ranee.  Its  Estates  were  no  longer 
summoned  but  the  Parleincnt  was  allowed  to  exist, 
though  its  duties  were  confined  to  civil  matters. 
It  sat  henceforth  at  Besangon,  which  fortified  by 
Vauban  became  the  well  administered  capital  of  the 
province.  Franche-Comtd  in  spite  of  heavy  taxation 
on  the  whole  gained  by  its  subjection  to  the  central 
authority.  It  soon  became  completely  merged  into 
the  French  kingdom,  and  its  conquest  prepared  the 
way  for  the  future  possession  of  all  Alsace  and  Lor¬ 
raine  and  for  the  extension  of  the  French  frontier 
to  the  Rhine.  When  Louis  returned  to  Fontaine¬ 
bleau  in  June,  he  had  carried  out  for  France  a  very 
important  operation.  Henceforth  the  Jura  was  to 
be  the  eastern  frontier  to  France. 


184 


Lotus  XIV. 


t 

[1674 


The  war  had  by  the  middle  of  1674  assumed  in¬ 
creased  proportions.  The  Elector  Palatine  and  the 
Elector  of  Saxony,  with  the  Dukes  of  Brunswick  and 
Liineburg  had  joined  the  coalition.  In  May  the 
Empire  declared  war  against  France  and  in  July 
the  Great  Elector  joined  the  League  of  The  Hague. 
Louis  had  indeed  made  strenuous  endeavours  to 
hamper  Austria  by  forming  an  alliance  with  Bavaria. 
But  he  could  only  succeed  in  making  a  treaty 
early  in  1673,  which  was  of  a  very  unsatisfactory 
and  vague  character,  the  Elector  refusing  to  be 
drawn  into  open  hostility  to  the  Hapsburgs,  and 
in  spite  of  a  promise  in  1675  to  aid  the  Swedes  he 
abstained  from  taking  any  active  part  in  the  war, 
and  none  of  Louis’  agents  were  able  to  shake  him 
in  this  resolution. 

Sweden  was  the  one  active  ally  left  to  Louis, 
but  it  was  not  till  1675  that  Sweden  made  a  useful 
diversion  in  the  north,  which  resulted  in  a  severe 
defeat  at  Fehrbellin  in  June  and  the  temporary  loss 
of  the  Swedish  conquests  in  Germany.  In  spite, 
however,  of  the  want  of  allies  the  French  held  their 
own  during  1674.  All  the  recent  conquests  in  Holland 
had  been  abandoned  except  Maestricht  and  Grave 
and  the  war  assumed  a  defensive  character.  Conde 
who  made  head  against  the  Dutch  and  Spaniards  on 
the  northern  frontier  fought  in  August  the  bloody 
but  indecisive  battle  of  Senef,  and  though  William 
of  Orange  succeeded  in  taking  Grave  he  had  to  re¬ 
linquish  his  intention  of  invading  France.  The  real 
interest,  however,  of  the  year  1674  centres  round 
Turenne’s  famous  campaign. 


1674] 


The  War  of  i6j2. 


185 


The  redeeming  feature  of  the  invasion  of  Holland 
in  1672  had  been  Turenne’s  skilful  operations.  But 
at  Saint-Germain  his  detractors  had  raised  their 
heads  and  disputes  had  broken  out  between  him 
and  Louvois.  To  excuse  his  own  shortcomings  and 
errors  Louis  acquiesced  in  the  attacks  on  his  ablest 
general.  Though  Montecuculi  successfully  out¬ 
manoeuvred  Turenne  and  though  in  the  autumn  of 
1673  Bonn  fell,  the  French  general  completely  ef¬ 
faced  his  reverse  by  his  brilliant  campaign  in  1674 
and  1675,  It  was,  indeed,  due  to  his  advice  that 
Franche-Comt6  was  reconquered  ;  but  his  great 
achievement  was  his  defence  of  France  in  the 
autumn  of  the  year  1674.  His  devastation  of  the 
Palatinate  was  justifiable  according  to  the  opinion 
of  the  time  and  was  only  carried  out  in  order  to 
check  the  invasion  of  France  by  the  armies  of  the 
League.  Despite  of  all  his  efforts,  however,  the 
allies  crossed  the  Rhine  in  September  and  after 
effecting  a  junction  with  the  Great  Elector  settled 
in  Alsace  for  the  winter  and  compelled  Turenne  to 
retreat.  The  alarm  in  Paris  was  great,  the  arrival  of 
the  foe  at  the  capital  was  expected,  and  the  ancient 
arriere-ban  was  called  out.  But  Turenne  was  equal 
to  the  occasion,  and  by  his  winter  campaign  in  the 
Vosges  he  saved  France.  Using  the  Vosges  to  screen 
him  from  his  enemies  he  marched  from  Lixheim  in 
Lorraine  to  Belfort  in  the  depth  of  winter,  arriving  at 
the  latter  place  on  December  27th.  He  at  once  burst 
upon  his  astonished  foes  scattered  through  Alsace, 
defeated  some  of  them  at  Mulhausen  and  the  Great 
Elector  at  Turckheim  on  January  5th.  A  week 


i86 


Louis  XIV. 


[1675 


later  not  a  German  soldier  remained  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Rhine. 

The  rest  of  the  war  was  of  a  tamer  character, 
though  as  far  as  France  was  concerned  it  was  carried 
on  at  first  with  satisfactory  results.  Sweden  attacked 
the  Great  Elector  in  Pomerania  and  drew  him  from 
the  Rhine;  John  Sobieski,  the  King  of  Poland,  had 
French  sympathies,  and  in  1675  made  a  treaty  with 
France.  He  agreed  to  aid  Sweden  against  Branden¬ 
burg  as  soon  as  his  hands  were  free  from  his  Turkish 
war.  For  this  aid  he  was  to  have  a  large  sum  of 
money  and  Ducal  Prussia.  But  when  the  treaty  of 
Zurawna  in  1676  ended  his  war  with  the  Turks  the 
relations  of  France  and  Poland  were  no  longer 
friendly,  and  in  1684  Sobieski  made  a  treaty  with 
Austria.  In  the  west  Turenne’s  movements  against 
Montecuculi  were  so  successful  that  the  King  de¬ 
lighted  with  the  bright  prospects  set  out  to  join  the 
army  of  the  north,  intending  to  end  the  war  with  a 
brilliant  campaign. 

Departing  from  Saint-Germain  on  May  nth  he 
proceeded  to  join  the  forces  in  the  Netherlands. 
After  a  campaign  distinguished  by  no  brilliant  suc¬ 
cess,  Louis  left  his  army  under  the  Prince  of  Conde 
and  arrived  at  Versailles  on  July  21st.  But  the  death 
of  Turenne,  on  July  27th,  destroyed  all  chance  of  a 
successful  campaign.  The  efforts  of  Condd  in  the 
north  and  of  Crdqui  on  the  Moselle  were  paralysed 
and  the  latter  was  defeated  on  August  nth  near 
Treves  by  the  Dukes  of  Lorraine  and  of  Zell- 
Liineburg.  /T"  ' — 

In  Paris  the  utmost!  consternation  wrevailed.  The 


TURENNE. 

(From  an  illustration  in  Erdmannsdorfer’s 
Deutsche  Geschichte  von  1648-1^40.) 


1675] 


The  War  of  id"/ 2. 


187 


opposition  to  the  party  of  Louvois  and  Madame  de 
Montespan  had  lost  its  leading  member.  Though 
Louis  had  latterly  allowed  Louvois  to  come  between 
him  and  Turenne  he  fully  appreciated  the  loss  which 
France  had  sustained,  and  the  necessity  of  increased 
exertions  on  his  own  part  and  on  that  of  his  generals. 
On  July  30th  he  wrote  to  Conde  giving  him  the 
command  of  Turenne’s-  army  and  ordering  him  to 
hand  over  his  force  to  the  Duke  of  Luxemburg. 
On  August  i6th  he  wrote  again  to  Cond6  relative 
to  Crequi’s  defeat  at  Kond-Saarbruck,  and  on  Octo¬ 
ber  17th  he  wrote  sympathising  with  Conde’s  weak 
health  and  allowing  him  to  leave  the  army  whenever 
he  chose.  Having  driven  Montecuculi  from  Alsace 
Cond^  retired  and  Montecuculi  resigned  his  com¬ 
mand. 

Thus  the  year  1675  saw  the  end  of  the  military 
careers  of  not  only  Turenne  but  also  of  Conde  and 
Montecuculi,  the  great  masters  of  the  art  of  war  in 
Europe. 

In  1676  Louis  again  took  part  in  the  campaign 
in  the  Spanish  Netherlands  with  the  army  of  the 
north.  In  was  in  this  latter  campaign  that  he 
“  lost  the  very  finest  occasion  he  could  ever  have 
had  for  gaining  a  victory.”  He  had  left  Versailles 
on  April  i6th  and  on  the  21st  joined  the  army  which 
under  Crequi  and  d’Humieres  was  besieging  Conde. 
Vauban  directed  the  siege  operations  and  Conde  fell 
before  the  end  of  the  month  and  Bouchain  was  in 
its  turn  besieged.  William  of  Orange  marched  to  re¬ 
lieve  it  and  a  battle  seemed  imminent.  The  Prince’s 
troops  lay  between  Valenciennes  and  Raimes  and 


i88 


Louis  XIV 


[1676 


Louis  began  to  draw  his  up  between  Saint-Leger 
and  Aubri.  His  troops  numbered  about  48,000 
while  those  of  the  enemy  only  amounted  to  35,000. 
Never  was  there  a  better  opportunity  for  winning 
a  battle  with  the  minimum  of  risk.  On  a  risingr 
ground  was  held  a  famous  council  of  war.  Louis 
himself  recognised  that  a  victory  lay  within  his 
grasp.  Some  of  his  generals  advised  an  immediate 
attack ;  others  feared  to  expose  Louis  to  any  danger. 
The  Marshal  de  la  Feuillade  threw  himself  at  the 
King’s  feet  imploring  him  not  to  run  any  risk,  while 
Schomberg  when  appealed  to  by  Louis  refused  to 
accept  the  responsibility  of  advising  a  battle.  Louis, 
who  always  preferred  besieging  towns  to  fighting 
pitched  battles,  allowed  his  better  judgment  to  be 
overruled  with  the  words :  “  As  you  have  more 
experience  than  I  have,  I  yield,  but  with  regret.” 
It  is  said  that  he  lamented  all  his  life  this  momentary 
weakness,  which  enabled  his  enemies  to  say  that  he 
lacked  courage,  that  he  always  avoided  battles  and 
delighted  only  in  sieges.  Bouchain  capitulated  on 
May  iith.  After  marching  about  the  Netherlands 
for  some  six  weeks  he  left  the  command  of  the 
army  with  Schomberg  and  departed  for  Versailles 
on  July  4th.  In  spite  of  her  success  in  warding 
off  invasion,  in  spite  of  the  brilliant  achievements 
of  the  French  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean  where 
Duquesne  had  defeated  utterly  the  Dutch  and 
Spanish  fleets  off  Palermo,  France  was  discontented 
and  exhausted.  Revolts  had  broken  out  in  some 
of  the  provinces,  many  districts  near  the  frontier 
had  been  wellnigh  ruined,  the  continued  war  had 


1677] 


The  War  of  i6j2. 


189 


necessitated  heavy  loans,  oppressive  taxation,  and 
the  adoption  of  that  most  pernicious  custom — the 
sale  of  offices. 

There  was,  however,  no  immediate  chance  of  the 
war  coming  to  an  end  and  though  several  of  the 
combatants  were  ready  for  peace,  hostilities  were 
continued  with  vigour.  Two  events  of  a  different 
sort  irritated  Louis  beyond  measure  during  the  year 
1677.  In  the  first  place  his  brother,  the  Duke  of 
Orleans,  won  a  pitched  battle  at  Cassel  against  Wil¬ 
liam  of  Orange — a  feat  far  more  brilliant  than  the 
continuous  sieges  of  towns, — and  in  the  second  place 
William  of  Orange  crossed  over  to  England  and  per¬ 
suaded  Charles  to  agree  to  his  marriage  with  Mary, 
the  daughter  of  James,  Duke  of  York.  But  though 
this  latter  circumstance  showed  that  public  opinion 
in  England  was  forcing  the  hand  of  Charles  II.  no 
active  interference  in  the  Netherlands  on  the  part  of 
the  English  was  apprehended,  and  during  the  year 
1677  the  French  armies  continued  to  win  successes. 
Louis  had  left  Saint-Germain  on  February  26th  and 
had  arrived  before  Valenciennes,  then  besieged  by 
Luxemburg  and  Montal  on  March  4th.  Vauban, 
who  as  usual  directed  the  siege  operations,  was 
strongly  of  opinion  that  the  final  assault  should  be 
by  day  and  not  as  was  usual  by  night.  Louis  and 
Louvois  strongly  opposed  this  proposal  but  Vauban 
defended  his  view  with  such  tenacity  that  Louis 
after  much  careful  thought  yielded.  On  March  17th 
at  9  A.M.  the  assault  was  made  and  the  town  capitu¬ 
lated.  Cambrai  fell  on  April  6th,  and  on  April  22d 
Orleans  who  had  been  detached  to  take  Saint  Omer 


Lotiis  XIV. 


11 677 


190 

defeated  Orange  at  the  battle  of  Cassel.  There 
seems  little  doubt  that  Louis  was  much  piqued  by 
his  brother’s  success.  He  carefully  avoided  visit¬ 
ing  the  battle-field,  and  Orleans  was  never  allowed 
another  opportunity  of  winning  any  military  suc¬ 
cesses.  Jealousy  of  his  brother  alone  explains  such 
conduct  on  the  part  of  Louis.  On  May  31st  he  was 
back  at  Versailles.  Nothing  more  of  great  import¬ 
ance  occurred  after  the  King’s  departure.  William 
of  Orange  failed  to  take  Charleroi,  and  in  December 
d’Humieres  captured  Saint- Guilain  without  much 
difficulty.  It  fell  on  the  nth,  and  on  the  14th 
Louis  sent  a  letter  of  congratulation  to  the  Marshal. 

But  affairs  in  England  were  becoming  serious. 
England’s  alliance,  or,  at  any  rate,  her  neutrality, 
was  of  vital  importance  to  Louis.  Louis  knew  well 
the  real  position  of  things  in  England.  He  knew 
that  as  long  as  Danby  and  William  acted  together, 
England’s  hostility  was  assured.  To  neutralise 
their  influence  he  intrigued  with  and  received  timely 
aid  from  the  opposition,  who,  bent  on  the  overthrow 
of  Danby,  were  ready  to  join  Louis,  and  sacrifice 
their  country.  Louis,  therefore,  supported  by  the 
English  opposition,  determined  to  act  boldly,  and 
by  forcing  peace  with  one  of  the  combatants  to 
bring  the  rest  to  terms  in  detail.  He  took  Ghent 
and  Ypres  in  March,  1678,  and  these  victories  had 
the  effect  he  expected,  viz.,  of  hastening  on  peace 
between  himself  and  the  Dutch.  Ever  since  1676  a 
congress  had  been  sitting  at  Nimeguen  to  discuss 
terms  of  peace.  The  Dutch  had  been  anxious  to 
end  the  war  for  some  years.  They  hated  the  Span¬ 
iards,  they  were  discomfited  by  the  death  of  Ruyter 


1678] 


The  War  of  id"/ 2. 


191 


in  1676.  But  each  side  hoped  for  further  successes, 
and  time  was  On  the  side  of  Louis.  There  was  little 
heartiness  in  the  relations  subsisting  between  Eng¬ 
land  and  Holland,  and  in  both  countries  there  was 
a  strong  opposition  to  the  government. 

By  taking  advantage  of  these  circumstances,  and 
by  working  upon  the  internal  divisions  in  England 
and  Holland,  Louis  undoubtedly  gained  better 
terms  than  he  could  have  expected.  In  Holland 
William  was  continually  abused,  and  his  relations 
with  England  became  the  object  of  suspicion.  In 
England  party  passion,  fomented  by  Louis  and  his 
agents,  was  rising,  and  Charles  H.  was  in  great  per¬ 
plexity. 

Alone  of  the  combatants  Louis,  who  was  above 
criticism  and  unchecked  by  the  presence  of  an  oppo¬ 
sition,  had  not  only  clear  views,  but  the  power  to 
put  them  into  execution.  By  concluding  treaties 
with  each  of  the  allies  separately,  he  emerged  tri¬ 
umphantly  from  a  war  which  seemed  at  one  time 
likely  to  end  disastrously  for  France.  On  August 
10,  1678,  Louis  made  peace  with  the  Dutch,  on  Sep¬ 
tember  17th  with  Spain,  on  February  2,  1679,  with 
the  Emperor  and  Empire,  and  shortly  afterwards 
with  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  and  Liineburg  and 
with  the  Bishop  of  Munster.  Sweden  and  Branden¬ 
burg  made  peace  at  Saint-Germain-en-Laye  in  1679, 
Louis  insisting  that  his  ally,  Sweden,  should  lose 
nothing,  and  Sweden  and  Denmark  made  peace  a 
few  months  later.*  , 

'  Among  the  numerous  works  bearing  upon  the  Dutch  war  the 
most  useful  are,  The  Life  of  John  de  IVil/,  by  Lefebre-l’ontalis,  and 
Rousset’s  History  of  Lonvois. 


Louis  XIV 


[1678 


I  92 


By  the  peace  of  Nimeguen  France  was  the  gainer, 
and  Spain  the  real  loser.  Though  France  restored 
Courtrai,  Oudenarde,  Ath,  Charleroy,  Ghent,  Lim¬ 
burg,  and  Saint-Ghislain,  Spain  was  forced  to  yield 
Franche-Comtd  and  many  strong  places  on  the  north¬ 
eastern  frontier,  such  as  Cambrai,  Bouchain,  Valen¬ 
ciennes,  and  Condd,  besides  Aire  and  Saint  Omer  in 
Artois,  and  Ypres,  Cassel,  Maubeuge,  Charlemont, 
and  Dinan  in  Flanders  and  Hainault.  France  thus 
obtained  a  line  of  strong  places  stretching  from 
Dunkirk  to  the  Meuse,  and  useful  for  purposes  of 
defence  or  as  a  basis  of  attack.  The  questions  at 
issue  with  the  Emperor  had  been  difficult  to  settle. 
Of  these  three  only  required  considerable  attention  : — 

(1)  The  imprisonment  of  the  Prince  .William  of 
Fiirstenberg  in  1674  by  the  Austrians. 

(2)  The  future  position  of  the  Duke  of  Lorraine 
and  of  his  duchy. 

(3)  The  affairs  of  Alsace — the  Emperor  demanding 
arbitration  with  reference  to  Louis’  claims  in  respect 
of  the  ten  Imperial  towns  of  Hagenau,  Rosheim, 
Obernai,  Landau,  Wissembourg,  Schlestadt,  Colmar, 
Kayserberg,  Turckheim,  and  Munster. 

The  Emperor,  who  refused  to  make  peace  till  a 
campaign  of  Cr^qui  compelled  him  to  yield,  gave  up 
Freiburg  and  Old  Breisach,  and  received  in  exchange 
Philipsburg.  Fiirstenberg  was  released,  Lorraine 
remained  temporarily  in  French  hands,  as  the  Duke 
refused  to  accept  the  terms  offered  him,  and  the 
position  of  the  ten  Imperial  towns  was  left  unde¬ 
cided. 

Such  is  a  brief  account  of  the  Dutch  War,  as  it  is 


16781 


The  War  of  16"/ 2. 


193 


generally  called.  In  the  history  of  the  development 
of  Louis  XIV.  it  holds  an  important  place.  During 
its  progress  many  of  those  characteristics  which 
marked  him  off  from  other  monarchs  of  the  time  are 
presented  to  our  notice.  Though  enamoured  of 
Madame  de  Montespan,  he  never  allowed  her  influ¬ 
ence  to  interfere  with  public  affairs.  As  he  says  in 
Ins  3  In  noire s\  “Our  first  object  should  always  be 
the  preservation  of  our  glory  and  our  authority, 
which  can  only  be  maintained  by  assiduous  work.” 
Louis  as  a  lover  and  Louis  as  a  sovereign  were  to  be 
two  distinct  personalities.  The  amusements  of  the 
one  were  never  to  encroach  in  the  slightest  degree 
on  the  duties  of  the  other.  And  certainly  he  never 
allowed  his  work  to  be  interfered  with  during  the 
war.  He  always  held  the  theory  that  the  army  was 
the  especial  care  of  the  King,  and  he  took  the  army 
under  his  charge.  Each  month  he  satisfied  himself 
that  the  regiments  were  complete,  deserters  were 
severely  punished,  the  generals  and  officers  were 
carefully  supervised.  All  disputes  were  settled  by 
the  King,  whose  authority  was  never  questioned. 
The  smallest  details,  such  as  questions  relating  to 
the  quarters  of  the  troops,  were  referred  to  him, 
while  the  larger  questions,  dealing  with  the  commis¬ 
sariat,  were  only  decided  after  Louis  had  mastered 
all  the  points  at  issue.  All  appointments  in  the  in¬ 
fantry,  as  well  as  in  the  cavalry,  were  made  by  him 
directly,  and  in  this  way  the  officers  realised  that 
the  surest  road  to  promotion  lay  in  their  devotion  to 
the  King.  He  was  very  fond  of  reviews,  which  he 

held  frequently,  and  by  means  of  them  made  himself 
13 


194 


Louis  XIV. 


L1678 


acquainted  with  the  life  of  each  regiment,  and  was 
able  to  influence  the  officers  by  praises  and  re¬ 
wards. 

At  the  peace  of  Nimeguen  his  power  stood  at  its 
greatest  height.  Though  he  had  not  trampled  upon 
Holland,  he  had  dictated  terms  of  peace  to  all  the 
other  powers.  He  had  united  to  France  the  impor¬ 
tant  province  of  Franche-Comte  and  a  large  part  of 
the  Spanish  Netherlands.  The  north-east  frontier, 
increased  and  strongly  fortified  by  Vauban,  was  an 
invaluable  addition  to  the  French  monarchy;  Lor¬ 
raine  was  practically  at  his  feet.  Out  of  a  great 
struggle  against  half  Europe  in  arms  Louis  had 
emerged  the  only  gainer.  He  had  been  well  served 
by  his  commanders,  his  diplomatists,  and  his  admin¬ 
istrators,  all  of  whom  he  had  found  to  his  hand  on 
the  death  of  Mazarin. 

Since  the  time  of  Charles  V.  no  European  mon¬ 
arch  had  wielded  so  much  power  or  been  regarded 
with  greater  awe  and  admiration  by  Europe.  The 
authorities  of  Paris  conferred  on  him  in  1680  the 
title  of  “  the  Great.”  Louis  indeed  stood  before  the 
world  on  a  pinnacle  of  glory.  He  had  baffled  and 
tricked  England,  he  had  pensioned  her  king,  and 
bribed  the  leaders  of  the  English  opposition.  He 
had  created  a  navy  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  ships, 
and  his  armies  had  in  1678  numbered  three  hundred 
thousand  men.  Since  the  days  of  Imperial  Rome 
no  such  forces  had  been  employed  by  any  civilised 
nation. 

The  skill  of  Turenne  ably  seconded  by  Vauban 
and  Louvois  had  increased  the  territory  and  strength' 


1678] 


The  IVar  of  i6'j2. 


195 


ened  the  frontiers  of  France,  while  Colbert’s  vigilant 
genius  had  insured  order  and  efficiency  at  home. 
With  no  fear  of  interruption  from  within,  and  with 
vast  resources,  financial,  military,  and  naval,  Louis 
was  now 'in  a  position  to  pursue  the  work  of  external 
expansion. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE  TAKING  OF  STRASBURG. 

1 68 1. 

make  France  “a  central  for¬ 
tress  of  which  he  was  com¬ 
mander  and  the  approaches 
of  which  he  vigilantly  guarded 
and  strengthened  ”  was,  says 
von  Ranke,  Louis’  great  aim. 

The  peace  of  Nimeguen 
had  not  gone  far  enough.  It 
was  still  necessary  to  complete 
the  “ceinture  de  frontieres.” 
Vauban  had  already  done  a  great  work  in  fortifying 
the  frontiers.  Bayonne  and  Perpignan  defended 
France  against  Spanish  invasion  ;  Pignerolo  was  an 
advanced  post  in  Italy;  while  Freiburg  and  Hunin- 
gen  on  the  Upper  Rhine,  Saarlouis,  to  defend  Lor¬ 
raine,  Maubeuge  on  the  Sambre,  Dunkirk,  La 
Rochelle,  and  Toulon  on  the  sea-coast,  and  Lille  on 
the  northern  frontier,  all  testified  to  the  thorough 

196 


1679] 


The  Taking  of  Strasbtirg. 


197 


and  practical  manner  in  which  Vauban  had  carried 
out  his  task.  But  German  rights  extended  very 
considerably  over  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  and 
Louis’  object  was  as  far  as  possible  to  extinguish 
these  rights  and  to  make  the  Rhine  the  boundary  of 
France. 

The  possession  of  Luxemburg,  Lorraine,  and 
Alsace  was  therefore  absolutely  necessary  for  the 
fulfilment  of  Louis’  ambitious  schemes.  Already 
during  the  negotiations  at  Nimeguen  significant 
indications  had  not  been  wanting  of  coming  aggres¬ 
sions.  The  French  envoys  had  endeavoured  with¬ 
out  success  to  secure  Lorraine,  and,  in  anticipation 
of  the  settlement  of  1735,  to  compensate  the  Duke 
with  territory  in  Sicily  or  elsewhere.  Attempts 
were  also  made  to  obtain  Luxemburg,  the  possession 
of  which  would  have  doubled  the  value  of  Thion- 
ville  and  Longwy.  The  great  aim,  however,  of 
French  diplomacy  was  to  gain  full  sovereignty  over 
Alsace.  With  Alsace  in  French  hands,  Franche- 
Comt6,  Champagne,  and  part  of  the  three  Bishoprics 
would  be  safe  from  attack,  and  Lorraine  could  never 
be  retaken.  Consequently  during  the  negotiations 
at  Nimeguen  the  French  absolutely  refused  to  con¬ 
sent  to  any  limitations  of  their  rights  over  Alsace. 
No  sooner  was  peace  made  and  Europe  had  dis¬ 
armed  than  Louis  began  to  put  into  force  his  great 
scheme  of  Reunions  by  which  he  was  enabled  to 
annex  to  France  in  time  of  peace  more  territory 
than  she  had  ever  gained  by  war.  According  to  the 
French  theory  he  simply  asserted  rights  which  had 
since  the  treaty  of  Westphalia  lain  dormant. 


198 


Louis  XIV 


[1679 


The  French  pretensions  were  founded  on  their 
interpretation  of  clauses  in  the  treaty  of  Westphalia. 
By  that  treaty  certain  places  with  their  dependencies 
or  districts  were  ceded  to  France.  The  sovereignty 
of  Upper  and  Lower  Alsace  had  been  given  to  Louis 
saving  the  rights  of  the  “  immediate”  nobles,  while 
ten  towns  in  Alsace  which  were  termed  immediate 
towns  or  Imperial  cities  also  asserted  their  claim  to 
independence.  These  indefinite  rights  and  this 
qualified  sovereignty  Louis  desired  to  abolish.  He 
determined  to  sweep  away  by  a  coup  de  main  these 
cobwebs  of  old  claims  and  this  shadowy  indepen¬ 
dence,  to  bring  within  the  boundaries  of  France 
the  disputed  territories,  and  above  all  to  secure 
Strasburg,  the  key  of  the  way  across  the  Rhine  into 
Alsace.  Strasburg  had,  indeed,  hoped  to  continue  the 
neutrality  which  she  had  enjoyed  during  the  late  war. 
But  weak,  defenceless,  surrounded  by  enemies  and 
far  from  all  help,  it  was  obvious  that  this  detached 
fragment  of  the  Empire  could  not  continue  much 
longer  to  preserve  her  neutrality  between  France 
and  Germany.  She  was  bound  to  become  either 
entirely  French  or  German,  and  it  seemed  certain 
that  she  would  fall  a  victim  to  the  French  schemes. 
In  carrying  out  his  designs  Louis  was  aided  by  the 
fact  that  England  was  occupied  with  her  own  inter¬ 
nal  dissension.  The  quarrel  between  Charles  II. 
and  his  Parliament  had  become  very  bitter,  and 
while  it  lasted  ”  external  considerations  fell  into  the 
background.”  Louis’  army,  too,  alone  of  European 
armies,  was  kept  on  a  war  footing,  and  added  weight 
to  his  pretensions.  Moreover  the  Bishops  of  Metz, 


1679] 


The  Takuig  of  Strasburg. 


199 


Toul,  and  Verdun  were  his  creatures  and  played  into 
his  hands.  On  being  summoned  to  render  homage 
to  Louis,  they  asked  for  the  institution  of  a  tribunal 
to  adjudicate  upon  usurpations  which  had  taken 
place  during  the  course  of  time.  So  many  of  their 
possessions,  they  declared,  had  been  gradually  taken 
from  them,  and  so  many  of  their  rights  had  lapsed, 
that  without  a  tribunal  it  was  impossible  for  them 
to  give  a  proper  account  of  their  lands  and  juris¬ 
dictions. 

A  committee  of  the  Parlement  oi  Metz  were  there¬ 
upon  empowered  to  make  the  necessary  enquiries, 
and  this  committee  became  the  first  “  Chamber  of 
Reunion.”  Before  this  committee  the  three  Bishops 
laid  a  long  list  of  those  who  had  seized  any  part  of 
their  lands,  and  of  those  who  owed  and  had  not  per¬ 
formed  their  feudal  duties.  The  new  chamber  dealt 
with  both  these  classes  in  a  very  summary  fashion. 
The  former  were  at  once  to  justify  their  possession 
of  any  portion  that  had  formerly  belonged  to  the 
Bishoprics  ;  the  latter  were  to  recognise  no  other 
sovereign  than  Louis  XIV.  and  no  tribunal  other 
than  the  Parloncnt  of  Metz. 

The  chamber,  which  was  appointed  in  October, 
1679,  and  began  its  work  on  December  i  ith,  took  it 
for  granted  that  all  the  rights  of  the  Empire  within 
the  limits  of  the  three  Bishoprics  had  passed  to 
Louis,  and  that  he  was  the  suzerain  of  all  the  so- 
called  vassals  of  the  Bishops.  In  other  words, 
“  Louis,  one  of  the  parties,  made  himself  judge  in 
his  own  cause  and  by  one-sided  verdicts  had  every¬ 
thing  which  he  desired  granted  him.”  Other 


200 


Louis  XIV 


L1679 


Chambers  of  Reunion  were  erected  at  Besan^on, 
Breisach,  and  Tournay.  While  the  Metz  chamber 
examined  into  questions  connected  with  the  three 
Bishoprics,  that  of  Besangon  acted  for  Franche- 
Comt6,  Breisach  for  Alsace,  and  Tournay  for  Flan¬ 
ders.  By  their  decisions  a  large  number  of  towns 
and  a  considerable  extent  of  territory  was  handed 
over  to  Louis  who,  if  the  owners  refused  to  recognise 
his  sovereignty,  promptly  seized  and  occupied  their 
city  or  district.  By  this  method  France  obtained, 
among  other  acquisitions,  Saarbruck,  Saarwerden, 
Falkenberg,  and  Gemersheim,  belonging  to  the 
Elector  of  Treves;  Wildentz,  belonging  to  the 
Elector  Palatine  ;  Deux-Ponts,  belonging  to  the  King 
of  Sweden  ;  Lauterbourg,  belonging  to  the  Bishop 
of  Spires;  Montbeliard,  belonging  to  the  Duke  of 
Wiirtemberg.  TTeJireisaeli  chamber  cspeoially  dis¬ 
tinguished  itself  by  two  decrees,  one  on  March  22d, 
the  other  on  August  9,  1680,  which  declared  the  ' 
absolute  and  exclusive  sovereignty  of  Louis  in  Upper 
and  Lower  Alsace ;  and  in  consequence  all  the  im¬ 
mediate  nobles  (that  is  those  who  held  directly  from 
the  Emperor),  and  towns,  princes,  officers,  and 
estates  of  Alsace  became  vassals  of  the  King  of 
France.  The  French  arms  were  in  1681  put  up  all 
over  Alsace,  and  the  nobles,  unable  to  resist,  sent  to 
Paris  a  deputation  which  gave  in  their  submission  to 
Louis.  The  same  high-handed  policy  was  carried  on 
throughout  the  “  reunited  ”  districts.  Oberstein, 
which  for  five  hundred  years  had  belonged  to  the 
Archbishops  of  Treves,  was  occupied  by  French 


1679] 


The  Taking  of  Strasburg. 


201 


The  Castle  of  Falkenburg,  in  the  Palatinate,  resisted, 
but  was  soon  forced  to  surrender  by  the  French 
artillery.  There  were  however  still  three  places  the 
possession  of  which  was  deemed  essential  for  the 
rounding  off  of  French  territory.  These  were 
Casale,  Strasburg,  and  Luxemburg.  By  means  of 
diplomacy,  legal  fiction,  and  the  exercise  of  force, 
Louis  managed  to  secure  all  three  by  the  autumn  of 
1684,  and  Europe  awoke  to  find  that,  during  six 
years  of  nominal  peace,  the  French  power  had  made 
greater  advance  than  during  any  previous  war. 

The  two  decrees  of  the  Breisach  court  respect¬ 
ing  Louis’  sovereignty  in  Alsace  extended  of  course 
by  implication  to  Strasburg,  which,  if  these  decrees 
had  any  force,  was  now  included  in  the  French 
monarchy.  Precedents  were  not  wanting  to  encour¬ 
age  Louis  in  his  design  on  the  liberties  of  Strasburg. 
By  the  treaty  of  Westphalia  Bremen  had  been  ceded 
to  Sweden  in  terms  as  vague  as  those  which  regulated 
the  cessions  to  France.  In  1666,  in  spite  of  a  prom¬ 
ise  made  by  the  Swedes  in  1654  that  her  customs 
and  government  should  be  maintained,  Bremen  had 
been  forced  by  Wrangel  to  bow  her  neck  to  the 
Swedish  yoke.  Again  in  1671  Rudolf  Augustus, 
Duke  of  Wolfenbiittel,  had  possessed  himself  for¬ 
cibly  of  Brunswick,  an  Imperial  town,  and  had  intro¬ 
duced  a  garrison  of  three  thousand  men. 

Strasburg  was  herself  in  an  unenviable  position. 
During  the  early  part  of  1C79  Imperial  troops  had 
remained  within  her  walls,  and  she  had  been  the 
recipient  of  Imperial  orders  couched  in  very  harsh 
terms.  She  certainly  had  no  reason  to  desire  that 


202 


Louis  XIV. 


[1679 


her  connection  with  and  dependence  on  the  Em¬ 
peror  should  become  closer. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  ever-increasing  numbers 
of  French  troops  in  Alsace  filled  her  citizens  with 
disquiet  and  inclined  them  to  retain  the  Imperial 
troops.  Their  suspicions  were  far  from  being  ground¬ 
less.  As  early  as  January,  1679,  Louvois  himself 
visited  Alsace  in  order  to  make  himself  master  of 
the  real  position  of  affairs  there.  The  three  lead¬ 
ing  citizens  of  Strasburg — Zedlitz,  Dietrich,  and 
Guntzer — paid  him  a  formal  visit  at  Schlestadt.  It 
has  been  asserted  that  at  this  time  Louvois  opened 
secret  negotiations  with  some  of  the  leading  Stras¬ 
burg  magistrates.  Though  no  doubt  bribery  played 
some  part  in  the  fall  of  Strasburg,  no  actual  proof 
exists  to  show  that  Louvois’  visit  to  Alsace  had  any 
other  object  than  that  of  studying  the  best  means 
for  effecting  the  capture  of  the  principal  city  of  the 
province. 

The  first  direct  step  towards  this  end  was  to  insist 
on  the  retirement  of  the  Imperial  troops.  The  firm 
attitude  of  the  French,  who  had  occupied  the  Stras¬ 
burg  territory,  resulted  in  a  special  treaty  signed  by 
Leopold,  regulating  the  execution  of  the  articles  of 
the  peace  of  Nimeguen.and  placing  Strasburg  more 
than  ever  at  the  mercy  of  the  French.  Strasburg 
was  to  be  evacuated  by  Imperial  troops  by  August 
loth,  but  no  clause  prevented  the  entry  of  French 
armies  into  Alsace. 

The  departure  of  the  Imperial  troops  so  far  from 
rendering  the  relations  between  the  French  Court 
and  Strasburg  more  friendly  was  the  signal  for  fresh 


STRASBURQ. 

(From  an  old  print,  and  reproduced  in  Erdmanusdorfer’s  Deuisc/ie  Geschichie  von  164S-1740.') 


\ 


i 


I 

i 


1679] 


The  Taking  of  Strasbtirg. 


203 


misunderstandings.  The  commercial  regulations  of 
the  Senate — the  mere  flickerings  of  a  spirit  of  inde¬ 
pendence — irritated  the  French.  Then  the  Stras- 
burgers  had  burnt  the  Chateau  of  Schaffolsheim 
belonging  to  the  Baron  of  Wangen,  one  of  the  most 
active  of  French  partisans  during  the  late  war.  It 
was  only  by  payment  of  a  large  indemnity  that  the 
Senate  could  satisfy  Louvois.  The  third  difficulty 
which  arose  was  more  serious.  In  1672,  the  bridge 
between  Strasburg  and  Kehl  which  had  been  built 
in  1388  and  which  was  the  last  link  between  the  city 
and  the  Empire  had  been  destroyed  by  Condd, 
and  in  1679  Louvois  wrote  forbidding  as  contrary  to 
the  treaty  of  Munster  the  re-establishment  of  any 
fortification  between  Bale  and  Phillipsburg.  This 
question  became  so  acute  that  the  Senate  deter¬ 
mined  to  send  a  deputation  to  Versailles  to  explain 
the  true  state  of  the  case  by  word  of  mouth.  From 
Louvois  the  members  of  the  deputation  received 
rude  treatment ;  Louis,  on  the  contrary,  presented 
them  with  gold  chains.  It  was  evident  that  any 
serious  attempt  to  rebuild  the  bridge  or  any  portion 
of  the  old  fortifications  would  be  at  once  crushed  by 
the  troops  which  during  1679  were  busy  enforcing 
the  French  domination  throughout  Alsace  and  at 
the  same  time  rapidly  isolating  Strasburg.  Early 
in  July,  Hagenau,  and  later  in  the  month,  Wissem- 
burg  and  Landau,  two  important  strategic  ports, 
were  occupied  by  the  French.  Schlestadt,  Turk- 
heim,  Kaisersburg,  Munster,  and  Colmar  all  took  an 
oath  of  fidelity  and  obedience  to  Louis  XIV.  and 
his  representative  Montelar.  About  the  same  time 


204 


Louis  XIV. 


[1680 


(September,  1679,)  the  Marshal  d’Humieres  was  oc¬ 
cupying  the  two  Lorraine  fortresses  of  Homburg 
and  Bitche. 

In  the  beginning  of  1680  a  threat  to  fill  all  the 
villages  round  Strasburg  with  French  troops  forced 
from  the  Senate  a  distinct  engagement  to  suppress 
the  works  then  in  progress  at  the  fort  of  Kehl. 
Strasburg  being  now  from  a  military  point  of  view 
practically  isolated,  the  time  was  come  for  a  definite 
assertion  of  the  sovereignty  of  Louis  over  the  whole 
of  Alsace. 

On  March  22,  1680,  the  Parlement  of  Breisach 
proclaimed  the  absolute  sovereignty  of  Louis  in 
Lower  as  well  as  in  Upper  Alsace.  In  consequence 
of  this  decree  Strasburg  was  virtually  united  to  the 
French  monarchy.  On  August  9th  the  Superior 
Council  of  Breisach  confirmed  the  doctrines  enunci¬ 
ated  on  March  22d.  Louis’  pretensions  to  Alsace 
thus  received  the  support  of  legal  authority,  and  it 
was  evident  that  the  King  would  not  be  content  with  a 
mere  form  of  words,  but  would  take  the  first  oppor¬ 
tunity  of  enforcing  a  claim  which  had  been  recog¬ 
nised  as  valid.  In  May  the  Senate,  with  the  knowl¬ 
edge  that  their  doom  was  upon  them,  sent  a  second 
deputation  to  Paris  to  make  useless  complaints  of 
the  exactions  of  French  officers  in  their  villages. 

The  action  of  the  French  in  Alsace  reassured 
them.  The  March  edict  of  the  Breisach  chamber 
was  put  into  execution  with  severity.  Falkenburg 
in  the  Palatinate  was  taken  by  assault ;  Strasburg 
itself  was  warned  that  the  reception  of  an  Imperial 
garrison  would  be  considered  as  a(casus  belliA  In  the 


1680] 


The  Taking  of  Slrasburg. 


205 


autumn  the  villages  round  Strasburg  were  formally 
occupied  and  the  arms  of  France  were  substituted 
for  those  of  the  Emperor  on  all  public  buildings.  In 
each  village  were  posted  two  dragoons  and  all  arms 
were  seized. 

Thus  the  French  with  consummate  skill  had  in¬ 
deed  not  only  secured  the  retirement  of  the  Imperial 
forces  from  Strasburg,  but  had  taken  full  possession 
of  Alsace.  Strasburg  remained  the  last  home  of 
Alsatian  independence,  but  isolated  as  she  was  and 
surrounded  by  foes,  it  seemed  as  if  little  less  than 
a  miracle  could  save  her  from  sharing  the  fate  of 
the  rest  of  the  province.  The  inhabitants  of  Stras¬ 
burg  were  helpless  to  avert  from  themselves  their 
impending  doom.  Warnings  of  the  designs  of  the 
French  government  against  their  city  reached  them 
from  Paris  in  the  autumn  of  1680,  and  the  appear¬ 
ance  of  a  comet  increased  and  seemed  to  justify  the 
fears  of  the  superstitious.  The  vague  answers  of  the 
French  agent.  General  Montelar,  to  the  ^Dressing  in¬ 
interrogations  of  the  leading  citizens  as  to  the  de¬ 
signs  of  Louis  XIV.,  left  no  room  for  doubt  in  the 
minds  of  thoughtful  men  that  before  a  year  had 
run  its  course  Strasburg  would  have  fallen  from  its 
position  as  a  free  Imperial  city. 

The  chances  of  help  from  without  grew  more  and 
more  remote  as  the  months  passed.  The  Court  of 
Vienna,  though  appealed  to  by  the  government  of 
Strasburg,  confined  its  efforts  in  favour  of  the  city  to 
diplomacy.  One  diplomatist  was  sent  to  sound  the 
Elector  of  Brandenburg  ;  another.  Count  Mansfeld, 
was  sent  to  Paris  to  combat  the  views  of  the  French 


2o6 


Louis  XIV. 


[1680 


government  with  regard  to  the  question  of  the 
Reunions.  His  interviews  with  Colbert  de  Croissy 
were  of  a  most  unsatisfactory  nature,  and  the  am¬ 
biguous  answers  he  received  convinced  him  that  the 
only  method  of  checking  the  progress  of  the  French 
in  Alsace  was  by  proposing  a  conference  and  thus 
postponing  if  possible  the  outbreak  of  open  hostili¬ 
ties,  till  the  Imperial  army  was  ready  to  take  the 
field. 

The  fate  of  Strasburg  depended  on  the  immedi¬ 
ate  action  of  the  Emperor  Leopold.  Frederick 
William  of  Brandenburg  could  not  be  relied  on  for 
assistance.  His  policy  was  one  of  opportunism  tem¬ 
pered  by  occasional  paroxysms  in  favour  of  Protes¬ 
tantism.  He  hated  the  Court  of  Vienna,  for  Leopold 
had  not  only  refused  to  aid  him  during  the  late  war 
in  securing  Pomerania,  but  had  also  turned  a  deaf 
ear  to  his  demands  for  Jagerndorf,  East  Friesland, 
and  the  three  Silesian  Duchies  of  Liegnitz,  Brieg,  and 
Wohlau.  Immediately  after  making  the  treaty  of 
Saint-Germain-en-Laye  he  had  become  the  ally  and 
pensioner  of  France,  and  in  consideration  of  an  an¬ 
nual  payment  of  100,000  livres  for  ten  years  had 
agreed  to  support  by  his  vote  and  interest  the  can¬ 
didature  of  Louis  XIV.  or  that  of  the  Dauphin  to 
the  Imperial  throne  or  to  the  position  of  King  of 
the  Romans  whenever  occasion  required.  That  the 
Elector  knew  of  the  coming  fate  of  Strasburg  as 
early  as  the  beginning  of  1680  there  is  no  room  for 
doubt.’ 

*  On  this,  and  other  matters  connected  with  the  fall  of  Strasburg 
M.  Legrelle’s  work  on  Louis  XIV.  et  Strasbourg  can  be  consulted. 


1680] 


207 


The  Taking  of  Strasburg. 

The  jealousy  between  Brandenburg  and  Vienna, 
while  peculiarly  advantageous  to  the  policy  of  France, 
was  disastrous  to  the  fortune  of  Strasburg.  But 
Frederick  William  had  no  high  ideas  of  his  duty  to 
Germany.  The  Archbishopric  of  Magdeburg,  as¬ 
signed  to  Brandenburg  by  the  treaty  of  Westphalia 
on  the  death  of  the  administrator,  fell  to  Frederick 
William  in  1680,  and  the  Elector  was  far  more  occu¬ 
pied  in  entering  into  possession  of  his  newly  acquired 
territory  than  in  raising  any  sentimental  or  other  ob¬ 
jections  to  Louis’  acquisition  of  Strasburg.  In  May, 
1681,  Louis  sent  to  Hamburg  three  vessels  from 
Rouen  laden  with  gifts  for  the  Elector  and  Electress 
and  their  family :  two  carriages,  suits  of  clothes, 
sweetmeats,  and  books.  The  carriages  and  clothes 
were  to  be  used  on  the  entry  of  the  Elector  and  his 
wife  into  Magdeburg  and  Halle ;  the  sweetmeats 
were  for  distribution  among  the  people.  Like  an¬ 
other  well-known  ruler,  Frederick  William,  secure  in 
his  alliance  with  the  Great  King,  busied  himself  with 
his  own  affairs,  while  the  Empire  was  losing  one  of 
its  fairest  gems.  Though  Frederick  William  failed 
to  appreciate  the  magnitude  of  the  issues  at  stake, 
the  feeling  in  Germany  was  rising  in  strong  opposi¬ 
tion  to  the  annexation  policy  of  the  French  govern¬ 
ment.  The  Electors  of  Saxony  and  Palatinate 
together  with  a  crowd  of  smaller  princes  took  up  a 
national  attitude  and  clamoured  for  a  general  arm¬ 
ing  as  early  as  August,  1680.  A  coalition,  to  include 
the  Empire,  England,  Holland,  and  Spain,  was  anx¬ 
iously  desired  and  at  one  time  seemed  likely  to  be 
formed.  The  Emperor  pressed  the  Diet  to  arm  for 


208 


Louis  XIV 


[1681 


the  defence  of  the  Empire,  levies  were  raised,  and 
by  May,  i68i,  140,000  men  had  been  collected  by 
the  order  of  the  Diet.  William  of  Orange  had  an 
interview  with  the  leading  princes  of  the  House  of 
Brunswick,  and  on  September  30,  1681,  a  convention 
between  Holland  and  Sweden  to  maintain  the  settle¬ 
ments  of  Westphalia  and  Nimeguen  proved  the 
germ  of  the  League  of  Augsburg.  War  was  on  the 
verge  of  breaking  out,  and  had  it  done  so  Louis’ 
schemes  would  have  been  very  considerably  inter¬ 
fered  with.  That  it  did  not  break  out  was  due 
partly  to  his  own  wisdom  in  consenting  to  Mans- 
feld’s  suggested  conference,  partly  to  certain  events 
which  for  a  time  prevented  the  Courts  of  Vienna 
and  St.  James  from  taking  active  steps  in  opposition 
to  his  aggressive  policy.  England  was  the  heredi¬ 
tary  foe  of  France,  and  her  rival  on  the  sea;  her 
Protestant  religion  rendered  her  peculiarly  antago¬ 
nistic  to  Louis  XIV.  And  his  Rmnion  policy  had 
been  viewed  with  dismay  by  English  statesmen. 
Charles  H.  strongly  disapproved  of  his  encroach¬ 
ments,  and  the  words  of  Sunderland  to  Barillon  the 
French  ambassador  in  England  go  far  to  show  that 
had  King  and  Parliament  been  united,  the  European 
league  of  1686  might  have  been  formed  in  1680. 
But  the  political  and  religious  animosities  of  Eng¬ 
lish  parties  checked  these  statesmanlike  projects  and 
postponed  their  realisation  some  eight  years. 

The  Exclusion  question  turned  men’s  attention 
from  the  crisis  on  the  continent.  Shaftesbury,  the 
defender  of  Protestantism  in  England,  cared  noth¬ 
ing  for  its  fate  in  Europe,  and  the  policy  of  his  party 


1681] 


The  Taking  of  Strasburg. 


209 


drove  Charles  II.  into  the  arms  of  Louis  XIV.  As 
usual,  the  necessities  of  the  later  Stuarts  proved 
the  opportunities  of  the  French  monarch.  The  dis¬ 
solution  of  the  Parliament  of  Oxford  on  March  28, 
1681,  was  immediately  followed  by  an  agreement 
between  Charles  and  Louis  in  accordance  with  which 
the^nglish  king  was  to  receive  500,000  livres  during 
the  ensuing  three  years,  so  as  to  carry  on  the  gov¬ 
ernment  without  having  recourse  to  Parliament,  and 
he  on  his  part  undertook  to  withdraw  gradually  from 
his  alliance  with  Spain  and  not  to  allow  Parliament 
to  lead  him  into  hostility  with  France.  Louis  had 
succeeded.  No  interference  by  the  English  nation 
in  opposition  to  his  policy  was  to  be  anticipated, 
for  in  spite  of  a  visit  to  England,  undertaken  for  the 
purpose,  William  of  Orange  had  failed  to  reconcile 
Charles  II.  and  the  Parliament.  Louis  was  now 
free  to  accomplish  one  of  the  great  schemes  of  his 
life.  He  not  only  advanced  claims  to  the  county 
of  Chiny,  which  embraced  almost  all  Luxemburg, 
and  marched  his  troops  into  the  county,  but  he  defi¬ 
nitely  prepared  for  the  immediate  seizure  of  Stras¬ 
burg  itself.  Frederick  William  and  Charles  11. 
being  his  pensioners,  the  only  other  serious  obstacle 
to  the  realisation  of  his  designs  was  the  Emperor. 
Leopold  was  in  a  difficult  position.  He  had  at¬ 
tempted  to  get  Strasburg  chosen  as  the  seat  of  the 
conference,  hoping  that  the  fact  of  the  city  being 
the  meeting-place  of  a  European  congress  would 
give  it  a  sort  of  inviolability.  The  French  min¬ 
ister  saw  through  this  device  and  eventually  Frank- 

fort-on-the-Main  was  selected. 

14 


2  10 


Louis  XIV.  • 


1681] 


Leopold’s  only  hope  of  any  successful  opposition 
to  Louis  lay  in  gaining  time.  His  hands  were  full)’ 
occupied  in  Hungary.  The  rhinions  had  forced 
from  him  concessions-  which  he  had  hoped  would 
conciliate  the  Hungarians,  leave  him  free  to  deal 
with  the  French  encroachments,  and  able  to  concen¬ 
trate  on  the  Rhine  all  his  available  forces.  Unfor¬ 
tunately  Toekeli  and  his  party  refused  to  accept  the 
concessions  and  drew  still  closer  to  the  Turks. 
Louis  was  fully  alive  to  the  necessity  of  rapidity  in 
his  movements.  In  a  despatch  to  Sebeville,  his  am¬ 
bassador  at  Vienna,  he  says  :  “No  sooner  has  the 
Emperor  freed  himself  from  his  embarrassments 
which  keep  his  principal  forces  on  the  Hungarian 
frontier  than  he  will  direct  his  steps  to  the  Rhine.” 
The  French  saw  clearly  through  Leopold’s  design  of 
gaining  time,  and  when  the  Imperial  envoys  entered 
Frankfort  on  October  30th,  Strasburg  had  been  for 
a  month  in  French  hands. 

The  course  of  events  had  favoured  Louis’  schemes. 
England’s  desertion  of  the  European  cause,  coupled 
with  the  inability  of  the  Emperor,  owing  to  the  dan¬ 
gers  on  his  eastern  frontier,  to  take  an  active  part  in 
counteracting  Louis’  designs  on  Strasburg  and 
Alsace,  removed  for  the  time  all  chance  of  any  exter¬ 
nal  aid  being  given  to  the  citizens  of  Strasburg. 
The  only  chance  of  the  preservation  of  the  republi¬ 
can  liberties  of  Strasburg  lay  in  help  from  without, 
for  within  the  city  division  and  discord  reigned,  and 
rendered  any  successful  defence  against  French  ar¬ 
mies  impossible.  Unlike  Metz  in  the  late  Franco- 
Prussian  war  Strasburg  was  absolutely  incapable  of 


1681] 


The  TakUig  of  Strasburg. 


2  I  I 


standing  a  siege.  Isolated,  for  the  Ten  Towns  were 
now  definitely  in  French  hands,  she  could  not  rely 
on  her  Town  Council  any  more  than  on  her  Bishop 
and  Chapter  for  effective  measures  of  resistance. 
The  circle  of  iron  within  which  she  now  found  herself 
was  narrowing  each  day,  and  all  the  efforts  of  her 
patriotic  citizens  were  of  no  avail.  The  Alsatian 
nobles  had  either  been  coerced  or  cajoled  ;  Francis 
Egon  of  Fiirstenberg,  the  Bishop,  was  a  mere  creat¬ 
ure  of  the  French  King.  At  the  congress  of  Nime- 
guen  by  a  declaration  of  the  rights  of  his  office  he 
had  brought  down  upon  him  all  the  fury  of  Leopold. 
On  his  flight  from  Germany  Louis  had  diplomati¬ 
cally  accorded  to  Fiirstenberg  a  hospitable  welcome 
at  the  Louvre,  French  officers  in  Alsace  were  forbid¬ 
den  to  shoot  any  game  on  the  episcopal  lands,  and 
all  possible  measures  were  taken  to  gain  the  full  sup¬ 
port  of  the  powerful  and  cunning  prelate.  In  May, 
1680,  Fiirstenberg  like  Charles  11.  and  Frederick 
William  became  one  of  Louis’  pensioners,  receiving 
a  payment  of  60,000  livres.  In  the  following  autumn 
with  a  suite  of  fifty  horsemen  he  proceeded  to  Paris, 
where  he  took  a  leading  part  in  the  fetes  organised 
during  the  Carnival  in  the  early  spring  of  1681. 
Louis’  policy  was  successful ;  the  Bishop  became  an 
active  partisan  for  the  French  cause;  the  higher 
clergy  in  Strasburg  declared  themselves  in  favour  of 
the  sovereignty  of  France.  This  adherence  of  the 
Bishop  and  Chapter  to  the  I^rench  side  was  recog¬ 
nised  by  the  increase  of  the  Bishop’s  pension  on 
August  I,  1681,  to  80,000  livres  for  four  years. 

But  though  the  Bishop,  the  Chapter,  and  the  Town 


212 


Louis  XIV. 


[1681 


Council,  influenced  partly  no  doubt  by  bribes  and 
promises,  supported  the  French  pretensions,  the  mass 
of  the  citizens,  who  were  mainly  strict  Lutherans, 
were  opposed  to  the  abolition  of  the  republican  form 
of  government.  They  desired  the  continuance  of 
their  local  autonomy,  they  had  no  wish  to  snap  the 
link  which  connected  them  with  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire.  They  were  proud  of  the  unique  position 
held  by  their  city  in  Europe  and  had  no  reason  to 
desire  annexation  to  France.  In  their  eyes  their 
connection  with  the  Empire  was  their  only  hope  of 
security.  Strasburg  fell,  but  it  did  not  fall  through 


the  corruption  of  its  citizens.  Its  fall  was 


about  by  superior  force,  by  the  sudden  appearance 
of  the  powerful  armies  of  France.  ^ 

In  May,  i68i,  the  announcement  of  the  arrival  of 
the  famous  General  Mercy  at  Strasburg  startled 
Louvois.  Already  in  March  consultations  had  taken 
place  in  Paris  as  to  the  course  to  be  adopted,  should 
the  Imperial  forces  march  toward  the  Rhine.  The 
arrival  of  M^rcy  at  Strasburg  seemed  to  imply  that 
fresh  projects  against  the  French  were  in  contempla¬ 
tion.  Louvois  was  not  the  man  to  wait.  Full  in¬ 
structions  were  sent  to  the  generals  and  measures 
were  at  once  taken  to  cut  off  all  hope  of  relief  being 
sent  to  the  doomed  city.  Troops  were  posted  at 
Altkirch,  and  on  the  borders  of  Flanders  to  check 
any  hostile  movement  of  the  Swiss  or  the  Spaniards. 
On  the  night  of  the  27th-28th  September,  d’Asfeld 
with  three  regiments  of  French  dragoons  seized  the 
old  dismantled  bridge.  The  whole  city  was  roused, 
alarm  bells  were  rung,  and  fires  made  on  the  ram- 


1681] 


The  Taking  of  Strasburg. 


213 


parts,  which  were  manned  by  the  affrighted  citi¬ 
zens. 

In  the  morning  the  French  force  was  largely  aug¬ 
mented,  and  though  negotiations  were  opened  by 
the  citizens  it  was  obvious  that  resistance  was  im¬ 
possible.  The  defence  of  the  city  had  been  left  since 
1679 — when  from  motives  of  economy  they  had  dis¬ 
missed  their  two  Swiss  companies — to  a  force  of  five 
hundred  men,  of  whom  at  this  moment  one  half  were 
rendered  useless  by  sickness.  A  large  proportion 
too  of  the  citizens  capable  of  bearing  arms  were 
absent  at  the  Frankfort  Fair.  The  moat  was  also 
dry,  and  there  was  a  deficiency  of  powder.  To  such 
a  helpless  condition  was  Strasburg  reduced  through 
the  short-sighted  economy,  incapacity,  and  perhaps 
corruption  of  its  leading  men.  The  citizens,  perceiv¬ 
ing  that  they  were  unable  to  resist  a  power  “  so 
great  and  so  terrible  as  that  of  His  most  Christian 
Majesty,”  sent  a  deputation  to  meet  Louvois  on 
Monday  September  29th  at  Illkirch,  and  on  the  fol¬ 
lowing  day,  September  30th,  the  French  troops  took 
possession  of  Strasburg,  Louvois  having  agreed  with 
some  qualifications  to  the  terms  proposed  by  the 
city  authorities. 

Louis  heard  of  the  capitulation  on  October  2d  at 
Vitry  on  his  way  to  Strasburg  to  be  present  at  its 
capture.  He  had  left  Fontainebleau  on  Saturday 
September  27th  after  making  a  public  declaration  of 
the  object  of  his  journey  and  his  destination.  Lou¬ 
vois’  efforts  to  make  the  entry  of  the  King  as  mag¬ 
nificent  and  imposing  as  possible  were  crowned  with 
success.  Amid  the  salvos  of  265  cannons,  the  blow- 


Louis  XIV. 


[1681 


214 

ing  of  trumpets,  and  the  ringing  of  bells,  a  carriage 
drawn  by  eight  grey  horses  and  containing  Louis 
and  his  Queen,  the  Dauphin  and  his  wife  the  Dau- 
phiness,  as  well  as  the  Duke  and  Duchess  of  Orleans, 
entered  Strasburg  in  the  afternoon  of  the  23d  of 
October. 

On  arriving  at  their  quarters,  the  King  at  once 
mounted  a  horse  and  attended  by  the  Dauphin  and 
other  members  of  his  suite  rode  off  to  inspect  the 
bridge,  about  which  so  much  had  been  heard  at  Saint- 
Germain.  The  day  ended  with  a  general  illumina¬ 
tion  of  the  city.  The  next  morning  Louis  attended 
a  grand  Mass  in  the  cathedral  when  a  magnificent 
Te  Deum  was  sung.  On  entering  the  cathedral 
he  was  met  by  the  Prince-Bishop  Francis  of  Fiirs- 
tenberg,  supported  by  mitred  abbots,  the  canons,  and 
many  of  the  clergy.  Fiirstenberg  having  delivered  an 
address,  in  which  he  recalled  the  part  taken  by  the 
early  Frankish  kings  in  the  construction  of  the  cathe¬ 
dral,  the  King  and  Queen  proceeded  to  their  seats  in 
the  choir.  In  Strasburg  Louis  remained  four  days, 
giving  audiences  to  the  leading  men.  As  was  his 
custom,  he  took  the  greatest  interest  in  seeing  every¬ 
thing,  and  in  drawing  up  the  minutest  instructions 
with  reference  to  the  future  government  of  his  new  ac¬ 
quisition.  He  crossed  the  Rhine  and  saw  Kehl ;  he 
made  a  close  examination  of  the  defences  of  Stras¬ 
burg  and  of  the  environs.  On  the  26th  he  held  a 
review  of  his  troops,  and  the  next  day  the  Court  left 
Strasburg  and  went  homewards  by  Saverne. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE  TRUCE  OF  RATISBON. 

1684. 

HE  news  of  the  fall  of  Stras- 
burg  sent  a  shock  through 
Germany.  Casale  had  fallen 
the  same  day  into  the  hands 
of  a  French  force  under  Bouf- 
flers  and  Catinat.  Luxem¬ 
burg  was  expected  to  follow 
suit.  The  wildest  rumours 
found  credence,  and  at  Frank¬ 
fort  it  was  asserted  that 
Worms  and  Philipsburg  had  capitulated  to  the 
French.  There  was  nothing  in  the  attitude  of  the 
princes  of  Germany,  lay  or  ecclesiastical,  to  cause 
alarm  to  the  French.  Brandenburg  was  in  Louis’ 
pay  ;  the  young  Elector  of  Bavaria  was  occupied  with 
marriage  projects  ;  Hanover  was  bribed  by  the  pros¬ 
pect  of  an  electorate  for  himself ;  the  Count  Palatine 


215 


2i6 


Louis  XIV. 


[1681 


by  the  convention  of  Areillen  (February,  1682)  was 
promised  a  pension  of  200,000  livres  a  year  in  addi¬ 
tion  to  a  sum  down  of  600,000  livres;  the  three 
ecclesiastical  Electors  were  as  usual  devoted  to 
French  interests.  For  a  time  indeed  John  George 
III.  of  Saxony  showed  warlike  tendencies.  In  April, 
1681,  he  had  made  a  treaty  with  Brandenburg  and 
the  two  Electors  had  agreed  to  unite  forces  in  case  of 
necessity.  The  influence  of  Frederick  William’s 
agent  Meinders,  who  was  sent  to  Dresden,  succeeded 
in  calming  John  George.  It  was  pointed  out  to  him 
that  if  he  fought  against  Louis  XIV.  he  must  neces¬ 
sarily  be  beaten,  and  that  the  only  result  of  a  suc¬ 
cessful  war  on  the  part  of  the  French  would  be  to 
transfer  the  Imperial  crown  to  the  House  of  Bour¬ 
bon. 

Though  Louis  could  not  rely  on  the  support  of 
either  Bavaria  or  Saxony  he  had  by  diplomacy  se¬ 
cured  a  majority  in  the  Electoral  College.  The 
Bishop  of  Munster,  too,  had  definitely  made  an  alli¬ 
ance  with  Louis  on  December  28,  1680,  and  thus  in 
the  north  of  Europe  the  French  King  could  count 
upon  powerful  supporters,  though  he  had  failed  to 
gain  over  Hesse  Cassel  and  other  north  German 
princes. 

The  Emperor  Leopold  seemed  helpless.  The 
appearance  of  the  Turks  in  Styria,  and  the  con¬ 
tinued  discontent  in  Hungary  rendered  for  the  time 
being  any  movement  towards  the  Rhine  out  of  the 
question. 

But  each  year  the  Emperor’s  position  in  Germany 
was  in  reality  becoming  stronger.  In  many  of  the 


1681] 


The  Trtice  of  Raiisbon. 


2  I  7 


small  German  Courts  the  aggressions  of  Louis  had 
caused  a  deep  feeling  of  uneasiness.  For  the  moment, 
however,  Germany  seemed  powerless  to  arrest  any 
further  invasion  of  her  rights  or  territory.  Men  were 
rather  dazed  and  stupefied  than  actually  furious  when 
they  heard  of  the  seizure  of  Strasburg.  It  was  Louis’ 
interest  to  allay  this  feeling,  to  calm  all  irritation,  to 
pose  as  a  monarch  desirous  of  peace.  He  therefore 
not  only  attempted  by  strenuous  diplomatic  efforts  to 
gain  over  individuals,  but  he  definitely  offered  to  the 
Empire  an  equivalent  for  the  territory  which  it  had 
lost  since  the  treaty  of  Nimeguen.  He  proposed  to 
yield  Freiburg  in  Brisgau,  a  strong  place  and  an  an¬ 
cient  Imperial  town,  which  had  been  in  French  hands 
since  1678.  Had  this  offer  been  accepted,  the  ar¬ 
rangements  made  in  1713  would  have  been  in  part 
antedated  by  some  thirty-four  years. 

But  Louis’  efforts  for  a  general  pacification  were 
destined  to  fail.  The  Rdimions  had  touched  too 
many  interests  :  the  capture  of  Strasburg  was  too 
flagrant  a  piece  of  audacity  to  be  allowed  to  pass 
unnoticed.  Moreover,  as  though  to  see  to  what  ex¬ 
tent  he  could  go,  Louis  in  November,  1681,  began 
the  siege  of  Luxemburg. 

The  Chambers  of  Rdmiion  had  awarded  to  France, 
as  belonging  to  the  Bishopric  of  Verdun,  Vireton 
and  the  county  of  Chiny  which  stretched  up  to  the 
fortifications  of  Luxemburg.  Louis  also  claimed 
Alost,  with  the  intention  of  exchanging  it  for  Lux¬ 
emburg,  the  possession  of  which  was,  the  French 
declared,  indispensable  for  the  safety  of  Thionville 
and  Longwy. 


2i8 


Lotiis  XIV. 


[1682 


Both  England  and  Holland  were  by  this  new  ag¬ 
gression  attacked  in  a  vital  point.  The  capture  of 
Luxemburg  would  make  the  French  from  a  military 
point  of  view  masters  of  both  the  Netherlands. 
Charles  II.  of  England  proposed  that  the  fortress  of 
Luxemburg  should  be  razed,  and  in  order  to  give 
time  for  him  to  negotiate  with  the  Spaniards  Louis 
agreed  not  to  blockade  it  strictly  for  four  months. 
In  Holland  there  was  as  usual  a  difference  of  opin¬ 
ion.  The  peace-at-any-price  party  advocated  the 
cession  of  the  fortress  to  the  French  on  condition 
that  it  was  dismantled  or  razed.  William  of  Orange 
and  his  followers,  however,  desired  a  close  union  with 
Spain  and  England,  and  a  firm  opposition  to  Louis’ 
schemes.  The  States-General  in  accordance  with  his 
views  agreed  to  raise  a  force  which  should  advance 
to  the  relief  of  Luxemburg,  whenever  such  a  course 
was  necessary. 

A  European  war  appeared  to  be  on  the  verge  of 
breaking  out,  and  this  would  have  interfered  with 
all  Louis’  arrangements.  His  constant  aim  was  to 
prevent  any  interference  on  the  part  of  England  in 
opposition  to  his  policy.  It  seemed  likely  that 
Charles  H.  might  be  compelled  to  summon  Parlia¬ 
ment,  which  would  insist  on  the  weight  of  English 
influence  being  thrown  into  the  scale  against  Louis. 
It  was  all-important  therefore  to  keep  Charles  H. 
true  to  his  understanding  with  Louis.  This  could 
only  be  done,  in  the  opinion  of  the  French  King,  if 
James  Duke  of  York  was  in  England.  In  James 
Louis  had  full  confidence  ;  Charles  H.  he  was  con¬ 
vinced,  could  not  be  trusted.  He  therefore  made  it 


1682] 


The  Truce  of  Ratisbon. 


219 


a  matter  of  great  personal  interest  to  secure  the  re¬ 
turn  of  James.  On  the  understanding  that  Louis 
should  yield  in  the  matter  of  Luxemburg,  James  was 
allowed  to  appear  in  England.  By  this  means  Louis 
had,  as  he  hoped,  removed  all  danger  of  the  summon¬ 
ing  of  the  English  Parliament. 

These  were  the  true  motives  of  his  unexpected 
declaration  early  in  1682,  that  the  siege  of  Luxem¬ 
burg  was  raised.  But  these  motives  did  not  appear. 
“  Louis  XIV.  possessed,”  to  quote  from  von  Ranke, 
“  acuteness  of  observation,  decision,  and  a  grand 
manner.”  He  loved  to  pose  as  a  magnanimous 
monarch,  he  always  studied  effect.  The  Turks  were 
threatening  Germany.  Louis  therefore  declared 
that,  being  anxious  not  to  impede  the  efforts  of  the 
German  princes  in  defence  of  their  country,  he  was 
resolved,  in  order  to  bring  to  a  conclusion  the  mat¬ 
ters  at  issue  in  the  Low  Countries,  to  confide  the 
decision  of  his  claims  to  the  arbitration  of  the  King 
of  England.  This  proposal,  to  allow  the  great 
European  question  of  the  day,  viz.  the  fate  of  the 
Netherlands,  to  be  settled  by  the  decision  of  Charles 
11. ,  was  not  likely  to  commend  itself  either  to  Spain 
or  to  the  States-General.  Orange’s  statesmanlike 
counter  proposal  in  December,  1682,  was  to  the 
effect  that  Charles  11.  should  call  a  congress  of  am¬ 
bassadors  to  London,  and  that  before  them  should 
be  laid  not  only  the  question  of  the  Spanish  Nether¬ 
lands,  but  also  the  German  matters.  The  oppo¬ 
nents  of  Louis  XIV.  hoped  to  prevent  the  Empire 
from  being  compelled  to  cede  Strasburg ;  they  also 
wished  to  save  Luxemburg. 


220 


Lords  XIV. 


[1682 


But,  as  usual,  circumstances  aided  Louis  and  af¬ 
forded  him  an  opportunity  of  carrying  out  his  de¬ 
signs.  On  the  very  day  on  which  Strasburg  fell, 
Charles  XL  of  Sweden,  furious  at  the  loss  of  the 
Duchy  of  Deux -Pouts  and  determined  to  be  no 
longer  dependent  on  France,  had  signed  a  treaty 
with  the  States-General.  In  the  spring  of  1682 
Leopold  and  Spain  had  joined  this  coalition,  and  in 
June  Saxony,  Bavaria,  Hesse-Cassel,  Liineburg,  and 
the  leading  members  of  the  circles  of  the  Upper 
Rhine  and  Franconia  had  given  in  their  adhesion  to 
iR-'^We  see  here  the  beginnings  of  the  famous  league 
of  Augsburg,  which  a  few  years  later  was  to  unite 
Europe  against  France.  The  reply  of  Louis  to  this 
coalition  of  his  enemies  was  unhesitating.  An  envoy 
was  sent  to  support  Toekeli  in  his  resistance  to  the 
Hapsburgs,  attempts  were  made  to  stir  up  opposi¬ 
tion  in  Sweden  and  Poland  and  Holland  to  the 
foreign  policy  of  their  rulers,  (and  in  the  case  of  the 
latter  country  with  considerable  success,)  a  treaty  was 
signed  with  Denmark,  which  power  with  Branden¬ 
burg,  Munster,  and  Cologne  formed  a  powerful  north¬ 
ern  league  devoted  to  French  interests.  It  was  even 
proposed  to  send  an  agent  to  rouse  Russia.  In  the 
south  the  Swiss  had  been  pacified,  Venice  had  shown 
no  objection  to  the  occupation  of  Strasburg,  and  a 
treaty  had  been  signed  with  the  Duke  of  Savoy 
which  in  1684  was  to  be  ratified  by  his  marriage  with 
the  second  daughter  of  Monsieur.  Louis  conse¬ 
quently  in  the  early  portion  of  1682  was  far  from 
being  isolated ;  he  was  ready  for  a  new  war  if  his 
enemies  desired  it.  But  his  aim  was  if  possible  to 


1683] 


The  Truce  of  Ratisbon. 


22  1 


secure  his  new  possessions  without  further  recourse 
to  arms.  He  wished  for  a  peaceful  settlement  of  his 
claims,  he  hoped  that  they  might  be  definitely  recog¬ 
nised  and  acquiesced  in  by  Europe.  Since  the 
autumn  of  i68i  the  conference  of  Frankfort  had 
been  sitting.  But  little  progress  was  made  toward 
any  conclusion.  The  Hapsburg  interests  were  served 
best  by  delays.  Leopold  looked  for  a  speedy  termi¬ 
nation  of  the  troubles  in  Hungary,  when  he  could 
at  the  head  of  a  large  armed  force  speak  with  au¬ 
thority  on  the  Rhine.  Both  Brandenburg  and  Den¬ 
mark  through  their  envoys  attempted  to  induce  the 
Austrians  to  come  to  some  arrangement  at  Frank¬ 
fort  such  as  Louis  desired.  At  length  weary  of 
delays  Louis  ordered  his  envoys  to  leave  Frankfort 
on  December  i,  1682,  the  conference  having  sat 
for  fifteen  months  and  done  literally  nothing. 

One  more  attempt  Louis  made  at  securing  a  peace¬ 
ful  recognition  of  his  claims.  He  authorised  Verjus 
his  envoy  at  the  Diet  at  Ratisbon  to  negotiate  on  the 
same  basis  as  had  been  laid  down  at  Frankfort,  up 
to  February,  1683,  but  in  consequence  of  the  Turkish 
invasion  of  Austria  the  time  was  extended  to  Au¬ 
gust  31st.  Louis  demanded  a  thirty  years'  truce 
during  which  period  he  was  to  be  left  in  undisturbed 
possession  of  his  recent  acquisitions.  To  the  Em¬ 
peror  no  less  than  to  such  men  as  William  of  Orange, 
agreement  with  such  terms  was  regarded  as  equiva¬ 
lent  to  a  surrender  of  all  the  places  and  territories 
in  question. 

At  first  the  attitude  of  the  Austrians  was  unac¬ 
commodating.  A  large  number  of  troops  had  just 


222 


Louis  XIV. 


[1683 


been  assembled  in  Hungary,  and  Leopold  hoped  to 
achieve  a  decisive  victory  in  the  East  which  would 
affect  the  solution  of  the  problems  in' the  West. 
But  in  the  summer  his  tone  changed  and  the  Diet, 
moved  partly  by  the  greater  moderation  of  Louis’ 
tone  and  partly  by  the  Turkish  designs,  were  more 
disposed  to  come  to  some  arrangement.  On  August 
31st,  it  was  decided  to  accept  the  offered  truce. 
The  Turks  were  in  full  march  on  Vienna  and  all 
Europe  waited  anxiously  for  the  result  of  this  bold 
action  on  the  part  of  the  Porte.  The  questions  at 
issue  in  the  West  were  for  the  moment  put  on  one 
side.  The  siege  of  Vienna  absorbed  the  attention 
of  all  Christendom. 

Louis  has  been  frequently  accused  of  alliance 
with  the  Turks,  or  at  any  rate  of  sympathising  with 
their  aggressive  attitude  in  the  East  and  especi¬ 
ally  with  their  attacks  on  the  Hapsburg  possessions. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  success  of  Louis’  policy 
in  the  West  was  greatly  facilitated  by  the  difficult 
position  in  which  the  Hapsburgs  found  themselves 
owing  to  the  disaffection  in  Hungary  and  the  aggres¬ 
sions  of  the  Turks.  Since  the  times  of  Francis  1. 
the  French  had  deftly  made  use  of  their  friendship 
with  the  Porte  to  harass  the  Hapsburgs  on  their 
eastern  frontier.  With  Poland  too  a  connection 
began  in  the  same  century,  and  a  few  years  later 
France  and  Sweden  fought  in  close  alliance  in  the 
Thirty  Years’  War.  Thus  was  built  up  that  sys¬ 
tem  of  alliances  with  Sweden,  Poland,  and  Turkey, 
which  was  supposed  to  unite  these  three  powers  in 
close  union  with  France. 


1683] 


The  Truce  of  Ratisbon. 


223 


But  this  elaborate  system  with  its  centres  at  Stock¬ 
holm,  Warsaw,  and  Constantinople  only  existed  in 
the  minds  of  theorists.  To  bring  three  nations 
like  Sweden,  Poland,  and  Turkey  different  in  so 
many  respects  into  line  at  a  given  time  against  an 
astute  power  like  that  of  the  Hapsburgs  was  im¬ 
possible.  With  Sweden  France  had  during  the 
first  half  of  the  century  much  in  common, 
and  Sweden  had  as  late  as  the  Dutch  war  of  1672 
benefited  largely  from  the  F'rench  alliance.  But  the 
effect  of  the  seizure  of  the  Duchy  of  Deux- Fonts 
had  converted  Sweden  into  an  open  enemy,  and  one 
link  in  the  chain  stretching  from  Stockholm  to  Con¬ 
stantinople  was  broken. 

Poland  the  centre  of  the  chain  proved  to  be  the 
weakest  part  of  the  system  and  most  difficult  to 
manage.  Opposed  as  a  rule  to  Sweden  either  on 
territorial  questions  such  as  those  relating  to  Livonia, 
Esthonia,  and  Courland,  or  on  questions  of  succession, 
and  equally  opposed  to  Turkey  on  every  possible 
ground,  Poland  was  always  an  insoluble  difficulty  to 
French  diplomatists.  Between  1678  and  1683  Louis 
had  tried  hard  to  gain  over  John  Sobieski.  His 
efforts  were  in  vain.  The  Polish  King  largely  con¬ 
tributed  to  the  salvation  of  the  Austrian  House  at 
the  siege  of  Vienna  and  in  the  following  year  made 
a  definite  alliance  with  Leopold. 

Turkey  was  probably  the  most  valuable  of  the 
three  powers  as  a  counterpoise  against  Austria.  But 
with  the  beginning  of  the  personal  government  of 
Louis  XIV.,  a  reaction  had  taken  place  against  the 
policy,  pursued  by  Francis  1.  and  Plenry  IL,  of  a 


224 


Louis  XIV. 


[1683 


definite  alliance  with  the  Turks.  Unlike  these  two 
monarchs,  Louis  was  permeated  with  strong  religious 
ideas.  That  he  a  great  Christian  King  should  form 
a  close  connexion  with  an  Infidel  power  was  repug¬ 
nant  to  his  most  cherished  convictions.  The  very 
notion  of  an  alliance  ran  counter  to  the  whole  ten¬ 
dency  of  his  policy  :  it  could  not  be  seriously  en¬ 
tertained  by  the  Head  of  Christendom.  On  the 
other  hand  there  was  the  influence  of  tradition. 
The  Ottoman  alliance  had  powerfully  contributed  to 
save  France  from  the  grasp  of  Charles  V.,  it  had  cer¬ 
tainly  aided  Protestantism  in  Germany,  and  from  a 
French  point  of  view  it  had  rescued  the  North  Ger¬ 
man  allies  of  Francis  I.  and  Henry  II.  from  sub¬ 
servience  to  Vienna.  Friendship  between  the  French 
and  the  Turks  might  again  be  used  to  enable  France 
to  strengthen  her  position  at  the  expense  of  the 
Empire. 

Louis  therefore  was  torn  by  two  conflicting  ideas. 
The  prospect  of  making  an  Ottoman  alliance  and  of 
using  it  for  the  furtherance  of  his  own  schemes  ap¬ 
pealed  strongly  to  him  as  a  politician.  On  the 
other  hand,  to  carry  on  a  crusade  against  the 
Turks,  to  advance  the  movement  towards  Chris¬ 
tian  solidarity,  to  attack  the  Ottomans  by  sea  and 
by  land,  was  a  course  which  commended  itself  to 
Louis’  religious  and  dramatic  instincts.  It  was 
under  the  influence  of  the  crusading  idea,  that 
the  French  took  a  leading  part  in  the  battle  of 
St.  Gothard  in  1664  and  aided  the  Venetians  in 
Candia  in  1668.  It  was  this  idea  that  led  Louis 
to  entertain  the  project  of  taking  Egypt,  and 


1683] 


The  Truce  of  Ratisbon. 


225 


which  caused  him  to  attack  the  Barbary  states,  and 
to  threaten  even  to  burn  Constantinople.  But  it 
could  not  be  denied  that  France  benefited  greatly 
from  the  conflict  between  the  Porte  and  the  Haps- 
burgs.  Though  Louis  did  not  support  the  Turks  by 
a  definite  alliance,  he  derived  great  advantage  indi¬ 
rectly  from  their  invasions  of  the  Austrian  territory. 
While  the  march  of  French  troops  to  aid  the  Haps- 
burgs  in  1664  contributed  to  give  lustre  to  the  begin¬ 
ning  of  Louis’ reign,  the  siege  of  Vienna  in  1683 
the  long  war  which  followed,  occupied  the  Austrians 
and  enabled  Louis  to  gain  his  ends  at  the  treaty  of 
Ratisbon.  Louis  did  not  actively  support  the  Turks, 
and  as  a  result  they  were  overthrown  at  Vienna  in 
1683,  at  Mohacz  in  1687,  at  Salankemen  in  1691,  at 
Zenta  in  1697.  They  were  furious  at  the  conduct 
of  France  and  refused  to  be  included  in  the  treaty  of 
Ryswick.  An  alliance  between  the  P'rench  and  Turks 
was  impossible  in  1683.  The  French  fleet  was  carry¬ 
ing  on  a  struggle  of  considerable  importance  in  the 
Mediterranean  against  the  Barbary  states,  and  this 
alone  would  have  prevented  any  union  between  Louis 
and  the  Sultan.  Colbert  de  Croissy  declared  that  the 
French  hoped  that  the  siege  of  Vienna  would  last  a 
long  time,  and  finally  would  fail  through  want  of 
discipline  on  the  part  of  the  Turks,  and  the  ravages  of 
disease.  The  P'rench  government,  too,  expected  that 
the  impression  produced  in  the  Empire  by  the  siege 
would  enable  them  to  carry  out  their  designs  in 
Germany.  In  the  event  of  the  fall  of  Vienna,  the 
Venetian  ambassador  asserts  that  Louis’  intention 
was  to  march  to  the  relief  of  that  city,  and  having 


226 


Louis  XIV. 


[1683 


joined  forces  with  the  Germans  to  drive  back  the 
Turks.  He  would  thus  have  posed  as  the  saviour 
of  Christendom,  and  on  the  death  of  Leopold 
would  have  received  the  Imperial  crown. 

But  events  turned  out  otherwise.  The  Turks  were 
driven  back,  but  the  man  who  was  hailed  by  Europe 
as  the  deliverer  of  Christendom  was  not  Louis  XIV., 
but  John  Sobieski.  Louis  had  missed  a  great  op¬ 
portunity  of  taking  part  in  one  of  the  most  im¬ 
portant  events  of  his  day,  the  struggle  between 
the  East  and  the  West,  between  Christendom  and 
Mohammedanism. 

During  the  period  of  the  Turkish  invasion  the 
siege  of  Luxemburg  had  been  suspended.  No 
sooner  was  Vienna  delivered  than  the  Spaniards, 
overjoyed  at  the  event,  regained  confidence  and 
thought  they  could  resist  France.  They  relied  on 
receiving  help  from  Germany  and  expected  that  the 
armies  which  saved  Vienna  would  also  deliver  Lux¬ 
emburg.  “  With  extraordinary  and  ill-timed  te¬ 
merity  they  nerved  themselves  so  far  as  to  make  a 
declaration  of  war  against  France.”  On  October 
26th,  Charles  11. ,  then  in  his  23d  year,  drew  his 
sword  and  declared  that  he  would  never  sheath  it 
till  he  had  been  avenged  of  all  the  injustices  which 
he  had  suffered  from  the  King  of  France. 

Louis  replied  with  elaborate  preparations  and  in 
April,  1684,  Cr^qui  and  Vauban  besieged  Luxem¬ 
burg.  It  seemed  likely  that  a  general  European 
war  would  break  out,  and  with  the  Turkish  war  still 
on  his  hands,  the  Emperor  would  have  found  it  very 
difficult  to  resist  the  arms  or  the  pretensions  of 


VAUBAN. 

(From  an  illustration  in  Philippson’s  Das  Zeitaltcr  Ludwigs  XIV.) 


i 

i 

\ 

I 


1684] 


The  Truce  of  Ratisbon. 


227 


France.  Louis  had  formed  the  plan  of  marching 
through  the  Cologne  territory  against  Holland  and 
Hanover.  Fortunately  for  Europe  this  project  was 
not  carried  out  and  the  war  narrowed  down  to 
a  campaign  against  the  Spanish  power  in  the  Nether¬ 
lands  and  in  Italy.  Brandenburg,  Louis’  ally,  was 
strongly  opposed  to  a  French  attack  on  Hanover 
and  was  as  strongly  in  favour  of  a  general  pacifica¬ 
tion.  Holland,  owing  to  the  opposition  of  Amster¬ 
dam,  was  unable  to  aid  the  Spaniards,  and  Germany, 
still  the  prey  to  internal  divisions,  was  not  in  a  posi¬ 
tion  to  combat  the  French  and  Turks  at  the  same 
time.  The  Spaniards,  without  money  or  even  an 
army  worthy  of  the  name,  could  make  no  resistance 
when  hostilities  broke  out  on  the  frontiers  and  the 
French  seized  Courtrai  and  Dixmude.  The  Span¬ 
ish  Court  fired  with  warlike  enthusiasm  at  once 
arranged  to  send  troops  and  money  to  the  Low 
Countries.  In  order  to  show  that  reconciliation 
with  or  concessions  to  the  Court  of  France  was  im¬ 
possible,  a  solemn  declaration  of  war  against  France 
was  made  in  December.  Courtrai  and  Dixmude 
had  by  that  time  fallen,  Oudenarde  was  bombarded, 
while  Luxemburg  itself  was  captured  on  June  4, 
1684,  and  Genoa  almost  destroyed  by  Duquesne 
was  compelled  to  agree  to  humiliating  conditions. 
The  Marshal  Schomberg  advanced  into  Alsace  with 
20,000  cavalry,  and  Charles  H.  of  England  congrat¬ 
ulated  Louis  on  the  fall  of  Luxemburg.  That  suc¬ 
cessful  resistance  to  the  French  army  was  impossible 
was  recognised  by  the  Electors  and  Princes  of  the 
Empire  no  less  than  by  the  Dutch.  The  latter  on 


228 


Lo7iis  XIV. 


[1684 


June  27th  accepted  a  twenty  years’  truce  and  with¬ 
drew  their  troops  from  the  Spanish  Netherlands; 
the  former,  conciliated  by  Louis’  declaration  that 
he  intended  to  adhere  to  the  terms  laid  down  the 
previous  summer,  succeeded  in  impressing  on  Leo¬ 
pold  the  necessity  of  making  an  arrangement  with 
L»ouis. 

The  Spaniards,  through  the  unreadiness  of  Europe 
to  oppose  actively  the  French  arms,  were  compelled 
to  agree  to  Louis’  terms.  On  June  29th,  by  a  pro- 
visional  arrangement,  they  yielded  Bouvines,  so  cele¬ 
brated  in  French  history,  Chesnay  and  Beaumont, 
important  possessions  of  Hainault,  and  Luxemburg 
itself.  Some  thirty  villages,  half  in  Luxemburg  and 
half  in  Hainault,  together  with  the  Spanish  protec¬ 
torate  over  Genoa,  completed  the  cessions  resulting 
from  the  unfortunate  “  War  of  Luxemburg.”  On 
August  15th,  the  Empire  and  Emperor  recognised 
the  existing  state  of  things  by  the  truce  of  Ratisbon, 
which  settled  that  for  twenty  years  Louis  should 
.retain  his  hold  upon  all  the  places — including  Stras- 
burg  and  the  fort  of  Kehl — assigned  to  him  by  the 
chambers  of  Metz  and  Breisach  and  by  the  Parle- 
ment  of  Besangon  up  to  August  i,  1681. 

For  twenty  years  then  Louis  was  to  enjoy  posses¬ 
sion  of  his  newly  gained  territories.  Even  with  this 
limit  he  had  secured  a  great  victory.  His  next  aim 
was  to  convert  the  truce  of  Ratisbon  into  a  perma¬ 
nent  definitive  peace,  so  as  to  get  legal  and  perpet¬ 
ual  possession  of  his  new  acquisitions.  He  regarded 
that  truce  as  a  step  towards  a  general  pacification 


1684] 


The  Trtice  of  Ratisbon. 


229 


which  should  find  France  with  her  frontiers  ad¬ 
vanced  and  well-nigh  impregnable,  her  reputation 
enormously  increased,  and  Paris  the  centre  of  a 
powerful  and  united  Christian  monarchy  of  which  he 
was  the  moving  spirit. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE  YEAR  1685. 

E  truce  of  Ratisbon  is  an  im- 
portant  laiHmarEnn  the  reign 
of  Louis  XIV.  “This  great 
diplomatic  success,”  says  M. 
Legrelle,  “Truly  marks  the 
apggee  of  Louis’  long  reign.” 
It  was  “  that  glorious  con¬ 
vention  rather  perhaps  than 
the  peace  oRHXimeguen  ” 
which__i‘_is-  th^  -culminating 
point  of^^_^is  great  reig^nA.  Von  Ranke  holds  a 
similar  opinion.  “  France,”  he  says,  “  was  obtaining 
at  that  time  a  position  of  incontestable  preponder¬ 
ance  in  continental  Europe,”  and  again  he  speaks  of 
the  new  power  which  Louis  had  called  into  life,  uni¬ 
form  in  its  nationality  and  ecclesiastical  system,  with 
well  defined  frontiers,and  admirably  armed  for  offence 
and  defence  both  by  land  and  sea.  And  in  another 
place  he  alludes  to  the  truce  as  a  magnificent  diplo- 


230 


1684] 


The  Yca7'  i68§. 


231 


matic  success  which  distinctly  marks  the  apogee  of 
Louis’  long  reign.  Similar  language  is  held  by  Saint- 
Simon  and  by  Lavallee.  “Here  ends,”  says  the  for¬ 
mer,  speaking  of  the  years  between  1684  and  1688, 
“the  apogee  of  the  reign  and  height  of  its  glory  and 
prosperity.  ...  We  are  now  to  see  the  second 
age  which  will  scarcely  come  up  to  the  first.”  And 
the  latter  indicates  the  year  1684  as  the  culminating 
point  of  Louis’  life  and  reign.  “At  this  epoch,”  he 
says,  “  Louis  stood  at  the  height  of  his  prosperity 
and  at  the  apogee  of  his  greatness.  The  absolute 
monarchy  which  had  raised  itself  on  the  ruins  of 
the  Fronde  seemed  unconquerable  abroad  and  all- 
powerful  at  home.  The  Protestants  were  disarmed 
and  in  subjection,  the  Parletncnt  of  Paris  was  dis¬ 
credited, and  the  nobles  were  reduced  to  complete  sub¬ 
mission.  While  Colbert  had  restored  the  finances,  had 
formed  a  strong  navy,  and  had  stimulated  not  only 
the  industrial,  but  also  the  artistic  and  literary  re¬ 
sources  of  P’rance,  Louvois  and  Turennehad  reorgan¬ 
ised  and  unified  the  army  and  Lionne  had  developed 
and  strengthened  the  diplomatic  relations  of  France 
with  Europe.  With  a  well  equipped  army  of  400,000 
men,  and  with  the  frontiers  defended  by  a  hundred 
fortresses  restored  or  constructed  by  Vauban,  France 
might  well  feel  able  to  defy  the  wrath  of  Europe. 

After  the  peace  of  Nimeguen,  the  predominance 
of  France  became  each  year  more  assured,  and  the 
truce  of  Ratisbon  found  Louis  occupying  a  brilliant 
position  both  at  home  and  abroad.'  He  had  still 

'  On  the  importance  of  the  truce  of  Ratisbon,  see  Ranke,  Fran- 
zdsisclie  Geschichle  ;  and  Legrelle,  La  Diplomatic  Fran^aise  et  la  Suc¬ 
cession  d’Espagne.  Vol.  i. 


232 


Louis  XIV. 


[1684 


further  increased  and  strengthened  the  frontiers  of 
France,  he  had  conquered  Strasburg,  Casale,  and 
Luxemburg,  he  had  bombarded  Genoa  and  Algiers. 
He  was  the  terror  of  Europe  and  the  admiration  of 
his  subjects.  He  was  in  full  possession  of  all  his 
faculties  and  thoroughly  appreciated  the  glorious 
position  to  which  he  had  attained . 

''~'X et  success  seems  to  have  blinded  him  to  the 
tendencies  of  the  time  and  to  the  actual  condition 
of  European  politics.  The  death  of  Colbert  re¬ 
moved  a  sagacious  adviser,  and  henceforward  Louis 
is  usually  served  by  men  of  mediocre  abilities. 
“  The  secondary  age,”  as  Saint-Simon  calls  it,  began 
with  the  truce  of  Ratisbon,  an  age  which  sees  the 
commission  of  many  fatal  mistakes — mistakes  which 
well-nigh  ruin  France  and  bequeath  to  her  endless 
trouble  and  misery,  and  serious  political  complica- 
4;ions. 

The  truce  of  Ratisbon  itself  was  in  reality  a  great 
blunder.  Louis  had  hoped  that  it  would  prove  the 
prelude  to  a  general  peace  ;  his  enemies  regarded  it 
as  affording  them  a  valuable  opportunity  for  gaining 
time  and  for  gradually  forming  a  powerful  Euro¬ 
pean  leagqe  against  him.  Europe  employed  this 
breathing  space  for  drawing  together  the  threads 
of  a  general  coalition  which  was  to  humble  France 
and  wrest  from  her  some  of  her  lately  acquired  pos¬ 
sessions  ;  Louis  used  the  period  of  peace,  partly  to 
complete  the  extensive  works  at  Versailles,  partly  to 
establish  the  French  predominance  in  the  Mediter¬ 
ranean,  and  generally  to  pose  as  a  Grand  Monarch, 
whose  influence  and  prestige  extended  not  only  far 


1684] 


The  Year  i68^. 


233 


into  the  distant  East,  but  over  the  American  conti¬ 
nent. 

His  authority  was  practically  boundless.  No 
opposition  to  his  will  existed.  In  1682  the  residence 
of  the  Court  was  definitely  fixed  at  Versailles,  which 
henceforth  became  the  recognised  centre  of  the 
monarchy.  Louis  had  never  liked  Paris.  That  city 
had  been  the  centre  of  the  troubles  of  his  minority  ; 
it  had  witnessed  many  of  the  episodes  of  his  early 
days,  which  he  would  have  gladly  consigned  to 
oblivion.  Paris  wearied  him  with  its  crowds,  its  in¬ 
dependence,  its  many  importunities.  In  the  early 
days  of  his  rule,  too,  he  loved  hunting,  open-air 
fetes,  and  out-of-door  amusements.  Hence,  soon 
after  the  death  of  his  mother,  he  lived  mainly  at 
Saint-Germain,  the  beauties  and  delights  of  which 
are  so  clearly  set  forth  by  Saint-Simon.  As  years 
rolled  by  Louis  developed  a  passion  for  building 
which,  with  his  ever  increasing  love  of  splendour, 
magnificence,  and  profusion,  proved  a  ruinous  matter 
for  his  country.  Colbert  had  in  vain  attempted  to 
check  the  lavish  expenditure  in  Versailles;  he  urged 
the  completion  of  the  Louvre,  “  the  most  superb 
palace  in  the  world,”  and  did  all  in  his  power  to  keep 
the  King  in  Paris. 

But  Louis  in  addition  to  his  dislike  of  Paris  had 
no  sympathy  with  Colbert’s  view,  which  in  later 
days  was  forcibly  enunciated  by  Danton,  that  Paris 
was  the  head  of  France.  He  was  jealous  of  the 
capital  and  wished  to  be  himself  the  centre  of  the 
French  nation. 

Fontainebleau,  Chambord,  Saint-Germain  had 


234 


Louis  XIV. 


[1684 


been  occupied  by  his  predecessors,  and  reminded 
him  of  their  great  deeds.  Louis  determined  to  build 
a  palace  which  should  be  the  glorification  of  himself. 
It  was  through  this  strongly  marked  characteristic 
combined  with  his  passion  for  building  that  led  Louis 
to  abandon  Saint-Germain  for  V ersailles,"  la  plus  triste 
et  la  plus  ingrat  de  tous  les  lieux,”  and  to  create  out  of 
a  small  hunting  lodge  a  royal  palace,  his  chef-cT (Btivre, 
“so  ruinous  and  built  in  such  bad  taste.”  Versailles 
was  by  nature  treeless,  without  water,  with  a  dry 
sandy  soil,  but  Louis,  as  Saint-Simon  tells  us,  loved 
to  fight  and  conquer  even  nature.  Everything  at 
Versailles  was  magnificent,  uncomfortable,  and  in 
questionable  taste.  The  want  of  water  “  in  spite  of 
sixty  leagues  of  aqueducts  ”  was  a  serious  defect.  To 
remedy  this  drawback  Louis  determined  to  divert  the 
Eure  between  Chartres  and  Maintenon  and  to  bring 
its  waters  by  means  of  a  canal  to  Versailles.  In  i68i 
22,000  soldiers  and  6ooo  horses  were  employed  on 
the  work,  a  great  part  of  whom  were  soon  rendered 
by  sickness  unfit  for  service.  No  sooner  was  the 
truce  of  Ratisbon  signed  than  Louis  sent  a  portion 
of  his  army  to  the  works.  A  third  of  them  perished, 
and  this  attempt  to  remedy  the  deficiencies  of 
nature  was  finally  abandoned  in  i688  on  the  out¬ 
break  of  war,  after  the  sacrifice  of  many  lives  and 
an  enormous  expenditure  of  money,^ — nine  millions 
alone  being  spent  on  the  aqueduct  of  Maintenon. 
*It  was  at  Versailles  that  Louis  resided  during  these 
years  when  his  power  and  influence  were  at  their 
height.  It  was  there  that  he  received  embassies 
from  distant  lands.  There  came  in  1684  the  Alge- 


1684] 


The  Year  i68^. 


rian  envoys  to  implore  Louis’  mercy  and  considera¬ 
tion.  There  was  seen  at  the  beginning  of  1685  the 
unusual  spectacle  of  a  Doge  of  Genoa  and  four  Sena¬ 
tors  asking  pardon  of  the  King  of  France,  while  at 
the  end  of  1684  and  again  in  1686  Versailles  wit¬ 
nessed  an  event  almost  unique  in  the  history  of 
western  Europe, — the  appearance  of  an  embassy 
from  Siam.  The  arrival  of  this  mission  was  the 
result  of  Louis’  far-reaching  diplomacy  and  admira¬ 
bly  illustrates  the  general  aims  of  his  policy. 

During  these  years  Louis  was  not  content  with 
being  supreme  in  Europe  ;  he  aimed  at  the  exten¬ 
sion  of  his  influence  in  the  far  East  and  discovered 
an  excellent  opportunity  of  carrying  out  his  purpose 
in  the  success  of  Colbert’s  East  Indian  policy.  In 
India  the  position  of  the  French  was  eminently 
satisfactory.  The  French  East  India  Company  wasY 
flourishing  and  the  fame  of  Louis’  victories  and  of  1 
the  peace  of  Nimeguen  had  penetrated  as  faiy^arS 
Siam. 

No  better  illustration  of  the  general  tenor  of 
Louis’  policy  could  be  found  than  in  the  history  of 
his  relations  with  Siam.  His  motives  in  sending 
embassies  to  Siam  were  partly  religious,  partly  com¬ 
mercial,  partly  political.  The  rivalry  between  the 
French  and  the  Dutch  raged  in  the  East  Indies  and 
Louis  hoped  to  oust  his  rivals  from  Siam  and  to  ruin 
their  trade  with  that  country.  At  the  same  time  he 
undoubtedly  hoped  to  effect  the  conversion  of  the 
Siamese,  and  never  realised  how  well-nigh  insuper¬ 
able  were  the  obstacles  to  the  success  of  such  an 
attempt. 


236 


Louis  XIV. 


[1684 


Almost  simultaneously  with  the  revocation  of  the 
Edict  of  Nantes,  the  conversion  of  the  Siamese  was 
taken  definitely  in  hand.  A  revolution  in  Siam  coin¬ 
cident  in  point  of  time  with  the  English  Revolution 
of  1688  dealt  with  dramatic  completeness  a  similar 
blow  to  French  influence.  The  Roman  Catholic  re¬ 
ligion  in  Siam  received  a  shock  from  which  it  never 
recovered,  the  French  prestige  in  that  country  was 
well-nigh  ruined,  and  the  Dutch  influence  triumphed 
in  Siam  at  the  very  time  that  William  III.  was  se¬ 
curing  the  English  crown. 

The  history  of  the  relations  of  France  and  Siam  is 
short  but  piquant,  and  abounds  with  curious  illustra¬ 
tions  of  Louis’  methods,  of  his  general  attitude,  of 
his  belief  in  himself,  and  of  the  defects  of  his  policy. 

Official  intercourse  between  the  two  countries 
began  in  Louis  XIV.’s  reign,  but  up  to  1669  the 
French  had  only  been  represented  by  missionaries. 
The  early  missions  seem  to  have  been  so  successful 
that  an  additional  number  of  priests  were  sent  out 
and  by  1677  five  missions  had  been  established  and 
letters  sent  to  Phra-Narai  the  tolerant  King  of  Siam 
from  both  the  Pope  and  the  French  King.  Phra-Narai 
was  greatly  impressed  with  the  power  of  Louis,  and 
moreover  was  alarmed  at  the  maritime  tyranny  of 
the  Dutch  and  the  menacing  development  of  their 
eastern  empire.  He  accordingly  spoke  of  sending 
an  embassy  to  France.  The  rapid  growth  of  the 
Dutch  power  had  for  a  long  period  been  a  source  of 
great  anxiety  to  French  statesmen.  This  anxiety 
was  in  a  special  manner  shared  by  Louis,  whose  an¬ 
tipathy  to  the  Dutch  on  account  of  their  political 


1684] 


The  Year  i6Sj. 


237 


views  and  religious  tenets  only  increased  as  years 
went  on. 

In  Siam  there  was  a  splendid  field  for  an  attack  on 
the  Dutch  East  India  Company,  which,  the  mistress 
of  Java  and  the  Moluccas,  not  only  had  the  right 
of  carrying  on  trade,  of  building  ports,  of  making  al¬ 
liances,  and  of  founding  colonies  in  the  Indian  and 
Chinese  seas,  but  enjoyed  a  practical  monopoly  of 
the  spice  trade,  and  had  in  great  measure  driven  the 
Portuguese  out  of  India. 

Colbert  had  in  1664  founded  the  French  East 
India  Company  which  was  not  at  first  received  with 
any  great  favour.  But  in  1668  a  French  factory  was 
established  at  Surat ;  a  few  years  later  Martin 
founded  Pondicherry  and  the  French  Company  en¬ 
tered  upon  fairly  prosperous  days.  The  commercial 
monopoly  of  the  Dutch  was  at  once  threatened,  and 
the  French,  overjoyed  at  the  favourable  reception 
accorded  to  their  missionaries,  determined  to  estab¬ 
lish  a  factory  in  Siam.  In  1680  the  King  of  Siam 
having  heard  from  the  missionaries  of  the  peace  of 
Nimeguen  with  a  highly  coloured  account  of  Louis’ 
victories,  and  being  moreover  influenced  by  Constan¬ 
tine  Phaulkon  a  Greek  adventurer,  who  had  gained 
his  confidence  and  had  practically  become  first  min¬ 
ister,  allowed  the  establishment  of  a  Ph'ench  factory, 
and  in  1682  made  a  treaty  with  the  French  East 
India  Company  on  very  favourable  terms.  He  also 
resolved  to  send  an  embassy,  and  in  1681  the  first  ex¬ 
pedition  to  France  set  out  with  numerous  presents 
for  the  Pope,  Louis,  his  Queen,  the  Dauphin,  Orleans, 
and  Colbert.  Off  Madagascar,  however,  their  ship  was 


Louis  XIV. 


[1685 


238 

wrecked  and  all  perished.  In  1684  a  second  embassy 
was  sent,  Phra-Narai  having  in  the  meantime  re¬ 
ceived  a  letter  from  Louis  together  with  the  King’s 
miniature.  This  embassy,  composed  of  two  manda¬ 
rins  and  their  suite,  started  in  January,  landed  at 
Calais  towards  the  end  of  the  year,  and  early  in  De¬ 
cember  had  an  audience  of  Louis  at  Versailles.  On 
being  presented  to  the  King  the  members  of  the 
embassy  remained  so  long  on  the  ground  that  Louis 
growing  impatient  asked  if  they  were  never  going  to 
rise.  They  spoke  fair  words,  hinted  that  Christian¬ 
ity  was  on  the  increase  in  Siam  and  that  the  King 
was  favourably  disposed  to  it,  spoke  of  commercial 
privileges,  and  asked  that  a  French  embassy  should 
be  sent.  This  request  was  strongly  supported  by 
Pere  la  Chaise,  Louis’  confessor,  by  the  French 
clergy  generally,  and  by  the  most  eloquent  divines  in 
particular. 

It  was  eventually  decided  that  an  embassy  should 
be  sent  and  in  March,  1685,  it  set  out.  The  objects 
aimed  at  by  Louis  and  his  advisers  in  fitting  out  a 
costly  expedition  to  a  distant  kingdom  like  Siam  are 
singularly  in  agreement  with  those  for  which  French 
policy  was  then  struggling  at  home. 

First,  the  embassy  was  to  attempt  the  conversion 
of  the  King  of  Siam.  Just  when  religious  unity 
was  being  insisted  upon  in  France,  in  the  very  year 
which  saw  the  revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes, 
Louis  thought  the  conversion  of  an  Asiatic  sover¬ 
eign  would  clearly  demonstrate  to  the  world  his 
determination  to  advance  the  Christian  religion,  no 
matter  at  what  cost,  in  Asia  no  less  than  in  Europe. 


1685] 


The  Year  i68^. 


239 


Then  secondly  the  embassy  was  to  leave  no  stone 
unturned  to  further  the  political  and  commercial  in¬ 
terests  of  France,  France  was  on  the  verge  of  a  war 
in  Europe.  Foremost  among  her  avowed  enemies 
stood  Holland.  The  greatness  of  Holland  in  large 
measure  depended  upon  her  eastern  trade.  A  blow 
was  therefore  to  be  struck  at  once  at  that  trade. 

On  September  the  23d,  after  a  voyage  of  six  months 
and  twenty  days,  the  two  ships  conveying  the  mem¬ 
bers  of  the  embassy — L' Oisemi  and  Le  ATaligne, 
arrived  at  Siam.  But  the  expedition  did  not  prove 
a  conspicuous  success.  Its  chief  was  the  Chevalier 
de  Chaumont,  a  hot-headed  fanatic  full  of  religious 
zeal,  and  he  was  accompanied  by  the  notorious 
Abb6  de  Choisy,  and  twelve  young  Frenchmen  of 
noble  birth,  four  missionaries,  six  Jesuit  Fathers,  and 
an  engineer.  Like  Louis  XIV.  and  his  advisers,  the 
members  of  the  embassy  seem  to  have  really  ex¬ 
pected  the  immediate  conversion  of  the  King  of 
Siam.  Nothing,  however,  was  further  from  the 
thoughts  of  Phra-Narai,  and  Chaumont,  who  only 
cared  for  the  work  of  conversion  and  had  no  sym¬ 
pathy  with  commerce,  soon  found  that,  as  far  as  he 
was  concerned,  he  might  have  stayed  in  France. 

The  Siamese  desired  an  offensive  and  defensive 
treaty  with  France;  Chaumont  made  the  conversion 
of  the  King  a  sine  qua  non.  Eventually  Phra-Narai 
declared  that  he  had  no  intention  of  giving  up  a 
religion  which  had  been  held  by  the  Siamese  for 
2229  years.  Though  the  main  object  of  the  embassy 
was  thus  defeated,  missionaries  w'ere  still  allowed  to 
carry  on  the  work  of  conversion,  and  a  treaty  favour- 


240 


L07Lis  XIV. 


[1685 


able  to  French  commerce  was  made.  It  was  further 
arranged  that  the  maritime  places  should  be  fortified 
a  la  Vauban  and  that  new  forts  should  be  built  at 
Bangkok  and  Mergui  and  garrisoned  by  French  forces. 
In  December,  1685,  another  Siamese  embassy  accom¬ 
panied  Chaumont  back  to  France  and  arrived  at 
Brest  in  June,  1686.  In  August  a  solemn  entry  was 
made  into  Paris  and  later  the  Siamese  were  taken  to 
Maintenon  and  shown  the  troops  still  working  at 
the  aqueduct.  On  September  ist,  a  great  recep¬ 
tion  was  accorded  to  them  at  Versailles,  and  a 
picture  of  that  very  characteristic  scene  is  still 
extant. 

After  once  more  seeing  Louis  the  embassy  started 
back  early  in  1687  accompanied  by  some  636  officers 
and  men  to  garrison  the  forts  of  Bangkok  and  Mergui. 
This  expedition  had  as  usual  the  threefold  character 
of  a  military  expedition,  of  a  commercial  enterprise, 
and  of  a  religious  crusade.  Only  492  arrived  at  Siam, 
the  rest  having  succumbed  on  the  way.  Early  the 
following  year  a  reinforcement  of  200  men  were 
dispatched  from  France. 

But  the  French  fortunes  in  Europe  and  in  the 
East  seem  to  have  been  inextricably  intertwined. 
The  year  1688  was  destined  to  be  as  disastrous  to 
the  French  in  Siam  as  it  was  to  their  fortunes  in 
Europe.  The  priests  and  Siamese  aristocracy  had 
long  been  weary  of  the  rule  of  Constantine,  whose 
policy  had  uniformly  been  one  of  alliance  with  the 
French.  In  July,  1688,  a  revolution  broke  out.  The 
King  was  deposed,  French  influence  was  overthrown, 
Constantine  was  ruined.  The  unpardonable  indeci- 


RECEPTION  OF  THE  SIAMESE  AMBASSADORS  AT  VERSAILLES. 
(From  a  photograph  of  a  painting.) 


I 


1685] 


The  Year  i68§. 


241 


sion  of  the  French  commander,  Desfargues,  was  in 
great  measure  answerable  for  the  disasters  to  the 
French  cause.  Louis’  relations  with  Siam  remain, 
however,  as  a  curious  and  interesting  illustration  of 
his  zeal  for  conversion,  of  his  hatred  of  the  Dutch, 
and  of  his  intense  and  overweening  desire  to  seize 
every  opportunity  to  pose  as  a  Great  King.’ 

But  in  1685  there  was  no  sign  of  coming  disaster 
in  Siam.  The  conversion  of  the  King  and  his  coun¬ 
try  was  regarded  as  imminent,  and  Louis  plumed  him¬ 
self  with  the  thought  of  the  profound  impression  which 
would  be  produced  in  Western  Christendom  when  he, 
the  strong  supporter  of  the  Christian  religion  in  Eu¬ 
rope,  could  boast  of  having  converted  a  large  and 
powerful  kingdom  in  the  far  East.  For  while  he 
was  attempting  to  convert  the  Siamese,  he  was  busy 
at  home  in  proving  to  Europe  his  zeal  for  religion. 
He  had  resolved  to  proceed  rapidly  in  carrying  out 
his  deepseated  determination  of  securing  at  all  costs 
religious  and  political  unity  at  home.  Political  unity 
was  practically  assured,  but  as  long  as  the  Huguenots 
were  allowed  to  enjoy  the  privileges  accorded  them  by 
the  Edict  of  Nantes,  Louis  could  not  regard  France 
as  united  in  a  religious  sense.  Religious  unity  at  home 
was  the  logical  outcome  and  result  of  the  political 
unity  already  won,  and  the  necessary  complement  of 
the  commanding  position  acquired  by  Louis  in  West¬ 
ern  Christendom.  His  power  dominated  Europe.  His 
navy  swept  the  Mediterranean.  All  around  him  was 

'  On  the  subject  of  the  French  relations  with  Siam  see  L.  Lanier’s 
£luiie  historiqiie  stir  les  relations  de  la  France  et  du  royaume  deSiam  : 
de  1662  a  1703. 

16 


242 


Lotus  XIV. 


[1685 


subservience  and  adulation.  Religious  unity  at  home 
was  to  him  absolutely  necessary  and  seemed  easy  to 
secure.  In  the  East  the  Emperor  was  carrying  on  a 
crusade  against  the  Turks.  It  seemed  to  Louis  a 
happy  idea  to  emulate  him  by  leading  a  crusade 
against  the  Protestants.  He  had  moreover  the  sym¬ 
pathy  of  James  II.,  who  while  pursuing  his  own 
policy  in  England  was  acting  in  harmony  with 
the  views  of  the  French  King.  The  flood  of  uni¬ 
versal  Catholicism  seemed  to  be  rising  rapidly,  and 
in  devotion  to  that  Catholicism  a  great  Christian 
monarch  like  Louis  could  not  allow  himself  to  be 
outdistanced  by  Austria  or  England. 

But  if  Louis’  motives  are  closely  analysed,  it  will  be 
found  that  the  existence  of  the  Huguenot  element  in 
France  jarred  upon  his  dogma  of  absolute  authority 
and  did  not  imply  any  real  sympathy  with  or  devo¬ 
tion  to  the  Papacy.  His  wish  to  realise  an  absolute 
supremacy  far  outweighed  any  desire  to  uphold  the 
divine  power  of  the  Pope.  He  was  convinced  that 
the  royal  authority  was  insulted  by  the  presence  in 
France  of  the  Protestant  camp;  he  was  equally 
certain  that  the  French  people  would  be  all  the 
better  for  the  suppression  of  the  heretical  section. 
And  in  his  persecution  of  the  Huguenots  he  was 
completely  at  one  with  the  nation.  Never  was 
the  King  more  in  sympathy  with  the  mass  of  his  sub¬ 
jects  than  when  he  issued  the  order  for  the  revoca¬ 
tion  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes. 

The  existence  of  a  schismatic  body  within  France 
had  always  been  a  source  of  annoyance  to  Louis,  and 
it  is  possible  that  he  hoped  by  expelling  the  whole 


1685] 


The  Year  i68^. 


243 


sect  of  Protestants  to  be  in  a  position  to  claim  “  the 
liberties  of  the  national  Church  as  a  reward  for  his 
crusade.”  A  Gallican  Church  under  the  direct  super¬ 
vision  of  the  King  himself  and  free  from  all  interfef;— 
ence  from  Rome  was  undoubtedly  Louis’  idea^  It 
was  therefore  an  accurate  appreciation  of  tlie  King’s 
real  motives  that  caused  Innocent  XI.  to  condemn  the 
revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes.  By  it  the  inter¬ 
ests  of  Rome  were  as  seriously  imperilled  as  the  in¬ 
terests  of  the  national  Church  in  P'rance  were 
advanced.  The  revocation  was  from  Louis’  point 
of  view  absolutely  necessary,  and  was  part  of  a  gen¬ 
eral  scheme.  He  had  long  been  preparing  for  the 
event.  Mazarin  had  treated  the  Huguenots  with 
tolerance.  With  his  natural  prudence  he  saw  the  wis¬ 
dom  of  pursuing  a  conciliatory  policy.  Besides,  they 
had  not  supported  the  Fronde  and  for  that  he  was 
grateful.  The  Edict  of  Nantes  had  in  consequence 
been  confirmed  in  1652  and  the  future  seemed  assured 
to  the  Huguenots  for  the  exercise,  not  only  of  theirre- 
ligious  rites  but  also  of  their  political  functions.  But 
the  hatred  of  the  French  clergy  never  slept.  With  pas¬ 
sionate  language  they  besought  Louis  even  while  he 
was  a  mere  child  to  check  the  progress  of  this  hereti¬ 
cal  society.  In  1655  the  Archbishop  of  Rheims 
declaimed  against  the  declaration  of  Saint-Germain  in 
1652  and  alluded  to  the  Huguenot  temples  as  “  Syna¬ 
gogues  of  Satan  ”  and  to  the  Huguenots  themselves 
“  as  heretics,  persecutors,  and  schismatics.” 

Soon  after  the  death  of  Mazarin  the  policy  which 
culminated  in  1685  began  in  real  earnest.  The  young 
King  yielding  to  his  clerical  advisers  abandoned  once 


244 


Louis  XIV. 


[1685 


and  for  all  the  liberal-minded  policy  of  Henry  IV.  and 
inaugurated  the  era  of  persecution.  In  April,  i66i, 
/Louis  agreed  to  the  demand  of  the  clergy  that  com¬ 
missioners  should  be  sent  into  the  provinces  to  re¬ 
port  on  the  Protestant  churches  built  since  the  Edict 
of  Nantes;  for  the  clergy  claimed  that  Article  9  of 
that  Edict  only  allowed  the  Protestants  to  exercise 
their  worship  in  certain  places  and  therefore  that  all 
churches  built  since  1597  should  be  pulled  down. 
The  result  of  the  commission  was  favourable  to  these 
views  and  numerous  churches  were  demolished. 
Not  only  was  public  worship  gradually  proscribed 
but  many  vexatious  restraints  were  imposed  on  the 
Protestants.  The  signal  had  been  given  and  prepara¬ 
tory  measures  were  taken  which  made  quite  ap¬ 
parent  to  farsighted  men  the  nature  and  meaning 
of  the  King’s  policy.  In  1666  the  first  series  of 
emigrations  took  place  and  in  1668  it  was  reported 
that  800  French  Protestant  families  had  arrived  at 
The  Hague.  The  Elector  of  Brandenburg  ventured  to 
protest  against  the  infractions  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes, 
but  Louis  replied  that  no  churches  which  had  been 
in  existence  in  1597  had  been  destroyed.  A  system  of 
semi-persecution  was  thus  continued  in  accordance 
with  the  strict  Jesuit  interpretation  of  the  treaty 
of  Nantes.  Already  burials  in  the  daytime  were 
prohibited  on  the  ground  that  no  clause  could  be 
found  permitting  interments  by  day.  In  1670 
schoolmasters  were  forbidden  to  teach  any  subject 
save  reading,  writing,  and  arithmetic  on  the  ground 
that  the  Edict  contained  no  list  of  subjects  which 
the  Protestants  might  teach.  On  such  frivolous  in- 


1685] 


The  Year  i68§. 


245 


terpretations  of  the  Edict  many  schools  were  closed 
and  only  one  master  was  allowed  in  each  school. 
These  regulations  were  severely  enforced  through 
the  instrumentality  of  the  clergy,  and  the  Protestant 
schools  were  practically  ruined. 

In  1669,  the  violent  and  persecuting  spirit  shown 
by  the  Bishop  of  Amiens  resulted  in  a  large  emigra¬ 
tion  of  the  Protestants  of  Picardy  to  England.  In 
1675  the  clergy  demanded  that  Protestant  children 
should  be  converted  at  the  age  of  fourteen,  and  in 
1681  a  royal  edict  declared  that  such  children  could 
be  converted  at  the  age  of  seven.  The  Protestants 
had  to  choose  between  ignorance  or  conversion. 
They  were  thus  treated  like  Turks  or  infidels.  They 
were  loj'^al  French  subjects  ready  and  willing  to  fight 
for  their  country,  they  were  the  backbone  of  the 
commercial  prosperity  of  France.  But  Louis  had 
always  dreaded  as  well  as  disliked  them.  In  1668  he 
feared  a  revolt  of  the  French  Huguenots,  and  in 
1680  he  ordered  that  the  Protestant  officers  should 
gradually  be  dismissed  from  the. navy.  The  King 
had  evidently  been  entirely  misinformed  as  to  the 
strength  of  the  dissidents,  for  as  a  political  party 
the  Huguenots  do  not  seem  to  have  been  well  or¬ 
ganised  or  in  any  way  dangerous.  But  after  the 
peace  of  Nimeguen  a  change  had  come  over  Louis’ 
life.  He  fell  under  the  influence  of  Pfere  la  Chaise 
and  Madame  de  Maintenon.  Colbert’s  influence  was 
waning  ;  that  of  Louvois  was  increasing.  The  lying 
reports  of  the  intendants  notifying  the  conversion  of 
thousands  rendered  Colbert’s  advice  fruitless,  and 
Louis’  fresh  persecuting  measures — the  result  of  his 


246 


Louis  XIV. 


[1685 


religious  and  political  ardour — were  accompanied  by 
a  rapid  series  of  emigrations.  In  1681  a  large  num¬ 
ber  of  Protestants  fled  from  the  west  and  the  north 
and  in  1683  after  Colbert’s  death  persecution  and 
destruction  of  churches  continued  with  renewed 
vigour  till  the  culminating  point  was  reached  in  the 
Dragonnade  of  1685  and  the  revocation  itself. 

In  1688  the  largest  emigration  took  place,  and  apart 
from  the  thousands  of  good  citizens  who  left  the 
country,  we  must  notice  the  remark  of  Vauban  that 
France  lost  600  officers  and  12,000  soldiers  better 
seasoned  than  their  Catholic  brethren.  And  this 
took  place  in  1688  the  year  of  all  others  when  Louis 
required  all  his  best  soldiers  to  combat  the  rising 
flood  of  European  hostility. 

The  question  as  to  Louis’ own  share  in  the  respon¬ 
sibility  of  this  fatal  policy,  which  produced  such  in¬ 
calculable  harm  and  loss  to  France,  has  yet  to  be 
finally  determined.  Louvois  has  been  accused  of 
being  the  author  of  the  fatal  revocation  ;  Madame 
de  Maintenon  has  been  also  charged  with  strongly 
supporting  the  anti-Protestant  policy  and  of  being 
the  main  cause  of  the  attack  of  the  Reformed  re¬ 
ligion.  The  Jesuits  and  clergy  generally  have  in 
their  turn  been  regarded  as  mainly  instrumental  in 
bringing  about  the  greatest  mistake  of  the  reign. 

There  is  no  proof  that  Louvois  played  a  leading 
part  in  furthering  a  policy  wjjich  had  been  in  men’s 
minds  all  through  Louis’  reign.  But  there  is  no 
doubt  that  he  carried  out  with  unnecessary  violence 
against  the  Protestants  measures  which  were  in 
direct  oppositon  to  Colbert’s  principles,  and  that  he 


THE  REVOCATION  OF  THE  EDICT  OF  NANTES,  1685. 

(From  an  old  print  reproduced  in  F.rdmannsdorfer's  Deutsche  Gesckichte  von  16/8-1^40,) 


1685] 


The  Year  i68§. 


247 


regarded  the  adoption  of  a  policy  of  persecution  as 
a  means  of  supplanting  that  great  minister  and  of 
recouping  the  exchequer  at  the  expense  of  his 
victims. 

Madame  de  Maintenon  certainly  did  not  play  a 
leading  part  in  the  revocation.  This  is  Voltaire’s 
opinion,  and  there  is  no  ground  for  disputing  it. 
She,  like  almost  all  Catholic  France,  approved  of  the 
measures  taken  against  the  Huguenots,  thinking 
with  all  the  world  that  the  revocation  was  a  praise¬ 
worthy  act  and  easy  of  execution.  In  a  letter 
written  on  August  13,  1684,  she  says  that  the 
King  has  the  intention  of  bringing  about  the  entire 
conversion  of  the  heretics,  and  that  he  had  frequent 
interviews  with  Le  Tellier  the  Chancellor  and  Cha- 
teauneuf.  Secretary  of  State,  with  reference  to  Ics 
affaires  dc  la  religion  prctetidiie  reforniee.  She  goes 
on  to  say  that  she  was  allowed  to  be  present  at  these 
interviews  and  that  she  did  not  agree  with  the  meas¬ 
ures  proposed  by  Chateauneuf.  “  One  cannot,”  she 
writes,  “  precipitate  matters;  one  must  convert  and 
not  persecute.  .  .  .  The  King  is  ready  to  do  all 

that  may  be  considered  as  tending  to  the  benefit 
of  religion.  This  enterprise  wilt  cover  him  with 
glory  before  God  and  before  men.”  The  atrocious 
persecution,  due  in  great  measure  to  Louvois,  was 
repugnant  to  her  nature.  She  would  have  trusted 
entirely  to  persuasion  and  not  to  cruelty.  “  The 
King,”  she  writes,  “  is  much  touched  by  what  has 
come  to  his  ears — and  he  knows  only  a  portion. 
.  .  .  For  fifteen  years  have  I  counselled  moder¬ 

ation  ;  I  have  never  injured  any  one,  and  the  King 


248  Louis  XIV.  ^1685^ 

has  often  reproached  fbr  my  moderl^ion.”^ 

When  she  told  Louis  that  the  persecution  would, 
so  far  from  bringing  about  conversion,  only  inflame 
the  Protestants  the  more  against  the  Catholic  reli¬ 
gion,  Louis  refused  to  listen.  “  I  fear,  Madame,”  he 
said  to  her  at  one  time,  “  that  the  mildness  with 
which  you  would  wish  the  Calvinists  to  be  treated, 
arises  from  some  remaining  sympathy  with  your 
former  religion.”  Still  she  pressed  her  point  of 
view  and  succeeded  in  keeping  her  Protestant  ser¬ 
vants  in  spite  of  Louis’  protests. 

Louis  was  distinctly  responsible  for  the  revoca¬ 
tion.  The  question  of  the  conversion  of  all  dissi¬ 
dents  in  France  had  occupied  his  thoughts  for  a  very 
long  period.  Throughout  his  reign,  ministers,  the 
clerical  assemblies,  the  Parlements,  the  great  mass 
of  the  kingdom,  had  pressed  the  matter  upon  his 
attention.  Public  opinion  had  declared  itself  un¬ 
mistakably  for  the  revocation.  As  early  as  April 
5,  1681,  Madame  de  Maintenon  writes:  “If  God 
preserve  the  King  there  will  not  be  one  Huguenot 
left  twenty  years  hence.”  This  is  usually  taken  to 
be  a  quotation  from  Louis’  own  lips,  and  would  seem 
to  indicate  that  Louis  was  more  than  willing  to  re¬ 
gard  himself,  as  in  other  cases,  carrying  out  the 
popular  wish.  Louis’  responsibility  was  heavy,  but 
he  was  in  great  measure  the  tool  of  the  clergy.  Ever 
since  1661  he  was  to  a  considerable  extent  unwit¬ 
tingly  influenced  by  some  more  powerful  mind  than 
his  own.  Thinking  he  was  acting  best  for  his  own 
salvation,  he  allowed  himself  in  this  matter  to  be 
guided  by  the  Jesuits,  The  determining  cause  of 


1685] 


The  Year  i6S^. 


249 


the  revocation  was  the  action  of  the  clergy.  “  The 
conduct,  the  direction,  the  strategy  of  this  great 
event  was  in  the  hands  of  the  French  clergy,”  says 
a  modern  French  writer.  “The  real  authors  of  this 
revocation  carried  out,”  says  Saint-Simon,  “  with 
the  least  pretext  and  without  any  necessity,  are  as¬ 
suredly  those  who  inspired  it.”  *  . 

Louis  has  in  accordance  with  this  view  been /de¬ 
scribed  as  a  “  glorious  accomplice.”  On  his  depth- 
bed,  on  August  26,  1715,  addressing  the  tiiree 
cardinals  who  stood  round  him,  he  declared,  accord¬ 
ing  to  Saint-Simon,  that  he  had  always  acted/ with 
regard  to  Church  affairs  by  the  direction  pf  his 
clerical  advisers,  and  that  they  were  responsible  for 
all  that  he  had  done. 

Louis  unquestionably  hoped  in  1685  to  repair  the 
past  by  one  great  act  of  religious  intolerance,  though 
he  probably  was  in  the  hands  of  his  agents  through¬ 
out.  There  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  he  was  de¬ 
ceived  as  to  the  amount  of  vigorous  Protestantism 
in  the  country.  The  intendants  sent  lying  reports  of 
conversions  to  the  King,  and  Louis,  misled  by  the 
ofhcial  information,  imagined  that  the  revocation 
would  have  no  disastrous  effect  upon  France.  Louis 
lived  on  a  pedestal  and  was  to  a  great  extent,  if  not 
entirely,  ignorant  of  the  horrors  which  attended  the 
execution  of  his  policy.  This  view  receives  some 
confirmation  in  the  letter  of  Madame  de  Maintenon 
quoted  above.  And  at  the  same  time  it  must  always 
be  remembered  that  few  even  of  the  more  sagacious 
minds  ever  realised  the  real  import  of  the  line  of 
policy  pursued  by  the  government  of  France 


250 


Louis  XIV. 


[1685 


towards  the  Huguenots.  Colbert  never  actively 
opposed  the  persecutions,  and  never  showed  any 
signs  of  an  appreciation  of  the  real  drift  and  pos¬ 
sible  results  of  Louis’  religious  policy.  But  during 
his  lifetime  the  persecution  had  not  reached  its  ex¬ 
treme  limits,  and  he  was  mainly  occupied  in  the  task 
of  establishing  an  equilibrium  between  the  expendi¬ 
ture  and  receipts — a  task  in  which  he  was  fairly 
successful  even  as  late  as  1683,  the  year  of  his  death. 

Louis  succeeded  in  his  object,  but  at  what  cost? 
The  last  remaining  stumbling-block  in  the  way  of  a 
centralised  monarchy  was  removed.  No  jarring  or 
discordant  note  disturbed  the  harmony  which  ex¬ 
isted  on  the  surface  between  king  and  people.  The 
revocation  was  extremely  popular.  Louis  like 
George  III.  represented  the  tastes  and  prejudices  of 
the  mass  of  his  countrymen.  The  Huguenots  were 
unpopular,  they  had  always  held  their  privileges  “  in 
the  teeth  of  the  majority  of  the  nation,”  and  their 
proscription  by  Louis  was  a  popular  act.  The  nation, 
like  Nero,  fiddled  while  France  received  a  blow 
from  which  she  has  never  recovered.  vAbove  ^00,000 
emigrants  left  the  country,  including  the  best  men 
of  France  as  regards  “  birth,  substance,  and  repu- 
tation.”  The  trade  of  the  country  went  with  them 
and  the  rest  of  Louis’  reign  is  a  period  of  economic 
decadence.  Even  in  the  year  1685,  it  is  stated  that 
a  single  parish  in  Rouen  contained  5000  poor,  while 
in  Poitou,  in  Limousin  and  Languedoc,  a  large 
number  of  peasants  subsisted  on  chataignes,  glands, 
licrbes,  boucliers.  And  from  this  time  the  want  and 
misery  increased  to  an  enormous  extent.  France 


16851 


The  Year  i68^. 


25' 


could  ill  afford  to  see  the  entire  Teutonic  factor 
eliminated  from  her  midst. 

Centralisation  was  indeed  secured,  but  the  stream 
of  national  life  was  dried  up.  The  educated  middle 
class  ceased  to  exist,  l^die^ear  1684  saw  Louis 
at  the  height  of  his  power,  the  year  1685  saw  the 
commission  of  this  fatal  error  and  the  beginning 
of  the  decline  of  the  greatness  and  influence  of 
Frangt^ 

'  The  revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes  gave  the 
religious  question  a  foremost  place  among  all  the 
affairs  of  Western  Christendom  and  proved  to  be 
the  prelude  to  the  League  of  Augsburg.  In  1684 
Louis  had  given  the  law  to  Europe  ;  in  1687  his 
domination  in  Europe  was  threatened  on  all  sides. 
The  explanation  of  this — one  might  almost  say  revo¬ 
lution  in  the  general  current  of  European  opin¬ 
ion  was  due  to  the  revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes. 
And  Louis’  whole  conduct  with  reference  to  it  was 
teeming  with  blunders.  He  had  expected  that  the 
revocation  proceeding  simultaneously  with  the  Im¬ 
perial  war  against  the  Turks  would  disarm  the  hos¬ 
tility  of  the  Emperor  and  bring  about  friendly 
relations.  But  the  very  reverse  happened.  The 
Empire  and  Emperor  became  united.  The  German 
Catholics  remained  faithful  to  their  chief  and  the 
Protestants  joined  them.  Louis  moreover  carried 
away  by  his  ideas  of  exterminating  heresy  had  forced 
Victor  Amadeus  of  Savoy  to  assent  to  the  expulsion 
iof  the  Vaudois  from  their  valleys  early  in  1686.  He 
considered  that  the  presence  of  Protestants  living 
peacefully  so  near  France  would  prove  a  bad  exam- 


252 


Louis  XIV. 


[1685 


pie  to  his  own  Huguenot  subjects.  The  Vaudois 
valleys  too  would  afford  a  refuge  for  fugitives  from 
France,  and  such  a  state  of  things  could  not  be 
tolerated  by  the  greatest  monarch  in  Europe.  The 
expulsion  of  the  Vaudois  was  an  act  of  blind  and 
useless  brutality  and  only  aggravated  the  general 
feeling  of  Europe  against  the  aggressive  and  all 
pervading  domination  of  France. 

The  year  1685  then  marks  the  time  when  Louis 
finally  deserted  the  wise  policy  which  aimed  at  pre¬ 
serving  intact  a  circle  of  Protestant  alliances  in 
Germany.  Though  he  and  his  successors  endeav¬ 
oured  at  times  with  success  to  return  to  the  old  and 
more  statesmanlike  system,  it  was  left  for  the  rising 
power  of  Brandenburg  to  enter  upon  the  position 
which  France  had  abandoned. 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE  LEAGUE  AND  THE  WAR  OF  AUGSBURG. 
1686-1697. 

T  was  impossible  for  the  peace 
of  Europe  to  be  much  longer 
maintained  in  face  of  the 
“  position  of  incontestable 
preponderance  ”  acquired  by 
France  in  continental  Europe. 
“  Everyone,”  says  von  Ranke, 
“  knew  what  object  the  ambi¬ 
tion  of  Louis  XIV.  was  likely 
to  pursue  on  the  approaching 
extinction  of  the  Spanish  line  of  the  House  of  Aus¬ 
tria  and  on  the  expiration  or  breach  of  the  armistice 
concluded  with  Germany.  The  old  independence 
of  the  States  of  Europe  could  not  be  maintained 
any  longer  unless  this  prince  found  somewhere  or 
other  an  energetic  resistance.” 

The  possibility  of  making  such  a  resistance  had 


253 


254 


Loicis  XIV 


[1686 


long  occupied  the  minds  of  many  of  the  European 
Princes.  In  the  autumn  of  i68i  Charles  XL  of 
Sweden,  furious  at  the  loss  of  the  Duchy  of  Deux- 
Ponts,  signed  a  treaty  with  the  States-General, 
and  to  this  early  in  1682  Leopold  gave  his  adhe¬ 
sion,  his  example  being  followed  by  Spain,  Saxony, 
Bavaria,  Hesse-Cassel,  and  the  leading  members  of 
the  Circles  of  the  Upper  Rhine  and  Franconia.  This 
attempt  to  curb  the  Grand Monarqtie  was,  as  we  have 
seen,  premature,  and  it  was  not  till  after  the  revoca¬ 
tion  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes  that  European  oppo¬ 
sition  took  a  practical  form.  A  deep  feeling  of 
sympathy  was  manifested  in  England  for  continen¬ 
tal  Protestantism  ;  in  Holland  the  party  of  the  Prince 
of  Orange  was  strengthened  ;  the  Elector  of  Bran¬ 
denburg  was  thoroughly  aroused.  But  as  long  as 
England’s  King  was  an  ardent  Roman  Catholic,  the 
issue  of  a  struggle  with  Louis  XIV.  was  regarded 
as  doubtful. 

It  had  been  obvious  for  some  years  to  all  sagacious 
men  that  if  Louis  succeeded  in  transforming  the 
truce  of  Ratisbon  into  a  peace,  and  secured  forever 
his  Rhmion  acquisitions  he  would  acquire  complete 
military  preponderance  in  Europe. 

With  England  as  his  ally  there  is  little  doubt  that 
Louis  would  have  carried  his  point  and  established 
his  predominance.  On  England’s  action  then  the 
fortunes  of  Europe  depended.  The  alienation  of 
James  from  his  subjects  was  of  the  gravest  Euro¬ 
pean  consequence.  “  The  strife  which  awaited  its 
decision  in  England  was  closely  bound  up  with  the 
great  religious  and  political  conflict  which  then  di- 


1687]  The  League  and  the  War  of  Augsburg.  255 


vided  Europe.”  ’  James  II.  was  bent  on  the  restora¬ 
tion  of  Roman  Catholicism  in  England.  But  even  the 
Roman  party  in  England  was  divided.  The  moder¬ 
ate  Catholic  party  was  in  agreement  with  the  views 
of  Innocent  XL,  while  the  Jesuit  faction  which  sur¬ 
rounded  the  King  strongly  advocated  a  close  alliance 
with  Louis  XIV.,  whose  policy  they  supported. 
The  rival  claims  of  Louis  and  Innocent  placed 
James  in  an  unpleasant  dilemma,  and  at  length  he 
decided  to  mediate  between  the  two.  While  James 
was  busy  endeavouring  to  wean  Innocent  from  his 
antagonism  to  Louis,  and  to  establish  the  Roman 
Catholic  religion  in  England,  the  opposition  to 
France  had  become  European.  On  July  9,  1686, 
the  League  of  Augsburg  was  formed — to  preserve 
the  treaties  of  Westphalia  and  Nimeguen  and  the 
truce  of  Ratisbon.  It  included  the  Emperor,  the 
Kings  of  Spain  and  Sweden,  the  Dutch  Repub¬ 
lic,  the  Palatine  and  Saxon  Electors,  with  the  Cir¬ 
cles  of  Bavaria,  Franconia,  and  the  Upper  Rhine. 
In  1687  Innocent  XI.  secretly  joined  it,  and  the 
Dukes  of  Bavaria  and  Savoy  openly.  Calvinists, 
Lutherans,  Catholics  united  so  as  to  be  ready  for  all 
possible  contingencies.  The  League  bore  a  Euro¬ 
pean  rather  than  a  German  character.  It  only  re¬ 
quired  the  adhesion  of  England. 

Louis’  answer  to  the  League  was  a  demand  that 
the  truce  of  Ratisbon  should  be  at  once  transformed 
into  a  peace.  James  11.  supported  him,  and  it 
appeared  likely  that  the  European  struggle  would 

*  See  Ranke.  History  of  England,  principally  in  the  Sixteenth  and 
Seventeenth  centuries. 


256 


Lott  is  XIV. 


[1688 


begin  in  the  north  of  Europe  by  the  allied  English 
and  French  forces  attacking  the  Dutch  Republic. 

It  seemed  then  possible  that  England  and  France 
might  early  in  1688  unite  against  Holland,  and  that 
the  history  of  1672  might  be  repeated.  The  rela¬ 
tions  between  the  government  of  James  II.  and  that 
of  the  Stadtholder  were  seriously  strained.  Colonial 
disputes  about  Bantam  in  Java,  and  the  recall  by 
James  in  January,  1688,  from  the  Dutch  service  of 
those  English  and  Scottish  regiments  which  had  re¬ 
mained  in  Holland  since  1678  boded  no  good  to  the 
Protestant  cause  in  Europe.  At  this  very  time  too 
Denmark  and  Sweden  were  on  the  verge  of  a  strug¬ 
gle  over  the  Schleswig-Holstein  “  affair,”  and  as  the 
Dutch  supported  the  Swedes,  England  and  France 
supported  Denmark.  It  seemed  more  than  likely 
that  this  business  might  bring  on  a  general  war. 

Louis  had  no  time,  however,  to  lose.  The  Turk¬ 
ish  war  still  occupied  the  Emperor  in  the  East  but 
it  might  be  concluded  at  any  moment;  Hungary 
was  firmly  held  by  Austria ;  on  September  6th 
Belgrade  was  carried  by  assault.  Peace  with  the 
Turks  once  made,  the  forces  then  employed  on  the 
Danube  would  be  an  important  factor  on  the  Rhine. 
Louis’  policy  ever  since  1684  had  been  perfectly 
clear.  To  unite  permanently  to  France  those  dis¬ 
tricts,  the  possession  of  which  was  yielded  to  him 
for  twenty  years  by  the  truce  of  Ratisbon,  was  a 
policy  wbrthy  of  a  great  king.  By  so  doing  he 
would  acquire  “  complete  military  preponderance  in 
Europe  both  for  defence  and  offence.”  His  reli¬ 
gious  policy  was  equally  clear.  He  intended  to 


1688]  The  League  and  the  Wa7'  of  Aiigsbtirg.  257 


force  the  Pope  to  confirm  the  ecclesiastical  inde¬ 
pendence  of  France  and  thus  the  first  position  in 
the  Catholic  world  would  be  assured  to  himself.  To 
secure  these  objects  it  was  necessary  to  strike  at  the 
newly  formed  League,  while  as  yet  the  Turkish  war 
occupied  a  great  part  of  its  forces.  Opportunities  for 
kindling  a  European  war  have  been  rarely  difficult 
to  find  during  the  last  three  centuries,  and  Louis 
easily  found  more  than  one  pretext  which  he  thought 
would  enable  him  to  establish  his  preponderance 
in  Europe  on  a  permanent  footing.  The  death  of 
Maximilian  Henry,  Archbishop  of  Cologne,  in  June, 
1688,  was  an  opportunity  seized  upon  by  Louis  to 
occupy  Cologne,  and  to  place  his  creature  William  of 
Fiirstenberg  in  possession  of  the  Electorate  to  which 
he  had  not  been  legally  elected.  The  idea  of  the 
occupation  of  an  Electorate,  so  important  geographi¬ 
cally  as  was  Cologne  to  France,  by  Prince  Joseph 
Clement  of  Bavaria,  the  candidate  of  the  Emperor 
and  Pope  was  not  to  be  entertained  for  a  moment, 
and  while  P'iirstenberg  took  possession  of  his  Electo¬ 
rate,  Ph-ench  troops  occupied  Cologne.  Then  the 
question  of  the  succession  to  the  Palatinate  opened 
a  vast  field  for  Louis’  ambitious  schemes.  The 
extinction  of  the  male  line  of  Simmern  in  1685  left 
Charlotte  Elizabeth,  the  wife  of  Orleans,  the  only 
descendant  of  the  Simmerns.  Finding  that  the  Pope 
and  Elmperor  refused  to  recognise  I'iirstenberg  and 
to  transform  the  twenty  years’  truce  into  a  peace, 
Louis  determined  to  postpone  the  inevitable  strug¬ 
gle  no  longer,  and  at  once  prepared  to  assert  the 
rights  of  the  Duchess  of  Orleans  in  the  Palatinate. 

17 


258 


Loliis  XIV. 


[1688 


Madame  herself  was  furious  at  this  claim  set  up 
on  her  behalf,  and,  before  the  Dauphin  started  on 
September  25th  to  invade  the  Palatinate  without 
any  previous  declaration  of  war,  she  told  him  that 
he  should  be  grieved  and  “  not  pleased  at  the 
thought  that  her  name  should  be  used  to  ruin 
her  poor  country.”  The  decision  to  occupy  the 
Palatinate  had  not  been  come  to  without  serious 
deliberation.  But  after  long  consultations  the 
French  ministers  had  decided  that  it  was  of  the  ut¬ 
most  importance  to  France  that  the  Emperor  and 
Empire  should  cede  definitely  the  territories  placed 
in  Louis’ hands  by  the  truce  of  Ratisbon,  and  should 
recognise  the  claims  of  Orleans  to  the  Palatinate 
succession.  In  order  to  obtain  the  cession  of  these 
territories  it  was  resolved  to  occupy  the  Palatinate 
without  further  delay. 

This  decision  has  been  severely  criticised  by  many 
able  historians.  By  attacking  Holland  or  even  by 
making  a  movement  against  Maestricht,  the  expedi¬ 
tion  of  William  would,  it  is  usually  said,  have  been 
prevented.  But  it  must  be  remembered  that  Maes¬ 
tricht  was  not  in  the  heart  of  Holland,  and  though 
its  siege  would  have  embarrassed  the  Dutch,  there 
is  no  reason  for  believing  that  it  would  have  caused 
the  abandonment  of  the  expedition  to  England. 
The  French  arms  had  failed  in  1672  in  the  attack 
on  Holland,  though  the  Dutch  were  unable  to  offer 
any  organised  resistance.  In  1688  the  Dutch  were 
fully  prepared,  they  had  powerful  allies,  and  Maes¬ 
tricht  itself  was  far  better  able  to  stand  a  long  siege 
than  in  1672.  French  troops  had  already  marched 


1688]  The  League  and  the  War  of  Augsburg.  259 


into  the  Electorate  of  Cologne  without  causing  any 
special  disquietude  to  Holland  or  paralysing  the 
efforts  of  William.  There  is  no  doubt  that  it  would 
have  been  far  better  for  the  French  cause  had 
William’s  landing  in  England  been  prevented.  But 
Louis’  reasons  for  deciding  to  attack  Philippsburg 
have  not  been  fully  appreciated  by  writers  who  speak 
of  his  great  blunder  in  marching  to  the  Middle  Rhine. 
Louis’  principal  object  at  this  time  was  to  convert 
the  truce  of  Ratisbon  into  a  solid  and  definite  peace. 
By  seizing  Philippsburg,  the  main  doorway  from 
Germany  into  France,  he  hoped  to  bring  his  enemies 
to  treat,  and  he  at  once  offered  to  restore  it  and 
Freiburg  if  they  would  agree  to  his  terms. 

Moreover  his  relations  with  the  English  Court  had 
in  the  summer  of  1688  become  strained.  To  prevent 
the  landing  of  William  in  England,  Louis  had  pro¬ 
posed  a  junction  of  the  English  and  French  fleets 
and  had  this  taken  place  William’s  plans  would  for 
a  time  have  been  frustrated.  But  the  English  minis¬ 
ters  thought  that  William  would  be  hampered  by 
diflicultles  with  the  States-General,  and  they  feared 
the  effect  of  the  junction  of  the  fleets  upon  Eng¬ 
lish  public  opinion.  James  and  the  Court  too 
were  indignant  at  Louis’  attitude  and  the  tone  of 
the  declaration  made  early  in  September.  It  was 
thought  that  he  assumed  the  air  of  a  protector  and 
imagined  that  England  could  not  defend  itself  with¬ 
out  his  aid.  Such  patronising  manners  on  the  part 
of  Louis  at  once  roused  James’  pride.  He  assured 
the  Dutch  envoy  that  no  alliance  existed  between 
England  and  France,  and  that  he  intended  to  pursue 


Louis  XIV. 


[1688 


260 


a  policy  of  neutrality  ;  shortly  afterwards  he  offered 
the  States  General  a  treaty  which  had  for  its  object 
the  maintainance  of  the  peace  of  Nimeguen  and  the 
truce  of  Ratisbon.  The  foreign  policy  of  England 
was  no  longer  in  harmony  with  the  aims  of  the  French 
Court,  and  as  James  determined  further  to  conciliate 
the  Episcopalian  party  the  English  alliance  seemed 
for  the  time  lost  to  Louis. 

Villars,  describing  the  opinion  held  at  Versailles, 
gives  us  some  very  valuable  information  ;  “  The 

Court  hesitated  as  to  what  should  be  its  policy, 
whether  it  should  give  aid  to  King  James  about  to 
be  attacked,  or  should  prevent  the  peace  with  the 
Turks,  which  was  being  made,  and  which  would 
bring  upon  us  the  whole  forces  of  the  Emperor  and 
Empire.  M.  de  Louvois,  upon  his  return  from 
Forges,  where  he  had  been  taking  the  waters  for 
some  days,  decided  to  take  the  second  course.  In 
effect  nothing  was  more  important  for  us  than  to 
secure  so  powerful  a  diversion  in  our  favour  as  that 
of  the  Turks.  Besides,  what  prospect  was  there  that 
so  great  a  revolution  could  take  place  in  England 
without  much  trouble  and  discord  ?  This  suited 
us  better  than  a  settled  government  under  King 
James;  the  more  so  that  we  had  already  seen  Eng¬ 
land  at  peace  and  under  the  authority  of  King 
Charles  II.,  a  devoted  ally,  compel  that  sovereign  to 
declare  war  against  us.”*  Though  these  views  proved 
erroneous,  still  it  was  always  quite  possible  that  the 
English  feeling  might  have  forced  James  II.  into 


*  Villars  (Marechal  de),  Alemoires :  1672-1734.  Edited  by  the 
Marquis  de  Vogue. 


JAMES  II.  OF  ENGLAND. 

(From  an  iUustr.ation,  based  on  an  old  engraving,  in  Philippson’s 
Vas  Zeitalter  Ludwigs  XIVi) 


16881  The  League  and  the  War  of  A  ugsburg.  261 


measures  prejudicial  to  the  French  interests.  It 
is  easy  to  be  wise  after  the  event,  and  to  say  that 
Louis  ouglit  to  have  spared  no  efforts  to  prevent  the 
Prince  of  Orange  from  landing  in  England,  but  when 
the  circumstances  of  the  time  are  clearly  and  fully 
examined,  and  when  it  is  remembered  that  no  one 
could  anticipate  that  William  III.  would  take  pos¬ 
session  of  England,  as  Charles  VIII.  conquered 
Naples,  with  a  piece  of  chalk,  it  will  be  found  that 
there  is  more  justification  for  the  attack  on  Philips- 
burg  than  some  historians  imagine.  On  October 
2nd  Boufflers  took  Kaiserslautern  ;  on  October  2gth 
the  Dauphin  received  the  submission  of  Philips- 
burg;  in  November  Madame  wrote  “my  troubles 
are  increased  by  hearing  all  those  around  me  dis¬ 
cuss  incessantly  the  preparations  that  are  being 
made  to  burn  and  bombard  the  good  town  of  Man- 
heim,  which  my  father,  the  late  Elector,  built  with 
so  much  care.  It  makes  my  heart  bleed,  yet  they 
are  angry  at  my  grief  .  .  .  now  the  King  is 

sole  master  of  the  Palatinate.” 

On  the  very  day  of  the  fall  of  Philipsburg,  Wil¬ 
liam  of  Orange  sailed  for  England,  to  save  Protes¬ 
tantism  and  the  balance  of  powder  in  Europe.  The 
decision  to  attack  the  Palatinate  was,  as  it  turned 
out,  an  enormous  blunder.  Had  Louis  elected  to  at¬ 
tack  Holland  or  even  to  make  a  demonstration  in  the 
direction  of  Maestricht,  William  would  have  been 
paralysed  and  the  Revolution  in  England  averted  or 
at  any  rate  postponed. 

The  news  of  the  siege  of  Philippsburg  came  as  a 
great  relief  to  the  Protestant  Princes  of  north  Ger- 


262 


Louis  XIV. 


[1688 


many.  To  them  it  had  been  long  apparent  that  a 
general  struggle  against  the  predominance  of  France 
was  inevitable.  Frederick  William,  the  great  Elec¬ 
tor  of  Brandenburg,  had  hoped  that  on  the  con¬ 
clusion  of  the  Turkish  war,  the  forces  of  united 
Germany  would  invade  France  and  aided  by  disaf¬ 
fection  among  the  French  nobles  would  penetrate 
to  Paris.  On  his  death  his  son  Frederick  III.  con¬ 
tinued  to  advocate  his  father’s  plans.  With  Charles, 
Landgrave  of  Hesse,  he  formed  a  close  alliance  to 
defend  the  whole  course  of  the  Rhine,  which  they 
rightly  thought  was  endangered  by  Louis’  attitude. 
It  was  evident  to  them  as  it  was  to  the  Duke  of 
Celle  and  others  that  the  election  of  Fiirstenburg 
to  the  Electorate  of  Cologne  must  be  prevented  at 
all  cost,  and  that  England  must  be  won  over  to  the 
European  opposition  to  Louis. 

The  invasion  of  the  Palatinate  decided  many 
hesitating  Princes.  The  Elector  of  Saxony  declared 
he  would  carry  the  war  on  the  Middle  Rhine,  the 
Duke  of  Hanover  was  equally  determined  to  come 
to  the  aid  to  the  Empire.  It  only  remained  for 
William  to  succeed  in  his  English  enterprise.  All 
the  events  of  the  last  three  years  had  combined  to 
aid  him.  The  revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes 
had  destroyed  in  great  measure  Louis’  influence  in 
many  of  the  small  German  courts  ;  the  continued 
alliance  of  England  and  France  had  roused  the  fears 
of  every  Protestant  statesman  in  Europe ;  the  affair 
of  the  Cologne  electorate  would,  it  was  believed, 
end  in  the  ruin  of  Germany ;  Louis’  attack  on  the 
Palatinate,  while  it  convinced  William  of  Orange 


16891  The  League  and  theWar  of  Augsburg.  263 


that  the  Anglo-French  alliance  must  at  all  hazards 
be  broken,  relieved  his  anxiety  on  the  score  of  Hol¬ 
land  and  enabled  him  to  set  out  for  England,  sui> 
ported  by  the  good  wishes  of  not  only  the  German 
Protestants  but  of  Pope  Innocent  XI.  and  the  Em¬ 
peror  Leopold. 

By  the  beginning  of  i68g,  Louis’  position  was  far 
from  being  satisfactory.  The  Turks  were  unable  to 
create  any  serious  diversion  in  his  favour;  Denmark 
was  surrounded  by  foes.  Louis  deemed  it  neces¬ 
sary  to  withdraw  from  the  Palatinate.  He  had 
seized  on  the  four  Rhine  Electorates  but  realised 
that  he  could  not  defend  the  whole  breadth  of  the 
annexed  districts.  His  advisers  therefore  hit  upon 
a  ghastly  plan  of  wasting  the  Palatinate.  Accor¬ 
dingly  what  is  known  as  the  Second  Devastation  of 
the  Palatinate  took  place — and  this  meant  the  total 
destruction  of  its  cities,  and  the  ruin  of  its  agricul¬ 
ture,  trade,  and  prosperity,  in  order  that  the  advan¬ 
cing  Germans  might  find  a  desert  between  them  and 
France. 

Madame  was  in  despair  at  the  fate  of  her  beloved 
country.  “  Should  they  kill  me  for  it,”  she  wrote 
on  March  20th,  “  I  cannot  help  bitterly  regretting 
and  deploring  my  share  in  my  country’s  ruin.  I  am 
seized  with  such  a  horror  when  I  think  of  all  that 
has  been  destroyed  that  every  night  I  think  myself 
at  Heidelberg  or  Manheim  in  the  middle  of  the 
desolation.  I  wake  up  with  a  start  and  do  not  go 
to  sleep  again  for  two  hours.  I  think  of  it  all  as  I 
once  knew'  it,  and  as  it  is  now ;  also  the  change  in 
my  own  life,  and  then  I  cannot  prevent  myself 


264 


Louis  XIV. 


[1689 


weeping.”  But  Madame’s  despair  could  not  save 
her  beloved  country.  The  French  soldiers  devasta¬ 
ted  the  Palatinate,  the  town  of  Heidelberg  was 
burnt,  its  magnificent  castle  was  ruined.  The  whole 
country  was  ravaged  ;  cities  and  agriculture  de¬ 
stroyed,  the  Rhine  district  left  in  great  part  a 
desert. 

“  The  ravage  of  the  Palatinate,”  says  Mr.  Lilly, 
“was  one  of  those  crimes  which  arouse  inextinguish¬ 
able  hatred  in  the  breasts  of  a  people  and  leave  to 
future  generations  a  terrible  legacy  of  vengeance.”  ‘ 

The  memory  of  Turenne’s  devastation  in  1674 
was  still  fresh,  and  this  second  wanton  infliction  of 
misery  on  the  inhabitants  of  the  Palatinate  roused 
Germany  and  infused  new  energy  into  the  League. 
The  Diet  declared  war  at  Ratisbon  in  February, 
1689,  and  three  armies  were  at  once  set  on  foot.  This 
second  devastation  of  the  Palatinate  well  marks  the 
end  of  Louis’  culminating  period  of  prosperity, 
which  beginning  with  the  peace  of  Nimeguen,  closes 
with  a  deed  unsurpassed  in  cruelty  and  lawlessness. 
A  thrill  of  horror  ran  through  Europe,  and  the  pa¬ 
triotic  feelings  roused  in  Germany  by  this  last  mani¬ 
festation  of  Louis’  arrogance  may  be  said  to  have 
never  entirely  subsided.  Some  fifty  years  or  so 
later,  when  the  French  at  the  opening  of  the  Aus¬ 
trian  Succession  War  were  proposing  to  intervene 
actively  on  the  side  of  Prussia,  it  was  found  that 
there  was  “  one  point  on  which  all  Germans  were 
agreed  without  distinction  of  the  greater  and  lesser 
states,  of  Protestant  or  Catholic,  one  common  feel- 
’  Chapters  in  European  History  by  W.  S.  Lilly,  vol.  ii.  pp.  84-5. 


1689]  The  League  and  the  War  of  Augsburg.  265 


ing  that  could  impose  silence  on  their  special  dissen¬ 
sions ;  this  was  sullen  and  jealous  irritation  with 
France.”'  The  soldiers  of  France  “little  knew  to 
what  an  undying  hatred  on  the  part  of  Germany 
they  devoted  the  very  name  of  their  country,  when 
they  inscribed  it  in  letters  of  blood  and  fire  on  all 
the  hills  of  the  Palatinate.” 

Some  of  the  most  eminent  of  French  soldiers  like 
Villars  condemned  this  devastation  as  opposed  to 
the  true  science  of  war  and  contrary  to  humanity. 
Villars  himself  tries  to  excuse  Louis  on  the  ground 
that  Louvois  over-persuaded  him.  “  The  King,”  he 
says,  “  whose  merciful  nature  was  never  really  un¬ 
derstood,  had  been  over-persuaded  that  the  safety 
of  the  State  depended  upon  creating  a  desert 
between  our  frontier  and  the  enemy’s  armies.” 
And  he  continues  in  still  stronger  language,  “  This 
pernicious  policy  had  been  carried  so  far  that  sowing 
had  been  forbidden  upon  a  space  of  four  leagues  on 
either  bank  of  the  Meuse.  It  is  still  unknown  by 
what  fatality  these  atrocious  orders  were  made. 
The  Marquis  of  Louvois,  a  man  of  great  intelligence, 
did  not  oppose  them,  and  persuaded  the  King, 
whose  kind  nature,  nevertheless,  I  repeat,  was  un¬ 
doubted.”  But  though  it  may  be  allowed  that 
Louis  was  naturally  kind-hearted  and  was  perhaps 
over-persuaded  by  Louvois,  the  fact  remains  that 
the  French  had  not  very  long  before  laid  waste  the 

'  For  an  interesting  account  of  the  effect  of  this  devastation  of  the 
Palatinate  upon  the  attitude  of  the  German  people  towards  France, 
see  the  Duke  de  Broglie’s,  Frederick  the  Great  and  Maria  Theresa, 
vol.  i. 


266 


Lo7tis  XIV. 


[1689 


Piedmontese  valleys,  and  that  a  little  later  they 
proposed  to  destroy  Dublin  in  order  to  save  Ire¬ 
land.  It  would  seem  that  the  plan  of  devastating 
the  Palatinate  was  quite  in  harmony  with  their  meth¬ 
ods  of  making  war. 

It  would  have  been  well  for  Louis  if  he  had  never 
sent  a  French  soldier  into  the  Palatinate.  In  the 
first  place  the  French  failed  in  their  aim  and  the 
devastation  was  useless,  for  the  Germans,  more 
united  than  ever  before,  took  Mainz  and  Bonn.  Be¬ 
sides,  by  invading  the  Electorate,  instead  of  making 
a  movement  in  a  more  northerly  direction,  he  had 
Nsnabled  his  great  rival,  William  of  Orange,  to  act  as 
he  wished  and  sail  for  England.  That  the  Revolu¬ 
tion  of  1688  occurred  when  it  did  is  due  to  Louis’ 
excusable  though  fatal  blunder,  due  to  his  desire  to 
increase  the  glory  of  his  house.  The  whole  course 
of  European  politics  was  changed  by  William’s 
rapid  action,  which  was  alone  rendered  possible  by 
Louis’  great  mistake.  Then,  again,  the  devastation 
of  the  Palatinate  was  another  fatal  blunder.  Just 
as  the  invasion  had  ended  his  connexion  with  the 
English  Court,  so  the  devastation  destroyed  his  last 
hold  upon  Germany. 

The  new  war  in  which  Louis  found  himself  in 
1689,  marks  an  epoch  in  the  history  of  France. 
The  decline  of  the  monarchy  begins.  The  Revolu¬ 
tion  of  1688  inaugurates  in  England  a  period  of 
constitutional  government,  of  commercial  prosper¬ 
ity,  of  colonial  expansion.  The  success  of  William 
III.  represents  the  victory  of  constitutional  over 
divine  right.  With  the  opening  of  the  war  of  the 


1689]  The  League  and  the  War  of  A  ugsburg.  267 


League  of  Augsburg,  “  The  Age  of  Louis  XIV.” 
may  be  said  to  be  over,  just  as  the  Tudor  period 
may  be  said  to  end  with  the  defeat  of  the  Spanish 
Armada.  The  year  1588  was  a  turning  point  in  the 
history  of  constitutional  government  and  commer¬ 
cial  progress  in  England  ;  it  also  disclosed  to  the 
world  the  real  weakness  of  Spain  and  indicated  her 
rapid  decline. 

The  year  1688,  again  bringing  with  it  the  accession 
of  William  III.  to  the  English  throne,  marks  an  im¬ 
portant  epoch  in  the  constitutional  development 
of  England.  It  does  more,  for  it  sees  a  revolution 
in  her  foreign  policy.  England  comes  into  line  with 
the  members  of  the  League  of  Augsburg,  and  in 
doing  so  gives  a  new  force  to  the  general  European 
opposition  to  Louis  XIV.  The  year  1688,  too, 
marks  the  time  when  the  true  character  of  the 
French  monarchy  stands  revealed  before  an  indig¬ 
nant  Europe.  This  revolt  of  Europe  against  the 
violent  acts  of  the  French  monarchy  had  been  gath¬ 
ering  force  and  volume  during  the  last  ten  years, 
and  was  not  to  be  appeased  till  the  treaty  of  Utrecht 
had  lowered  the  pretensions  of  France  and  allayed 
the  apprehensions  of  all  the  Teutonic  peoples.  From 
1688  England  and  Holland  definitely  united  against 
the  aggressive  Catholic  monarchy  of  Louis  XIV. 
The  revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes,  and  the  ac¬ 
cession  of  James  IL,  had  brought  home  to  Dutch 
statesmen  the  danger  from  France,  and  their  own 
helplessness  without  the  alliance  of  England.  That 
Holland  would  lose  much  of  her  independence 
by  becoming  the  satellite  of  England  was  foreseen 


268 


Louis  XIV. 


[1689 


by  many  Dutchmen;  but  in  1688^ — 9  the  Republic 
of  the  Netherlands  had  no  other  course  but  to  co¬ 
operate  with  William  III.  From  1688,  too,  a  new 
period  in  the  rivalry  of  England  and  France  begins. 
From  the  Norman  Conquest  to  the  reign  of  Eliza¬ 
beth,  hostility  between  the  two  countries  was  re¬ 
garded  as  part  of  the  political  creed  of  each. 
Elizabeth  and  the  Stuarts,  however,  found  that  a 
French  alliance  was  more  suited  to  the  circum¬ 
stances  of  the  time,  and  even  Cromwell  very  wisely 
preferred  to  ally  with  Mazarin,  than  to  suspend  for  a 
day  the  commercial  expansion  of  England  at  the 
expense  of  Spain. 

Had  the  latter  Stuarts  acted  towards  Louis  XIV. 
with  the  caution  and  firmness  showed  by  Cromwell 
in  his  dealings  with  Mazarin,  the  preponderance  of 
France  in  Europe  would  not  have  been  dangerous  and 
the  Revolution  of  1688  might  not  have  been  neces¬ 
sary.  But  Charles  II.  and  his  brother  systematically 
shut  their  eyes  to  the  needs  of  the  English  nation, 
and  persistently  ignored  not  only  the  general  interests 
of  Europe  but  those  of  England  in  order  to  further 
their  own  personal  aims.  As  the  whole  tendency  of 
Louis’  policy  became  apparent,  the  deep-seated  antag¬ 
onism,  religious,  commercial,  and  political,  between 
the  two  countries  asserted  itself.  Nothing  short  of 
the  Revolution,  which  destroyed  the  hopes  of  the 
Catholics  and  reversed  the  foreign  policy  of  Charles 
II.  and  his  brother,  could  possibly  have  restored  the 
balance  of  power  in  Europe.  From  1688  England 
plunged  into  a  contest  at  once  political,  commercial, 
colonial,  and  religious  with  her  ancient  enemy 


1689]  The  League  and  the  War  of  Augsburg.  269 


France, — political  in  that  she  was  opposed  to  the 
restoration  of  James  II.,  to  the  enslavement  or 
weakening  of  Germany,  and  to  the  extension  of 
the  north-east  frontier  of  France, — commercial  and 
colonial,  for,  apart  from  the  fact  that  English 
and  French  interests  clashed  in  the  Mediterranean, 
France  held  Canada  and  that  famous  scheme 
for  building  a  line  of  forts  from  the  Mississippi  to 
the  Canadian  Lakes  to  prevent  the  Anglo-Saxon 
from  developing  and  spreading  his  colonies  west¬ 
wards  had  already  been  produced, — religious,  for  it 
was  the  fixed  belief  of  Englishmen  till  the  peace 
of  Utrecht  that  Louis  intended  to  forcibly  convert 
Great  Britain  to  Roman  Catholicism.  But  English¬ 
men  need  not  have  been  so  apprehensive  of  an  in¬ 
crease  in  Louis’  aggressive  jaolicy,  for  the  decadence 
of  France  dates  from  1688. 

This  decadence  is  nowhere  so  visible  as  in  the 
change  in  the  character  of  the  art  of  war.  No  doubt 
owing  to  Vauban,  a  great  improvement  showed  itself 
in  the  attack  and  defence  of  strong  places,  but  though 
the  armies  had  increased  in  size,  the  art  of  war  had 
distinctly  declined.  There  was  no  scientific  com¬ 
mander  like  Turenne,  and  though  many  brilliant 
victories  were  won,  they  were  not  followed  up  by 
decisive  results.  Luxemburg  was  the  most  capable 
general,  but  his  admirable  qualities  were  marred  by 
indolence  and  ill  health.  William  III.,  Louis  of 
Baden,  Catinat,  and  Villeroy  were  poor  substitutes 
for  Gustavus  Adolphus,  Wallenstein,  Turenne,  and 
the  great  Conde.  Signs  of  decadence  were  equally 
visible  in  the  administration.  On  the  death  of  the 


270 


Louis  XIV. 


[1689 


able  Seignelay  in  1690,  the  incompetent  Pontchartrain 
was  appointed  Minister  of  the  Marine,  and  Louvois, 
who  died  the  following  year,  was  succeeded  by 
Barb^zieux,  young  and  also  incapable.  Louis  as 
ever  had  no  conception  of  the  value  of  the  work 
done  by  his  capable  ministers.  “  Tell  the  King  of 
England,”  he  said  the  day  after  Louvois’  death, 
“  that  I  have  lost  a  good  minister,  but  that  his 
affairs  and  mine  will  go  none  the  worse  for  that.” 
But  though  the  value  of  Louvois’  work  might 
not  be  appreciated  by  his  master,  the  debt  France 
owes  to  him  is  immense.  The  position  of  Louis 
XIV.  had  never  been  so  threatening  to  the  indepen¬ 
dence  of  Europe  as  it  was  at  the  time  of  William’s 
landing  in  England,  and  had  the  expectations  of  the 
French  Court  been  realised  and  a  long  internecine 
struggle  taken  place,  the  conflict  between  France 
and  Europe  might  have  ended  in  one  more  signal 
triumph  for  the  French  King,  which  would  have 
been  in  great  measure  the  result  of  Louvois’  work 
of  organisation. 

As  soon  as  William  III.  became  master  of  Eng¬ 
land  and  Scotland,  the  policy  of  Louis  was  at  once 
plain.  The  accession  of  William  was  a  blow  struck 
at  the  principles  to  which  he  attached  the  most 
vital  importance.  The  theory  of  the  Divine  Right 
of  Kings  had  been  rudely  attacked  and  the  connec¬ 
tion  between  Catholic  and  dynastic  ideas  contempt¬ 
uously  ignored. 

To  Louis’  Minister  of  the  Marine,  Seignelay,  the 
Revolution  presented  itself  in  a  different  but  no  less 
forcible  manner.  He  had  determined  to  secure  for 


LOUVOIS. 

(From  an  old  portrait  reproduced  in  Philippson’s 
Das  Zeitalter  Ludwigs  XII'',) 


\ 

I 


i 


1689]  The  League  and  the  War  of  Augsburg.  2  7 1 


the  French  the  sovereignty  of  the  Mediterranean,  and 
to  gain  access  to  the  East  Indies  through  Turkey. 
The  Dutch  power  was  the  principal  obstacle  to 
the  realisation  of  these  schemes.  But  when  in  con¬ 
sequence  of  the  Revolution,  England  and  Holland 
became  closely  allied,  Seignelay  recognised  that  a 
most  serious  change  in  the  aspect  of  affairs  had  oc¬ 
curred.  The  measures  taken  by  King  and  Minister 
were  characteristic  of  the  special  aims  of  both.  The 
royal  exiles  were  received  with  great  magnanimity. 
James’  Queen — the  daughter  of  a  niece  of  Mazarin, 
whose  marriage  with  James  had  been  brought  about 
by  Louis — was  conducted  from  Boulogne  by  an 
equerry  and  received  near  Versailles  by  Louis  him¬ 
self,  accompanied  by  his  whole  court.  It  is  said 
that  a  hundred  and  six  coaches  were  there.  There 
is  no  doubt  that  great  importance  was  attached  to 
securing  the  person  of  James’  son,  the  heir  to  the 
crown,  and  Louis  greeted  him  first.  In  his  own 
coach  he  conducted  Queen  Mary  Beatrice  to  Saint- 
Germain.  James  11.  arrived  later  but  did  not  act 
with  the  dignity  which  his  wife  had  shown.  Louis 
regarded  himself  as  the  principal  supporter  of 
Catholic  and  dynastic  ideas  in  the  world,  he  felt 
bound  to  support  James,  and  was  thus  disposed  to 
give  Seignelay  and  Louvois  full  powers. 

As  a  war  with  England  was  inevitable,  all  the 
military  authorities  agreed  that  a  diversion  in  Ire¬ 
land  would  be  invaluable.  The  forces  of  England 
and  Holland  would  be  drawn  off  there,  and  Ireland 
would  in  the  first  stages  of  the  war  prove  of  the  ut¬ 
most  service  in  preventing  William  from  acting  vig- 


272 


Lotiis  XIV. 


[1690 


orously  in  any  other  quarter,  and  eventually  would 
serve  as  a  basis  for  a  more  serious  undertaking 
against  England. 

In  March,  1690,  a  corps  consisting  of  six  regi¬ 
ments,  6300  men  under  Count  Lauzan  and  several 
officers,  and  supported  by  a  fine  train  of  artillery 
and  abundant  stores  of  ammunition,  was  sent  to  Ire¬ 
land.  The  Count  of  Avaux  with  a  large  sum  of 
money  had  been  in  Ireland  for  some  months  as 
diplomatic  representative  of  the  French  govern¬ 
ment.  He  was  a  man  of  considerable  acuteness,  but 
lacked  the  power  of  conciliation  and  took  up  a  posi¬ 
tion  of  hostility  to  all  Protestants  in  Ireland. 

Both  James  and  Louis  hoped  to  pacify  Ireland 
and  to  give  the  country  a  government  under  which 
Protestants  could  exist.  But  the  anti-English  views 
of  the  Catholic  Irish  were  too  strong  for  them  and 
helped  to  bring  about  the  chaos  which  followed  the 
arrival  of  James  in  the  country. 

To  Seignelay  it  was  of  the  utmost  importance 
that  James  II.  should  be  maintained  in  Ireland. 
Cork  and  Kinsale  he  regarded  as  French  ports. 
Tourville  was  made  Commander-in-chief  of  the 
united  French  fleet,  and  was  ordered  to  seek  out 
the  English  ships  in  their  harbours,  to  inflict  as  much 
damage  as  possible  and  then  to  station  himself  off 
the  mouth  of  the  Thames  to  prevent  communica¬ 
tion  between  the  Dutch  and  English,  and  to  destroy 
the  trade  between  England  and  the  North. 

The  success  of  James  II.  was  therefore  all-impor¬ 
tant  for  the  military,  naval,  and  commercial  undertak¬ 
ings  of  the  French  government.  But  William  HI. 


1690]  The  League  and  the  War  of  Aug sbiirg.  2  73 


was  equally  conscious  of  the  absolute  necessity  on 
the  one  hand  of  a  loyal,  or  at  any  rate,  of  an  Ireland 
powerless  for  harm,  and  on  the  other  of  the  com¬ 
mand  of  the  Channel.  The  way  in  which  he  grap¬ 
pled  with  the  combined  forces  of  France  and  of 
Catholic  Ireland  and  the  orders  given  to  the  English 
Admiral  showed  that  he  was  well  aware  of  the  peril 
to  which  England  was  exposed  from  her  Celtic  de¬ 
pendency,  and  from  the  French  fleet,  when  com¬ 
manded  by  Tourville  and  directed  by  Seignelay. 

No  sooner  had  the  latter  heard  of  the  existence 
of  discontent  in  England  and  Scotland  and  of  Wil¬ 
liam’s  departure  for  Ireland  than  he  pressed  Tour¬ 
ville  to  attack  the  English  fleet  before  William  had 
done  anything  decisive  in  Ireland. 

The  English  government  fully  realised  the  im¬ 
mense  importance  of  preventing  France  from  ac¬ 
quiring  the  preponderance  on  the  sea.  Though  the 
condition  of  the  English  fleet  was  bad,  it  was  neces¬ 
sary  to  attack  Tourville  at  once,  even  at  the  risk  of 
a  defeat.'  Unassailed  he  could  throw  men  and  arms 
into  Scotland  and  could  capture  English  merchant¬ 
men  returning  from  Cadiz.  England  could  not  even 
in  those  days  afford  to  allow  a  foreign  and  hostile 
fleet  to  ride  unmolested  in  the  channel.  Precise  or¬ 
ders  were  sent  to  Admiral  Torrington  to  unite  with 
the  Dutch  fleet,  and  to  attack  Tourville  wherever 
he  could  be  found.  Through  Torrington  leaving 
the  Dutch  unsupported  the  French  won  a  naval 
battle  off  Peachy  Head  on  July  lOth,  and  though 
severely  damaged,  Tourville’s  fleet  was  still  able  to 
keep  the  sea.  The  contest  for  the  supremacy  of  the 

18 


Louis  XIV. 


[1691 


274 

Channel  remained  for  the  moment  undecided  but  the 
schemes  of  Louis  in  Ireland  had  already  suffered  an 
irreparable  blow. 

James  had  left  France  early  in  1689.  “The  best 
thing,”  said  Louis,  on  wishing  him  farewell,  “  that  I 
can  wish  for  you  is  that  I  may  never  see  you  again.” 
But  the  principles  which  were  defended  by  the 
greatest  monarchy  of  the  age  were  not  destined 
to  take  root  in  Ireland.  The  political  and  religious 
controversy  which  was  being  fought  out  in  Europe 
was  to  be  decided  in  Ireland  in  a  sense  hostile  to  the 
wishes  and  ideas  of  Louis  XIV. 

The  battle  of  the  Boyne  took  place  on  July  ist, 
and  proved  decisive.  James  11.  returned  at  once  to 
France,  and  all  chance  of  using  Ireland  as  a  centre 
for  French  expeditions  against  England  passed  away. 
Cork  and  Kinsale  instantly  capitulated,  and  thus  the 
whole  south  coast  of  Ireland  was  lost  to  the  Catho¬ 
lic  cause.  During  the  short  and  last  struggle  of  the 
Irish  in  the  west  under  Sarsfield,  Louis  supplied 
ammunition,  provisions,  and  money,  and  St.  Ruth,  a 
French  general,  aided  by  other  French  officers,  en¬ 
deavoured  to  unite  and  organise  the  Irish  resistance. 
But  St.  Ruth  was  killed  on  July  12,  1691,  and 
though  the  Irish,  led  by  one  of  St.  Ruth’s  officers. 
General  D’Urson,  at  first  made  a  good  stand  in  Lim¬ 
erick,  they  gradually  realised  that  they  could  not 
expect  any  efficient  help  from  France.  The  capitu¬ 
lation  of  Limerick  placed  Ireland  under  Protestant 
ascendancy,  and  gave  Louis  valuable  reinforcements 
in  the  shape  of  12,000  Irish  soldiers,  who  were 
formed  into  regiments,  and  well  sustained  the  cause 
of  France  in  many  a  battle-field. 


1691]  The  League  and  the  War  of  Aug sbtirg.  275 


After  the  battle  of  the  Boyne  the  antagonism  be¬ 
tween  the  united  and  energetic  Catholic  monarchy 
presided  over  by  Louis,  and  the  Protestant  Germanic 
kingdoms  of  which  England  was  the  chief,  became 
more  distinct  and  more  clearly  defined  than  ever. 

It  was  evident  that  while  on  the  one  hand,  in  the 
great  European  struggle,  England  held  a  leading 
position,  on  the  other,  resistance  to  Louis  was  not 
only  an  English  but  also  a  European  necessity.' 

Ireland  being  no  longer  a  possible  theatre  of  war, 
the  European  contest  was  narrowed  to  the  war 
on  the  continent  and  to  a  long-continued  struggle 
between  the  French  and  English  fleets  for  the  su¬ 
premacy  of  the  sea  and  more  particularly  for  the 
command  of  the  Channel.  This  rivalry  between  the 
English  and  French  fleets  is  the  novel  feature  in 
what  is  always  regarded  as  a  dreary  list  of  sieges  and 
battles.  The  success  of  the  French  fleet  at  Beachy 
Head  had  roused  to  a  high  pitch  the  English  national 
feeling  against  France,  whose  preponderance  at  sea 
was  at  that  moment  undoubted.  In  the  Parliament 
of  1691  it  was  openly  stated  that  England’s  power 
rests  upon  her  fleet  alone,  and  efforts  were  made  to 
strengthen  and  render  the  navy  thoroughly  efficient. 
The  French  realised  with  equal  clearness  the  impor¬ 
tance  to  them  of  the  mastery  at  sea. 

Louis  and  his  ministers  saw  that  the  object  for 
which  the  war  was  being  waged,  viz.,  the  retention  of 
the  reunited  districts,  would  never  be  gained  by  a  war 
conducted  on  the  mainland  alone.  If  Holland  and 
England  were  boldly  attacked  by  sea  and  forced  to 


'  On  England’s  relations  with  the  Continent  see  Ranke.  History  of 
England  principally  in  the  Seventeenth  Century.  (Trans.).  Vol.  v. 


Louis  XIV. 


[1692- 


276 


come  to  terms,  the  Empire  would  be  compelled  to 
agree  to  make  a  peace  recognising  the  acquisition 
by  France  of  the  districts  given  to  her  for  twenty 
years  at  the  truce  of  Ratisbon.  Chamlay’s  assertion 
with  reference  to  England  that  “  the  Romans  can 
only  be  conquered  at  Rome  ”  found  ready  accept¬ 
ance  at  the  French  Court.  The  Dutch  fleet  had 
forced  the  peace  of  Breda  from  the  English,  why 
should  not  the  French  fleet  do  likewise?  The  dis¬ 
content  with  William’s  rule  was  general  in  1691. 
Not  only  Catholics  and  High  Churchmen  but  men 
who  had  taken  a  leading  part  in  the  Revolution  like 
Marlborough  and  Russell  were  intriguing  with 
James  II.  The  Princess  Anne  had  quarrelled  with 
William,  and  James  had  gathered  round  him  a  large 
body  of  supporters,  who  held  constant  communica¬ 
tion  with  his  supporters  in  England.  Louis  himself 
had  caused  enquiries  to  be  made  as  to  the  true  state 
of  political  feeling  among  Englishmen.  In  Decem¬ 
ber,  1691,  he  asked  James  what  success  was  likely  to 
attend  an  expedition  to  England ;  the  latter  replied 
full  of  hope.  Louis  himself  convinced,  and  count¬ 
ing  on  the  jealousy  of  the  English  and  Dutch  and 
on  the  defection  of  Russell,  the  admiral  of  the  fleet, 
decided  that  England  should  be  invaded  in  May  of 
the  following  year.  But  the  English  Government 
were  not  so  unprepared  as  it  was  thought,  and  Russell 
did  not  neglect  his  duty. 

On  May  19,  1692,  the  battle  of  La  Hogue  de¬ 
stroyed  for  the  time  all  Louis’  hopes  of  carrying  out 
nis  policy  by  forcing  England  to  make  peace.  But 
the  English  supremacy  of  the  sea  was  by  no  means 


1696]  The  Lcagtie  and  the  War  of  Aug skirg.  277 


assured,  though  La  Hogue  is  certainly  an  important 
epoch  in  the  history  of  England’s  navy,  and  in  1693 
Tourville  managed  to  capture  sixty-two  English 
merchantmen  in  spite  of  the  proximity  of  a  division 
of  the  English  fleet  under  George  Rooke.  For  up¬ 
ward  of  a  hundred  years  the  French  navy  was  gov¬ 
erned  by  the  regulations  drawn  up  by  Seignelay 
while  the  value  of  the  merchant  service  in  time  of 
war  continued  from  his  time  to  receive  numerous 
illustrations. 

Though  a  serious  blow  had  been  inflicted  on 
Louis’  hopes  and  on  James’  chances  of  regaining  his 
crown  by  the  battle  of  La  Hogue,  neither  Louis  nor 
James  regarded  their  chances  of  success  in  a  future 
invasion  as  hopeless.  By  Louis’  advice  James — 
unlike  his  son  in  the  later  times — agreed  to  accept 
very  stringent  conditions  from  the  English  royalists 
as  the  price  of  his  return.  In  1696,  perhaps  in  con¬ 
sequence  of  the  unsatisfactory  results  of  the  cam¬ 
paign  just  ended  in  the  Netherlands,  Louis  again 
determined  to  support  an  expedition  against  Eng¬ 
land.  To  ensure  success  it  was  absolutely  necessary 
that  France  should  be  supreme  in  the  Channel  if 
only  for  two  or  three  days,  and  it  seemed  possible 
that  this  might  be  done  early  in  the  year.  But 
though  Louis  was  willing  to  consider  a  project  for 
landing  in  England,  he  insisted  that  James’  adher¬ 
ents  in  England  should  seize  a  harbour  and  defend 
it  till  the  arrival  of  the  French  fleet.  As  soon  as — 
and  not  before — a  harbour  had  been  seized  the 
French  fleet  would  sail.  But  James’  supporters 
refused  to  move  till  the  arrival  of  the  hrench  fleet, 


278 


Louis  XIV. 


t1692- 


and  so  the  enterprise  was  wrecked  before  any  at¬ 
tempt  had  been  made  to  carry  it  out,  through  the 
lukewarmness  of  James’  adherents  and  the  caution 
if  not  sagacity  of  the  French  king.  Later  in  the  year 
Louis  was  ready  to  take  advantage  of  the  famous  plot 
to  assassinate  William  though  he  refused  to  be  in  any 
way  connected  with  it.  James  11.  hastened  to  Calais 
where  the  French  fleet  lay  prepared.  The  plot  was 
discovered,  James  returned  to  Saint-Germain  and  the 
French  ministers  countermanded  their  preparations. 

Thus  the  attempts  of  Louis  to  secure  his  ends  by 
obtaining  the  mastery  of  the  sea  and  by  invading 
England  had  by  1696  entirely  failed.  Similarly  on 
the  Continent,  though  his  troops  had  won  several 
battles,  there  was  small  hope  that  Germany  would 
consent  to  the  permanent  loss  of  the  reunited  dis¬ 
tricts.  The  war  was  waged  on  an  immense  scale,  and 
assumed  far  greater  dimensions  than  had  ever  been 
seen  before. 

Though  France  had  to  defend  herself  by  sea  and 
also  on  the  side  of  the  Pyrenees,  the  principal  thea¬ 
tres  of  the  war  were  Italy,  the  Rhine,  and  the  Low 
Countries.  The  capture  of  Mainz  in  1689  had  indi¬ 
cated  to  the  King  and  to  Louvois  the  serious  nature 
of  the  struggle  which  was  coming;  and  the  mode  of 
carrying  on  the  land  war  which  was  arranged  with 
consummate  skill  showed  a  full  appreciation  of  the 
gravity  of  the  position.  “  Louis  XIV.,”  says  von 
Ranke,  “  arranged  France  as  if  she  had  been  a  huge 
fortress  in  the  heart  of  Europe,  as  a  base  of  opera¬ 
tions  and  a  reserve,  if  the  state  of  affairs  made  it 
desirable  for  him  to  take  the  offensive  in  any  direc- 


1696]  The  Leagtie  and  the  War  of  A  ugshirg.  2  79 


tion,  and  at  the  same  time  as  a  refuge  for  the  defen¬ 
sive,  in  case  the  foes  she  stirred  up  might  either 
drive  her  in,  or  even  in  their  turn  invade  her.” 

In  Italy  Catinat  was  fairly  successful.  William 
III.  had  hoped  to  effect  a  serious  diversion  by  means 
of  Savoy,  who  bitterly  resented  the  occupation  of 
Pinerolo  and  Casale  by  French  garrisons.  If  the 
Duke  joined  the  Allies,  it  might  be  possible  to  effect 
the  re-establishment  of  the  Piedmontese  Waldenses 
in  their  native  valleys,  and  their  possible  employment, 
together  with  the  Protestants  of  southern  France 
against  Louis.  Similar  schemes  were  projected  dur¬ 
ing  the  Spanish  Succession  war  and  by  Alberoni 
during  the  Regency  of  Louis  XV. 

Louis  XIV.,  fully  alive  to  the  seriousness  of  the 
crisis,  at  once  summoned  Victor  Amadeus  to  give  up 
Verona  and  the  citadel  of  Turin.  The  Duke  imme¬ 
diately  allied  himself  with  Austria  and  Spain,  re¬ 
stored  the  Waldenses  to  their  valleys,  welcomed 
a  body  of  French  Huguenots,  and  determined  to 
regain  Pinerolo  and  Casale. 

But  in  August,  1690,  Catinat  won  a  brilliant  vic¬ 
tory  at  Staffarda  over  Victor  Amadeus,  and  Savoy 
and  Nice  and  the  greater  part  of  Piedmont  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  French.  During  the  next  year, 
however,  in  conjunction  with  an  English  plan  of  in¬ 
vading  France  from  the  north,  a  fine  army  under 
Victor  Amadeus  and  Prince  Eugene  invaded  Dau- 
phine  and  threatened  Casale  and  Pinerolo.  The  ill¬ 
ness  of  Victor  necessitated  a  retreat,  and  Catinat 
defeated  the  enemy  in  October,  1693,  at  Marsaglia 
and  overran  all  Piedmont. 


28o 


Louis  XIV. 


[1690- 


On  the  Rhine  after  the  opening  campaign  in  1689, 
the  war  was  mainly  defensive.  The  Empire  aided 
by  Russia  and  Poland  was  still  engaged  in  the  Holy 
war  with  the  Turks,  and  though  the  subjugation  of 
Hungary  by  Austria  had  deprived  Louis  of  a  useful 
ally,  as  long  as  the  war  continued  the  Empire  could 
not  employ  against  Louis  its  full  strength.  The 
campaigns  on  the  Rhine,  so  fully  described  by  Saint- 
Simon,  are  most  uninteresting.  Lorges,  who  com¬ 
manded  the  French  troops,  was  devoid  of  military 
ability,  and  the  long  encampments,  together  with 
the  marchings  and  countermarches  varied  by  a  few 
skirmishes  are  quite  unimportant. 

But  it  was  in  the  Low  Countries  that  Louis  took 
the  greatest  personal  interest,  and  there  the  cam¬ 
paigns,  if  not  very  interesting,  are  at  any  rate  of  some 
importance.  In  July,  1690,  Luxemburg  had  won  a 
victory  over  the  Prince  of  Waldeck  at  Fleurus,  but 
this  success  was  not  vigorously  followed  up,  and 
Louis  declared  he  would  have  no  more  battles  but 
would  act  on  the  defensive  and  capture  towns  in  the 
manner  of  former  days.  As  usual  the  arrangements 
made  for  the  army  were  excellent,  and  great  atten¬ 
tion  was  bestowed  on  the  commissariat.  Early  in 
the  spring,  Mons,  a  town  which  in  French  hands 
would  be  of  enormous  military  importance,  was  be¬ 
sieged.  It  fell  on  April  8th.  Louis  was  present  at 
its  capture  and  returned  in  triumph  to  Versailles. 
He  had  indeed  cause  for  satisfaction.  Though  his 
intervention  in  Ireland  had  failed,  the  French  power 
was  preponderant  on  the  sea,  and  seemed  likely  was 
gaining  ground  in  the  Netherlands. 


1696]  The  League  and  the  War  of  Augsburg.  28 1 


The  League  against  him  had  so  far  shown  no  signs 
of  extraordinary  activity.  It  was  weakened  by  the 
Turkish  war,  by  the  continued  opposition  of  the 
Irish  and  Scottish  Jacobites,  by  the  defeat  at  Staf- 
farda.  But  the  French  cause  suffered  a  heavy  loss 
when  Louvois  died  in  1691,  for  his  successor  Barbe- 
zieux  was  young  and  inexperienced.  Very  char¬ 
acteristically  Louis  made  himself  practically  War 
Minister,  and  took  upon  his  own  shoulders  the  main 
burden  of  the  struggle  against  Europe. 

In  1692  Louis  left  Versailles.  Early  in  May  he 
held  a  great  review  of  his  troops,  and  at  the  end 
of  the  month  he  appeared  before  Namur.  With 
Vauban  he  arranged  the  plan  of  attack  with  the 
utmost  energy  and  care.  “It  is,”  he  writes,  “the 
strongest  rampart  not  only  of  Brabant,  but  of  the 
Bishoprick  of  Liege,  of  the  United  Provinces,  and 
of  a  portion  of  Lower  Germany.  Besides  securing 
the  communications  of  all  these  districts,  its  situa¬ 
tion  at  the  confluence  of  the  Sambre  and  the  Meuse 
makes  it  mistress  of  these  two  rivers  ;  it  is  splendidly 
placed,  either  to  arrest  the  action  of  France,  or  to 
facilitate  the  forward  movements  o’f  her  enemies.” 
He  had  the  satisfaction  of  seeing  its  capture  at  the 
end  of  June. 

Again  the  French  lost  a  grand  opportunity  by  not 
following  up  their  success.  Just  as  Luxemburg 
should  have  energetically  pursued  Waldeck’s  forces 
after  Fleurus,  so  now  had  Louis  been  a  real  warrior 
of  even  the  type  of  Frederick  the  Great  he  could 
have  driven  William  III.  into  Holland.  But,  as  the 
Dutch  war  of  1672  had  amply  proved,  Louis  was  not 


282 


Louis  XIV. 


[1696 


a  real  soldier.  He  had  no  taste  for  field  warfare. 
He  had  taken  one  of  the  strongest  fortresses  in  Eu¬ 
rope,  and  he  held  its  capture  to  be  his  most  brilliant 
military  exploit.  His  personal  glory  was,  he  consid¬ 
ered,  much  enhanced  by  the  deed,  and  he  returned 
in  a  triumphant  manner  to  Paris. 

The  next  year,  1693,  saw  the  last  appearance  of 
Louis  in  person  with  his  armies  in  the  field.  In  June 
he  had  hoped  to  take  Lifege  and  compel  the  Dutch 
to  make  peace.  William  HI.,  however,  was  very 
strongly  posted,  and  now  as  at  Bouchain  Louis 
declined  to  give  battle  and  returned  to  Versailles. 
Luxemburg  might  again  defeat  William  HI.  at  Neer- 
winden,  but  it  was  impossible  for  the  French  to 
break  the  power  of  the  League.  The  years  1694 
and  1695  are  uninteresting  in  the  annals  of  the  war. 
Though  Noailles  invaded  Spain  with  some  success 
in  the  former  year,  and  though  in  1695  the  Rhine 
provinces  were  again  ravaged,  it  was  quite  useless 
for  the  French  to  hope  to  gain  their  ends.  Luxem¬ 
burg  died  early  in  1695,  and  in  September  of  the 
same  year  William  HI.  retook  Namur.  Though 
the  war  languished  on  all  sides,  there  still  seemed  no 
hope  of  peace,  till  the  defection  of  the  Duke  of 
Savoy,  attesting  again  Louis’  diplomatic  skill  and 
the  untrustworthiness  of  Victor  Amadeus,  brought 
to  an  issue  the  question  of  peace  or  no  peace. 

At  all  hazards  Louis  was  determined  to  break 
,the  unity  of  the  League  formed  against  him.  By 
promising  Victor,  Casale,  and  Pinerolo,  and  all 
■S^oy,  and  by  affiancing  his  daughter  to  the  Duke 
of  Burgundy,  Louis  gained  over  the  Duke  and 


1697]  The  League  and  theWar  of  Augsburg.  283 


detached  him  from  the  cause  of  the  Allies  in  1696. 
This  defection  of  Savoy  seriously  affected  the 
League.  Louis  could  now  throw  30,000  troops  into 
the  Netherlands  under  Catinat,  and  the  war  would 
be  indefinitely  prolonged.  William  III.  had  long 
desired  peace  on  the  basis  of  the  terms  of  the  treaties 
of  Westphalia  and  of  the  Pyrenees,  but  the  defection 
of  Savoy  seemed  to  render  such  an  arrangement 
impossible.  No  sooner,  however,  had  Louis  shown 
an  unexpected  readiness  to  discuss  terms  of  peace, 
than  negotiations  began  between  France  and  Eng¬ 
land  under  the  mediation  of  Sweden.  So  moderate 
were  Louis’  demands,  that  when  the  Congress  of 
Ryswick  opened  in  May,  1697,  little  difficulty  was 
experienced  in  settling  the  terms  so  far  as  England 
was  concerned  when  once  Louis  had  agreed  to  recog¬ 
nise  William  as  King  of  England.  In  September, 
the  first  of  the  treaties  which  formed  the  peace  of 
Ryswick  was  signed  with  England,  Holland,  and 
Spain.  Louis  recognised  William  as  King  of  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland  and  promised  not  to  abet  any 
plots  against  him.  He  ceded  all  places  taken  or 
claimed  since  1678,  even  Luxemburg,  the  most 
prized  of  all  his  conquests  in  the  late  war,  and  agreed 
to  the  garrisoning  of  certain  strong  places  in  the 
Spanish  Netherlands  by  the  Dutch,  such  as  Ypres, 
Menin,  Namur,  which  now  received  the  name  of  the 
Barrier.  The  Dutch,  moreover,  obtained  an  advan¬ 
tageous  treaty  of  commerce,  and  the  policy  pursued 
by  Colbert  toward  the  United  Provinces  was  entirely 
reversed.  William  HI.  had  some  difficulty  in  per¬ 
suading  the  Germans  to  make  peace.  But  at  last 


284 


Loiiis  XIV. 


[1697 


they  consented  very  reluctantly,  and  the  second 
treaty  was  made  in  October  between  France  and  the 
Emperor  and  Empire.  Louis  ceded  all  places  taken 
since  1678  except  Landau  and  Strasburg,  which  to 
the  great  grief  and  rage  of  the  Germans  he  insisted 
on  keeping.  He  consented  to  withdraw  from  the 
right  bank  of  the  Rhine,  but  though  he  gave  up 
Philipsburg,  Breisach,  and  Freiburg,  he  at  once 
ordered  Vauban  to  furnish  plans  for  the  buildings 
and  fortifications  of  a  new  Breisach  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  river.  Louis  further  restored  Lorraine,  which 
he  had  occupied  for  sixty  years,  to  its  young  Duke, 
though  Saarlouis  remained  in  French  hands.  An 
arrangement  was  come  to  about  Cologne  and  the 
Palatinate,  Louis  accepting  a  sum  of  money  in  lieu 
of  the  claims  of  “  Madame  ”  on  the  latter,  and  fore¬ 
going  his  support  of  a  candidate  to  the  electorate  of 
the  former. 

He  undoubtedly  expected  that  one  result  of  the 
pacification  of  Ryswick  would  be  that  many  of  the 
German  Princes  would  return  to  their  old  connection 
with  France. 

This  expectation  is  very  noticeable  in  Louis’  in¬ 
structions  to  Villars  as  ambassador  at  Vienna  in  1698. 
Louis  apparently  thought  that  the  German  Princes 
would  view  with  distrust  if  not  alarm  the  increase  of 
the  Imperial  power,  so  successful  in  Hungary  and 
Translyvania  and  in  the  war  against  the  Turks.  By 
his  conduct  between  1678  and  1688,  Louis  had 
destroyed  the  political  edifice  built  by  his  predeces¬ 
sors.  He  now  hoped  in  vain  to  repair  the  damage 
which  he  had  done  to  one  of  the  most  valuable  of 


1697]  The  League  and  the  War  of  Atigsburg.  285 


the  traditions  of  French  foreign  policy.  But  the 
clause  in  the  treaty  of  Ryswick  which  stipulated 
that  the  religion  of  the  provinces  restored  by  Louis 
should  remain  as  it  was  at  the  time  of  their  restitu¬ 
tion  had  exasperated  the  Protestant  party  in  Ger¬ 
many,  and  nullified  the  effects  of  any  fear  on  their 
part  of  the  possible  absolutism  of  Leopold. 

The  peace  of  Ryswick  was  but  a  truce  in  the  great 
struggle  against  the  preponderance  of  Louis  XIV. 
On  the  most  pressing  question  of  the  day — the 
Spanish  Succession — not  a  word  was  said.  Thus 
left  unsolved,  the  Spanish  question  was  bound  to 
appear  shortly  on  the  surface  and  to  tax  the  skill  of 
all  European  statesmen. 

But  though  Louis’  hope  of  German  alliances  was 
not  to  be  fulfilled,  and  though  he  had  given  up 
Luxemburg  and  retired  from  Barcelona,  his  diplo¬ 
macy  had  again  stood  him  in  good  stead.  The 
great  League  was  broken  up  and  would  not  easily 
be  reunited.  Lorraine,  though  nominally  indepen¬ 
dent,  was  within  his  grasp,  and  his  position  on  the 
north-east  was  still  menacing.  In  spite  of  William 
\lll.’s  pledge  to  the  Emperor,  he  had  kept  Strasburg 
and  Alsace.  Moreover,  he  had  in  no  way  imperilled 
his  claims  to  the  Spanish  Succession,  and  was  in  a 
better  and  stronger  position  than  any  other  Euro¬ 
pean  power  to  consider  that  question  whenever  it 
became  necessary. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

VERSAILLES  AND  THE  PROVINCES. 
1678-1700. 

ROM  the  conclusion  of  the 
peace  of  Nimeguen  to  the 
opening  of  the  war  of  the 
League  of  Augsburg  is  rightly 
regarded  as  the  period  when 
Louis’  greatness  reached  its 
height.  His  reign  had  so  far 
been  remarkably  successful ; 
his  wars  had  been  uniformly 
brilliant.  The  territories  of 
France  had  been  considerably  augmented  and  her 
influence  in  Europe  was  predominant.  The  French 
language  was  used  in  German  Courts  and  each  petty 
German  princeling  emulated  Louis  XIV.  and  built 
himself  a  Versailles.  “  Louis,”  says  Dean  Kitchin,* 
“  stood  at  the  topmost  pinnacle  of  his  glory  ;  to  see 

*  Kitchin.  History  of  France,  vol.  iii.,  p.  211. 

286 


1678-1700]  Versailles  and  the  Provinces. 


287 


how  far  adulation  could  go,  one  must  turn  to  Bayle’s 
Thoughts  on  the  Comet  of  1680,  a  treatise  which  for 
base  and  shameless  flattery  stands  unrivalled  ;  or  we 
must  read  the  obsequious  historiographer  Pellisson, 
who  called  his  master  ‘  a  visible  miracle  or  watch 
La  Feuillade’s  mad  adoration  of  the  statue  he  had 
erected  to  his  king  on  the  Place  des  Victoires  at 
Paris.  Thrice  he  rode  round  it  at  the  head  of  his 
regiment  of  guards,  with  all  those  protestations 
which  in  old  times  the  pagans  used  before  the 
statues  of  their  Emperors.  Nor  was  this  merely  the 
extravagance  of  eccentric  courtiers ;  it  entered  into 
all  things.  The  pencil  of  Lebrun  has  left  on  the 
walls  of  Versailles  the  splendid  apotheosis  of  the 
monarch  ;  his  court  poets  composed  hymns  in  his 
glory  ;  it  is  recorded  that  Louis,  even  hummed  his 
own  praises  with  tears  in  his  eyes.”  But  Bossuet’s 
adulation  of  Louis  XIV.  in  1685,  on  the  occasion  of 
the  death  of  Le  Tellier  and  a  few  days  after  the  fatal 
revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes  had  been  signed, 
is  perhaps  unequalled  in  servility  and  inaccuracy  : 
“Our  fathers  never  saw,  as  we  have,  an  inveterate 
heresy  fall  at  a  stroke ;  the  deluded  flocks  returning 
in  crowds,  and  our  churches  too  small  to  receive 
them ;  their  false  pastors  abandoning  them  without 
even  waiting  to  be  ordered  off,  glad  to  pretend  that 
they  were  banished  ;  perfect  calmness  maintained  in 
the  midst  of  so  vast  a  movement ;  the  world  amazed 
at  perceiving  in  so  novel  an  event  the  most  decisive 
as  well  as  the  noblest  exercise  of  authority,  and  the 
merits  of  the  sovereign  more  recognised  and  revered 
than  even  his  authority.  Touched  by  so  many  mar- 


288 


Lotiis  XIV. 


[1678- 


vels,  let  our  hearts  overflow  to  the  piety  of  Louis. 
Let  us  raise  our  acclamations  to  the  skies — to  this 
new  Constantine,  this  new  Theodosius,  this  new 
Marcian,  this  new  Charlemagne.” 

No  opposition  existed  to  Louis’  rule.  The  States- 
General  had  not  been  called  since  1614,  and  after 
the  Fronde  the  Parleinent  of  Paris  had  no  power. 
In  1673,  Louis,  by  his  famous  edict,  had  dealt  a 
final  blow  at  its  influence  by  decreeing  that  hence¬ 
forth  its  courts  should  no  longer  be  called  sovereign, 
but  only  supreme,  and  that  no  remonstrances  could 
;  made  until  the  royal  edicts  had  been  registered. 


It  would  seem  as  if  this  period  in  Louis’  reign 
marked  the  apotheosis  of  the  French  nobility.  The 
gilded  saloons  of  Versailles  were  filled  with  magnifi¬ 
cently  dressed  nobles,  many  of  whom  had  performed 
brilliant  feats  of  arms  in  the  wars  and  who  now 
crowded  to  do  homage  to  their  great  king.  But  in 
reality  the  French  nobility  were  already  ruined. 
Their  excessive  luxury,  their  enormous  expenses, 
their  enforced  absenteeism  from  their  estates  aided, 
and  indeed  marked,  the  triumph  of  the  monarchy 
over  the  aristocracy.  The  measures  of  Louis  and 
Louvois  which  had  destroyed  the  influence  of  the 
nobility  in  the  country  and  in  the  army  had  com¬ 
pleted  the  subservience  and  practical  overthrow  of 
the  great  baronial  class.  On  Louis’  accession  the 
had  considerable  authority.  Richelieu  had 
devoted  the  years  of  his  ministry  to  render  the  no¬ 
bility  submissive  to  the  crown,  and  to  check  their 
almost  independent  power  in  the  provinces  which 
they  governed.  His  death  had  given  the  signal  for 


VERSAILLES. 

(From  an  illustration  in  Philippson’s  Das  Zeitalter  Ludwigs  Xn'.-) 


1700] 


Versailles  and  the  Provinces. 


289 


a  last  great  revolt  against  the  new  governmental 
system,  and  it  was  not  till  the  death  of  Mazarin 
that  the  traditions  of  the  great  nobles  were  finally 
laid  by  and  their  place  taken  by  a  political  theory 
which  till  1789  dominated  France.  The  decline  of 
the  independent  authority  of  the  nobles  was  accom¬ 
panied  by  an  increased  desire  on  their  part  to  secure 
dignities  and  privileges.  They  became  over-anx¬ 
ious  about  questions  of  rank  and  precedence.  They 
vied  with  the  King  in  scrupulousness  about  points 
of  etiquette.  This  tendency  had  been  clearly  seen 
during  the  second  Fronde  and  marked  the  last  strug¬ 
gles  of  the  decaying  nobility.  But  one  character¬ 
istic  which  was  common  to  the  great  French  lords 
at  all  periods  of  their  history,  and  which  in  the 
end  caused  their  fall  was  that  they  never  possessed 
the  hearts  of  the  people  to  any  great  extent.  In 
spite  of  isolated  instances  to  the  contrary,  the  French 
nobles  as  a  class  always  showed  themselves  singu¬ 
larly  indifferent  to  the  prosperity  as  well  as  to  the 
sufferings  of  the  mass  of  the  nation.  The  estab¬ 
lishment  of  the  absolute  power  of  Louis  XIV.  was 
in  itself  a  striking  proof  of  the  lack  of  sympathy 
between  noble  and  peasant.  In  the  seventeenth 
century  the  nobles,  in  consequence  of  the  neglect  of 
their  duties  towards  their  dependents,  found  them¬ 
selves  helpless  before  the  advancing  wave  of  des¬ 
potism  ;  in  the  eighteenth  century,  from  the  same 
cause,  they  were  mere  political  ciphers  when  the 
Revolution  came  to  sweep  them  awa)^  ^ 

Louis  attacked  the  nobles  in  various  ways.  He 

legitimised  his  illegitimate  children,  and  he  largely 
19 


290 


Louis  XIV. 


[1678- 


increased  the  number  of  the  offices  by  holding  which 
a  man  could  become  ennobled.  The  nobles  were  no 
longer  employed  in  the  royal  councils  ;  they  had 
already  ceased  to  have  any  power  in  the  provinces. 
By  attracting  them  to  Versailles  and  by  encouraging 
them  to  prefer  an  idle  life  dependent  on  pensions 
and  privileges  to  existence  at  their  chateaux  in  the 
country,  Louis  had  finally  destroyed  their  last  chance 
of  ever  offering  any  effective  resistance  to  the  growth 
of  the  monarchy. 

Independent  then  of  all  restraints,  free  from  all 
possible  opposition,  the  monarchy  had  become  the 
sole  authority.  The  royal  power  had  done  great 
things  for  civilization,  and  the  French  had  come  to 
expect  everything  from  the  monarchy.  In  France 
it  was  absolute  and  centralised.  Louis’  ministers 
chosen  from  the  middle-class  families  were  entirely 
dependent  on  himself,  and  the  chief  offices  were 
kept  in  ministerial  families,  such  as  those  of  Colbert 
and  Le  Tellier.  Louis  himself  remained  as  indefatiga¬ 
ble  a  worker  as  ever.  In  spite  of  the  flattery  and 
adoration  with  which  he  was  surrounded  his  power 
of  work  was  still  enormous,  and  what  was  more  im¬ 
portant  it  was  regular  and  continuous.  “  Nothing,” 
he  said  himself,  “  is  more  dangerous  than  a  king  who 
generally  sleeps  but  wakes  up  from  time  to  time.” 
And  so  though  festivities  might  follow  one  another 
in  rapid  succession,  and  though  wars  might  rage, 
the  work  of  the  governmental  machine  never  ceased, 
and  Louis,  when  he  was  not  with  the  army,  never 
failed  to  preside  over  its  multifarious  duties.  Un¬ 
der  him  and  in  close  connection  with  him  worked 


1700] 


Versailles  and  the  Provinces. 


291 


the  four  Secretaries  of  State.  The  Chancellor  and 
Controller-General  were  not  necessarily  Secretaries 
of  State,  though  sometimes  the  Controller-General,  as 
in  the  case  of  Colbert,  was  also  Secretary  of  State. 
The  business  of  the  country  was  transacted  as  in 
Spain  by  means  of  Councils.  But  while  in  Spain 
the  government  was  hampered  by  the  mutual 
jealousies  and  inertness  of  its  members,  in  France 
the  Councils  worked  harmoniously  and  energet¬ 
ically. 

The  Conseil  d'Etat  exercised  supreme  control  over 
all  functions  of  government  and  was  at  once  execu¬ 
tive,  legislative,  and  judicial.  It  was  divided  into 
six  subordinate  departments  or  Councils  : — The  Con¬ 
seil  die  Roi  071  d'en  haut,  which  consisted  of  three, 
four,  or  five  members,  all  of  whom  were  selected  by 
Louis  usually  from  the  legal  class.  Important  matters 
of  internal  or  foreign  policy  were  managed  by  it  alone. 
Then  came  the  Co7iseil des  Dcpechcs,\v\\\ch.  dealt  with 
matters  relating  to  the  Interior  and  in  which  the 
Royal  Councillors  and  the  Secretaries  of  State  met 
to  transact  business  ;  the  Coi7seil  des  Fina77ces,  which 
was  supposed  to  supervise  the  Controller-General  who 
was  Minister  of  Finance,  the  Interior,  Trade,  Public 
Works,  and  Agriculture;  the  Co77seil  des  Parties  or 
Conseil  priv^,  which  was  a  sort  of  Court  of  Appeal ; 
the  Conseil  de  la  G7tcrre ;  which  had  no  regular 
occupation  during  time  of  peace;  and  the  Co)7seil 
d7i  Co7/77/7ercc,  which  was  not  definitely  organised 
till  1700.  Gradually  the  Controller-General  with  his 
32  intendants  absorbed  into  his  own  hands  the  whole 
internal  administration  and  managed  all  affairs  in  his 


292 


Louis  XIV. 


[1678- 


own  house,  and  after  the  King’s  death  the  growth  of 
this  close  bureaucracy  became  an  unmitigated  evil. 
During  Louis’  reign,  however,  the  constant  presence 
of  the  King  formed  a  connecting  link  between  the 
four  Secretaries  of  State  and  gave  a  unity  to  the 
general  policy.  But  before  the  end  of  the  seven¬ 
teenth  century  the  evil  effects  of  this  exaggerated 
centralisation  had  already  become  obvious  to  many 
of  the  more  enlightened  intendants.* 

Though  the  system  of  Louis  XIV.  did  not  break 
down  under  the  enormous  weight  of  business  which 
it  had  to  carry  during  his  reign,  he  practically  dealt 
a  death-blow  to  the  monarchy  during  these  years  by 
the  completion  of  Versailles.  Though  Louis’  taste  for 
building  was  as  expensive  as  his  taste  for  war,  France 
is  greatly  indebted  to  Louis  for  the  marked  im¬ 
provement  in  Paris  during  his  reign,  for  the  Hotel 
des  Invalides,  for  the  addition  to  the  Louvre,  for  the 
broadening  of  the  streets,  and  for  the  laying  out  of 
parks.  The  Languedoc  canal  and  many  other  works 
carried  out  by  Colbert  also  testified  to  the  interest 
of  the  King  in  buildings  and  improvements. 

But  Versailles  ruined  the  monarchy.  The  im¬ 
mense  works  undertaken  by  Louis  and  carried  out 
by  Levau  and  Mansard  were  begun  in  1661,  but  it 
was  not  till  1682  that  the  residence  of  the  Court  was 
definitely  fixed  there.  Louis  never  cared  for  Paris, 
and  he  wished  to  punish  the  city  for  its  conduct  during 
the  Fronde  troubles.  “  Paris,”  says  Martin,  “I’im- 
portune  et  lui  pese  ;  il  sent  sa  grandeur  h  I’etroit  dans 

*  On  the  subject  of  the  Councils  see  an  appendix  to  A.  de  Boislisle’s 
edition  of  the  Memoirs  of  Saint-Simon. 


1700] 


Versailles  and  the  Provinces. 


293 


cette  cite  reine  qui  ne  precede  pas  de  lui  et  qui  I’en- 
veloppe  dans  sa  gigantesques  bras  ;  il  bait  cette  puis¬ 
sance  populaire  qui  a  humilie  son  enfrance,  et  plus 
d’une  fois  terrasse  ses  predecesseurs.” 

Colbert  again  and  again  had  urged  Louis  to  take 
more  interest  in  the  Louvre  and  to  live  in  Paris. 
“  Pendant  que,”  he  said,  “  que  votre  majestd  a  de- 
pensd  des  tres  grandes  sommes  en  cette  maison,  elle 
a  neglige  le  Louvre,  qui  est  assurernent  le  plus  su- 
perbe  palais  qu’il  y  ait  au  monde,  et  le  plus  digne  de 
la  grandeur  de  votre  majeste.”  But  Colbert  was  not 
listened  to.  Louis  was  resolved  not  only  not  to  live 
in  Paris  but  to  make  himself  a  dwelling  which  should 
be  unique.  Fontainebleau,  Chambord,  and  Saint- 
Germain  owed  their  existence  to  his  predecessors. 
Versailles  and  its  world  were  to  be  his  own  creation. 
“Louis,”  says  Martin,  “  a  fait  ce  qu’il  voulait ;  il  a 
cree  autour  de  lui  un  petit  univers,  ou  il  est  le  seul 
etre  necessaire,  et  presque  le  seul  etre  reel.”  At 
Versailles  all  was  Louis’  work,  all  was  new,  symmet- 
trical,  and  monotonous ;  all  was  vast  and  wanting 
in  taste;  all  was  commonplace  and  dull.  Inside  the 
palace  Louis  was  represented  by  artists  in  peace  and 
in  war  ;  his  triumphs  in  love  and  his  victories  over  his 
foes  were  equally  celebrated  ;  he  was  glorified  alike 
for  his  care  for  the  arts  and  for  his  administration  of 
an  Empire. 

1  The  King  intended  to  impress  the  popular  imagina¬ 
tion  with  the  splendour  of  his  Court,  to  collect  and  oc¬ 
cupy  the  nobility  round  himself,  and  to  form  a  small 
world  complete  in  itself.  The  Court  became  far  too 
large  ;  Versailles  contained,  it  is  said,  some  60,000 


294 


Louis  XIV. 


[1678- 


who  were  mostly  courtiers,  and  of  these  the  palace 
itself  could  house  10,000.  Versailles  cost  the  king¬ 
dom  about  .^"24,000,000,  while  the  loss  of  life  among 
the  soldiers  who  were  j^mployed  to  construct  the 
aqueduct  of  Maintenon  was  frightful.  Immense 
sums  were  also  spent  between  1679  and  1690  on  the 
palace  of  Marly. .^Louis’  habit  was  to  arrive  at  Marly 
on  Wednesday  and  leave  it  on  Saturday,  spending 
Sunday  at  Versailles.  Saint-Simon  has  left  imper¬ 
ishable  descriptions  of  the  life  both  at  Versailles  and 
at  Marly. 

When  at  Versailles  the  King  was  wakened  by  the 
first  valet  de  chambre  at  eight  o’clock,  and  then  be¬ 
gan  the  King’s  Lever"  or  “  Rising,”  which  was  di¬ 
vided  into  three  parts,  each  of  which  was  appropriated 
by  a  particular  class  of  courtiers.  With  the  valet  de 
chambre,  the  doctor,  surgeon,  and  the  King’s  old 
nurse  as  long  as  she  lived,  were  admitted.  At  a 
quarter  past  eight  the  Grand  Chamberlain,  or  in  his 
absence  the  first  gentleman  of  the  bed-chamber,  and 
all  those  who  had  the  privilege  of  “  grand  entry  ” 
were  admitted.  As  a  rule  they  only  remained  a  few 
minutes.  Then  those  who  had  the  “  second  entry  ” 
presented  themselves,  and  a  few  minutes  later  the 
crowd  which  had  remained  outside  were  allowed  to 
enter.  As  soon  as  the  King  was  dressed  he  said  his 
prayers  by  the  side  of  his  bed,  and  then  went  into 
his  private  room  where  he  issued  orders  for  the  day. 
There  he  was  left  alone  for  a  time  with  his  children 
and  people  such  as  Mansard  with  whom  he  wished  to 
speak  on  some  particular  subject.  It  was  at  this  time 
that  he  discussed  his  building  schemes,  and  his  other 


LOUIS  XIV. 'S  BEDROOM  AT  VERSAILLES. 


1700] 


Versailles  and  the  Provinces. 


295 


designs  for  beautifying  Versailles.  Meanwhile  all 
the  Court  waited  in  the  gallery  till  the  King  went  to 
hear  mass.  On  his  way  to  and  from  the  chapel  any 
one  who  wished  could  speak  to  him.  After  mass  a 
council  was  held,  except  on  Thursdays  which  were 
devoted  to  audiences,  and  on  Fridays  which  were 
given  up  to  the- King’s  confessor.  The  King  dined 
at  one  o’clock,  and  was  waited  upon  by  the  first  gen¬ 
tleman  of  the  bed-chamber  or  by  the  Grand  Cham¬ 
berlain  if  he  was  at  Versailles.  All  the  courtiers 
were  allowed  to  be  present,  and  after  dinner  any  one 
of  high  rank  could  have  an  interview  with  the  King 
at  the  door  of  his  room  or  inside  the  room  if  the 
King  bade  him  enter. 

Louis  loved  the  ojDen  air  and  usually  after  dinner 
he  amused  himself  with  hunting  stags,  shooting, 
driving,  or  walking ;  and  each  of  these  amusements 
had  its  own  regulations  and  its  own  etiquette.  After 
taking  exercise  the  King  remained  upwards  of  an 
hour  in  his  own  room  and  then  went  to  see  Madame 
de  Maintenon,  speaking  to  any  one  who  wished  to  do 
so  on  the  Avay.  At  a  quarter  past  ten  he  had  supper 
with  the  Princes  and  Princesses,  the  courtiers  being 
allowed  to  stand  round.  After  supper  the  King  usu¬ 
ally  spent  an  hour  in  his  room  with  his  children,  he 
sitting  in  an  arm-chair.  His  retirement  to  bed  was, 
like  the  “  Rising,”  conducted  with  great  ceremony 
and  was  divided  into  three  parts. 

In  the  evenings  the  King  often  played  cards,  the 
stakes  being  at  times  very  high,  or  listened  to  music; 
sometimes  he  dined  with  Madame  de  Maintenon. 
For  the  courtiers  the  principal  occupation  of  the  day 


296 


Louis  XIV. 


[1678- 


was  to  see  the  King  and  if  possible  to  speak  to  him. 
It  is  impossible  to  describe  the  fatigue,  the  dulness, 
and  the  insipidity  of  the  life  at  Versailles.  The  life  at 
Fontainebleau,  at  the  Grand  Trianon,  and  at  Marly 
was,  however,  in  many  respects  similar  to  that  of 
Versailles. 

Before  he  created  Versailles  and  Marly  Louis  had 
been  very  much  attached  to  Fontainebleau.  There 
he  frequently  had  musical  water-parties  in  the  even¬ 
ings.  It  was  there  that  he  fell  under  the  influence 
of  Marie  Mancini,  it  was  there  that  he  spent  his  hap¬ 
piest  days  with  Louise  de  la  Vallibre,  it  was  there 
that  Madame  de  Maintenon  first  appeared  at  the 
councils.'^  Even  after  the  creation  of  Marly  and 
Versailles,  Louis  went  once  a  year  with  all  his  Court 
to  Fontainebleau.  But  after  the  peace  of  Nimeguen 
Louis  spent  most  of  his  time  which  was  not  given 
up  to  Versailles  in  visits  to  the  Grand  Trianon  or  to 
Marly.  In  1687  he  built  the  palace  of  the  Grand 
Trianon.  It  was  there  that,  according  to  Saint-Si¬ 
mon,  the  famous  window  scene  took  place  between 
Louis  and  Louvois.  Till  1700  Louis  constantly  vis¬ 
ited  the  Grand  Trianon.  It  was  at  the  Grand  Tria¬ 
non  that  on  March  18,  1692,  a  famous  “  appartementl 
an  evening  entertainment  which  began  at  seven 
o’clock  and  ended  at  ten,  was  given  in  honour  of  the 
approaching  marriage  of  the  Duke  of  Maine.  Though 
no  dancing  but  only  music,  and  refreshments  was  al¬ 
lowed  these  “  appartements  ”  were  popular,  for  eti¬ 
quette  was  abolished  and  each  one  did  as  he  pleased. 

*  For  the  life  at  Fontainebleau  see  Lair,  Louise  de  la  VallUre  et  la 
jeunesse  de  Louis  XIV, 


1700]  Versailles  and  the  Provinces.  297 

The  King  as  a  rule  only  appeared  for  a  few  minutes, 
and  previous  to  the  “  appartement  ”  of  1692  had 
not  been  present  at  one  for  some  years.  But  on  this 
occasion  he  stayed  a  long  time  and  presided  at  one 
of  the  supper  tables.  After  1700  Louis  apparently 
wearied  of  the  Grand  Trianon,  and  till  the  end  of 
his  life  devoted  all  his  attention  to  Marly.  There 
his  building  schemes  were  most  costly.  Between 
1679  and  1715  he  must  have  spent  nearly  12,000- 
000  of  francs.  To  Marly,  originally  created  as  a 
resting-place  after  the  fatigues  of  Versailles,  Louis 
became  each  year  more  and  more  attached,  until  at 
last  he  divided  his  time  between  it  and  Versailles. 
When  the  custom  arose  for  the  King  and  Court  to 
go  each  week  to  Marly,  the  great  object  of  every 
courtier  was  “  etre  des  Marlys,”  and  it  was  known 
that  the  best  way  to  please  Louis  was  to  ask  for 
leave  to  accompany  him  on  his  “  voyages  de  Marly.” 
“  Cela  s’appelait  se  presenter  pour  Marly.  Les  hom- 
mes  demandaient  le  meme  jour  le  matin,  en  disant 
au  roi  seulement :  ‘  Sire,  Marly  !  ’  Les  derni^res 
anneees  le  roi  s’en  importuna.  Un  gargon  bleu 
dcrivait  dans  la  galerie  les  noms  de  ceux  qui  deman¬ 
daient  et  qui  y  allaient  se  faire  inscrire.  Pour  les 
dames,  elles  continu^rent  toujours  a  se  presenter.” 

These  exigencies  of  Court  life  were  intolerable  to 
certain  of  the  Princesses.  The  young  Duchess  of 
Maine  absolutely  declined  to  become  a  slave  to 
the  etiquette  of  Versailles  and  Marly,  and  she  was 
rarely  present  at  the  official  evening  parties,  or  took 
part  in  the  “  voyages  en  toilette  de  gala,  et  le 
dinettes  dans  le  carosse  du  roi.”  Moreover  she 


298 


Louis  XIV. 


[1687- 


avoided  moral  conversations  with  Madame  de  Main- 
tenon,  and  gave  up  her  devotional  exercises.  She 
was  an  able  woman  and  determined  not  only  to 
amuse  herself  but  to  become  of  importance  and 
to  secure  for  her  husband,  the  Duke  of  Maine,  a 
recognised  position.  Clagny  had  been  given  the 
Duke  by  his  mother  Madame  de  Montespan,  but 
Clagny  was  too  near  Versailles,  and  the  Maines  lived 
at  Chateney  till  1699,  when  they  bought  Sceaux 
which  Colbert  and  his  son  had  made  one  of  the  most 
beautiful  and  agreeable  houses  near  Paris.  There 
the  Duchess  established  herself,  and  though  she  tried 
to  while  away  the  time  with  her  laborious  amuse¬ 
ments  she  was  nevertheless  bored  to  distraction. 
She  was  more  successful  in  her  other  aims.  While 
she  lived  at  Sceaux  the  Duke  went  frequently 
to  Versailles.  He  followed  Louis  to  Trianon,  to 
Marly,  and  to  Fontainebleau.  He  always  played  the 
part  of  the  affectionate  and  respectful  son,  who  full 
of  admiration  of  the  glorious  majesty  of  the  King, 
was  never  so  happy  as  when  basking  in  the  royal 
presence.  He  was  equally  attentive  to  Madame 
de  Maintenon,  who  repaid  his  attentions  by  using 
her  interest  with  the  King  on  his  behalf.  And 
he  succeeded.  He  gained  places  for  himself  and  his 
children.  He  was  himself  legitimised  and  became 
a  peer  of  France.  After  the  death  of  the  Dukes  of 
Burgundy  and  Berry,  an  edict  of  July  1714,  placed 
him  and  his  brother  the  Count  of  Toulouse  in  the 
succession  to  the  throne.  The  Duchess  of  Maine 
had  indeed  triumphed  at  Sceaux.  But  she  was 
building  upon  sand.  No  sooner  was  Louis  dead 


1700] 


Versailles  and  the  Provinces. 


299 


than  Maine  became,  after  a  short  struggle, 
quantite  neglig^able.  The  Duchess  of  Orleans  was 
as  alive  to  the  dreariness  of  the  Court  life  as  was  the 
Duchess  of  Maine,  but  she  quietly  endured  it.  The 
life  at  Marly  was  indeed  if  possible  duller  than  the 
routine  of  Versailles.  At  Marly  Madame  de  Mainte- 
non  was  the  leading  figure  and  Saint-Simon  has 
fully  described  her  life  there. 

It  was  during  the  years  following  the  peace  of 
Nimeguen  that  Madame  de  Maintenon’s  influence 
became  paramount.*  This  remarkable  woman,  the 
most  influential  woman,  it  has  been  said,'  in  French 
history,  had  great  influence  on  Louis’  character, 
though  probably  her  influence  on  French  policy  has 
been  exaggerated.  “  Her  position,”  says  Madame 
de  S^vign^,  “  is  unique  in  the  world  ;  there  never 
has  been  nor  ever  will  be  again  anything  like  it.” 
The  vivacious  Charlotte  Elizabeth,  Duchess  of 
Orleans,  who  disliked  her,  and  with  Saint-Simon 
regarded  her  as  the  evil  principle  of  French  politics, 
expresses  the  general  views  as  to  her  influence. 
“  All  the  ministers,”  she  writes,  “  have  placed  them¬ 
selves  under  the  heel  of  this  woman.”  f  Madame  de 
Maintenon’s  work  in  life  was,  in  her  own  opinion,  to 
convert  the  King  from  evil  ways.  And  there  is  no 
doubt  that  she  succeeded.  Madame  de  Montespan 
was  given  the  Chateau  of  Clagny,  which  cost  about 

*The  literature  on  the  subject  of  Madame  de  Maintenon  is  enor¬ 
mous.  No  one  who  wishes  to  form  a  just  estimate  of  her  influence 
.should  omit  to  read  :  Madame  de  Alaintenon.  D' aprh  des  Documents 
Authenliques.  A.  Geffroy,  1887. 

fin  the  Life  and  Letters  of  Charlotte  Elizabeth,  Princess  Palatine, 
will  be  found  some  severe  judgments  on  Madame  de  Maintenon. 


300 


Louis  XIV 


[1678- 


^12,000,  and  thither  she  retired.  Madamed  de  Font- 
anges  was  dead,  and  the  life  at  Court  became  gradually 
more  and  more  decorous  if  not  austere.  As  regards 
her  political  influence  it  would  seem  that  whenever  she 
was  asked  for  advice  and  gave  it  she  was  usually  wrong. 
She  blamed  however  the  devastation  of  the  Palatinate, 
and  she  probably  approved  of  the  acceptance  of  the 
Will  of  Charles  II.  of  Spain.  Her  partiality  for  Vill- 
eroi  and  Chamillart,  if,  as  is  always  alleged,  it  had 
anything  to  do  with  their  promotion,  was  decidedly 
injurious  to  the  interests  of  France.  She  certainly 
advised  Louis  on  the  death  of  James  II.  to  acknowl¬ 
edge  the  Pretender;  from  1709  onwards  she  was  in 
favour  of  making  peace  at  any  price.  But  she  only 
really  cared  for  matters  relating  to  the  Church  and  her 
conscience,  and  it  was  in  religious  questions  that  her  in¬ 
fluence  on  the  King  was  most  clearly  seen.  The  year 
after  her  marriage  saw  the  foundation  of  Saint-Cyr  for 
the  education  of  the  poor  daughters  of  the  nobility 
who  had  been  ruined  by  the  exigencies  of  the  military 
service  or  by  other  causes.  Mansard  was  the  architect, 
and  the  building,  which  was  begun  on  May  1st,  1685, 
and  finished  in  July,  1686,  cost  about  ^^56,000.  On 
July  30th,  1683,  the  Queen  had  died  declaring  that 
under  God  she  owed  it  to  Madame  de  Maintenon  that 
after  twenty  years  of  neglect  her  husband  began  to 
treat  her  with  kindness.  Late  in  the  evening  of  Jan¬ 
uary  I2th,  1684,  Madame  de  Maintenon  was  privately 
married  to  Louis  in  the  chapel  of  Versailles  in  the  pres¬ 
ence  of  five  persons,  Pere  la  Chaise  who  said  mass, 
Harlay  the  Archbishop  of  Paris  who  gave  the  benedic¬ 
tion,  Louvois,  Montchevreuil,  who  were  witnesses, 


MADAME  DE  MAINTENON. 


1700]  Versailles  and  the  Provinces.  301 

and  Bontemps,  the  King’s  first  valet  de  chainbre,  who 
prepared  the  altar. 

The  marriage  itself  was  never  openly  acknowl¬ 
edged,  though  in  private  with  the  King’s  family  the 
position  of  Madame  de  Maintenon  was  fully  recog¬ 
nised.  She  was  addressed  as  “  Madame  ”  by  mem¬ 
bers  of  the  Court,  who  always  spoke  of  her  as 
Madame  the  Marquise  de  Maintenon.  She  had  a 
striking  and  pleasant  appearance.  “Her  voice’’ it 
was  said  of  her  at  the  time  of  her  marriage,  “  was 
most  agreeable,  and  her  manner  winning,  she  had  a 
bright  and  open  forehead,  eyes  full  of  fire,  and  the 
carriage  of  her  figure  so  graceful  and  supple  that  it 
eclipsed  the  best  at  Court.  The  first  impression  she 
made  was  imposing,  through  a  veil  of  severity ;  but 
the  cloud  vanished  when  she  spoke,  and  smiled.’’ 

Perhaps  nothing  illustrates  better  the  change  that 
came  over  Louis’  life  in  1683  and  the  kind  of  influ¬ 
ence  which  Madame  de  Maintenon  exerted  over 
him  than  the  history  of  the  foundation  of  Saint-Cyr. 
Louis  was  in  1684  at  the  height  of  his  glory.  He 
had  extended  the  frontiers  of  France,  he  had  con¬ 
quered  Strasburg  and  Casale,  and  had  bombarded 
Genoa  and  Algiers.  He  had  taken  Luxemburg,  and 
threatened  to  annex  the  Low  Countries.  He  was  the 
terror  of  Europe  and  the  admiration  of  his  subjects. 
At  this  culminating  point  of  his  career  and  reign, 
Louis  decided  to  change  his  whole  manner  of  life  and 
henceforth  to  lead  a  sober  if  not  austere  existence. 
Both  Louis  and  Louvois  at  first  hesitated  when  the 
plan  of  Saint-Cyr  was  laid  before  them.  Louvois 
hinted  that  after  the  long  war  the  treasury  was  ex- 


302 


Louis  XIV 


[1678- 


hausted.  “No  queen  of  France,”  said  Louis,  “has 
ever  thought  of  anything  like  this.”  But  Madame 
de  Maintenon  quietly  pleaded  her  cause.  She  re¬ 
minded  Louis  of  his  resolution  to  reform  and  to 
convert  the  whole  of  his  kingdom,  and  pointed  out 
that  such  a  foundation  as  she  desired  would  con¬ 
tribute  directly  towards  the  end  that  he  had  in  view. 
Louis  was  touched  by  her  arguments  and  granted  her 
request. 

No  sooner  was  the  scheme  decided  upon  than 
Louis  took  the  greatest  interest  in  the  welfare  of  the 
new  foundation,  and  there  exist  at  the  present  day 
some  notes  which  he  made  with  his  own  hand  with 
reference  to  the  character  of  the  establishment  of 
Saint-Cyr.  Up  to  this  time  Louis  had  always  been 
opposed  to  monastic  institutions  of  any  kind,  and 
thought  it  was  for  the  benefit  of  his  kingdom  to  re¬ 
duce  the  number  of  priests.  He  now  revised  care¬ 
fully  the  regulations  drawn  up  by  Madame  de 
Maintenon  and  Madame  de  Brinon  (who  was  to 
preside  over  Saint-Cyr),  and  had  several  interviews 
with  thedatter  in  his  own  room  at  Versailles.  The 
interest  which  he  began  to  take  in  Saint-Cyr  must 
have  helped  to  distract  his  mind  from  the  painful 
contemplation  of  the  results  of  the  revocation  of 
the  Edict  of  Nantes  and  may  have  tended  to  allay 
his  anxiety  with  regard  to  the  League  of  Augsburg. 

On  September  7,  1686,  Louis  paid  his  first  visit  to 
Saint-Cyr  on  the  completion  of  the  building.  After 
a  solemn  service  he  entered  the  garden  where  three 
hundred  demoiselles  sang  a  hymn  in  his  honour,  the 
music  being  composed  by  Lulli. 


1700] 


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303 


“  Grand  Dieu,  sauvez  le  Roi  ! 

Grand  Dieu,  vengez  le  Roi  ! 

Vive  le  Roi  ! 

Qu’a  jamais  glorieux 

Louis  victorieux 

Voye  ses  enemis 

Tou jours  soumis. 

Grand  Dieu,  sauvez  le  Roi ! 

Grand  Dieu,  vengez  le  Roi  ! 

Vive  le  Roi  !  ”  * 

At  the  beginning  of  1689  Louis  was  present  at  a 
performance  of  Esther,  and  was  so  delighted  that  he 
came  several  times,  on  each  occasion  bringing  a  num¬ 
ber  of  visitors.  On  the  fourth  representation  a  bril¬ 
liant  company  was  present,  including  James  II.,  the 
dethroned  King  of  England.  But  after  a  representa¬ 
tion  of  Athalie  in  April,  1691,  Madame  de  Mainte- 
non  awoke  to  the  fact  carefully  impressed  upon  her 
by  the  clergy,  that  dramatic  performances  of  this 
sort  were  not  suitable  for  an  institution  such  as 
Saint-Cyr.  With  characteristic  energy  she  revolu¬ 
tionised  the  whole  method  of  life  and  instruction 
in  her  convent.  The  writings  of  F^n^lon,  who 
had  introduced  the  new  mysticism,  were  removed, 
changes  were  made  in  the  management,  and  Ma¬ 
dame  de  Maintenon  herself  began  a  course  of  the 
strictest  possible  supervision  over  the  lives  of  the 
pupils.  She  hoped  indeed  with  Louis  that  Saint- 
Cyr  as  a  school  of  morals  and  piety  would  in  time 
leaven  all  France.  But  on  behalf  of  religion  Ma- 

*  Th.  Lavallee,  Madame  de  Maintenon  et  le  Maison  Royalede  Saint- 
Cyr,  p.  76. 


304 


Louis  XIV. 


[1678- 


dame  de  Maintenon  was  willing  that  greater  works 
should  be  undertaken  than  even  the  building  of 
Saint-Cyr.  She  was  as  anxious  as  Louis  to  bring 
about  unity  in  religious  matters,  and  she  always 
opposed  the  Protestants,  the  Molinists,  and  the 
Jansenists.  Louis  regarded  the  very  existence  of 
Protestants  in  France  as  a  danger  to  his  rule,  and 
he  moreover  desired  to  secure  for  himself  the  glory 
of  effecting  their  conversion.  Madame  de  Mainte¬ 
non  asserts  that  she  pleaded  in  vain  with  the  King 
for  some  mitigation  of  the  proceedings  ;  nevertheless, 
she  held  that  the  forced  conversion  of  the  Hugue¬ 
nots  was  incumbent  upon  a  Christian  monarch.  Her 
influence  was  throughout  on  the  side  of  intolerance. 
She  stirred  up  and  fanned  theological  hatreds ;  her 
religious  animosities  were  most  persistent.  The 
banishment  of  Fenelon  was  a  disgrace  to  the  mon¬ 
archy,  the  attacks  on  the  Protestants  and  the  Jan¬ 
senists  were  most  prejudicial  to  the  nation.  She 
was  intimately  connected  with  all  these  blunders. 
It  was  indeed  very  unlikely  that  Louis  in  1685 
of  all  years  would  allow  himself  to  be  restrained  in 
what  he  considered  to  be  the  final  blow  to  religious 
independence  within  France.  Ever  since  1661  he 
had  shown  uneasiness  at  the  presence  of  the  rival 
authority  of  the  Pope,  and  several  times  he  had 
made  it  clear  that  he  viewed  with  great  dissatis¬ 
faction  the  existence  of  a  power  which  claimed  juris¬ 
diction  over  his  subjects.  In  the  affair,  of  Crdqui  he 
had  won  a  victory  over  the  temporal  power  of  the 
Papacy ;  in  that  of  the  regale  he  attacked  the  Pope 
in  his  spiritual  capacity;  in  1682  he  had  successfully 


1700] 


Versailles  and  the  Provinces. 


305 


asserted  his  claim  to  be  supreme  in  the  Church  as 
well  as  in  the  State. 

The  regale  or  King’s  right  to  receive  the  revenues 
of  vacant  bishoprics  and  to  appoint  to  all  living 
within  the  diocese  during  the  vacancy  was  recog¬ 
nised  all  over  France  except  in  Guienne,  Languedoc, 
Dauphine,  and  Province.  Louis  determined  to  ex¬ 
tend  his  right  over  these  provinces,  and  in  1673  and 
1675  declarations  of  his  right  were  published. 
Nicholas  Pavilion,  Bishop  of  Alet,  and  Caulet, 
Bishop  of  Pamiers,  who  were  Jansenists,  protested 
and  appealed  to  the  Pope  ;  Innocent  XL  took  up 
their  cause,  and  when  the  two  bishops  died  forbade 
Louis  to  put  his  views  into  effect  in  the  diocese  of 
Pamiers. 

But  Louis,  rigidly  orthodox  as  he  was,  breathed 
defiance  at  the  Pope  and  called  the  famous  council 
of  1682  which  under  the  direction  of  Bossuet  laid 
down  four  propositions  : 

(1)  That  the  Pope  has  no  authority  over  the  tem¬ 
poral  power. 

(2)  That  the  spiritual  authority  of  the  Popes 
should  be  regulated  by  General  Councils. 

(3)  That  the  exercise  of  Papal  authority  should 
be  in  accordance  with  the  usages  of  the  Gallican 
Church  ;  and 

(4)  Papal  decisions  in  matters  of  faith  are  not 
valid  till  they  have  received  the  consent  of  the 
Church. 

The  clergy  and  nation  supported  Louis  in  this 
contest  from  patriotic  motives.  They  regarded  the 
Papacy  as  a  foreign  power,  and  it  seemed  likely 


Louis  XIV 


[1678- 


at  one  time  that  Louis  would  play  the  part  of 
Henry  VIII.  and  supported  by  a  coalition  of  the 
bishops  of  the  Court  party,  like  Harlay,  with  the 
bishops  who  held  extreme  Gallican  views,  declared 
the  national  Church  independent.  Thus  did  Louis 
attempt  to  establish  his  supremacy  in  spiritual, 
as  he  had  already  done  in  temporal  matters.  In¬ 
nocent  XL  refused  to  accept  the  decision  of  the 
council  and  the  revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes 
did  not  mollify  him.  He  supported  the  League  of 
Augsburg ;  he  opposed  Louis’  schemes  with  regard 
to  the  Archbishopric  of  Cologne  ;  and  he  desired 
the  success  of  William  of  Orange.  On  his  death 
Madame  de  Maintenon  helped  to  bring  about  an 
understanding  between  Louis  and  Alexander  VIII. 
Though  Madame  de  Maintenon  cannot  be  described 
as  the  author  of  the  revocation  of  the  Edict  of 
Nantes  she  longed  for  the  conversion  of  all  France. 
The  Court,  the  clergy,  and  the  Parlements  were  all 
eager  for  the  extirpation  of  heresy.  Argument, 
bribery,  and  violence  were  the  three  methods  em¬ 
ployed  in  turn.  “  M.  Pelisson,”  wrote  Madame  de 
Maintenon,  “  works  wonders ;  he  may  not  be  so 
^earned  as  M.  Bossuet,  but  he  is  more  persuasive.” 
To  reunite  the  sects  of  the  Catholic  Church  and  to 


\\stamp  out  the  Protestant  schism  was  to  her,  as  it 
was  to  Bossuet,  one  of  the  principal  aims  of  her  life. 
Neither  indeed  can  Louis  be  severely  blamed  for 
attempting  the  conversion  of  the  Protestants.  “  If 
Louis  XIV.  was  mistaken  in  his  policy,  the  mistake 
was  shared  by  all  his  ministers,  by  all  the  great  men 
of  his  age,  and  by  all  the  public  bodies  of  his  king- 


1700] 


Versailles  and  the  Provinces. 


307 


dom.  The  error  was  the  error  of  the  whole  of 
France.”  It  is  impossible  to  overlook  the  extreme 
bitterness  with  which  the  French  Catholics  regarded 
their  Protestant  fellow-subjects.  When  the  Chan¬ 
cellor  Le  Tellier  died  in  1685,  he  thought  he  had 
seen  the  accomplishment  of  his  dearest  wish — the 
religious  unity  of  France. 

Religious  unity,  as  Louis  understood  it,  was  impos¬ 
sible  in  France,  but  his  improved  life  only  increased 
his  determination  to  extirpate  heresy,  and  made  him 
more  intolerant  than  ever  of  any  deviation  from  the 
beaten  track.  Hardly  had  the  Huguenots  been  sup¬ 
pressed  when  his  methodical  mind  received  a  severe 
shock  from  the  appearance  in  France  of  the  religious 
system  known  as  Quietism.  Harlay,  the  profligate 
Archbishop  of  Paris,  took  up  a  very  pronounced  at¬ 
titude  of  hostility  towards  all  who  espoused  these 
mystic  opinions,  and  was  supported  by  the  King. 
Bossuet,  who  had  just  concluded  his  controversies 
with  the  Protestants,  was  himself  involved  in  a  strug¬ 
gle  which  resolved  itself  into  a  duel  between  him  and 
Fenelon,  the  tutor  of  the  Duke  of  Burgundy,  and  in 
1695  the  Archbishop  of  Cambrai.  Fenelon  had  re¬ 
fused  to  agree  to  a  formal  condemnation  of  the  opin¬ 
ions  of  Madame  Guyon  whose  writings  had  attracted 
considerable  attention,  and  had  found  himself  con¬ 
fronted  by  Bossuet.  The  contest  between  the  two 
was  “  a  spectacle  which  for  three  years  engrossed 
the  attention  of  the  whole  of  Europe.”  During  the 
struggle  Fenelon  published  his  Explication  des  Max- 
inics  dcs  Saints  (1697),  a  vindication  of  himself  and 
his  opinions  which  still  further  exasperated  his  ene- 


Louis  XIV. 


[1678- 


308 

mies.  But  closely  connected  with  the  theological 
causes  of  dispute  between  Bossuet  and  Fendlon  were 
probably  certain  political  considerations.  Each  of 
the  men  may  have  hoped  on  the  death  of  Louis  to 
play  the  part  of  a  Mazarin  or  of  a  Richelieu.  Bos¬ 
suet  the  tutor  of  the  Dauphin,  Fen^lon  the  tutor 
of  the  Duke  of  Burgundy,  had  each  good  reason  for 
their  political  ambitions.  From  1695  to  1697  the 
struggle  between  these  two  prelates  raged.  Bossuet, 
a  man  of  action,  disliked  intensely  the  views  of  the 
mystics  and  dreaded  the  effect  of  their  propagation 
in  France. 

From  the  first  Louis,  instigated  by  Madame  de 
Maintenon  and  Bossuet,  had  determined  to  crush 
Fen^lon.  Fdndlon  may  or  may  not  have  hoped  to 
become  the  first  minister  of  the  Duke  of  Burgundy 
whenever  the  latter  became  king,  but  it  is  very 
doubtful  if  Louis’  suspicions  roused  by  the  Max- 
inies  were  justified.  Great  pressure  was  brought  to 
bear  on  Innocent  XII.  and  at  length  Fen^lon’s  views 
were  condemned  at  Rome.  Innocent  had  only  been 
gained  with  difficulty.  The  Jesuits  at  Rome  had 
defended  Fen^lon,  and  it  was  only  when  Louis’ 
complaints  and  remonstrances  grew  into  menaces 
that  the  Pope  yielded  so  far  as  to  condemn  by  a 
brief  of  March  12,  1699,  twenty-three  propositions 
taken  from  the  Maximes  des  Saints,  without,  how¬ 
ever,  declaring  them  heretical  or  sentencing  the 
book  to  the  flames.  This  victory  was,  however, 
sufficient  for  Louis,  F6n6lon  was  banished  from  the 
French  Court,  and  Madame  de  Guyon,  whose  mysti¬ 
cal  writings  had  been  the  origin  of  the  whole  de- 


FENELON. 

(From  an  illustration,  based  on  an  old  print,  in  Philippson’s 
Das  Zeit alter  Ludwigs  Xll'i) 


17001 


Versailles  and  the  Provinces. 


309 


bate,  was  with  the  full  approbation  of  Madame  de 
Maintenon  and  Bossuet  incarcerated  at  Vincennes. 
“No  wrath  like  a  woman’s”  remarked  an  Italian 
prelate  with  reference  to  Madame  de  Maintenon’s 
open  partisanship. 

But  while  Louis  was  creating  Versailles  and 
Trianon,  Marly  and  Saint-Cyr,  while  the  laborious 
amusements  of  Sceaux  were  in  full  progress,  and 
while  he  was  at  an  enormous  sacrifice  securing  an 
appearance  of  religious  unity,  France  was  suffering 
unspeakable  misery.  The  Dutch  war  of  1672  was 
the  first  event  that  upset  Colbert’s  plans  and  calcu¬ 
lations.  The  necessity  of  raising  money  forced  him 
to  adopt  measures  which  he  abhorred.  Loans,  new 
taxes,  the  sale  of  public  offices,  were  expedients 
the  disastrous  nature  of  which  he  was  fully  aware. 
But  he  had  no  other  course  open  to  him.  The 
Dutch  war  cost  more  than  fifty  millions  of  livres, 
and  the  money  had  to  be  found.  After  the  Peace  of 
Nimeguen  Louis  while  proceeding  with  his  Reunion 
policy  never  paused  in  his  magnificent  works  at 
Versailles,  Trianon,  and  Marly,  though  Colbert 
urged  economy  and  described  the  sufferings  of  the 
people.  Le  Peletier,  who  succeeded  Colbert  as  Con¬ 
troller-General — and  who  held  that  office  till  1689, 
was  a  well-meaning  man,  but  he  was  quite  unable  to 
resist  the  extravagant  tastes  of  Louis. 

In  1684  the  weight  of  the  taxes  led  to  riots  in  the 
provinces,  which  reappeared  from  time  to  time 
throughout  Le  Peletier’s  ministry.  The  many  ex¬ 
emptions  from  taxation  rendered  the  lot  of  the 
roUirier  particularly  hard  and  aroused  a  bitter  feel- 


310 


Louis  XIV. 


[1678- 


ing  towards  the  rich,  who  not  unfrequently  paid 
little  or  nothing.  Moreover  the  collection  of  the 
taxes  was  often  accompanied  by  corruption  and 
fraud  and  violence,  and  many  unfortunate  men  were 
thrown  into  horrible  prisons  from  which  they  rarely 
emerged  alive.  But  the  year  1685  was  destined  to 
bring  more  troubles  upon  the  French  nation.  As  if 
existing  exactions  and  the  inequalities  of  taxation 
were  not  sufficient  evils,  the  revocation  of  the  Edict 
of  Nantes  added  fresh  difficulties.  Before  the  end  of 
1685  many  of  the  intendants  recognised  the  import 
of  this  blow  struck  at  commerce  and  industry.  But 
though  Louis  was  aware  of  the  disastrous  effects  of 
his  act  he  actually  contemplated  expelling  the  Jews 
from  France  at  this  crisis.  On  May  6,  1688,  Le 
Peletier  wrote  to  the  intendant  of  the  Generality 
of  Bordeaux :  “  The  King  desires  you  to  examine 

the  design  which  he  has  in  his  mind  of  expelling 
the  Jews  from  the  kingdom.  But  this  step  should 
only  be  taken  after  much  consideration,  lest  the  in¬ 
terest  of  commerce  which  has  already  been  damaged 
by  the  exodus  of  the  Fluguenots  should  fall  into 
utter  ruin.” 

Fortunately  for  France  this  project  was  never 
carried  out.  But  the  disasters  caused  by  the  revoca¬ 
tion  did  not  interrupt  Louis’  building  schemes.  In 
1688  nine  millions  of  livres  had  been  spent  on  the 
gigantic  works  for  bringing  water  from  the  Eure  to 
Versailles,  works  which  were  interrupted  by  the  war 
with  the  League  of  Augsburg  and  were  never  taken  in 
hand  again.  It  was  a  very  difficult  matter  to  raise 
money  for  this  new  war.  An  appeal  was  made  to 


1700] 


Versailles  and  the  Provinces. 


311 


the  large  towns  and  promises  given  that  no  efforts 
would  be  spared  to  bring  about  a  firm,  sure,  and 
lasting  peace.  On  this  assurance  Paris  gave  400,000 
livres,  Toulouse  300,000,  and  other  towns  in 
somewhat  similar  proportions.  The  provinces  were 
also  called  upon  to  provide  additional  troops,  the 
result  being  that  the  number  of  the  French  troops 
was  greater  than  had  ever  been  seen  in  the  service 
of  a  single  country.  Moreover  some  towns  received 
permission  to  borrow,  others  to  repudiate  their 
debts.  Additional  offices  were  created  and  sold  and 
the  public  debt  was  largely  increased. 

Le  Peletier,  not  knowing  how  to  raise  more 
money,  pleaded  ill-health,  retired,  and  was  succeeded 
by  Pontchartrain,  who  became  Controller-General  in 
1689.  He  simply  followed  the  policy  of  his  prede¬ 
cessor  in  an  aggravated  degree.  He  was  obliged, 
says  a  French  historian,  to  have  recourse  to  “  des 
expedients  mesquins  : — Vente  des  lettres  de  noblesse, 
creation  de  charges  inutiles,  enregistrement  des 
armoires.”  No  minister  ever  displayed  so  much 
ingenuity  in  the  creation  of  new  offices,  and  he  be¬ 
queathed  to  France  thousands  of  privileged  func¬ 
tionaries — a  useless  and  most  pernicious  legacy. 

The  misery  of  the  provinces  during  all  these  years 
was  extreme.  In  many  parts  the  peasants  were  re¬ 
duced  to  living  on  boiled  herbs  alone  ;  in  1691  the 
Prince  of  Conde,  Governor  of  Burgundy,  wrote  to 
Pontchartrain  that  in  all  the  villages  which  he  passed 
through  in  a  journey  which  he  had  just  taken  in  Bur¬ 
gundy  he  had  not  seen  a  single  inhabitant  who  had 
not  begged  from  him.  Want  and  destitution  were 


Louis  XIV. 


[1678- 


312 

universal  and  they  gained  ground  steadily.  And  all 
the  while  the  French  armies  were  gaining  brilliant 
victories  at  Staffarda,  at  Fleurus,  and  Neerwinden. 
“  The  people,”  wrote  Villani,  “  perished  of  want  to 
the  sound  of  the  Te  Deum.” 

From  the  year  1692  the  starving  population  be¬ 
came  dangerous.  Desperate  men  demanding  bread 
infested  the  country  and  threatened  all  who  had 
property  or  who  were  known  to  have  money.  The 
forests  became  the  hiding-places  of  bands  of  armed 
and  ferocious  peasants  who  issued  out  only  to  rob 
and  to  kill.  “  France,”  said  F^nelon  in  1693,  “  is  only 
“  a  large  hospital  desolate  and  without  food.”  The 
peace  of  Ryswick  checked  to  some  extent  the  dis¬ 
tress,  and  France  breathed  again.  But  before  she 
had  time  to  recover  her  strength  she  was  plunged 
into  the  Spanish  Succession  war  and  all  the  evils  of 
the  previous  twenty  years  reappeared  with  terrible 
force. 

But  taxation,  absenteeism,  and  centralisation  were 
not  the  only  evils  from  which  the  provinces  suffered. 
Tenant-right  existed  over  Picardy,  the  lie  de  France, 
Vermandois,  Champagne,  and  Artois.  Towards  the 
close  of  the  seventeenth  century  many  nobles  who 
had  been  ruined  by  the  crushing  weight  of  the 
military  service,  or  who  had  exhausted  their  finances 
at  Versailles  and  had  become  impoverished, attempted 
to  raise  their  rents  or  to  sell  their  land.  Then  there 
arose  bitter  opposition  from  the  farmers  and  though 
the  government  sided  with  the  provincial  and  im¬ 
poverished  nobles,  legislation  failed  to  stamp  out 
tenant-right.  In  1679  and  in  1707  and  again  in  1714 


1700] 


Versailles  and  the  Provinces. 


313 


royal  edicts,  such  as  only  a  despotic  government 
could  enforce,  and  increasing  on  each  occasion  in 
severity,  attempted  to  deal  with  this  new  difficulty. 
But  though  the  landlords  were  backed  up  by  all  the 
weapons  of  the  government  of  the  Grand  Si'cclc, 
they  failed  to  assert  their  so-called  rights  against  the 
stern  resistance  of  the  farmer  and  peasant. 

The  contrast  between  the  life  at  Versailles  and  the 
life  in  the  provinces  during  these  years  is  striking. 
Still  more  striking  was  the  continued  devotion  of  the 
French  people  to  the  King.  In  their  misery  the  mass 
of  the  French  lower  orders  accused  the  ministers  and 
their  agents  of  being  responsible  for  their  calamities, 
The  towns  when  making  grants  for  the  war  expenses 
were  moved  as  much  by  patriotism  as  by  fear.  Even 
while  a  foreign  war  was  eating  away  all  their  re¬ 
sources  the  inhabitants  of  a  town  would  willingly 
and  joyfully  raise  statues  and  various  monuments  in 
honour  of  Louis  XIV.  and  his  victories. 

In  1685  statues  were  erected  in  almost  every  part  of 
the  kingdom.  In  1689,  Marseilles  put  up  one  of  Louis 
on  horseback  ;  in  1691  Tours  erected  to  the  glory  of 
Louis  a  triumphal  arch  ;  and  in  1692  the  town  of 
Issoire  in  Auvergne  employed  the  sculptor  James 
Suirot  to  erect  a  statue  of  the  King.  Undoubtedly 
there  existed  throughout  France,  at  any  rate  down 
to  the  Spanish  Succession  war,  a  widespread  admira¬ 
tion  for  and  appreciation  of  the  grandeur  of  Louis’ 
reign.  In  1699,  the  Moorish  envoy,  gazing  at  the 
Seine  from  a  window  in  the  Louvre,  only  expressed 
the  general  feeling  when  he  declared  that  if  those 
waters  were  ink  they  would  not  suffice  to  describe 


314 


Louis  XIV. 


[1678  1700 


adequately  the  grandeur  and  magnificence  of 
Louis  XIV. 

The  French  people  had  desired  military  glory,  and 
Louis’  reign  since  Mazarin’s  death  had  indeed  been 
glorious.  The  King  had  not  only  satisfied  all  the  as¬ 
pirations  of  his  subjects;  he  had  gained  for  his  coun¬ 
try  in  Europe  a  well  earned  prestige  which  it  never 
entirely  lost. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

THE  SPANISH  SUCCESSION  QUESTION. 
1697-1700. 

HERE  are  many  problems  in 
Louis’  long  reign  which  still 
await  solution.  Opinions  are 
even  now  at  variance  as  to  the 
real  motives  which  prompted 
the  King  in  the  full  tide  of 
victory  to  consent  in  1668  to 
the  treaty  of  Aix-la-Chapelle. 

Till  quite  lately  opinions 
have  been  equally  divided  as 
to  Louis’  reasons  for  making  the  peace  of  Ryswick. 
He  knew  there  was  a  strong  party  both  in  Holland 
and  England  in  favour  of  peace,  and  that  it  was  well- 
nigh  impossible  for  William  III.,  in  the  teeth  of  a 
bitter  opposition,  to  carry  on  war  much  longer. 
He  was  fully  aware  that  the  Duke  of  Bavaria  was 
dissatisfied  with  his  alliance  with  the  Emperor.  He 


315 


Lcmis  XIV. 


[1697 


316 

had  just  detached  the  Duke  of  Savoy  from  the 
Coalition  and  he  could  now  in  consequence  expect 
fresh  and  startling  successes  on  the  north-east  fron¬ 
tier.  Spain  was  not  in  a  condition  to  defend  the 
Netherlands,  and  could  not  even  ward  off  attacks  on 
her  northern  frontier.  During  the  war  France  had 
demonstrated  to  Europe  her  enormous  strength. 
Such  immense  armies  had  never  before  been  seen  in 
Europe :  William  III.  himself  declared  that  the 
army  with  which  Conde  won  Senef  would  in  this  last 
war  have  been  a  mere  division.  The  armies  of 
France  were  the  best  in  Europe. 

Being  in  such  a  comparatively  strong  position  it  is 
somewhat  surprising  that  Louis  should  not  only  have 
made  peace,  but  should  have  given  the  allies  such 
advantageous  terms.  As  it  stands,  the  treaty  of 
Ryswick  seemed  a  decided  blow  to  the  pretensions 
of  France.  Her  influence  in  Poland  had  just  received 
a  check  in  the  election  to  that  throne  of  Augustus  of 
Saxony  and  the  defeat  of  the  candidature  of  Cond6. 
She  had  already  retired  from  that  commanding  posi¬ 
tion  in  Italy  which  she  owed  to  the  genius  and  de¬ 
termination  of  Richelieu.  She  had  abrogated  the 
four  articles  of  1682,  had  made  her  peace  with  Rome, 
and  had  restored  Avignon.  But  the  peace  of  Ryswick 
still  further  curtailed  her  powers  and  lessened  her 
prestige.  By  it  she  withdrew  from  her  claim  to  con¬ 
vert  the  truce  of  Ratisbon  into  a  definite  peace  and 
so  to  annex  to  France  the  “  reunited  ”  districts. 

Moreover,  the  policy  with  which  Louis  had  set 
out  in  1661  had  not  been  carried  out.  Though 
France  was  the  first  power  in  Europe  on  land,  she 


1697]  The  Spanish  Stucession  Qtiestion.  317 


had  failed  to  secure  the  command  of  the  sea,  and 
the  Mediterranean  had  not  been  turned  into  a  French 
lake.  Though  Vauban  had  fortified  her  north-east 
frontier,  she  had  not  as  yet  annexed  the  Spanish 
Netherlands  and  she  had  been  forced  to  withdraw 
from  the  Rhine  frontier.  Any  hope  Louis  may  have 
had  of  securing  the  Imperial  dignity  for  himself  or 
for  the  Dauphin  had  by  the  end  of  the  century  com¬ 
pletely  disappeared. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  has  puzzled  historians 
to  explain  Louis’  consent  to  the  peace  of  Ryswick, 
and  the  moderation  of  his  tone  just  when  it  seemed 
that  by  the  continuance  of  the  struggle  for  a  year  or 
two  he  might  have  secured  far  more  favourable  terms. 
Even  in  the  harangue  pronounced  on  February  16, 
1699  at  Versailles,  by  Ben  Aicha,  the  envoy  of 
Muley  Ismael,  Emperor  of  Morocco,  allusion  was 
made  to  Louis’  unheard  of  moderation  in  sacrificing 
his  own  gains  to  the  glory  of  giving  peace  to  so  many 
vanquished  nations. 

The  general  conclusion  now  arrived  at  is  that  just 
as  Louis  in  1668  consented  to  a  treaty  in  the  expec¬ 
tation  of  gaining  the  whole  of  the  Spanish  Nether¬ 
lands  on  the  death  of  Charles  11.  of  Spain,  which  he 
regarded  as  imminent,  so  in  1697110  again  consented 
to  make  peace  in  order  to  have  his  hands  free  when 
the  death  of  Charles  11.  should  take  place.  That 
event  could  not  be  postponed  much  longer,  and 
when  it  should  occur  Louis  was  certain  to  secure  a 
great  addition  of  territory  and  power.  As  long  as 
war  continued  there  was  always  the  possibility  that 
in  accordance  with  the  wish  of  the  Dutch  and  Eng- 


Lotiis  XIV 


[1697 


lish,  the  Archduke  Charles  would  occupy  Catalonia, 
then  full  of  German  troops. 

As  the  Archduke  was  a  candidate  for  the  throne 
of  Spain,  it  would  obviously  be  most  disastrous  to 
French  interests  were  he  in  Spain  when  Charles  II. 
died.  In  the  face  of  so  much  jealousy  of  France  in 
Europe,  it  was  of  vital  importance  to  Louis  that  no 
armed  coalition  should  be  in  existence  when  the 
death  of  the  king  of  Spain  took  place  ;  it  was  equally 
important  he  .should  have  leisure  to  arrange  his 
plans. 

Louis’  diplomacy  and  knowledge  of  foreign  pol¬ 
itics  and  the  inner  history  of  foreign  courts  was 
always  remarkable.  But  while  the  Spanish  Succes¬ 
sion  war  affords  ample  illustrations  of  his  well-rea¬ 
soned  policy,  the  history  of  the  period  between  the 
conclusion  of  the  peace  of  Ryswick  and  the  accept¬ 
ance  of  the  Will  enables  us  best  to  appreciate  the 
very  unusual  sagacity  shown  by  him  in  his  choice  of 
instruments,  his  close  knowledge  and  clear  views  of 
the  questions  at  issue,  and  the  ability  with  which  he 
kept  the  main  object  of  his  policy  in  view. 

Never  was  a  diplomatic  game  played  with  more 
consummate  skill,  and,  as  it  turned  out,  with  more 
success.  Louis’  previous  relations  with  Spain  had  not 
been  such  as  would  inspire  any  confidence  that  the 
Spaniards  would  easily  recognise  in  him  a  friend  and 
an  upholder  of  their  interests.  He  had  injured  them 
in  the  Devolution  war,  and  his  success  against  the 
Dutch  in  the  next  war  would  have  been  followed  by 
the  annexation  of  the  Spanish  Netherlands.  At 
Nimeguen  Spain  was  again  the  principal  sufferer. 


1698]  The  Spanish  Sticcession  Question.  319 


During  the  war,  however,  a  revolution  had  taken  place 
at  Madrid.  The  Queen  Regent,  who  was  a  sister  of 
the  Emperor  Leopold,  was  in  1676  overthrown  by 
the  nobles  and  Don  John,  a  natural  son  of  Philip 
IV.,  was  received  at  Madrid  with  enthusiasm.  He 
was  a  great  admirer  of  Louis  XIV.,  and  as  soon  as 
the  peace  of  Nimeguen  was  made,  he  hastened  to  pro¬ 
pose  to  Louis  that  Charles  II.  should  marry  Louise 
of  Orleans,  one  of  the  royal  nieces.  The  marriage 
was  at  first  popular  in  Spain,  and  Louis  hoped,  if 
Louise  had  no  children,  to  get,  through  her  influence, 
the  right  of  the  Dauphin  to  the  Spanish  Succession 
recognised.  In  any  case  he  trusted  to  form  a  party 
in  Spain  capable  of  sustaining  his  pretensions.  Un¬ 
fortunately,  in  September,  1679,  Don  John  died  be¬ 
fore  Louise  even  arrived.  Another  revolution  took 
place,  and  the  Queen-Mother’s  anti-French  influence 
was  again  paramount.  Louis  did  not  despair,  and 
succeeded  in  forming  the  nucleus  of  a  French  party 
in  Spain,  which  survived  the  war  of  the  League  of 
Augsburg,  and  reappeared  after  the  conclusion  of 
the  peace  of  Ryswick  ready  to  support  the  French 
cause.  In  order  to  increase  and  strengthen  this 
party,  and  to  provide  for  all  contingencies,  Louis 
determined  to  send  Harcourt  to  Madrid.  His  arrival 
there  in  February,  1698,  constitutes  an  epoch  in 
French,  if  not  in  European,  history.  For  it  was 
mainly  due  to  Harcourt’s  skill  that  the  Spaniards 
gradually  contracted  so  great  a  hatred  of  the  Aus¬ 
trians,  that  in  1700  it  seemed  quite  natural  that  the 
Spanish  Empire  should  be  left  to  Louis’  grandson, 
and  that  Louis  should  accept  the  Will. 


320 


Louis  XIV. 


[1698 


In  his  labours  Harcourt  was  aided  by  the  acute 
difference  existing  between  the  views  of  Europe  and 
those  of  every  Spaniard,  whose  one  object  was  to 
prevent  any  partition. 

The  decline  of  Spain  rendering  the  development 
of  France  possible  was  so  obvious,  and  the  Spanish 
Empire  was  so  enormous,  including  the  Spanish 
Netherlands,  Sicily,  Naples,  the  Tuscan  Ports,  Milan, 
and  the  dominions  in  the  New  World,  that  Europe 
was  interested  in  the  Succession  question  and  meant 
to  have  a  voice  in  the  disposal  of  such  vast  and  dis¬ 
connected  territories. 

Two  attempts  had  already  been  made  to  settle 
the  future  government  of  the  Spanish  Empire.  In 
1668,  by  the  Partition  treaty  between  France  and 
Austria,  it  was  settled  that  on  Charles  II. ’s  death 
Louis  should  take  Franche-Comtd,  the  whole  of  Bel¬ 
gium  or  the  Spanish  Netherlands,  and  certain  terri¬ 
tories  in  the  north  of  Spain,  while  the  Emperor 
Leopold  was  to  take  Spain  and  most  of  her  foreign 
possessions.  In  1689  again,  William  III.,  filled  with 
an  exaggerated  fear  of  Louis  XIV. ’s  schemes,  guar¬ 
anteed  to  the  Emperor  Leopold  the  entire  Spanish 
Succession — an  arrangement  marked  by  about  the 
same  amount  of  wisdom  as  was  the  determination  of 
the  Whigs  after  the  death  of  the  Emperor  Joseph  1. 
to  reconstruct  the  empire  of  Charles  V.  for  the 
benefit  of  Charles  VI. 

But  at  the  time  of  the  peace  of  Ryswick  neither 
of  the  above  arrangements  held  good,  and  Europe 
prepared  to  consider  the  whole  subject  de  novo. 
Of  the  three  candidates  for  the  Spanish  Succession 


1697]  The  Spanish  Succession  Question.  321 


the  Dauphin  had  a  good  claim  if  the  renunciations 
of  his  mother  and  grandmother  were  invalid.  Louis 
claimed  the  Spanish  heritage  for  the  Dauphin  as 
the  son  of  Maria  Theresa,  the  eldest  daughter  of 
Philip  IV.,  and  insisted  that  the  renunciations  of 
Maria  Theresa  were  invalid  on  the  following  grounds. 
In  the  first  place  one  of  the  clauses  of  the  marriage 
contract  stated  that  the  renunciation  was  worthless 
unless  the  dowry  of  Maria  Theresa  was  paid  at  the 
time  agreed.  This  dowry  had  never  been  paid. 
Secondly,  Louis  urged  that  neither  the  Cortes  nor 
the  Parlement  of  Paris  had  ever  ratified  the  renun¬ 
ciation,  that  Maria  Theresa  being  a  minor  had  no 
power  to  deprive  herself  of  her  rights,  and  further 
that  it  was  desirable  in  the  interests  of  Spain  that  a 
prince  should  succeed  capable  of  maintaining  the 
unity  of  the  Spanish  Empire.  With  his  large  army, 
his  powerful  fleet,  his  excellent  generals  and  clever 
diplomatists,  it  seemed  that  Louis’  arguments  had  a 
greater  chance  of  success  than  the  claim  of  the  Em¬ 
peror  Leopold. 

Leopold  claimed  by  reason  of  the  right  (i)  of  his 
mother  who  was  a  sister  of  Philip  IV.,  and  (2)  of  his 
first  wife  Margeret  Theresa,  a  younger  daughter  of 
Philip  IV.  Neither  his  mother  nor  wife  had  ever 
signed  a  renunciation.  As  his  daughter  Maria,  mar¬ 
ried  to  the  Elector  of  Bavaria,  had  renounced  her 
claims,  Leopold  regarded  his  position  as  unassailable, 
and  was  willing  to  give  Spain  to  his  son  by  a  second 
marriage,  the  Archduke  Charles.  The  Court  of 
Spain  had  regarded  his  candidature  with  satisfaction. 

For  many  years  the  two  branches  of  the  House  of 
21 


322 


Louis  XIV 


[1698 


Hapsburg  had  been  closely  connected,  and  the  feel¬ 
ing  in  Spain  was  in  favour  of  the  House  of  Austria, 
especially  since  France  was  regarded  as  the  natural 
enemy  of  Spain. 

The  third  candidate  was  the  son  of  the  Elector  of 
Bavaria,  the  Electoral  Prince.  And  till  his  death  he 
was  the  favourite  candidate.  His  claims  were  prob¬ 
ably  best  from  a  legal  point  of  view,  and  Charles  II. 
had  rightly  refused  to  recognise  as  valid  the  renun¬ 
ciations  which  Leopold  had  extorted  from  his 
daughter,  the  mother  of  the  Electoral  Prince.  And 
moreover  the  succession  of  the  Electoral  Prince 
would  not  disturb  the  “  balance  of  power  ”  so  dear 
to  all  European  statesmen.  As  King  of  Spain  he 
would  not  endanger  the  tranquillity  or  the  inde¬ 
pendence  of  the  rest  of  Europe.  But  the  Emperor 
refused  to  regard  the  Electoral  Prince  as  a  formida¬ 
ble  candidate.  He  caused  a  will  made  by  Charles 
H.  in  his  favour,  to  be  annulled,  and  pressed  for¬ 
ward  the  claims  of  his  son  the  Archduke  Charles. 

The  question  was  obviously  in  all  its  aspects  so 
thorny,  and  so  likely  to  lead  to  a  European  war 
that  shortly  after  the,  peace  of  Ryswick  negotiations 
were  opened  between  France,  England,  and  Holland 
to  effect  by  means  of  a  partition  an  amicable  ar¬ 
rangement  of  the  difficult  question.  The  relations 
between  England  and  France  after  the  treaty  of 
Ryswick  had  remained  very  unsettled.  Though 
Louis  had  recognised  William  as  King  he  had  not 
recognised  the  succession.  James  11.  still  lived  at 
Saint-Germain,  and  Louis  declared  to  Portland,  the 
English  envoy,  that  he  had  no  intention  of  removing 


GENEALOGICAL  TABLE  OF  THE  CLAIMANTS  OF  THE  CROWN  OF  SPAIN,  169S-1700. 


1699] 


The  Spanish  Succession  Qtiesiion.  323 


him.  But  having  once  declared  his  views  on  the 
question  of  the  expulsion  of  the  Stuarts,  Louis  be¬ 
came  most  gracious  and  made  friendly  overtures  to 
William.  In  April,  1698,  Tallard  was  sent  to  Lon¬ 
don,  negotiations  were  opened,  and  Louis  told 
Portland  at  a  hunting  party  how  pleased  he  was  at 
the  overtures  made  by  William.  In  his  extreme 
anxiety  to  secure  the  Spanish  kingdom  for  his 
grandson,  Philip,  Duke  of  Anjou,  Louis  was  quite 
willing  to  provide  against  the  possible  union  of  the 
French  and  Spanish  crowns  in  the  future,  and  it  was 
only  after  long  and  obstinate  negotiations  that  he 
agreed  to  the  substitution  of  the  Electoral  Prince  for 
one  of  his  grandsons.  By  the  First  Partition  treaty 
(October  ii,  1698),  the  Electoral  Prince  was  to 
have  Spain,  the  Spanish  Netherlands,  and  the  Span¬ 
ish  possessions  in  the  New  World,  the  Archduke 
Charles  received  Milan,  and  the  Duke  of  Anjou  the 
two  Sicilies,  the  Tuscan  Ports  (Porto  Ercole,  Porto 
San  Stephano,  Orbitello,  Piombino,  Telamone,  Porto 
Longone  in  Elba),  Finale,  and  Guipuscoa. 

The  news  of  the  treaty,  as  had  been  expected, 
filled  the  Spaniards  with  rage.  Charles  II.  made  a 
will  leaving  all  the  Spanish  possessions  to  the  Elec¬ 
toral  Prince,  and  the  Spanish  patriotic  party  were 
satisfied.  William  III.  and  Heinsius  were  equally 
pleased,  for  the  Electoral  Prince,  with  no  navy,  could 
not  endanger  the  commerce  of  England  and  Hol¬ 
land.  Both  the  Emperor  and  Louis  were  discon¬ 
tented,  but  the  latter  agreed  with  William  that  the 
treaty  was  to  be  carried  out.  In  January,  1699,  the 
Electoral  Prince  died.  Louis  heard  of  the  death  of 


324 


Lotiis  XrV, 


[1699 


the  Prince  at  midday  on  the  8th  of  February.  In 
the  evening  he  spoke  a  good  deal  about  it  and 
sympathised  with  his  father  the  Elector.  He  had 
already,  however,  with  his  accustomed  energy,  dic¬ 
tated  two  despatches,  one  for  Harcourt,  and  one  for 
Tallard  ordering  him  to  sound  William  as  to  a  new 
treaty.  On  the  13th  he  drew  up  a  most  elaborate 
scheme  for  a  fresh  partition  of  the  Spanish  Empire 
and  sent  it  to  Tallard,  and  again  on  the  23rd  he  wrote 
another  long  letter  to  his  envoy  on  the  same  subject. 
It  was  evident  from  the  first  that  grave  difficulties 
had  arisen  in  arranging  a  fresh  Partition  treaty. 

Louis’  despatch  of  the  13th  is  a  masterpiece  for 
lucidity  and  ability.  The  death  of  one  of  the  claim¬ 
ants  left  the  Spanish  Empire  to  be  divided  between 
the  remaining  two.  “  I  know,”  he  writes,  “  how 
alarmed  Europe  would  be  to  see  my  power  raised  to 
a  greater  height  than  that  of  Austria.”  With  this 
recognition  of  the  worship  of  the  idea  of  the  balance 
of  power,  he  proceeds:  “  But  the  Emperor’s  power  is 
also  so  greatly  increased  by  the  submission  of  the 
princes  of  the  Empire  and  by  the  advantageous 
peace  which  he  has  just  concluded  with  the  Porte 
(T reaty  of  Carlowitz),  that  it  is  in  the  general  interest, 
if  he  becomes  stronger,  that  my  power  also  should 
be  sufficient  to  counterbalance  that  of  the  Emperor.” 
Louis  then  pointed  out  that  he  would  propose  to 
add  Milan  to  the  share  allotted  to  the  Dauphin  by 
the  First  Partition  treaty,  and  that  the  Archduke 
should  have  Spain,  the  Indies,  the  African  posses¬ 
sions,  the  islands  of  Sardinia,  Majorca,  Minorca, 
Ivica,  and  the  Philippines. 


WILLIAM  III.  OF  ENGLAND. 

(From  an  old  print,  and  reproduced  in  Philippson’s 
Das  Zeitalter  Ljedwig-s  A'lD.) 


1699]  The  Spanish  Sticcession  Question.  325 


Should  the  Archduke  receive  such  a  share,  it  is  of 
vital  importance  that  Milan  should  not  be  in  Haps- 
burg  hands.  The  Milanese  serve  as  an  easy  com¬ 
munication  between  the  two  branches  of  the  House 
of  Austria,  and  in  Hapsburg  hands  would  go  far  to 
raise  the  power  of  that  house  to  the  prejudice  of  the 
interests  of  the  rest  of  Europe. 

“  I  foresee,”  he  continued,  “  great  difficulties  in  the 
way  of  obtaining  the  consent  of  the  King  of  England 
to  the  addition  of  the  Milanese  to  my  son’s  portion. 
Should  you  see  that  it  is  impossible  to  overcome  the 
objections  raised,  you  can  make  a  suggestion  for 
bringing  to  a  satisfactory  conclusion  this  important 
matter.” 

The  suggestion  was  nothing  less  than  that  Lor¬ 
raine  should  be  united  to  France  in  exchange  for  the 
Milanese,  which  was  to  be  handed  over  to  the  Duke. 
A  new  power  would  thus  be  formed  in  Italy,  and 
France  would  have  added  little  to  her  strength,  for, 
as  Louis  truly  said,  Lorraine  was  so  surrounded  by 
French  possessions  that  it  was  practically  already  in 
the  power  of  the  French  monarchy. 

But  his  next  suggestion  shows  how  strongly  his 
mind  was  set  on  making  France  invulnerable.  “  I 
would  promise,”  he  said,  “  to  give  to  the  Duke  of 
Savoy  the  kingdoms  of  Naples  and  Sicily  ;  he  could 
also  have  the  Tuscan  ports  and  Finale  on  condition 
that  he  ceded  to  me  the  Duchy  of  Savoy,  the  princi¬ 
pality  of  Piedmont,  and  the  county  of  Nice,  and  his 
possessions  in  Montferrat ;  which  last  I  would  hand 
over  to  the  Duke  of  Milan.” 

Another  scheme  which  he  hinted  at  was  to  give 


Louis  X/V. 


[1699 


326 

the  Duke  of  Savoy  the  portion  allotted  above  to  the 
Archduke,  to  hand  over  to  the  latter  the  kingdoms 
of  Naples  and  Sicily,  to  place  the  Duke  of  Lorraine 
in  Milan  with  Savoy’s  possessions  of  Montferrat,  and 
to  leave  in  the  hands  of  France  the  remainder  of  the 
estate  of  Savoy  with  Lorraine  and  Guipuscoa. 

One  important  question  was  left  to  the  end  of  the 
despatch — that  of  the  Spanish  Netherlands.  And 
with  regard  to  this  debateable  land,  Louis  showed 
considerable  knowledge  of  the  feelings  of  Europe. 
“  The  King  of  England  and  the  States-General,”  he 
said,  “  would  be  equally  irritated  at  seeing  them  in 
my  hands,  or  in  those  of  the  Emperor.” 

In  dealing  with  this  delicate  question  Louis  fore¬ 
bore  to  make  any  definite  proposal,  but  threw  out 
four  alternatives  which  Tallard  might  lay  before 
William. 

The  first  suggestion  was  to  form  the  Low  Coun¬ 
tries  into  a  republic  which  should  be  closely  united 
by  treaty  with  Holland,  while  the  second  was  to 
hand  them  over  to  the  queen  of  Spain  after  the  death 
of  Charles  II.  The  third  project  would  be,  Louis 
thought,  not  acceptable  to  the  taste  of  William.  It 
consisted  in  renewing  the  treaty  made  in  1635  by 
Louis  XIII.  with  the  States-General,  for  the  parti¬ 
tion  of  the  Low  Countries  between  France  and 
Holland.  The  fourth  suggestion — and  this  was  the 
one  perhaps  the  most  popular  with  Louis — was  to 
give  the  provinces  as  an  independent  sovereignty  to 
the  Elector  of  Bavaria. 

But  great  difficulties  were  at  once  experienced. 
The  pretensions  of  the  French  had  increased  ;  and 


1699]  The  Spanish  Succession  Question.  327 


the  proposal  that  the  Spanish  Netherlands  should  be 
made  into  a  separate  principality  and  given  to 
Bavaria  was  not  well  received  by  William.  Louis  had 
in  fact  proposed  that  France  should  be  rounded  off 
by  securing  Lorraine,  Savoy,  and  Nice,  and  that  she 
should  gain  a  predominant  influence  in  the  Nether¬ 
lands.  The  maritime  powers  at  once  refused  to  con¬ 
sider  the  possibility  of  the  formation  of  the  Spanish 
Netherlands  into  an  independent  state,  though  they 
were  not  opposed  to  the  transfer  of  Lorraine  to 
France.  The  Court  of  Vienna  was  strongly  opposed 
to  the  suggested  arrangements.  The  Austrians  were 
looking  to  the  establishment  of  their  power  in  Italy, 
and  had  already  in  their  own  minds  anticipated  the 
settlement  effected  at  Utrecht. 

These  lengthy  negotiations  occupied  Louis’  full  at¬ 
tention.  He  examined  article  by  article  the  propo¬ 
sitions  made  by  the  English.  With  keen  foresight 
he  pointed  out  the  dangers  attendant  on  the  Spanish 
throne  being  given  to  the  Archduke.  “  The  Span¬ 
iards  are,”  he  rightly  declared,  “jealous  of  any  at¬ 
tempt  to  dismember  their  empire,  which  they  wish 
to  preserve  entire.  I  shall  be  obliged  to  take  up 
arms  and  conquer  that  portion  of  the  Spanish  do¬ 
minions  assigned  to  my  son.”  No  detail  escaped  his 
vigilant  eye,  and  he  prepared  for  all  eventualities. 
After  four  months  of  incessant  labour  Louis  agreed 
to  the  terms  of  the  Second  Partition  treaty.  But 
the  effects  of  the  death  of  the  Electoral  Prince  were 
never  entirely  removed,  and  it  was  only  after  great 
difficulty  that  Holland  was  induced  to  agree  to  the 
treaty,  Louis  and  William  were  building  upon  sand. 


328 


Louis  XIV. 


[1700 


The  Emperor  would  not  accept  the  treaty,  and  in 
England  its  unpopularity  was  universal. 

It  was  not  till  May,  1700,  that  the  Second  Partition 
treaty  was  finally  ratified.  By  it  the  Duke  of 
Anjou  secured  the  Two  Sicilies,  the  Tuscan  ports, 
Guipuscoa,  and  the  Milanese,  but  the  latter  was  to 
be  exchanged  for  Lorraine.  The  Archduke  Charles 
was  to  receive  Spain,  the  Spanish  Netherlands,  and 
the  Spanish  possessions  in  America.  The  news  of 
the  Second  Partition  enraged  the  Spaniards  beyond 
all  bounds.  The  Queen  broke  all  the  furniture  in 
her  room,  and  Charles  II.  was  equally  angry.  Eng¬ 
land  and  Holland  were  regarded  as  the  originators 
of  the  treaty,  and  Charles,  alarmed  at  the  idea  of 
the  influence  of  Protestant  powers  being  felt  possi¬ 
bly  in  his  American  possessions,  and  completely 
influenced  by  the  French  faction  supported  by  Por- 
tocarrero,  was  gradually  persuaded  to  forego  his 
natural  inclination  to  leave  his  dominions  to  the 
Austrian  House.  Innocent  XH.  advocated  the 
continuance  of  the  union  of  all  the  Spanish  do¬ 
minions,  and  it  was  held  in  Madrid  that  a  descendant 
of  the  great  representative  of  Catholicism  in  Europe 
would  be  the  best  sovereign  for  Spain. 

On  October  7th  Charles  signed  a  will  leaving  his 
dominions  to  the  Duke  of  Anjou  and  his  successors  ; 
failing  them,  to  the  Duke  of  Berry.  On  November 
1st  he  died,  and  thus  terminated  one  of  the  most 
melancholy  existences  recorded  in  history.* 

*  A  full  account  of  the  diplomacy  bearing  on  the  Partition  treaties 
will  be  found  in  A.  Legrelle’s  La  Diplomatic  Franfaise  et  la  Succes¬ 
sion  d'Espagne. 


1700]  The  Spanish  Snccessiotz  Question.  329 


Louis’  motives  in  agreeing  to  these  treaties  are 
hard  to  follow,  and  have  given  rise  to  much  contro¬ 
versy.  He  knew  that  the  question  of  the  succession 
was  still  a  very  open  one,  and  that  his  supporters  in 
Spain  could  not  be  depended  upon.  And  he  may 
have  thought  that  at  any  rate  he  had  secured  substan¬ 
tial  gains.  Had  the  terms  of  either  Partition  treaty 
been  carried  out,  the  Mediterranean  would  in  all 
probability  have  become  a  French  lake,  and  it  was 
the  appreciation  of  the  damage  which  such  a  state 
of  things  would  bring  to  English  trade  that  caused 
so  much  opposition  to  the  treaties  in  England. 
Though  apprehensions  with  regard  to  the  balance 
of  power  in  the  Mediterranean  were  as  yet  some¬ 
what  inarticulate,  English  merchants  were  fully  alive 
to  the  importance  of  their  interests  in  the  Levant 
and  generally  to  the  value  of  their  ever  extend¬ 
ing  intercourse  with  the  Mediterranean  countries. 
Though  the  causes  which  have  made  England  a 
Mediterranean  power  have  been  at  work  for  centu¬ 
ries,  the  Spanish  Succession  war  proved  an  important 
epoch  in  the  history  of  the  English  influence  and  of 
the  European  equilibrium  in  the  Mediterranean. 
Louis  was  himself  fully  alive  to  the  importance  of 
securing  French  influence  over  at  any  rate  the  west¬ 
ern  basin  of  the  Mediterranean.  But  in  his  corre¬ 
spondence  he  explained  his  agreement  with  the 
partition  schemes  on  general  grounds.  In  writing 
to  Tallard  he  declared  that  he  had  consented  to  the 
First  Partition  treaty  in  order  to  ensure  the  peace  of 
Europe.  “  After  I  have  sacrificed  so  much  to  give  my 
subjects  repose,”  he  wrote,  ”  no  interest  is  more  im- 


Louis  XIV. 


[1700 


portant  than  to  preserve  the  tranquillity  which  they 
now  enjoy.”  He  was  no  doubt  anxious  for  a  perma¬ 
nent  peace,  but  he  only  relinquished  his  grandson’s 
claim  to  Spain  with  regret.  “  I  can,”  he  wrote  to 
Tallard,  “enforce  my  grandson’s  rights,  but  my 
desire  for  tranquillity  leads  me  to  make  terms  with 
England.” 

At  the  same  time  it  must  be  remembered  that 
though  he  sent  Tallard  to  arrange  about  a  subdi¬ 
vision  of  the  spoil,  Louis  was  well  aware  of  the 
effect  which  would  be  produced  upon  the  minds 
of  the  Spaniards  when  once  they  heard  of  a  Parti¬ 
tion  treaty.  Historians  have  therefore  been  inclined 
to  believe  that  “  the  Partition  Scheme  was  a  blind,” 
and  that  both  “  Partition  treaties  were  in  fact  part 
of  a  game  played  skilfully  by  the  French  King  to 
quiet  and  delude  England  and  Holland,  to  paralyse 
the  Emperor,  and  to  incline  the  Spaniards  through 
fear  towards  the  French  interests.”  It  is  difficult, 
however,  to  suppose  that  all  Louis’  voluminous  cor¬ 
respondence  was  dishonest,  and  that  he  was  playing 
false  during  the  three  years  following  the  treaty 
of  Ryswick.  He  had  most  solemnly  protested  over 
and  over  again  that  he  would  keep  the  conditions  of 
the  treaty  of  Partition.  Early  in  1700,  the  Emperor 
had  agreed  to  the  Second  Partition  treaty,  the 
Archduke  might  have  entered  Spain  as  its  future 
sovereign,  and  if  he  had  done  so  the  war  of  the 
Spanish  Succession  would  never  have  taken  place. 
Harcourt,  convinced  that  a  Bourbon  prince  had  no 
chance  of  becoming  king  of  Spain,  had  left  Madrid 
in  May.  And  as  late  as  June  of  the  same  year 


1700]  The  Spanish  Succession  Question.  331 

Louis  informed  William  that  the  Spanish  Council 
were  strongly  disposed  in  favour  of  the  succession 
going  to  his  grandson,  but  he  asserted  :  “  Neither  the 
offer  of  the  Emperor,  nor  other  offers  still  more 
advantageous,  will  ever  lead  me  to  violate  the  engage¬ 
ments  which  I  have  taken.” 

Twelve  days  before  Charles’  death  Louis  ordered 
Tallard  to  insist  that  England  and  Holland  should 
hasten  their  military  preparations  so  that  the  treaty 
of  Partition  could  be  carried  out.  “  I  cannot  be¬ 
lieve,”  he  wrote,  “  that  they  [England  and  Holland] 
will  fail  in  executing  agreements  so  formal  and  so 
precise,  when  the  time  shall  arrive  to  carry  them  out.” 

Such  words  make  it  wellnigh  incredible  that  Louis 
should  have  again  and  again  urged  Tallard  to  hasten 
the  military  preparations  of  England  and  Holland  if 
he  had  seriously  contemplated  taking  a  step  which 
would  bring  him  into  immediate  collision  with  both 
those  powers. 

He  had  been  for  some  time  busy  trying  to  modify 
the  terms  of  the  treaty  so  that  France  should  obtain 
Savoy  and  Piedmont  in  place  of  Naples  and  Sicily, 
which  were  to  form  a  kingdom  for  Victor  Amadeus, 
and  up  to  the  death  of  Charles  H.  he  was  negotia¬ 
ting  on  this  subject.  There  seems  then  little  ground 
for  ascribing  to  Louis  a  policy  of  diabolical  ingenuity 
which  would  have  justified  the  popular  opinion  of  him 
held  in  England.  Until  the  death  of  Charles  Louis 
acted  towards  the  maritime  powers  in  perfect  good 
faith,  and  fully  intended  to  carry  out  the  partition. 

On  November  ist  Charles  II.  of  Spain  died,  leav¬ 
ing  the  Spanish  Empire  to  the  Duke  of  Anjou. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

THE  SPANISH  SUCCESSION  WAR. 
1702-1713. 

E  most  momentous  question 
of  Louis’  reign  now  awaited 
decision.  Should  he  accept 
the  Will  of  Charles  II.  ?  There 
is  no  reason  for  thinking  that 
Louis’  hesitation  was  assumed. 
While  on  the  one  hand  he  saw 
that  the  acceptance  of  the  Will 
would  bring  to  the  House  of 
Bourbon  a  dominion  rivalling 
that  of  Charles  V.,  on  the  other  it  was  patent  that 
Europe  would  not  stand  by  and  quietly  acquiesce 
in  a  political  revolution  which  would  gravely  affect 
the  equilibrium  of  the  European  states-system.  Ad¬ 
vancing  years  too  no  doubt  contributed  to  Louis’ 
hesitation.  He  was  no  longer  served  by  the  Lionnes, 
the  Colberts,  and  the  Louvois  of  his  more  prosperous 


332 


'I  JMHispaniarum, 


Carolus  II  d.g 

KT  InDIAR-UM 


Rex  Cathoeicus 


CHARLES  II.  OF  SPAIN. 

(From  an  illustration,  based  on  an  old  print,  in  Erdmannsdorfer’s 
Deutsche  Geschichte  vou  l6^8-i/^o.} 


1700] 


The  Spanish  Succession  War. 


333 


days.  While  his  own  views  had  begun  to  lack  firm¬ 
ness  and  clearness,  his  councillors  themselves  showed 
that  they  were  incapable  of  executing  a  policy  which 
would  have  tried  the  capacities  of  Louis’  most  able 
ministers. 

The  acceptance  of  the  Will  too  meant  a  very  con¬ 
siderable  change  in  his  foreign  policy.  France  would 
have  to  forego  the  gradual  annexation  of  the  Spanish 
Netherlands  and  the  extension  of  her  influence  in 
Italy, — a  policy  which  had  hitherto  been  carefully 
adhered  to.  Louis’  intention  of  establishing  a  great 
French  Empire  dominating  Europe  would  also  have 
to  be  modified. 

The  study  of  the  two  weeks  succeeding  the  death 
of  Charles  11.  is  of  the  deepest  psychological  in¬ 
terest.  Some  light  is  thrown  upon  the  considerations 
which  weighed  most  with  Louis  by  closely  following 
the  historical  sequence  of  events.  Tallard  had 
arrived  at  Fontainebleau  on  November  2d,  and  had 
already  heard  of  the  arrival  of  couriers  from  Spain 
bringing  news  of  the  Will  of  Charles  11. ,  and  of  the 
formation  of  a  strong  party  at  Court  in  favour  of 
the  acceptance  of  the  Will.  He  had  an  audience 
of  the  King  at  which  Madame  de  Maintenon  and 
Torcy  were  present.  Tallard  expressed  himself  in 
favour  of  adhering  to  the  Partition  treaty,*  and 
painted  in  strong  colours  the  European  opposition 
which  would  be  aroused  if  Louis  accepted  the  Will. 
Torcy,  Tallard  declares,  supported  him  to  such  an 
extent  that  on  the  next  day,  the  qth,  Louis  wrote 

*  All  allusions  to  the  Partition  treaty  refer  of  course  to  the  Second 
Partition  treaty. 


Louis  XIV 


[1700 


'y  A 

to  Briord,  the  French  ambassador  in  Holland,  order¬ 
ing  him  to  tell  Heinsius  that  he  would  keep  to  the 
treaty  of  Partition. 

On  November  9th  the  news  of  the  death  of  Charles 
II.  reached  Barbezieux  at  Fontainebleau,  and  he  had 
the  honour  of  informing  Louis  of  the  fact.  The 
King  at  once  put  off  his  hunting  expedition,  and 
issued  orders  that  during  the  winter  no  comedies  or 
festivities  should  take  place.  An  opportunity  was 
thus  suddenly  offered  him  of  carrying  out  one  of  his 
most  cherished  hopes,  one  of  his  most  important 
political  ideas.  An  enormous  increase  of  the  power 
of  his  country  and  of  his  own  prestige  would  result 
from  the  union  of  the  two  countries  under  Bourbon 
rulers.  And  not  only  would  the  dynastic  interests 
of  his  house  be  served  ;  the  interests  of  religion 
would  also  be  advanced.  The  prospect  was  opened 
before  him  of  placing  the  destinies  of  a  great  empire 
under  his  own  most  Christian  influence.  His  engage¬ 
ments  with  England  and  Holland  caused  a  natural 
hesitation,  and  it  was  only  after  a  sharp  struggle  with 
himself  that  he  decided  in  favour  of  the  Will. 

His  hesitation  was  reflected  in  the  attitude  of  his 
leading  advisers.  To  a  solemn  council  summoned 
on  the  loth  of  November  to  discuss  the  Will  of 
Charles,  only  three  ministers  were  bidden,  Torcy, 
Pontchartrain,  and  Beauvilliers,  his  habitual  coun¬ 
cillors. 

The  Chancellor  Pontchartrain  had  no  decided 
opinion.  He  contented  himself  with  weighing  the 
pros  and  the  cons,  and  to  the  end  refused  to  make  any 
decision.  He  occupied  a  middle  position  between 


1700] 


The  Spanish  Succession  War. 


335 


Beauvilliers,  the  President  of  the  Council  of  P" ranee, 
and  Torcy,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  The 
former  held  that  Louis  should  adhere  to  the  plan  of 
Partition,  that  the  acceptance  of  the  Will  would  be 
followed  by  war,  and  that  war  would  cause  the  ruin 
of  France  ;  the  latter,  on  the  contrary,  strongly 
urged  the  immediate  acceptance  of  the  Will.  To 
him  the  accession  of  the  Duke  of  Anjou  to  the 
crown  of  Spain  was  of  the  utmost  importance  to 
P'rench  interests.  He  had  no  doubts,  no  misgivings, 
and  in  the  coming  years  devoted  much  time  and 
energy  to  the  cause  of  Philip  V. 

What  advice  Louis  received  from  Madame  de 
Maintenon  is  not  known.  She  and  the  Dauphin 
were  present  at  this  memorable  council,  but  she  said 
nothing  during  its  session,  and  never  seems,  at  any 
rate  publicly,  to  have  expressed  a  decided  opinion. 
Monseigneur  on  the  other  hand  was  from  the  first 
openly  and  strongly  in  favour  of  the  acceptance  of 
the  Will. 

It  is  not  surprising  that  when  face  to  face  with  one 
of  the  most  difficult  of  modern  problems,  Louis’  ad¬ 
visers  should  have  shown  great  perplexity.  The 
crisis  was  short  but  acute,  and  the  pressure  of  exter¬ 
nal  circumstances  proved  too  strong  for  the  King. 
Pressing  appeals  came  from  Spain,  strong  represen¬ 
tations  from  his  own  Court ;  while  neither  Portugal 
nor  Savoy  liked  the  arrangements  made  by  the  treaty 
of  Partition.  The  affairs  in  the  Peninsula  required  a 
prompt  and  decisive  reply.  It  would  seem  that 
Louis’  mind  was  made  up  on  Thursday,  November 
nth,  though  the  Court  did  not  know  in  which  direc- 


336 


Louis  XIV. 


[1700 


tion.  The  courtiers  only  realised  that  the  period  of 
uncertainty  had  passed  away.  On  Friday,  the  I2th, 
a  despatch,  couched  in  dignified  terms,  was  sent 
through  Bl^court  to  the  Queen  of  Spain  at  Madrid, 
conveying  Louis’  acceptance  of  the  Will.  At  the 
same  time  a  long  memoir  was  sent  to  William  III., 
containing  a  full  description  of  the  cruel  dilemma  in 
which,  owing  to  the  patriotism  of  the  Spaniards,  he 
had  been  placed,  and  the  reasons  which  had  induced 
him  to  throw  over  the  treaty  and  accept  the  Will. 
In  this  memoir,  which  is  of  peculiar  interest,  Louis 
begins  by  pointing  out  that  up  to  the  death  of  Charles 
neither  he  nor  his  ministers  paid  any  attention  to  the 
general  wish  of  the  Spanish  nation  to  place  a  French 
prince  on  their  throne  :  “  Cette  inclination  g^n^rale 
des  peuples  que  leur  veritable  int^ret  leur  inspirait 
n’a  point  6t6  cultivee  par  les  ministres  de  sa  ma¬ 
jesty.”  He  then  adduces  the  reasons  which  have 
brought  about  his  decision  to  accept  the  Will.  In 
the  first  place  the  wishes  of  Charles  II.,  if  carried 
out,  would  entirely  prevent  the  union  of  France  and 
Spain,  and  so  the  jealousy  of  European  powers  on  that 
score  need  not  be  feared.  Secondly,  the  great  object 
of  the  Partition  treaty  was  to  secure  the  peace  of 
Europe  by  obtaining  the  consent  of  the  Emperor  to 
the  arrangements  made  by  it.  This  consent  had  not 
been  obtained,  and  consequently  war  was  certain, 
even  if  the  Partition  scheme  was  carried  out.  The 
Archduke  on  the  Spanish  throne  will  naturally  oppose 
any  partition  of  his  dominions,  and  it  will  be  neces¬ 
sary  to  enforce  the  execution  of  the  treaty  by  dint 
of  arms.  A  long  war  will  ensue,  and  such  a  war  is 


1700] 


The  Spanish  Stuccssiou  War. 


337 


contrary  to  the  spirit  of  the  Partition  treaty.  Then 
Louis  pointed  out,  thirdly,  that  the  acceptance  of  the 
Will  was  by  far  the  lesser  of  two  evils.  France  and 
Spain  will  remain  separate,  as  they  always  have  been. 
France  will  not  secure  any  territory  on  the  Spanish 
frontier,  she  will  not  receive  Lorraine  nor  the  king¬ 
doms  of  Naples  and  Sicily.  Thus  France  will  liter¬ 
ally  be  far  weaker  than  if  the  Partition  treaty  was 
executed. 

The  Spanish  ambassador  was  told  of  Louis’  deci¬ 
sion  the  same  day,  though  the  secret  was  kept  till 
the  following  week.  On  Saturday,  the  13th,  after 
supper  in  his  own  room,  Louis  playfully  asked 
“  Madame  ”  and  the  Princess  of  Conti  what  they 
thought  of  the  Spanish  difficulty.  Both  said  that 
they  would  send  the  Duke  of  Anjou  to  Spain.  “  I 
am  sure,”  replied  Louis,  “  that  whatever  I  do  will  be 
blamed  by  a  good  many  people.”  On  the  following 
Monday,  November  15th,  Louis  and  the  Court  pro¬ 
ceeded  from  Fontainebleau  to  Versailles,  arriving 
there  at  four  o’clock.  He  had  arranged  to  make  a 
public  declaration  of  his  policy  the  following  morn¬ 
ing.  On  Tuesday,  November  16,  1700,  Louis 

therefore  introduced  his  grandson  to  the  Court  as 
Philip  V.  of  Spain.  Saint-Simon’s  description  of 
this  impressive  scene  is  well  known.  After  Louis 
had  received  a  visit  from  Castel  dos  Rios,  the  Span¬ 
ish  ambassador,  and  had  told  him  that  he  could  salute 
the  Duke  of  Anjou,  who  was  present,  as  King  of 
Spain,  he  ordered  the  folding  doors  of  his  room  to 
be  thrown  open,  and  directed  that  all  should  enter. 
After  having  gazed  majestically  on  the  crowd  of 


Louis  XIV. 


[1700 


courtiers  before  him,  Louis  said,  pointing  to  the 
Duke  of  Anjou:  “  Gentlemen,  there  is  the  King  of 
Spain.  The  Spanish  crown  is  his  by  the  right  of 
birth,  by  the  Will  of  the  late  King,  and  by  the  unani¬ 
mous  wish  of  the  entire  nation.  This  is  the  will  of 
God,  and  I  yield  to  it  with  pleasure.”  Then  turning 
to  Anjou,  he  continued  :  “  Be  a  good  Spaniard,  it  is 
now  your  first  duty,  but  remember  that  you  were 
born  a  Frenchman,  and  preserve  the  union  of  the  two 
nations ;  by  this  means  you  will  render  both  happy 
and  will  give  Europe  peace.”  Then  Castel  dos  Rios 
approached  with  his  son  and  exclaimed  :  “  Quelle 
joie !  II  n’y  a  plus  de  Pyr6n6es  ;  elles  sont  abim^es, 
et  nous  ne  sommes  plus  qu’un.”  After  Louis  had 
given  an  audience  to  Sinzendorf,  he  proceeded  to 
the  Chapel,  the  Duke  of  Anjou  walking  on  his  right 
hand. 

It  is  of  little  avail  to  attempt  to  justify  the  cancel¬ 
ling  of  solemn  engagements,  or  to  endeavour  to  ex¬ 
plain  away  obvious  facts.  But  there  is  still  less 
reason  for  ascribing  to  Louis  any  peculiar  malignity 
in  thus  disregarding  his  previous  engagements.  He 
simply  acted  in  strict  accordance  with  the  political 
morality  of  the  age.  Treaties  were  in  both  the 
XVIIth  and  XVIIIth  centuries  viewed  with  remark¬ 
able  indifference,  and  many  instances  might  be  cited 
to  show  that  France  had  not  the  monopoly  of  bad 
faith  at  that  period.  Nay,  more,  it  may  be  urged 
that  Louis’  action  was  beneficial  to  Spain  and  Europe 
generally.  Under  the  Archduke’s  rule  it  is  certain 
that  though  the  downward  career  of  Spain  might 
have  been  checked,  that  remarkable  recovery  which 


1700] 


The  Spanish  Succession  War. 


339 


she  owed  to  the  invigorating,  revivifying,  Bourbon 
initiative  would  never  have  taken  place.  She  would 
have  remained  waterlogged  under  a  dull  Hapsburg 
rdgime.  And  Europe  would  not  have  gained  any 
advantage.  The  increased  Hapsburg  influence  in 
Europe  would  have  been  disastrous  to  the  growth  of 
civilisation,  and  the  balance  of  power  would  not 
have  been  placed  on  any  more  satisfactory  basis. 
Louis’  decision  was  undoubtedly  beneficial  to  Chris¬ 
tendom,  and  the  war  that  followed  was  not  due  to 
that  decision,  but  to  an  extraordinary  misapprehen¬ 
sion  on  his  own  part  and  on  that  of  his  advisers  of 
the  real  current  of  European  opinion. 

The  accession  of  the  Archduke  to  the  Spanish 
throne  would  have  been  followed  by  the  revival  of 
an  empire  on  the  model  of  that  of  Charles  V.  This 
result  could  not  have  been  foreseen  at  the  time,  but 
in  those  days  of  sudden  deaths  it  was  in  1700  not  at 
all  improbable.  ' 

To  avert  such  a  possibility,  to  prevent  the  return 
of  the  days  of  Francis  I.  and  Charles  V.,  any  means 
might  be  considered  by  a  Bourbon  king  as  justifiable. 

To  Louis  it  seemed  that  no  matter  what  decision 
he  might  come  to,  a  European  war  was  absolutely 
certain.  The  maritime  powers  had  no  love  for  him, 
Europe  was  sluggish  and  inert.  Supposing  he  clung 
to  the  Partition  treaty,  was  it  likely  that  the  con¬ 
tracting  powers  would  support  him  in  carrying  it 
out?  Would  England  or  Holland  deliberately  take 
up  arms  in  order  to  rob  the  Emperor  or  Spain  of 
the  kingdom  of  the  Two  Sicilies,  the  Tuscan  Ports, 
Savoy,  Nice,  and  Lorraine,  in  order  to  place  them 


340 


Loti  is  XIV. 


[1700 


in  the  hands  of  France?  It  has  been  well  said  that 
if  Louis  had  allowed  the  Archduke  to  succeed  to  the 
throne  of  Spain  after  Charles  11.  had  made  a  will  in 
favour  of  Anjou,  he  would  have  deserved  to  be 
canonised  as  a  saint,  but  he  would  have  lost  all  claim 
to  be  a  statesman. 

The  character  of  Philip  was  not  likely  to  inspire 
great  confidence  among  those  who,  like  Madame  de 
Maintenon,  the  Duchess  of  Orleans,  and  the  Due  de 
Beauvilliers,  knew  him  best.  His  piety,  his  love  of 
justice,  his  natural  straightforwardness  and  affection 
for  those  around  him,  were  counterbalanced  by  in¬ 
decision,  an  uncertain  temper,  and  a  distrust  of  his 
own  powers.  He  was  moreover  slow  of  speech  and 
his  voice  was  disagreeable.  He  had  been  brought 
up  with  his  brothers  the  Dukes  of  Burgundy  and 
Berry  in  severe  isolation.  They  had  undoubtedly 
suffered  from  over  anxiety  on  the  part  of  their 
tutors  and  governors.  “  I  am  miserable,”  the  young 
Duke  of  Berry  is  reported  to  have  said  on  hearing  of 
Philip’s  accession  to  the  crown  of  Spain.  “  I  have 
no  hope  of  being  a  king  like  my  brothers,  and  by 
the  departure  of  my  brother,  the  Duke  of  Anjou,  all 
the  governors  and  sub-governors  will  fall  upon  me, 
and  I  already  have  too  much  of  those  that  I  have. 
What  will  it  be  then  when  I  have  the  rest  ?  It  is  to 
be  hoped  that  they  will  make  me  infallible.”  Had 
Philip  remained  some  ten  years  more  under  the  im¬ 
mediate  care  of  a  few  wise  people  who  understood 
his  faults,  and  at  the  same  time  appreciated  and  knew 
how  to  develop  his  good  traits,  had  he  become  a  man 
before  he  was  made  a  king,  it  is  quite  possible  he 


1701] 


The  Spanish  Succession  IVar. 


341 


might  have  gone  down  to  posterity  as  a  wise  ruler, 
instead  of  being  merely  known  as  the  husband  of 
Elizabeth  Farnese.  “  Madame,”  the  Duchess  of 
Orleans,  probably  understood  him  best.  She  had 
loved  him  from  childhood  and  preferred  him  to  the 
Duke  of  Burgundy.  She  recognised  that  under  his 
extreme  timidity  were  concealed  some  excellent 
qualities.  Her  influence  over  him  was  great,  and 
her  letters  when  in  Spain  show  that  she  appreciated 
thoroughly  the  childlike,  easy-going  nature  of  the 
young  sovereign,  who  was  never  intended  by  nature 
to  be  a  king. 

Beauvilliers  had  no  confidence  in  his  capacity ; 
the  Marquis  of  Louville,  who  had  known  him  for 
years,  and  who  accompanied  him  and  watched  over 
him  in  Spain,  said  of  him  :  “  C’est  un  roi  qui  ne 
regne  pas,  et  qui  ne  regnera  jamais.”  On  his  arrival, 
however,  at  Madrid  Philip  shewed  unwonted  energy, 
rising  early,  being  present  in  council  with  his  minis¬ 
ters,  and  expressing  his  opinions  on  all  matters.  But 
this  energetic  fit  soon  passed  away.  He  retired  to 
rest  from  one  to  three  A.M. ;  he  rose  late.  He  had 
no  memory,  not  even  for  important  affairs  of  state, 
and  he  soon  contracted  a  great  dislike  for  work  of 
all  sorts.  Nay,  more,  he  hated  amusements  and  took 
no  delight  in  anything.  He  hardly  ever  spoke  in 
public,  and  spent  all  his  time  in  bewailing  his  depart¬ 
ure  from  France,  and  grieving  over  his  absence 
from  his  brothers.  In  six  months  all  his  popularity 
had  disappeared,  and  the  publication  of  caricatures 
showed  plainly  the  opinion  held  of  him  by  the  mass 
of  his  subjects. 


342 


Louis  XIV. 


[1701 


Philip  had  bidden  his  brothers  farewell  on  January 
22,  1701,  at  Saint-Jean  de  Luz.  The  parting  scenes 
were  very  affecting,  and  not  again  on  this  earth  were 
the  three  brothers  to  meet.  A  more  difficult  task 
than  governing  Spain  could  not  be  imagined.  The 
Spanish  monarchy  was  a  despotism  in  which  the 
clerical  influence  was  preponderant.  The  existence 
of  local  assemblies,  of  local  customs,  of  social  privi¬ 
leges  checked  all  attempts  of  the  central  power  to 
assert  itself  in  the  provinces.  At  the  time  of  the 
death  of  Charles  II.  the  central  power  itself  was  hope¬ 
lessly  lethargic  and  inert,  and  revolved  round  the 
person  of  the  King.  Provincial  independence  and 
disunion  prevented  the  growth  of  any  national  feeling, 
and  in  proportion  as  the  central  power  grew  more 
ineffective,  more  subservient  to  official  oligarchy,  and 
more  and  more  incapable  of  creating  among  the 
Spanish  people  the  idea  of  public  good,  so  provincial¬ 
ism  increased  in  intensity.  The  system  of  govern¬ 
ment  by  a  number  of  councils — a  system  tried  in 
France  on  Louis  XIV.’s  death  with  no  chance  of 
success — was  admirably  adapted  for  preventing  all 
chance  of  reform,  while  the  privileges  of  the  nobles, 
accompanied  by  idleness,  pride,  selfishness  and 
intrigues,  presented  a  formidable  bar  to  all  hopes  of 
regenerating  Spain.  National  unity  and  civil  equality 
were  indispensable  for  any  real  improvement.  The 
extraordinary  decadence  of  Spain  was  now  to  be 
followed  by  an  equally  extraordinary  resurrection. 

The  French  monarchy  was  very  different.  The 
public,  administration  founded  by  Richelieu,  Colbert, 
and  Louvois  had  no  counterpart  in  Spain.  A  cen- 


1701] 


The  Spanish  Succession  War. 


343 


tralised  government  and  a  powerful  bureaucracy  had 
seriously  diminished  provincial  liberties  and  individ¬ 
ual  powers  of  resistance.  This  system,  carefully 
organised  and  well  administered — like  the  legal  sys¬ 
tem  of  Henry  II.  of  England — controlled  the  des¬ 
potic  tendencies  of  the  King.  It  had  become  well- 
nigh  impossible  for  a  French  sovereign  to  over-ride 
the  limits  imposed  on  him  by  the  laws.  The  sub¬ 
ordination  of  all  interests  to  the  public  good,  the 
diminution  of  provincial  independence,  and  of  social 
privileges,  the  establishment  of  a  central  administra¬ 
tion  sufficiently  powerful  to  command  obedience 
throughout  the  length  and  breadth  of  the  land,  such 
reforms,  it  was  thought,  would  introduce  new  life 
into  Spain,  would  save  her  from  all  danger  of  a  dis¬ 
astrous  civil  war,  and  would  launch  her  on  a  career 
of  prosperity. 

In  the  introduction  of  French  influence  and  of 
French  ideas  of  administration,  lay  the  only  hope  of 
the  Spanish  monarchy.  Spain  lay  like  a  water¬ 
logged  vessel  by  the  side  of  her  active  and  well- 
equipped  ally.  The  Spanish  grandee  naturally  was 
opposed  to  all  ideas  of  reform.  Refusing  to  take 
any  share  in  the  government  of  his  country,  he  was 
keenly  susceptible  to,  and  ready  to  resist  any  gov¬ 
ernmental  influence  whatever.  Living  most  of  the 
year  in  Madrid,  and  occupied  mainly  with  pleasure 
and  intrigue,  the  Spanish  noble  was  none  the  less  an 
important  obstacle  to  any  attempt  by  King  or  Coun¬ 
cil  to  govern  the  country.  A  more  serious  difficulty 
was  the  provincial  spirit,  which  saw  in  any  increase 
of  centralisation  the  curtailment  of  its  liberties  and 


344 


Louis  XIV. 


[1701 


privileges.  The  whole  force  of  France  under  Napo¬ 
leon  was  some  hundred  years  later  to  retire  foiled  in 
its  attempt  to  cope  with  the  independence  of  the 
Spanish  provinces.  During  the  Spanish  Succession 
war  Louis’  first  attempt  to  govern  Spain  in  French 
fashion  were  similarly  doomed  to  failure,  and  for 
some  years  the  waves  of  reform  and  centralisation 
dashed  harmlessly  against  the  walls  of  that  provincial¬ 
ism,  which  was  never  stronger  or  more  aggressive  than 
at  the  time  of  the  accession  of  Philip  V.  This  pro¬ 
vincial  temper  was  clearly  illustrated  in  1705,  when  a 
disastrous  civil  war  broke  out,  which  continued  till 
after  the  peace  of  Utrecht.  Not  recognising  the 
immense  and  almost  insuperable  obstacles  in  his  way, 
Louis  determined,  on  his  grandson’s  accession,  to 
govern  Spain  through  Philip,  and  by  directing  his 
policy  to  restore  Spanish  finances  and  make  Spain  a 
useful  ally  in  the  coming  European  struggle. 

To  all  Spaniards  in  whom  a  real  love  of  their 
country  outweighed  every  other  consideration  local 
and  personal,  the  very  idea  of  a  close  union  with 
France  opened  up  a  new  vista  of  immense  possibili¬ 
ties.  To  them  Louis  XIV.  appeared  as  the  “  incar¬ 
nation  of  active  royalty,  active,  just,  and  benevolent.” 
He  was  to  them  a  sort  of  god  who  could  on  the  one 
hand  in  a  few  months  re-establish  order  in  the  finances 
and  honesty  in  the  administration,  and  on  the  other 
give  strength  to  the  army  and  navy,  and  introduce  a 
universal  system  of  equal  justice  for  poor  and  rich 
alike.  Louis  himself  was  prepared  to  direct  the 
Spanish  policy  and  to  inaugurate  reforms.  He  had 
in  fact  little  choice.  Philip  had  arrived  in  Madrid 


1701] 


The  Spanish  Snccessio)i  War. 


345 


on  February  i8,  1701,  and  before  the  year  was 
over  it  was  evident  that  a  European  war  was  on  the 
verge  of  breaking  out.  In  1701  the  Emperor  had 
begun  hostilities  in  Italy,  and  on  May  4,  1702,  war 
was  formally  declared  against  France  and  Spain  in 
London,  Vienna,  and  at  The  Hague. 

This  war  Louis  had  to  a  great  extent  brought  on 
himself.  The  mere  acceptance  of  the  Will  would 
not  have  led  to  any  serious  hostilities.  Neither 
England  nor  Holland  would  have  taken  up  arms, 
and  without  their  assistance  the  Emperor  was  power¬ 
less.  Louis  had  been  right  in  his  conjecture  that 
England  would  not  quarrel  with  him  about  the 
acceptance  of  the  Will.  The  Second  Partition 
treaty  was,  like  its  predecessor,  intensely  disliked  in 
England,  and  on  the  same  grounds.  And  the  rea¬ 
sons  of  the  English  dislike  are  not  difficult  to  under¬ 
stand.  By  the  treaty  France  would  become  mistress 
of  the  Mediterranean,  and  the  English  trade  in  the 
Levant  would  be  ruined.  The  possession  of  Gui- 
puscoa  would  enable  her  to  secure  trade  with  the 
West  Indies  and  South  America.  France  would  not 
only  make  the  Mediterranean  into  a  French  lake; 
she  would  gain  the  command  of  the  sea,  and  with  it 
universal  monarchy.  The  balance  of  power  founded 
by  the  peace  of  Westphalia  and  confirmed  at  Nime- 
guen  and  Ryswick  would  be  endangered  if  not 
entirely  overthrown. 

In  England  men  would  have  preferred  war  to  the 
treaty,  but  they  preferred  the  Will  to  both.  Louis’ 
decision  to  accept  the  Will  was  received  in  England 
and  in  Holland  with  resignation  if  not  satisfaction. 


346 


Louis  XIV. 


[1701 


The  Will  provided  that  the  Spanish  monarchy  was 
to  remain  independent,  and  the  execution  of  the 
Will  would  not,  it  was  thought,  compromise  the  ex¬ 
isting  equilibrium  of  European  forces.  But  Louis 
made  an  undoubted  mistake  in  the  month  of  Decem¬ 
ber,  1700,  when  he  reserved  the  rights  of  Philip  to  the 
French  throne.  Public  opinion  was  at  that  time  so 
extremely  sensitive  on  the  question  of  the  possible 
union  of  the  crowns  of  France  and  Spain,  i.  e.,  of  a 
universal  Bourbon  monarchy  in  the  West,  that  a  man 
usually  as  keenly  alive  to  the  necessity  of  putting 
himself  in  the  right  as  Louis  was,  ought  to  have  de¬ 
ferred  to  the  general  feeling.  Louis’  motives  indeed 
were  probably  easily  explained.  The  Duke  of  Berry 
had  shown  no  signs  of  capacity,  and  Louis  may  have 
thought  that  in  the  event  of  the  death  of  the  Duke 
of  Burgundy,  Philip  might  be  called  to  the  French 
throne,  and  Berry  sent  to  govern  Spain.  Moreover, 
there  were  numerous  precedents  for  reserving  rights 
in  similar  cases.  Henry  III.,  the  elected  king  of 
Poland,  had  reserved  his  rights  to  the  French  throne. 
But  whatever  may  be  urged  in  justification  of  Louis’ 
action  in  reserving  the  rights  of  Philip,  the  fact  re¬ 
mains  that  Louis  blundered.  Europe  demanded  in 
1700  what  it  demanded  and  obtained  some  eleven 
years  later,  a  solemn  guarantee  before  Europe  that 
the  two  crowns  should  be  forever  separated.  The 
fatal  declaration  of  Louis  placed  then  a  formidable 
weapon  in  the  hands  of  his  religious  and  political 
adversaries. 

This  error,  serious  as  it  was,  might  not,  however, 
have  led  to  war  had  not  Louis  followed  it  up  by,  if 


1701] 


The  Spanish  Succession  War. 


347 


possible,  graver  mistakes.  Though  Philip  V.  had  been 
recognised  by  William  III.,  by  the  States-General, 
and  by  many  of  the  lesser  princes  of  Europe,  such 
as  Savoy,  Bavaria,  Brunswick-Wolfenbiittel,  and 
others,  Tallard  had  been  for  some  time  convinced 
that  the  acceptance  of  the  Will  would  be  followed 
by  war,  and  the  same  conclusion  appears  to  have 
been  forced  upon  and  definitely  accepted  by  Louis. 
He  was  advised  that  his  true  policy  was  to  seize  all 
he  could  before  the  inevitable  war  began.  To  this 
extraordinary  and  fatal  want  of  appreciation  of  the 
real  feeling  of  the  English  and  Dutch  peoples  at  this 
critical  moment,  the  war  was  probably  due,  though 
many  writers  aver  that  his  imprudent  action,  so  un¬ 
like  the  sagacity  which  marked  his  conduct  from 
the  peace  of  Ryswick  to  the  death  of  Charles  II., 
was  due  to  the  reappearance  of  his  former  ambitious 
policy  and  to  his  conviction  that  he  could  now  dic¬ 
tate  the  law  to  Europe.  Certainly  his  seizure  early 
in  1701  of  the  line  of  Spanish  fortresses  known  as 
the  Dutch  Barrier,  altered  the  whole  complexion  of 
affairs,  while  his  contemptuous  release  of  the  cap¬ 
tured  Dutch  garrisons  recalled  his  similar  blunder  in 
1672.  This  line  of  fortresses,  including,  as  it  did, 
Luxemburg,  Namur,  Mons,  and  the  seaports  of 
Nieuport  and  Ostend,  were  of  the  utmost  impor¬ 
tance  to  Holland.  If  they  remained  in  Erench  hands 
there  was  no  security  that  Holland  would  not  her¬ 
self  be  conquered.  The  Dutch  were  infuriated; 
public  opinion  in  England  was  roused,  and  William 
HI.  was  enabled  on  September  7th  to  lay  the  foun¬ 
dation  of  the  Grand  Alliance  in  the  Triple  League 


348 


Louis  XIV. 


[1701 


between  England,  the  Emperor,  and  Holland.  By 
the  terms  of  the  Grand  Alliance  the  kingdoms  of 
France  and  Spain  were  never  to  be  united  or  gov¬ 
erned  by  the  same  person,  and  a  reasonable  satis¬ 
faction  was  to  be  given  to  the  Emperor  and  the 
English  King.  The  three  powers  further  agreed  to 
recover  the  Spanish  Netherlands  as  a  barrier  for  the 
protection  of  the  United  Provinces  from  the  French, 
to  protect  Dutch  and  English  commerce,  and  to 
compel  the  cession  of  the  Milanese,  and  the  Italian 
dominions  of  the  Spanish  crown  for  the  Emperor. 
It  was  quite  possible  that  even  then  England  might 
have  refused  to  engage  in  a  European  war  had 
Louis  acted  with  prudence  and  moderation,  and  re¬ 
stored  the  barrier  fortresses.  Instead  of  doing  so, 
however,  and  moved  perhaps  by  female  influence,  cer¬ 
tainly  by  a  misplaced  feeling  of  chivalry,  and  an 
injudicious  zeal  for  the  Church,  he  recognised  the 
Pretender,  James  III.,  as  King  of  England.  He  thus 
not  only  broke  his  engagements  solemnly  entered 
into  at  Ryswick,  but  he  alienated  the  English 
nation.  The  effects  of  this  mistake  were  most 
disastrous  upon  France.  Public  opinion  in  England 
rose  to  fever  heat.  Indignation  at  the  insult  was 
followed  by  alarm  at  the  prospect  of  further  ag¬ 
grandisement  by  Louis.  Universal  dominion  and 
the  establishment  of  Catholicism  all  over  Europe 
were  supposed  to  be  the  objects  of  his  policy. 

It  is,  while  impossible  to  extenuate,  extremely 
difficult  to  explain  Louis’  entire  misapprehension  of 
the  condition  of  public  feeling  in  England.  The 
English  had  no  wish  for  war,  and  the  dismissal  of 


1701] 


The  Spanish  Succession  War. 


349 


the  Dutch  guards,  the  reduction  in  the  army  and 
navy,  and  the  recognition  of  Philip  V.  as  King  of 
Spain  by  William,  ought  to  have  convinced  Louis 
that  if  he  only  walked  warily  he  could  carry  out  his 
own  solution  of  the  problem  which  had  been 
puzzling  Europe  for  half  a  century. 

But  French  statesmen  have  rarely  at  a  great  crisis 
interpreted  aright  the  temper  of  England,  and  Louis, 
in  spite  of  the  fact  that  he  had  the  best  information 
of  any  European  monarch,  was  no  exception  to  the 
rule.  He  never  had  understood  English  political 
life,  and  his  failure  to  appreciate  the  real  position  of 
affairs  in  England  in  1701,  combined  with  his  over¬ 
weening  ambition  and  confidence  in  his  own  powers, 
brought  with  it  a  heavy  penalty. 

War  being  upon  him,  it  was  absolutely  necessary 
to  take  immediate  action.  Practically  all  Europe 
was  opposed  to  him.  Spain,  therefore,  must  be 
turned  into  a  useful  ally.  France  and  Spain  re¬ 
organised  by  French  methods  would,  closely  allied, 
be  supreme  in  southern  Europe  and  command  the 
Mediterranean.  The  Turk  would  thus  be  controlled 
and  Louis  would  occupy  a  paramount  position  in 
southern  Christendom.  It  was  therefore  at  once 
necessary  to  direct  the  policy  of  Spain,  and  to  re¬ 
organise  her  administration.  For  this  work  a  man 
was  required.  Louis  decided  with  characteristic 
decision  that  he  was  the  man.  From  1701  to  1709, 
in  answer  to  the  Spanish  Junta  which  begged  him  to 
assume  the  direction  of  affairs,  he  took  charge  of  the 
Spanish  monarchy  and  carried  on  the  administration 
of  the  Spanish  government.  All  attempts  at  reform, 


350 


Louis  XIV 


[1702 


however,  failed,  owing  to  intrigue  and  dissensions 
at  the  Spanish  Court,  till  the  intelligence  of  the  am¬ 
bassador  Amelot  triumphed  over  all  difficulties,  and 
for  the  moment  it  seemed  as  if  the  governmental 
machine  of  France  would  be  introduced  into  Spain. 
But  the  disasters  of  the  war  endangered  the  throne 
of  Philip  V.  and  the  security  even  of  that  of  Louis 
XIV.  Amelot’s  policy  was  interrupted.  Louis  was 
compelled  to  relinquish  his  schemes  for  the  complete 
regeneration  of  Spain  and  to  look  to  the  safety  of 
his  own  throne. 

Till  1709,  however,  Louis  endeavoured  to  carry 
out  the  superhuman  task  of  warring  against  united 
Europe  while  organising  in  the  smallest  details  an 
internal  revolution  in  Spain.  He  was  not  only  con¬ 
tent  to  direct  the  life  of  the  King  and  Queen  of 
Spain,  he  took  an  active  part  in  supervising  the 
whole  administration.  That  such  interference  would 
arouse  discontent  among  the  Spaniards  was  recog¬ 
nised  by  Louis,  but  he  hoped  that  in  consideration 
for  the  benefits  gained  by  Spain  from  the  French 
alliance,  Spain  would  acquiesce  in  his  supremacy, 
and  in  his  unremitting  intervention.  France  had 
placed  at  the  disposal  of  Spain  her  armies,  fleets, 
and  resources.  In  return  it  seemed  a  small  thing  to 
insist  upon  the  recognition  of  French  influence  in 
the  Spanish  councils. 

It  was  obvious  that  unless  thorough  and  sweeping 
reforms  were  at  once  carried  out,  the  close  union  of 
the  two  countries  would  only  result  in  the  ruin  of 
France.  Certainly  as  long  as  the  war  lasted,  excep¬ 
tional  measures  were  necessary,  and  Louis,  who  saw 


1702] 


The  Spajiish  Sticcessioii  War. 


351 


clearly  the  advantages  to  Spain  of  a  reorganisation 
of  the  government  in  every  particular,  naturally  ex¬ 
pected  the  hearty  co-operation  of  the  Spanish  nation. 
No  time  was  lost  in  further  considerations,  and 
Louis  promptly  began  his  attempt  to  guide  the  des¬ 
tinies  of  Spain. 

He  advised  the  immediate  creation  of  a  Supreme 
Council,  known  as  the  Despacho,  and  composed  of 
four  persons.  By  means  of  a  strong  executive  Louis 
hoped  that  the  necessary  reforms  might  be  carried 
out.  In  order  that  Spain  should  be  able  to  be  an 
efficient  ally,  her  finances  must  be  reorganised. 
Louis  therefore  appointed  to  this  task  Orri,  a 
laborious  administrator,  full  of  expedients  and  bent 
on  destroying  the  abuses  which  disgraced  the  finan¬ 
cial  system  of  Spain.  A  hard  and  insolent  reformer, 
Orri  became  at  once  unpopular.  Nevertheless  he 
began  the  work  of  reform,  which  was  continued  till 
the  outbreak  of  the  French  Revolution  by  a  series 
of  skilful  administrators.  Similar  reforms  were  to 
be  carried  out  in  the  army,  navy,  and  all  depart¬ 
ments  of  state.  Over  this  stupendous  work  the 
French  ambassador  was  to  preside.  He  was  to 
guide  the  King,  reorganise  the  Court,  supervise  the 
reforms,  and  be  present  at  the  meetings  of  the  Des¬ 
pacho.  He  was  to  be  in  frequent  communication 
with  Louis,  who  himself  issued  directions  on  every 
subject.  Never,  perhaps,  was  Louis’  love  of  the 
details  of  administration  so  clearly  illustrated.  He 
knew  all  about  the  personnel  of  the  Spanish  gov¬ 
ernment  ;  and  not  an  appointment  nor  a  dismissal 
took  place  without  his  authorisation.  To  govern 


352 


Louis  XIV. 


[1702 


Spain  from  Paris  was  a  herculean  task,  but  Louis 
did  not  shrink  from  it. 

While  Philip  was  in  Italy  from  February  to  De¬ 
cember,  1702,  Louis  not  only  directed  the  govern¬ 
ment  of  Spain,  but  also  carefully  organised  the 
details  of  Philip’s  expedition.  During  1702,  there¬ 
fore,  Louis  managed  the  affairs  of  France,  Spain, 
and  Italy.  But  Spain  occupied  most  of  his  atten¬ 
tion.  For  the  work  which  he  had  in  hand  the  choice 
of  efficient  agents  was  obviously  of  the  utmost  im¬ 
portance.  Harcourt,  most  unfortunately  for  the 
success  of  Louis’  policy,  fell  dangerously  ill  at  this 
critical  moment,  and  the  Comte  de  Marsin  was 
appointed  ambassador  with  instructions  not  to  inter¬ 
fere  directly  in  the  government  of  Spain,  but  merely 
to  offer  advice.  Louville  was  given  to  Philip  as  a 
councillor  and  private  friend,  and  Anne  Marie  de  la 
Tremoille,  Princesse  des  Ursins,  was  appointed 
attendant  of  the  young  Queen  Louise  of  Savoy. 

For  many  years  the  Court  of  Spain  lived  in  entire 
and  well-nigh  abject  dependence  upon  Louis.  This 
subordination,  however,  of  Spain  to  France  was 
never  popular  among  the  Spaniards  themselves. 
People  do  not  like  being  reformed  and  organised  by 
force,  and  the  Spaniards  of  all  people  required  very 
delicate  handling.  Full  of  pride,  their  suscepti¬ 
bilities  were  very  easily  wounded.  All  Louis’  at¬ 
tempts  to  unite  the  Spanish  and  French  aristocracy 
by  an  exchange  of  honours  and  decorations  failed  to 
prevent  continual  bickerings  and  feuds.  As  early  as 
the  end  of  1702,  before  the  reverses  to  the  French 
and  Spanish  armies  had  interfered  with  Louis’ 


1703] 


The  Spanish  Succession  War. 


353 


plans,  a  strong  opposition  to  his  policy  had  showed 
itself,  and  many  Spaniards,  already  weary  of  the 
French  domination,  spoke  of  .the  Archduke  as  a  pos¬ 
sible  King  of  Spain.  This  public  discontent  was  far 
harder  to  grapple  with  than  the  attempts  of  either 
Philip  or  his  Queen  to  secure  a  small  modicum  of 
independence.  Early  in  1703  a  palace  intrigue, 
fomented  by  the  ambitious  Princesse  des  Ursins, 
resulted  in  the  temporary  overthrow  of  the  Despacho, 
and  the  retirement  of  Porto-Carrero.  This  insubor¬ 
dination  was  at  once  checked  by  Louis.  Portocar- 
rero  was  recalled,  the  Despacho  re-established,  and 
the  Court  of  Madrid  was  never  so  submissive  to  that 
of  Versailles  as  during  the  rest  of  the  year  1703. 

In  matters  of  Spanish  foreign  policy,  Louis  was 
equally  all  powerful.  He  promised  Guelders  and 
Limbourg  to  the  Elector  of  Bavaria  with  the  title 
of  hereditary  governor  of  the  Low  Countries.  No 
question  of  importance  was  settled  in  Spain  without 
his  advice  being  asked,  and  on  the  occurrence  of  the 
disaster  of  Vigo  Bay  a  letter  arrived  from  Louis  to 
Philip  in  which  he  gave  directions  with  reference  to 
the  remnant  of  the  treasure,  which  had  arrived  in 
Spain. 

The  years  1703  and  1704  formed  a  critical  period 
in  the  history  of  Louis’  relations  with  Spain.  The 
allegiance  of  even  Castille  to  Philip  was  not  assured, 
that  of  the  other  provinces  was  more  than  doubtful. 
Nor  was  Louis  fortunate  in  the  choice  of  his  repre¬ 
sentatives  at  Madrid.  Marsin  had  given  way  to  the 
Cardinal  d’Estr^es,  whom  Louis  considered  to  be 
a  most  capable  envoy,  and  whom  Saint-Simon 


354 


Louis  XIV. 


[1703 


describes  as  being  “  vif,  ardent,  bouillant,  haut  k  la 
main,  accoutume  a  decider,  souvent  trop  de  feu  en 
se  traitant  les  affaires.”  But  his  sojourn  in  Spain 
was  short,  and  his  successor,  the  Abbe  d’Estr^es,  after 
nearly  a  year’s  residence  in  Madrid,  gave  way  to  the 
Due  de  Gramont,  whose  embassy  ended  in  the 
spring  of  1705. 

This  task  of  administering  the  Spanish  Empire 
from  Paris  would  have  taxed  all  the  energies  of 
Louis  and  his  ministers  in  peaceful  times  ;  as  it  was 
one  can  only  wonder  at  the  temerity  with  which 
such  a  task  was  undertaken  during  a  European  war. 
By  the  end  of  1702  Louis  knew  all  the  details  of  the 
personal  administration  of  Spain,  and  no  appoint¬ 
ment  was  made,  and  no  dismissal  was  effected,  with¬ 
out  his  sanction.  The  nomination  to  the  archbishop¬ 
ric  of  Seville  was  approved  by  him,  he  drew  up  a  list 
of  the  Gentlemen  of  the  King’s  Bedchamber,  he 
fixed  upon  the  President  of  the  Council  of  Finances. 
The  saying  of  the  French  envoy  in  Spain  accurately 
represents  the  position  of  affairs:  “We  wait,”  says 
he,  “  for  the  decision  of  the  King  on  all  points.” 

During  these  years  palace  intrigues  and  dissen¬ 
sions  between  Louville,  the  Princesse  des  Ursins, 
the  Cardinal,  and  Abbe  d’Estrees  went  far  to  com¬ 
promise  the  work  begun  by  Louis  XIV.  The  vio¬ 
lence  of  the  Cardinal  and  I.ouville,  though  for  a 
time  successful,  made  the  French  influence  very 
unpopular.  The  recall  of  the  Cardinal  in  October, 
1703,  followed  by  that  of  Louville  three  months 
later,  and  the  brief  exile  of  the  Princesse  des  Ursins 
early  in  1704,  brought  about  by  the  Abbd  d’Estr^es, 


1704] 


The  Spanish  Succession  War. 


355 


only  increased  the  discord  at  the  Spanish  Court. 
The  recall  of  the  Abb^  d’Estrdes,  who  had  become 
hateful  to  Philip  and  his  Queen,  owing  to  the  part 
he  had  taken  in  the  opposition  to  the  exiled 
princess,  was  followed  by  further  intrigues.  The 
Due  de  Gramont  was  distinctly  not  the  man  for  the 
crisis.  “  II  avoit  pour  lui,”  says  Saint-Simon,  “  son 
nom,  sa  dignity,  et  une  figure  avantageuse,  mas  rien 
de  plus.”  He  plunged  into  the  labyrinth  of  palace 
intrigues,  formed  a  cabal,  the  object  of  which  was  to 
ruin  the  Queen’s  influence,  opposed  the  return  of 
the  Princesse  des  Ursins,  and  openly  declared  that 
Louis  governed  Spain  from  Paris.  All  the  ambas¬ 
sador’s  plans  failed ;  Louis  allowed  the  Princesse 
des  Ursins  to  return,  and  agreed  to  the  wishes  of 
Philip  and  the  Queen.  He  moreover  disavowed 
any  intention  of  openly  governing  Spain  from  Paris. 
De  Gramont,  finding  he  was  not  supported  by  his 
sovereign,  had  no  option  but  to  ask  for  his  recall. 

With  the  arrival  of  his  successor,  Amelot,  Marquis 
de  Gournay,  a  man  of  very  different  calibre  to  that 
of  his  predecessors,  begins  a  period  of  some  four 
years  when  the  plans  of  the  French  King  with  re¬ 
gard  to  Spain  on  the  whole  received  a  successful 
trial.  Though  hampered  by  disasters  in  the  field, 
the  policy  of  Louis,  as  carried  out  by  Amelot,  was 
not  only  extremely  valuable  at  the  time,  but  en¬ 
sured  for  Spain  immense  benefits  in  the  future. 
Amelot’s  embassy  brought  with  it  such  startling 
changes  that  it  might  almost  be  said  that  the  work 
of  reform  in  Spain  was  never  seriously  taken  in  hand 
till  his  arrival  at  Madrid  in  1705. 


356 


Lo2iis  XIV. 


[1705 


Before,  however,  Amelot  had  arrived,  Louis  had 
already  realised  that  the  war  was  likely  to  prove  far 
more  serious  for  France  than  any  previous  one. 
When  the  war  broke  out  it  might  at  first  sight  have 
appeared  likely  that  France  would  at  least  hold  her 
own.  She  had  all  the  resources  of  Spain  at  her 
back,  she  could  rely  on  the  support  of  Portugal 
and  Savoy,  and  above  all  among  her  allies  were 
numbered  the  Electors  of  Cologne  and  Bavaria. 
The  value  of  the  alliance  of  Bavaria  could  not  be 
over-rated.  By  it  Germany  was  divided  and  the 
road  to  Vienna  lay  open.  With  such  allies  the 
French  cause,  to  judge  from  previous  European 
contests,  might  appear  to  possess  the  elements  of 
success. 

But  the  war  had  hardly  passed  through  its  initial 
stages  when  it  was  seen  that  the  conditions  of  this 
new  contest  were  dissimilar  from  those  of  previous 
wars,  and  that  the  supremacy  of  France  was  likely 
to  be,  if  not  entirely  effaced,  at  any  rate  seriously 
diminished. 

The  true  causes  of  those  disasters  to  France  which 
left  her  at  the  Peace  of  Utrecht  shattered  and 
launched  on  that  downward  course  which  saw  her 
influence  in  Europe  destroyed  in  1763  and  her  mon¬ 
archy  overthrown  in  1792,  are  not  far  to  seek.  In 
the  first  place  the  England  of  Queen  Anne  was  very 
different  from  the  England  of  the  Stuarts  or  even 
from  the  England  of  William  III.  Strong  and 
united,  with  Scotland  no  longer  a  danger,  and  Ireland 
at  her  feet,  the  England  of  Marlborough,  Godolphin, 
and  Somers  was  a  formidable  foe.  And  if  England 


1705] 


The  Spanish  Sncccssion  War. 


357 


was  growing  in  strength,  her  rival  was  beginning  to 
feel  the  effects  of  a  long  period  of  despotic  rule, 
characterised  by  some  fatal  mistakes.  At  this  tre¬ 
mendous  crisis  France  felt  keenly  the  loss  of  the 
finest  elements  of  her  national  life,  of  which  she  had 
been  deprived  by  the  revocation  of  the  Edict  of 
Nantes.  Moreover,  at  the  very  outset  of  the  war, 
the  disorganisation  of  the  state  was  very  appar¬ 
ent.  At  a  time  when  great  statesmen  and  able 
administrators  were  required,  the  principal  offices  of 
the  government  were  held  by  a  Court  favourite. 
Louis’  ministers  and  generals,  though  in  many  cases 
capable  men,  could  not  compare  in  ability  with  Col¬ 
bert,  Louvois,  Lionne,  Conde,  and  Turenne.  Of  his 
four  Ministers  of  State,  Saint- Aignan,  Duke  of  Beau- 
villiers,  was  the  President  of  the  Council  of  Finance. 
The  son-in-law  of  Colbert  and  the  friend  of  Madame 
de  Maintenon,  Beauvilliers  had  gained  the  confidence 
of  the  King,  and  indeed  that  of  all  who  knew  him, 
by  his  high  character,  his  devotion  to  his  duties,  and 
his  modesty.  He  had  advised  Louis  not  to  accept 
the  Will,  and  he  was  strongly  opposed  to  the  ill- 
timed  recognition  of  the  Pretender.  Phelypeaux, 
Count  of  Pontchartrain,  the  Chancellor  of  France 
and  Minister  for  the  Marine  had  been  named  Con¬ 
troller-General  in  1689,  and  on  the  death  of  Seign- 
elay  he  was  also  given  the  post  of  Minister  of  the 
Marine  and  Minister  of  the  King’s  Palace.  In  1699 
Louis  had  relieved  him  of  all  his  offices  and  made 
him  Chancellor.  He  was  a  man  of  great  indepen¬ 
dence  of  character,  and  in  order  to  defend  the  liber¬ 
ties  of  the  Gallican  Church  had  even  resisted  the 


358 


Louis  XIV 


[1705 


bribes  of  Madame  de  Maintenon.  A  hard-working, 
well-informed  man,  he  was  for  those  days  remarkably 
honest,  and  had  a  conciliatory  manner  which  made 
him  popular.  Saint-Simon,  whose  friend  he  was, 
describes  his  character  in  flattering  terms.  Jean 
Baptiste  Colbert,  Marquis  of  Torcy,  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  had  seen  much  of  Europe,  having 
been  ambassador  in  England,  Denmark,  and  Por¬ 
tugal.  Of  all  Louis’  ministers  he  was  the  most  capa¬ 
ble,  and  showed  during  his  ministry  so  much  zeal 
for  the  welfare  of  France,  and  so  much  ability  in 
discharging  the  duties  of  his  office,  that  on  Louis’ 
death,  the  Duke  of  Orleans,  who  had  always  disliked 
him,  made  him  a  member  of  the  Council  of  Regency. 
The  fourth  minister,  Chamillard,  of  all  Louis’  min¬ 
isters,  was,  it  has  been  said,  the  most  modest  and  the 
least  capable.  In  1699  he  had  succeeded  Pontchar- 
train  as  Controller-General,  and  in  1700,  on  the  death 
of  Pomponne,  had  been  made  a  Minister  of  State. 
In  1701,  on  the  death  of  Barbezieux,  he  added  the 
duties  of  Minister  of  War  to  his  other  functions. 
The  friend  of  Madame  de  Maintenon  and  Beau- 
villiers,  he  had  never  desired  the  honours  that  were 
forced  upon  him.  Saint-Simon,  who  liked  him, 
speaks  highly  of  his  personal  qualities,  and  there  is 
no  doubt  that  the  much-abused  Chamillard  was  fully 
alive  to  his  unfitness  for  the  posts  of  Controller- 
General  and  Minister  of  War.  When  the  unfortu¬ 
nate  minister,  who  possessed  no  statesmanlike 
qualities,  shrank  from  the  responsibility  of  filling 
the  two  most  difficult  offices  in  the  Government, 
Louis,  unconscious  of  the  gravity  of  the  situation. 


1705] 


The  Spanish  Sticcession  War. 


359 


assured  Chamillard  of  his  support.  “Je  vous 
seconderai,”  he  graciously  said. 

Louis  had  for  so  many  years  been  assured  by 
Louvois,  that  he  had  himself  conducted,  often  from 
Versailles,  the  campaigns  of  his  armies,  that  he  seems 
not  to  have  realised  the  immense  value  of  the  ser¬ 
vices  of  his  late  Minister  of  War.  And  further  Louis 
does  not  seem  to  have  recognised  that  his  greatest 
military  successes  were  won  when  he  was  himself 
young,  strong,  active,  and  aided  by  the  advice  of  the 
greatest  military  organiser  of  the  century.  In  1701, 
all  was  changed,  though  he  alone  failed  apparently  to 
appreciate  the  fact  that  any  change  had  taken  place. 
His  personal  efforts,  backed  by  his  long  experience, 
were  but  poorly  seconded  by  the  incapable  and  timid 
Chamillard,  though  the  latter  was  aided  by  Chamlay, 
who  had  been  trained  by  Louvois.  “All  the  wheels 
of  the  machine  existed  but  the  principal  spring  was 
more  than  half  broken.”  Louis  had  undertaken  an 
impossible  task,  and  the  colossal  struggles  of  France 
were  unavailing.  Even  if  Louvois  had  been  alive, 
and  the  French  armies  had  been  led  by  Turenne  or 
Cond^,  it  would  have  taxed  all  the  efforts  of  the 
French  monarchy  to  combat  the  European  Coalition 
of  1701,  led  by  Marlborough  and  Eugene.  As  it 
was  Catinat  and  Boufflers  were  old,  and  Vendome, 
Villars,  Berwick,  Noailles,  and  Tesse  were  practically 
untried  men.  Though  before  long  Villars,  Vendome, 
and  Berwick  showed  that  they  were  great  command¬ 
ers,  and  the  art  of  war  received  some  brilliant  illus¬ 
trations  from  these  French  generals,  their  efforts  were 
from  the  first  checked  and  hampered  by  the  eleva- 


Louis  XIV. 


[1705 


360 

tion  of  men  like  Villeroy  to  the  supreme  command, 
by  the  lack  of  military  resources,  and  by  the  meddling 
and  inefficient  war  administration.  The  state  of 
things  in  many  points  anticipated  the  position  of 
affairs  in  1870.  From  Versailles  the  movements 
of  the  armies  were  directed  and  the  most  contradict¬ 
ing  orders  were  given.  At  Versailles,  too,  the 
knowledge  of  the  geography  of  Germany  was  of  a 
very  elementary  character.  As  might  be  expected, 
the  most  serious  mishaps  to  the  French  arms  were  the 
inevitable  result  of  this  mischievous  system.  Villars 
found  himself  in  1702  ordered  to  march  across  the 
Rhine  with  an  army,  the  ranks  of  which  were  half 
empty,  insufficiently  officered,  and  the  men  badly 
supplied  with  arms  and  even  clothing.  The  move¬ 
ments  of  1704  were  ruined  through  the  delay  caused 
by  the  chiefs  writing  for  orders  from  Versailles  and 
through  Villeroy  being  unable  to  understand  the 
drift  of  the  contradictory  directions  which  he  re¬ 
ceived.  In  i7o7Tess^  complained  that  for  seven  or 
eight  days  bread  and  water  had  been  the  only  food 
supplied  to  his  troops,  and  that  the  officers  could  not 
be  provided  with  any  horses.  Under  conditions 
such  as  these,  which  augured  ill  for  the  success  of 
the  French,  Louis  had  begun  his  herculean  task  of 
defying  all  Europe. 

Armies  had  to  be  provided  and  kept  up  in  Italy 
and  Flanders,  on  the  Rhine  and  in  Spain.  In 
Flanders  Boufflers,  who  had  distinguished  himself  by 
seizing  the  Barrier  towns  early  in  1701,  had,  after 
some  slight  successes  in  1701  and  1703,  suffered 
severe  reverses  at  the  hands  of  Marlborough,  who. 


VILLEROY. 

(From  an  illustration,  after  an  old  engraving,  in  Erdmannsdorfer’s 
Deutsche  Geschichte  von  16^8-1^40.) 


1702] 


The  Spanish  Succession  War. 


361 


by  the  end  of  1703,  had  driven  the  French  out  of  the 
Electorate  of  Cologne,  and  had  captured  Liege, 
Bonn,  and  Luxemberg,  and  had  occupied  all  Spanish 
Guelders.  But  these  reverses  were  not  entirely  due 
to  the  presence  of  Villeroy,  who  shared  the  chief 
command  with  Boufflers  in  the  Netherlands  in  1703, 
or  to  the  superior  generalship  of  Marlborough. 

It  had  been  decided  at  Versailles  that  decisive 
blows  were  to  be  struck  in  Germany  and  in  Italy. 
The  commanders  in  Flanders  were  ordered  to  remain 
on  the  defensive,  and  many  of  their  troups  were  sent 
to  reinforce  the  army  in  Alsace  under  Catinat.  The 
integrity  of  the  French  monarchy  had  just  received 
a  blow  in  the  loss  of  Landau,  and  the  Elector  of 
Bavaria  was  in  a  precarious  position,  exposed  to  the 
attacks  of  the  Imperialists.  Catinat  had  become 
timid  and  irresolute  at  a  moment  when  it  was  abso¬ 
lutely  necessary  to  take  the  offensive,  and  by  a  bold 
invasion  of  Germany  to  drive  back  the  Germans  and 
confirm  the  Bavarian  alliance.  Villars,  whose  skill 
and  audacity  were  well  known,  was  put  in  command 
of  an  expeditionary  force,  and  passing  the  Rhine  he 
inflicted  a  disastrous  defeat  upon  the  Imperialists  at 
Friedlingen  on  October  14,  1702.  The  equivocal 
conduct  of  the  irresolute  Elector  of  Bavaria,  who, 
instead  of  effecting  a  junction  with  Villars,  fell  back 
towards  Ingolstadt,  compelled  the  retirement  of  the 
French  into  Alsace.  The  next  year  saw  an  attempt 
to  carry  into  execution  one  of  the  most  brilliant 
conceptions  devised  during  the  war.  Like  Turenne 
in  1645,  and  like  Napoleon,  in  1809,  Villars  planned 
nothing  less  than  a  march  on  Vienna.  This  design, 


362 


Louis  XIV. 


[1703 


audacious  as  it  was  at  first  sight,  was  quite  feasible 
in  1703,  and  had  it  not  been  for  the  conduct  of  the 
Elector,  the  campaign  of  1809  might  have  been 
anticipated  by  a  series  of  movements  as  successful 
and  as  brilliant  as  those  executed  by  the  Emperor. 
At  the  beginning  of  1703  Villars  besieged  and  took 
Kehl  (March  12th),  and  having,  in  spite  of  the  mur- 
murings  at  Versailles  at  his  delay,  made  very  careful 
preparations,  he  crossed  the  Rhine  again  on  April 
5th,  and  effected  a  junction  with  the  Elector  at  Vil- 
lingen  on  May  6th.  No  time  could  have  been  more 
opportune  for  a  march  in  Vienna.  Before  the  year 
was  out  the  Hungarians  were  in  fierce  rebellion. 
In  Italy  the  Austrian  troops  were  fully  occupied, 
while  Louis  of  Baden  was  held  in  check  by  Tallard 
from  Alsace.  Villars  and  the  Elector  with  an  army 
of  40,000  men  were  now  in  the  centre  of  Germany, 
and  ready  to  strike  at  the  heart  of  the  Empire.  But 
jealousies  and  animosities  at  once  sprang  up  and 
interfered  with  the  successful  execution  of  any  plan 
of  operations. 

Villars’  project  can  best  be  learned  from  his  own 
words.  “  He  resolved,”  he  tells  us  in  his  memoirs, 
“  in  order  to  conceal  his  purpose  as  long  as  possible, 
to  extend  his  men  in  quarters  as  far  as  Ulm,  as 
though  his  principal  object  had  been  to  enable  his 
wearied  cavalry  to  recover  their  strength.  It  was 
then  settled  that  the  Elector  should  pass  some  days 
at  Munich,  that  the  Bavarian  army  should  spread 
itself  along  the  Danube  from  Ulm  to  Regensburg, 
and  that  about  June  ist  the  infantry  of  the  Elector, 
and  a  considerable  detachment  from  the  French 


1703] 


The  Spanish  Succession  War. 


o  A 
0^0 


army,  should  embark  in  boats  .  .  .  and  should 

descend  on  Passau,  meeting  some  of  the  Elec¬ 
tor’s  troops  on  the  Inn,  and  all  the  necessary 
artillery  which  was  at  Braunau,  a  fortified  place  on 
the  Inn.  By  carrying  out  this  project  Passau  would 
certainly  be  taken  within  three  days  :  Linz,  as  weak 
a  place,  would  fall,  and  Vienna  could  be  quickly 
reached.”  Villers,  who  had  himself  lived  in  Vienna 
for  three  years,  was  convinced  that  its  capture  would 
be  an  easy  matter,  and  like  Turenne  and  Napoleon 
he  had  grasped  the  importance  of  the  iq^per  valley 
of  the  Danube  and  realised  that  its  occupation  prac¬ 
tically  placed  Vienna  at  his  mercy. 

Eugfene  years  later  himself  allowed  that  Villars’ 
magnificent  project  could  have  been  carried  out. 
“  The  Emperor  Leopold  thought  Vienna  was  so  cer¬ 
tain  to  fall  that  he  was  about  to  leave  it.  .  .  . 

The  only  troops  available  to  defend  the  city  were  a 
few  recruits  on  the  way  to  join  their  regiments.” 

But  unfortunately,  after  much  hesitation,  the  Elec¬ 
tor  had  made  up  his  mind  to  adopt  another  plan. 
He  proposed  to  effect  a  junction  with  Vendome’s 
troops  and  then  to  penetrate  into  Austria  by  way  of 
the  Tyrol.  In  June,  Villars  being  left  to  protect 
Bavaria,  the  Elector  marched  to  join  Vendome  at 
Brixen.  But  the  latter  never  got  further  than  Trent, 
and  the  Elector  was  checked  by  the  rising  of 
the  Tyrolese.  The  defection  of  the  Duke  of 
Savoy  compelled  Vendome  to  make  a  hurried  re¬ 
treat  and  Maximilian  found  that  any  attempt  to 
advance  through  the  Tyrol  would  result  in  the  loss 
of  all  his  army.  Meanwhile,  though  the  position  of 


364 


Louis  XIV. 


[1703 


Villars  on  the  Danube  had  become  perilous  in  the 
extreme,  with  his  accustomed  daring  he  still  hoped 
to  carry  out  his  great  project.  Though  threatened 
by  the  forces  of  Louis  of  Baden  and  Count  Styrum^ 
he  proposed  to  the  Elector  to  take  advantage  of  the 
Hungarian  revolt  and  to  march  on  Vienna.  “  Let 
us  make  two  armies,”  was  his  advice  to  Maximilian, 
“  it  is  possible  to  defend  Bavaria  with  one  ;  let  .the 
other  march  into  the  Austrian  dominions.  You  will 
meet  30,000  Hungarians  in  rebellion.  An  army  of 
the  enemy  must  be  directed  to  defend  Austria ;  and 
meanwhile  the  Duke  of  Burgundy  who  has  taken 
Brisach  and  has  no  foe  in  his  front,  will  invade  the 
Empire.” 

But  not  receiving  any  reinforcements  from  Tallard 
(who  served  under  Burgundy)  or  any  co-operation 
from  the  Elector,  Villars  was  left  to  extricate  him¬ 
self  from  his  position  between  an  enemy  in  his  front 
and  one  in  his  rear.  On  September  20th  he  com¬ 
pletely  defeated  Count  Styrum  at  Hochstadt,  and 
shortly  afterwards  he  resigned  his  command  and  re¬ 
turned  to  Versailles  and  was  succeeded  by  Marsin. 
There  is  little  doubt  that  had  Villars  been  properly 
supported  from  Versailles,  had  he  been  ably  seconded 
by  Vendome  and  Tallard,  and  had  his  plans  not  been 
frustrated  by  the  Elector  of  Bavaria,  the  war  which 
terminated  in  1714  might  have  ended  in  1703.  No 
doubt  Villars’  inability  to  secure  the  hearty  co-opera¬ 
tion  of  the  incapable  and  vacillating  Maximilian  was 
due  in  some  measure  to  his  own  impatient  temper 
and  want  of  tact.  Still,  in  spite  of  Villars’  short¬ 
comings,  his  conception  of  a  decisive  march  on 


1704] 


The  Spanish  Succession  JVar.  365 


Vienna  was  admirable,  and  France  lost  in  1703  a 
grand  opportunity  of  compelling  the  Emperor  to 
sue  for  peace. 

The  events  of  1704  demonstrated  clearly  the  value 
of  the  services  of  Villars  and  proved  the  turning- 
point  in  the  war.  An  advance  on  Vienna  was  again 
meditated,  but  Marsin  was  probably  incapable  of 
carrying  out  a  great  design,  and  he  was  as  usual  ham¬ 
pered  by  want  of  soldiers,  of  money,  and  of  munitions 
of  war.  The  allies,  however,  had  by  this  time  realised 
the  serious  results  which  might  flow  from  these  un¬ 
checked  operations  on  the  Danube.  Marlborough’s 
famous  march  to  the  Danube  was  followed  by  the 
devastation  of  Bavaria  and  the  battle  of  Blenheim. 
The  defeat  of  the  French  saved  the  Empire  and 
Vienna  from  French  invasion,  and  placed  Bavaria 
in  subjection  to  the  Emperor.  Tallard  was  taken 
prisoner,  Landau  was  recaptured  by  Baden,  and  Trar- 
bach  and  Treves  were  reduced  by  Marlborough  and 
the  Emperor.  Leopold  erected  a  statue  on  the  field 
of  battle  with  the  inscription  :  Agnoscat  tandem 
Ludoviens  XIV.  neminem  debere,  ante  obitnm,  aut 
feliccm,  ant  magnum  vocari. 

Early  in  1705  Amelot  arrived  in  Spain,  but  the 
condition  of  affairs  both  there  and  in  Europe  gener¬ 
ally,  were  extremely  unpropitious  for  the  inaugura¬ 
tion  of  his  master’s  system.  Louis’  anxieties,  heavy 
enough  already  owing  to  the  defections  of  Savoy 
and  Portugal  in  1703,  the  landing  of  the  Archduke 
in  Spain,  the  rising  in  the  Cevennes,  and  the  loss  of 
Gibraltar  in  1704  had  been  greatly  increased  by  the 
defeat  at  Blenheim  and  the  necessity  of  defending 


Lotiis  XIV 


[1705 


366 

the  Rhine  frontier.  Though  Vendome  to  some  ex¬ 
tent  restored  the  French  cause  in  Italy  by  the  battle 
of  Cassano  in  August,  1705,  and  though  Villars’  suc¬ 
cessful  campaign  on  the  frontier  of  Lorraine  had 
frustrated  the  hopes  of  the  allies  and  had  produced 
an  excellent  effect,  the  gravity  of  the  situation  was 
such  that  it  was  very  remarkable  that  Louis  should 
have  continued  to  carry  out  with  calmness  and  firm¬ 
ness  his  schemes  for  the  reorganisation  of  Spain. 

Within  Spain  itself  there  seemed  less  chance  of 
carrying  through  a  successful  reform  policy  in  1705 
than  in  1701. 

By  1705  the  scandalous  intrigues  of  the  French  at 
Madrid  had  alienated  a  large  number  of  Spaniards, 
who  forgot  the  great  advantages  which  Spain  de¬ 
rived  from  Louis’  assistance  in  arms  and  money. 
The  enthusiasm  with  which  the  accession  of  Philip 
V.  had  been  greeted  had  subsided,  and  the  partisans 
of  the  House  of  Austria  were  encouraged.  A  strong 
anti-French  party  was  openly  formed  and  grew 
upon  the  discontent  caused  by  the  loss  of  Gibraltar, 
the  increasing  disbelief  in  the  power  of  Louis  XIV., 
and  the  discord  in  the  Court. 

All  the  more  credit  is  then  due  to  Louis  and 
Amelot,  the  former  for  encouraging,  the  latter  for 
carrying  out  a  work  which  bestowed  immense  bene¬ 
fits  on  Spain.  Amelot’s  indomitable  courage  sur¬ 
mounted  all  difficulties,  and  in  spite  of  the  continued 
failure  of  the  French  and  Spanish  armies,  and  of  the 
fierce  opposition  within  Spain  itself,  he  accomplished 
so  many  real  reforms  that  it  may  be  said  that  mod¬ 
ern  Spain  dates  from  his  period  of  office.  Under 


1705] 


The  Spanish  Succession  War.  ^67 

his  influence  Spain  began  to  be  rapidly  transformed. 
The  industries,  letters,  arts,  and  to  some  extent  the 
institutions  of  France  were  introduced,  and  it  has 
been  truly  asserted  that  had  it  not  been  for  the 
terrible  disasters  experienced  by  the  Spanish  and 
French  armies,  which  led  to  his  recall,  and  in  part 
to  a  modification,  and  in  part  to  a  postponement  of 
all  his  schemes  of  reform,  Amelot  would  have 
proved  himself  the  Colbert  of  Spain. 

He  was  recognised  by  Saint-Simon  as  a  man  of 
honour,  of  sense,  possessed  of  considerable  enlight¬ 
enment,  and  endowed  with  great  power  of  work.  He 
had  had  a  legal  education,  and  owed  his  advance¬ 
ment  to  merit  alone.  His  modesty  and  natural 
urbanity  did  not  prevent  him  from  adhering  firmly 
to  any  resolution  which  an  unerring  instinct  showed 
him  was  right.  His  simplicity,  sagacity,  straight¬ 
forwardness,  and  trustworthiness  had  enabled  him  to 
succeed,  in  spite  of  his  want  of  family  connection,  in 
whatever  he  had  undertaken.  His  residence  in 
Spain  afforded  fresh  proof  of  the  success  which  had 
ever  attended  his  efforts,  and  was  marked  by  the 
inauguration  of  reforms  which  were  continued  by 
Alberoni  and  the  statesmen  who  came  after  him. 

During  the  preceding  four  years  Louis  XIV. ’s 
views  regarding  Spain  had  undergone  considerable 
modifications.  He  had  learned  much  of  the  temper 
of  the  inhabitants  and  of  the  methods  of  the  gov¬ 
ernment,  which  was  new  to  him.  He  had,  moreover, 
gauged  to  some  extent  the  character  of  Philip  V. 
and  the  capacities  of  his  various  councillors.  He 
had  made  many  false  steps.  He  had  formed  not  a 


Louis  XIV. 


11705 


368 

few  erroneous  opinions.  His  schemes  for  the  thor¬ 
ough  reorganisation  of  Spain  on  French  lines  had 
obviously  failed.  It  was  necessary  to  acknowledge 
that  failure.  And  in  1705  it  was  more  than  ever 
necessary  to  look  facts  in  the  face,  and  to  recognise 
boldly  that  the  situation  in  Spain  was  most  critical. 
Its  revenues  had  not  increased  since  the  death  of 
Charles  II.,  its  leading  governmental  departments 
remained  in  a  state  of  chaos.  Had  the  Archduke 
Charles  made  a  bold  bid  for  the  throne  of  Spain  in 
the  spring  of  1705,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  Philip 
could  have  resisted  the  attempt.  None  of  the 
haughty  Spanish  grandees  who  surrounded  their 
king  were  remarkable  for  statesmanlike  qualities.  It 
was  clear  that  the  country  could  not  be  saved  by  the 
men  who  formed  the  Spanish  Court.  It  was  there¬ 
fore  necessary  to  inaugurate  a  new  political  system 
in  accordance  with  which  Philip  should  ostensibly 
govern  Spain,  while  increased  powers  should  be 
given  to  the  French  ambassador,  who  should  be  prac¬ 
tically  the  First  Minister  of  the  Spanish  monarchy. 

Louis  had,  moreover,  recognised  that  it  was  not 
possible  for  him  to  carry  out  his  policy  without  the 
assistance  of  the  Princesse  des  Ursins.  She  was  in¬ 
dispensable  to  the  success  of  his  schemes.  The 
appointment  of  Amelot  was  approved  by  her,  and 
in  her  hands  was  practically  left  the  composition  of 
the  new  Spanish  ministry.  Henceforward  by  means 
of  the  Princess  and  of  Amelot,  Louis  proposed  to 
govern  Spain.  The  Princess  solemnly  promised 
Louis  to  act  in  perfect  harmony  with  Amelot,  and 
she  returned  to  Spain  in  August,  1705. 


1705] 


The  Spanish  Succession  War. 


369 


It  was  a  bold  experiment,  but  its  success  justified 
Louis’  decision.  The  King,  it  was  stated  in  Ame- 
lot’s  instructions,  was  so  satisfied  with  the  solid 
qualities  of  the  Princess  and  her  knowledge  of  Span¬ 
ish  affairs,  that  he  thought  he  could  not  do  better 
than  send  her  back  to  Madrid  at  once.  Having 
decided  that  the  Princess  and  Amelot  were  to  be 
the  organs  of  the  French  government  in  Madrid,  the 
work  of  reforming  and  reorganising  the  whole  gov¬ 
ernmental  machine  was  promptly  taken  in  hand.  A 
new  Despacho  was  formed,  consisting  of  five  mem¬ 
bers,  but  practically  controlled  by  Amelot ;  a  French 
Jesuit,  Pfere  Robinet,  succeeded  Daubenton  as 
Philip’s  confessor,  and  changes  were  made  in  almost 
all  departments  which  were  calculated  to  insure 
efificiency  in  the  Spanish  state  system.  The  moving 
spirit  was,  however,  Amelot,  acting  in  accordance 
with  the  views  of  the  Princesse  des  Ursins,  which 
she  had  previously  expressed  to  Louis.  “  La  Prin¬ 
cesse  des  Ursins,”  wrote  Louis  to  his  embassador  in 
June,  1765,  “a  propose  ce  que  je  vous  ^cris.”* 

The  programme  of  the  new  government  was  am¬ 
bitious  enough  even  for  peaceful  times.  It  consisted 
of  nothing  short  of  the  introduction  of  the  French 
system  of  government  into  Spain.  For  the  estab¬ 
lishment  of  this  system  three  things  were  necessary: 
the  humiliation  of  the  nobles  and  of  the  religious 
orders,  and  their  complete  subordination  to  the  cen¬ 
tral  authority,  and  the  destruction  of  the  provincial 


*For  an  excellent  account  of  Louis’  policy  to  Spain  see  A.  Bau- 
drillart,  rhilippe  J".  el  la  Cour  de  France,  Vol.  /. 


370 


Louis  XIV. 


[1706 


liberties  of  the  non-Castilian  portion  of  Spain.  The 
nobles  feared  the  introduction  of  the  French  mon¬ 
archical  spirit,  and  viewed  any  attempt  at  change  with 
great  suspicion.  Louis’  directions  to  Amelot  fully 
justified  these  suspicions,  and  are  interesting  as 
throwing  light  on  his  own  fatal  policy  to  the  French 
nobility.  “You  must,”  he  wrote,  “  preserve  all  the 
external  prerogatives  of  their  dignity,  and  at  the 
same  time  exclude  them  from  all  matters  on  which 
their  knowledge  would  tend  to  increase  their  repu¬ 
tation.” 

To  prevent  the  Spanish  nobles  taking  any  part  in 
state  affairs,  to  destroy  all  union  between  them,  and 
to  leave  them  a  useless  and  harmless  appendage  of 
the  Court  was  the  definite  aim  of  Louis’  representa¬ 
tive  in  Spain.  The  opposition  of  the  nobles  to  the 
introduction  of  the  French  monarchical  system,  and 
that  of  the  religious  orders  to  any  attempt  to  force 
upon  them  the  position  of  the  Gallican  clergy,  was, 
however,  as  nothing  compared  with  the  difficulties 
to  be  apprehended  from  any  attempt  to  change  the 
provincial  institutions  and  liberties.  But  during  the 
course  of  a  long  and  terrible  war  it  is  impossible  to 
inaugurate  changes  of  a  sweeping  character,  and  the 
military  disasters  of  1706  interfered  largely  with 
Louis’  hopes  of  carrying  out  fully  his  schemes  for 
Spanish  reform.  Philip’s  failure  to  regain  Barcelona 
in  May  was  the  beginning  of  a  series  of  disasters. 
On  May  nth,  the  day  on  which  the  siege  of  Barce¬ 
lona  had  been  raised,  a  total  eclipse  of  the  sun  took 
place.  As  the  sun  in  his  glory  was  Louis’  favourite 
emblem,  the  eclipse  was  thought  to  portend  further 


1706] 


The  Spanish  Siiccession  War. 


371 


disasters  to  tfie  French  cause.  The  Anglo-Portu- 
guese  army,  after  taking  Salamanca,  pushed  on,  and 
the  Archduke  was  proclaimed  king  of  Spain  in 
Madrid  on  June  25th.  All  reforms  were  thrown  to 
the  winds,  and  the  abolition  of  the  privileges  of  the 
Catalans  was  indefinitdy  postponed.  Aragon  in¬ 
clined  towards  the  side  of  the  Archduke,  Catalonia 
and  Valencia  openly  declared  for  him.  Philip 
showed  unexpected  courage  and  energy,  and  was 
warmly  praised  by  his  grandfather.  News  of  the 
failure  of  Philip  at  Barcelona,  and  of  the  disaster  of 
Ramillies,  had  reached  the  F'rench  King  on  the  same 
day.  But  Louis  was  always  seen  at  his  best  in  the 
hour  of  adversity.  He  surveyed  the  position  of 
affairs  with  dignity  and  calmness,  and  urged  Philip 
to  guard  against  capture  by  his  enemies.  “  All 
depends,”  he  wrote,  “  upon  the  preservation  of  your 
person.”  “  We  have  not,”  he  added,  “  been  success¬ 
ful  in  Flanders  ;  it  is  necessary  to  submit  to  the 
judgment  of  Providence.” 

The  Spanish  monarchy  seemed  at  its  last  gasp, 
and  the  wildest  expectations  of  the  allies  likely  to 
be  realised.  Madrid  was  in  the  hands  of  the  Arch¬ 
duke,  and  Philip  and  his  Queen  were  fugitives.  The 
fidelity  of  the  Spanish  grandees  was  shaken,  and 
many  of  them  hastened  to  recognise  the  Archduke 
as  king  of  Spain.  Even  the  aged  Porto-Carrero  gave 
his  allegiance  to  Charles.  But  Philip  showed  un¬ 
expected  energy,  and  the  loyalty  of  the  Castilian 
people  never  wavered.  The  fury  of  the  Madrid 
populace  was  indeed  such  that  the  Archduke  and 
his  army  could  barely  get  the  necessaries  of  life,  and 


Louis  XIV. 


[1706 


11 - 

the  occupation  of  Madrid  by  the  foreigner  was  of 
very  short  duration. 

But  the  disasters  of  1706  had  convinced  Louis  of 
the  necessity  of  peace.  One  French  army  under 
Villeroy  had  been  defeated  in  May  at  Ramillies,  and 
another  under  Orleans  and  Marsin  had  been  over¬ 
thrown  in  September  at  Turin.  The  Netherlands 
were  lost,  and  the  French  cause  in  Italy  was  ruined. 
Madrid  had  been  occupied  by  the  Archduke,  and 
Berwick  had  been  driven  back  into  the  west  from 
Portugal.  These  successive  disasters  seemed  likely 
to  overwhelm  France,  and  to  bring  about  a  speedy 
close  of  the  war.  Villars  alone  had  gained  successes, 
and  had  not  only  driven  the  Germans  beyond  the 
Rhine,  but  had  even  contemplated  taking  the  ag¬ 
gressive.  But  in  spite  of  this  gleam  of  success  it 
seemed  impossible  for  France,  crippled  as  she  was, 
to  continue  the  war.  Louis  had  justification  when 
he  wrote  in  October  that  the  government  could  no 
longer  carry  on  hostilities,  and  that  he  had  proposed 
to  the  English  and  Dutch  that  negotiations  for  peace 
should  be  opened.  But  no  treaty  could  be  signed 
unless  Philip  was  prepared  to  sacrifice  a  portion  of 
his  dominions.  However,  the  allies  refused  to  treat, 
and  nothing  was  left  to  Louis  but  to  carry  on  war¬ 
like  operations  with  vigour.  The  allies  paid  dearly 
for  their  error.  Flushed  with  success,  they  had 
missed  an  excellent  opportunity  of  securing  more 
than  their  just  share  of  the  spoils  of  war.  The  for¬ 
tunes  of  France  and  Spain  were  at  their  lowest  ebb 
in  1706. 

With  the  year  1707  matters  began  to  mend,  and 


1707] 


The  Spanish  Succession  War. 


373 


though  Louis  experienced  disasters,  he  was  never 
reduced  to  the  position  of  1706.  The  King  and 
ministers  made  prodigious  efforts.  Though  ex¬ 
hausted  and  badly  administered,  France  had  still 
immense  resources,  and  thousand  of  recruits  joined 
the  armies.  In  April,  1707,  the  victory  of  Almanza, 
with  which  the  name  of  Berwick  will  ever  be  associ¬ 
ated,  proved  even  more  decisive  than  Blenheim.  It 
assured  the  throne  of  Spain  to  the  House  of  Bour¬ 
bon,  and  enabled  the  interrupted  reforms  of  Amelot 
to  be  continued.  Aragon  and  Valencia  returned  to 
their  allegiance  to  Philip,  and  many  of  their  privi¬ 
leges  were  suppressed.  A  great  step  was  taken 
towards  that  centralisation  of  powers  at  Madrid 
which  Louis  had  always  advocated,  and  which 
Amelot  was  enabled  in  part  to  carry  out.  The  con¬ 
stitution  of  Castile  was  solemnly  promulgated  in 
Valencia  and  at  Saragossa,  and  was  henceforth  ac¬ 
cepted  in  the  kingdom  of  Spain.  Thus  the  political 
results  of  Almanza  were  of  vast  importance  to  Spain 
and  in  their  later  effects  proved  the  wisdom  of 
Louis’  views  with  regard  to  the  necessary  reforms  in 
that  country.  But  though  success  had  begun  to 
attend  the  efforts  of  Louis  in  the  Spanish  peninsula, 
he  was  not  deterrred  from  carrying  out  a  new  policy 
with  regard  to  Italy.  It  had  become  quite  apparent 
to  the  French  king  that  it  was  impossible  for  him  to 
carry  on  war  successfully  at  four  different  centres. 
The  foreign  policy  of  both  Richelieu  and  Mazarin 
had  been  marred  by  a  similar  attempt,  and  very 
wisely  in  1706  Louis  had  determined  to  withdraw 
from  Italy,  and  to  employ  the  released  troops  on 


374 


Louis  XIV. 


[1707 


his  exposed  north-eastern  frontier  and  in  Spain.  He 
fully  realised  that  before  peace  could  be  made 
Philip  would  be  compelled  to  consent  to  some  parti¬ 
tion  of  his  dominions.  The  evacuation  of  Italy 
would  no  doubt  leave  that  country  in  the  hands  of 
Austria,  but  Spain  would  be  preserved  to  Philip,  and 
France  would  be  saved  avast  expenditure  of  money 
and  the  sacrifice  of  a  large  number  of  soldiers. 

The  evacuation  of  Italy,  arranged  in  March,  1707, 
by  the  convention  of  Milan — so  justly  attacked  by 
English  writers  as  an  act  of  treachery  on  the  part  of 
the  Emperor,  was  undoubtedly  a  wise  action  on 
the  part  of  Louis,  though  Philip  himself  naturally 
resented  the  unopposed  occupation  of  north  Italy 
by  the  Austrians  and  the  inevitable  seizure  of 
Naples.  Philip’s  worst  fears  were  soon  realised. 
The  retirement  of  the  French  from  Italy  was  fol¬ 
lowed  in  August  not  only  by  the  loss  of  Milan,  but 
by  the  further  loss  of  Naples,  while  the  Duke  of 
Savoy  invaded  Provence  and  besieged  Toulon.  The 
Whigs,  too,  delighted  at  the  victory  of  Ramillies, 
took  up  a  more  hostile  attitude  than  ever  towards 
Louis,  and  in  October  passed  their  celebrated  reso¬ 
lution  that  no  peace  “  can  be  safe  or  honourable  for 
her  Majesty  and  her  allies,  if  Spain  and  the  Spanish 
West  Indies  be  suffered  to  continue  in  the  power  of 
the  House  of  Bourbon.” 

But  on  the  whole  the  year  1707  was  favourable  to 
the  French.  The  inroad  into  Provence  and  the 
attack  on  Toulon  failed,  owing  to  the  resistance  of 
Tesse  and  to  a  quarrel  between  Amadeus  and 
Eugfene.  The  allies  retired  discomfited  behind  the 


1707] 


The  Spanish  Succession  War. 


375 


Alps,  and  the  English  fleet  failed  to  supply  the 
Camisards  with  arms.  Moreover,  a  great  French 
army  in  the  Low  Countries  had,  under  the  skilful 
leadership  of  Vendome,  kept  invasion  back,  and 
even  advanced  to  the  Sambre,  and  Villars  on  the 
Rhine  successfully  assailed  the  lines  constructed 
from  Stolhofen  to  Kehl  and  the  Black  Forest,  and 
invaded  Germany  with  the  object  of  combining  his 
operations  with  those  of  Charles  XII.,  or  at  any  rate 
of  aiding  the  revolted  Hungarians.  He  levied  con¬ 
tributions  in  Swabia  and  Wtirtemberg,  and  filled  the 
coflers  of  the  army.  If  Charles  XH.  had  effected 
the  desired  junction  at  Nuremberg,  Vienna  would 
have  fallen,  and  the  Swedish  King  would  have  been 
master  of  the  Empire.  But  the  influence  of  Marl¬ 
borough  turned  Charles  from  the  French  alliance, 
and  Villars’  hopes  were  again  disappointed.  If  he 
had  to  fall  back  across  the  Rhine  on  the  approach 
of  a  strong  force  under  the  Elector  of  Hanover,  his 
campaigns  had  inspired  his  troops  with  fresh 
courage. 

Though  the  Spanish  monarchy  had  lost  Milan 
through  the  retirement  of  the  French,  and  in  August 
of  the  same  year  Naples,  the  loss  of  which  was  hast¬ 
ened  by  the  hostility  of  Clement  XI.  to  the  Bourbon 
Church  policy,  Philip  V.  found  himself  at  the  end 
more  secure  in  his  possession  of  the  Spanish  throne 
than  he  was  at  the  beginning  of  1707.  On  his 
reiterated  requests,  Louis  agreed,  in  1708,  to  recon¬ 
sider  the  question  of  interfering  actively  in  Italy. 
There  the  overbearing  conduct  of  the  Emperor  had 
produced  deep  discontent  among  the  Italian  states. 


376 


Louis  XIV. 


[1708 


But  Louis  was  unwilling  to  risk  men  and  money 
unless  he  could  be  sure  that  the  Italians  had  thrown 
off  their  habitual  lethargy.  Tess^  was  sent  to  report 
on  the  condition  of  the  Italian  peninsula,  where  he 
found  everywhere  divisions,  uncertainty,  and  general 
want  of  energy.  The  Emperor  had  ordered  a  con¬ 
siderable  army  to  march  into  Italy  to  consolidate 
his  conquests,  and  unless  Louis  did  the  same  the 
Italians  would  naturally  side  with  the  Imperial 
cause.  Louis  dfd  not  send  troops,  and  adhered  to 
the  policy  inaugurated  by  the  convention  of  Milan. 
Clement  XL  was  compelled  to  recognise  the  Arch¬ 
duke  as  king  of  Spain.  The  year  1708  was  indeed 
not  only  marked  by  political  failure,  but  also  by 
military  disasters.  The  carefully  prepared  expedi¬ 
tion  to  Scotland  on  behalf  of  James  Edward  failed 
through  the  sudden  indisposition  of  that  prince,  and 
the  complete  supremacy  of  England  on  the  sea, 
while  the  campaign  in  Flanders  ended  in  the  defeat 
of  Oudenarde,  the  capture  of  Lille,  and  the  invasion 
of  France.  These  continued  disasters  again  brought 
forward  the  question  of  peace.  Louis  was  anxious 
to  bring  the  war  to  a  close  ;  he  was  prepared  to 
agree  to  the  partition  of  the  Spanish  Empire ;  he 
was  ready  to  accept  as  Philip’s  share  Naples,  Sicily, 
Sardinia,  and  the  Tuscan  presidencies. 

On  one  occasion,  when  some  one  spoke  of  found¬ 
ing  another  Saint-Cyr,  Madame  de  Maintenon  said 
that  there  were  other  things  much  more  urgent,  “  to 
secure  peace,  and  relieve  the  poor  people  of  their 
burdens.”  “Yes,”  added  Louis,  “that  is  what  a 
king  should  aim  at :  peace  in  his  kingdom,  and  relief 


THE  EMPEROR  JOSEPH  I. 

(Prom  a  print  reproduced  in  Philippson’s  Das  Zciialtcr  Litdwigs  XIV.') 


i 

I 

! 


'i 

I 

1 


1708] 


The  Spanish  Succession  War. 


377 


of  his  people.  But  to  obtain  these  advantages  for 
them  we  are  forced  against  our  will  to  oppress  them. 
We  want  peace,  but  a  good  peace,  and  I  ask  it  of 
God  continually,  who  alone  can  change  the  hearts  of 
those  who  oppose  it.” 

There  is  no  doubt  that  Louis  was  sincerely  anxious 
for  peace.  The  terrible  winter  of  1708-9  only  con¬ 
firmed  him  in  his  pacific  views.  The  Court  was  the 
scene  of  cabals  and  intrigues.  The  ministers  Beau- 
villiers,  Torcy,  Pontchartrain  and  Chamillard  were 
opposed  by  the  Duke  of  Maine,  Boufflers,  Huxelles, 
Harcourt,  and  Villeroy.  There  was  even  a  division 
of  opinion  among  the  ministers  themselves.  Chamil¬ 
lard  desired  peace  at  any  price.  Spain  he  regarded 
as  a  useless  encumbrance,  and  he  desired  to  break 
off  the  close  alliance  between  her  and  France.  The 
state  of  the  finances  was  appalling.  A  Colbert 
would  have  despaired  of  ever  bringing  order  into 
the  existing  chaos.  To  raise  money  with  which  to 
pay  the  soldiers,  Chamillard  had  created  privileges 
and  posts  of  all  sorts  and  kinds,  the  sale  of  which 
produced  large  sums.  New  taxes  had  been  levied 
even  on  marriages  and  baptisms.  Lotteries  had 
been  established.  After  every  possible  device  had 
been  adopted  for  raising  money,  the  condition  of  the 
finances  was  such  that  it  was  obviously  impossible 
for  France  to  continue  the  war.  Chamillard  had  for 
some  time  been  anxious  to  retire  from  his  office,  and 
told  Louis  that  the  burden  was  too  heavy  for  him, 
and  would  kill  him.  “  Well,”  said  the  old  King,  “  let 
us  die  together.”  But  at  last  Louis  agreed  to  defer 
to  public  opinion,  and  the  device  so  frequently 


378 


Louis  XIV. 


[1708 


adopted  in  the  years  immediately  preceding  the 
Revolution  was  tried,  Chamillard  being  succeeded 
by  Desmarets,  a  nephew  of  Colbert.  The  public 
credit  was  for  a  moment  restored,  and  new  supplies 
were  raised  on  loan.  The  change,  however,  brought 
little  real  improvement.  The  south  of  F'.ance  had 
not  recovered  from  the  Camisard  struggle  ;  in  Paris 
Jansenism  had  again  raised  its  head,  and  the  Arch¬ 
bishop  and  the  royal  power  were  in  opposition.  The 
frightful  winter  brought  with  it  famine  and  insurrec¬ 
tions.  The  price  of  the  absolute  necessaries  of  life 
was  almost  prohibitive,  and  under  the  very  windows 
of  the  King’s  rooms  the  people  clamoured  for  bread. 
Revolutionary  placards  were  posted  up,  anonymous 
letters  spoke  of  Ravaillac  and  Brutus  ;  Madame  de 
Maintenon  and  Chamillard  were  directly  attacked. 
The  hospitals  were  crowded  and  overflowing,  corpses 
of  peasants  who  had  died  of  hunger  were  frequently 
seen  in  the  woods.  The  P'rench  nation  had  suddenly 
found  itself  pauperised  and  in  danger  of  bankruptcy. 
To  any  one  who  understood  the  financial  condition 
of  the  country  peace  seemed  absolutely  indispensable. 
No  one  grasped  the  position  of  things  better  than 
did  Louis  XIV.  Though  seventy  years  old,  in  intel¬ 
ligence  and  in  courage  he  was  superior  to  any  of  his 
ministers.  He  worked  each  day  as  regularly  as  he 
did  when  he  took  up  the  cares  of  government  upon 
Mazarin’s  death.  His  knowledge  of  the  details  of 
the  administration  was  more  profound  than  ever. 
He  had  such  a  lively  appreciation  of  the  evils  under 
which  France  was  suflering  that  after  the  winter  of 
1708-9  he  determined  to  subordinate  all  considera- 


1709] 


The  Spanish  Sticcession  War. 


379 


tions  to  the  one  object  of  bettering  the  condition  of 
France. 

In  this  self-imposed  task  Louis  was  aided  by  Ma¬ 
dame  de  Maintenon.  Ever  since  the  opening  of  the 
war  she  had  been  obliged  against  her  wish  to  take 
some  part  in  political  affairs.  She  held  conferences 
with  the  ministers;  she  gained  the  confidence  of  Vil- 
lars  ;  her  letters  to  the  Princesse  des  Ursins  prove  the 
enormous  interest  which  she  took  in  Spanish  affairs. 
Her  solicitude  for  the  King  led  her  to  keep  from  him 
many  events  of  a  vexatious  character.  Her  principal 
care  was  for  him,  and  she  knew  no  other  will  than 
that  of  her  husband.  Her  many  submissions,  self- 
sacrifices,  and  losses  of  friends  for  his  sake  only  aug¬ 
mented  her  desire  for  rest  and  peace.  The  troubles 
of  the  end  of  the  reign  were  not  attributable  to  her, 
for  her  advice  was  rarely  taken.  But  her  work  in 
caring  for  the  King  is  beyond  all  praise.  Through¬ 
out  his  troubles  she  acted  the  part  of  a  faithful  and 
loving  wife,  for  whom  Louis  showed  the  greatest 
regard.  The  King  would  often  come  into  her  room 
and  lock  the  door.  Then  “  sometimes  he  sheds  tears, 
which  he  cannot  control.  Presently  a  minister  comes, 
bringing  bad  news.  If  my  presence  is  required  I  am 
called  ;  if  not  I  retire  in  some  corner  and  pray. 
Sometimes  I  hear  that  all  is  going  wrong ;  then  my 
heart  beats,  and  I  cannot  sleep  at  nights.” 

In  1707  Louis  had  realised  the  necessity  of  with¬ 
drawing  from  Italy,  and  the  convention  of  Milan 
had  signified  to  the  world  the  reality  of  his  convic¬ 
tion  of  the  need  of  lessening  the  area  of  the  strug¬ 
gle.  Early  in  1709  he  decided  to  give  up  his  attempt 


Louis  XIV. 


[1709 


380 

to  govern  Spain  through  his  envoy  and  the  Princesse 
des  Ursins,  in  other  words  to  relinquish  all  active 
attempts  to  establish  firmly  a  Bourbon  on  the  throne 
of  Spain,  and  to  leave  Spain  to  defend  itself.  This 
new  decision,  this  important  modification  of  the 
policy  of  1701,  was  signified  to  Europe  by  the  recall 
of  Amelot  in  April,  1709. 

But  though  Louis  might  decide  to  abandon  Spain, 
though  he  might  recall  his  ambassador,  he  could  not 
undo  the  work  of  the  last  four  years.  The  period  of 
Amelot’s  embassy  saw  a  silent  revolution  effected  in 
Spain.  Since  his  arrival  an  army  had  been  created, 
well  equipped  and  regularly  paid.  The  finances  had 
been  placed  on  a  better  footing  than  in  any  previous 
reign,  and  all  signs  of  poverty  in  the  royal  household 
had  passed  away. 

Moreover,  excellent  changes  had  been  quietly 
carried  out  in  the  government.  The  royal  authority 
had  been  firmly  established,  the  power  of  the  coun¬ 
cils  had  been  regulated,  the  independence  of  the 
nobles  curbed,  and  the  Church  forced  to  contribute 
to  the  necessities  of  the  State.  Though  the  provin¬ 
cial  liberties  had  been  to  some  extent  suppressed, 
the  provinces  were  on  the  whole  loyal ;  anarchy  had 
given  way  to  a  central  authority  which  endeavoured 
to  mete  out  equal  justice  to  rich  and  poor  alike. 

The  allies  were  so  convinced  of  the  uselessness  of 
attempting  to  conquer  Spain  that,  content  with  hold¬ 
ing  their  own  in  Catalonia,  they  devoted  all  their 
efforts  to  force  Spain  to  yield  to  their  wishes  by 
victories  gained  over  France  in  the  Netherlands. 
With  every  prospect  of  success,  their  tone  when 


1709] 


The  Spanish  Succession  War. 


;8i 


Louis  demanded  peace  in  1709  was  haughty  and 
overbearing. 

Louis  sincerely  desired  peace.  He  was  convinced 
of  the  hopelessness  of  any  further  attempts  against 
the  combined  forces  of  the  allies.  He  was  prepared 
to  cede  Spain  and  the  Indies  to  the  Archduke,  and 
to  reserve  Naples  and  Sicily  to  Philip.  He  was 
ready  to  restore  Strasburg  to  its  position  as  a  free 
Imperial  city.  He  was,  in  fact,  prepared  to  propose 
terms  which  one  would  have  thought  even  the  rapa¬ 
cious  Dutch  would  have  accepted.  But  Philip,  as  in 
1706,  resolved  to  throw  himself  upon  the  patriotism 
of  his  subjects.  And  in  1709  he  was  in  a  far  stronger 
position  than  in  1706.  In  1706  he  relied  mainly 
upon  the  people  of  Castille,  while  many  of  the  nobles 
declared  for  the  Archduke.  In  1709,  well-nigh  the 
whole  of  Spain  was  prepared  to  support  him,  and  the 
nobles  .were  among  the  foremost  to  oppose  any  par¬ 
tition  of  the  Spanish  Empire. 

In  arranging  terms  of  peace  with  the  allies,  it  was 
obvious  that  Louis  could  not  now  speak  for  his 
grandson.  This  new  complication  was  not  lost  sight 
of  by  the  English,  Imperial,  and  Dutch  plenipoten¬ 
tiaries.  They  had  no  intention  of  continuing  a  war 
with  Spain  while  France  was  enjoying  the  blessings 
of  peace.  They  therefore  insisted  that  Louis  should 
be  responsible  for  the  renunciation  by  Philip  of  his 
crown  within  two  months,  and  that,  failing  the 
latter’s  assent,  Louis  was  to  aid  the  allies  in  com¬ 
pelling  him  to  agree  to  the  treaty.  But  the  pre¬ 
liminaries  of  The  Hague  were  not  destined  to  be 
accepted.  Louis’  soul  revolted  against  the  humiliat- 


382 


Louis  XIV. 


[1709 


ing  conditions.  He  recalled  his  envoy  in  May,  and 
broke  off  negotiations.  “  If  I  must  continue  the 
war,”  he  said,  “  I  will  contend  against  my  enemies 
rather  than  against  my  own  family.”  The  whole  of 
France  shared  his  indignation,  and  when  the  pro¬ 
posals  of  the  allies  were  read  to  them  by  the  King’s 
order,  the  troops  of  Villars  demanded  with  fury  to 
be  led  against  the  foe.  In  a  circular  published  by 
the  advice  of  Torcy  and  sent  to  each  province,  Louis 
appealed  to  the  French  nation  to  support  him  in  his 
endeavour  to  secure  reasonable  terms.  He  showed 
the  unreasonableness  of  the  allies,  and  expatiated  on 
their  insincerity  and  intolerable  proposals.  “  See¬ 
ing,  then,”  he  said  “  that  our  enemies  in  their  pre¬ 
tence  to  negotiate  are  palpably  insincere,  we  have 
only  to  consider  how  to  defend  ourselves,  and  show 
them  that  France  united  can  resist  the  united  powers 
of  Europe  in  their  attempts,  by  fair  means  or  by 
foul,  to  ruin  her.  All  the  ordinary  sources  of 
revenue  are  exhausted.  I  come  before  you  for  your 
counsel  and  assistance,  at  a  time  when  our  very 
safety  as  a  nation  is  at  stake  ;  let  us  show  our  ene¬ 
mies  that  we  are  still  not  sunk  so  low,  but  that  we 
can  force  upon  them  such  a  peace  as  shall  consist 
with  our  honour  and  with  the  good  of  Europe.” 
The  effect  of  this  appeal  was  at  once  seen.  The  war 
from  being  dynastic  became  national,  from  being  a 
war  for  the  interests  of  the  Bourbons  it  became  a 
war  for  the  preservation  of  the  French  kingdom,  if 
not  for  the  very  existence  of  the  French  nation.  The 
enthusiasm  of  his  subjects  gave  Louis  an  army  larger 
than  any  which  he  had  yet  been  able  to  put  into  the 


1709] 


The  Spanish  Succession  War.  383 


field,  and  the  command  was  given  to  Villars.  The 
campaign  which  saw  the  battle  of  Malplaquet 
was  at  once  opened,  but  none  the  less  Louis  was  as 
firmly  convinced  as  ever  of  the  absolute  necessity  of 
peace. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

PEACE. 

1 709-1 7  I  3. 

O  keep  French  troops  in  Spain 
was  to  make  peace  impossible. 

To  show  his  enemies  then  how 
sincerely  desirous  he  was  to 
end  the  disastrous  war,  Louis 
determined  to  order  the  with¬ 
drawal  of  his  troops  from  Spain. 

The  carrying  out  of  this  reso¬ 
lution  was  a  necessary  comple¬ 
ment  to  his  intention  to  lessen, 
if  not  wholly  abandon,  his  political  influence  in  that 
country.  The  political  and  military  abandonment 
of  Spain  were  simultaneous.  With  difficulty  Louis 
was  persuaded  to  allow  the  French  troops  to  remain  in 
Spain  till  August,  1709;  at  the  beginning  of  Septem¬ 
ber  Bldcourt  succeeded  Amelot,  but  with  very  differ-  .  ► 
ent  functions.  Amelot  had  combined  the  functions  j 
of  Prime  Minister  with  those  of  French  ambassador.  < 

384  1 


1709] 


Peace. 


385 


Blecourt  was  to  be  a  mere  envoy  and  to  confine  his 
duties  to  observing  closel)^  all  that  went  on,  and  by 
working  cordially  with  the  Princesse  des  Ursins,  to 
keep  Louis  informed  as  to  the  exact  position  of 
things  in  Spain.  His  position  though  a  modified 
was  still  a  delicate  one.  The  hatred  felt  against 
the  French  was  now  universal,  and  the  popular  feel¬ 
ing  was  encouraged  by  the  Spanish  ministers. 

This  hostility  was  regarded  by  Louis  with  equa¬ 
nimity.  Torcy  and  all  his  ministers  were  convinced 
that  no  peace  could  be  made  unless  Philip  V.  was 
dethroned,  or  the  allies  could  be  persuaded  that  no 
political  union  based  upon  a  formal  treaty  existed 
between  France  and  Spain.  The  battle  of  Malpla- 
quet,  fought  on  September  nth,  was  a  glorious  de¬ 
feat  for  the  French.  It  restored  the  nation’s  respect 
for  itself;  it  saved  France  from  invasion. 

The  difficulties  which  Villars  had  to  contend 
against  during  the  campaign  only  served  to  bring 
out  his  military  genius.  His  army  was  at  the  outset 
without  proper  food  or  clothing,  inferior  to  the  op¬ 
posing  forces  in  point  of  numbers,  and  deeply  dis¬ 
couraged.  Within  a  short  time  the  great  French 
Marshal  succeeded  in  converting  his  dispirited  troops 
into  a  fine  army,  well  found  and  well  fed.  He  acted 
at  first  strictly  on  the  defensive,  but  after  one  of  his 
lieutenants,  Artagnan,  had  taken  Warneton,  a  small 
town  on  the  Lys,  and  1600  prisoners,  he  hoped 
to  be  able  to  save  Tournay.  But  the  town  fell  on 
July  27th  and  the  citadel  capitulated  on  September 
2nd.  The  victorious  allies  under  Marlborough  and 
Eugene  then  marched  upon  Mons,  the  capital  of 


386 


Louis  XIV. 


[1709 


Hainault,  and  Villars  was  ordered  to  try  and  save 
it.  Boufflers,  old  and  decrepit,  willingly  consented 
to  serve  under  his  young  and  illustrious  colleague, 
and  refused  the  latter’s  invitation  to  share  the  com¬ 
mand. 

Though  too  late  to  prevent  the  investment  of 
Mons,  Villars  advanced  to  Malplaquet,  a  village  situ¬ 
ated  on  the  top  of  a  ridge  a  few  miles  to  the  south¬ 
west  of  Mons,  and  during  the  night  and  day  after 
his  arrival,  took  up  a  strong  position.  On  either 
side  were  woods,  that  of  Laniere  lying  on  the  east 
and  that  of  Taisniere  on  the  west.  From  the  high¬ 
road,  which  Villars  skilfully  fortified,  the  ground  falls 
away  in  ravines  towards  the  plain  of  Mons.  On 
September  nth  the  allied  troops  attacked  Villars’ 
fortifications,  and  one  of  the  bloodiest  battles  of  the 
war  took  place.  Boufflers  commanded  the  right 
wing,  and  was  opposed  to  Tilly  and  the  Prince  of 
Nassau,  nephew  of  William  III.  Villars  himself 
fought,  on  the  left,  which  was  threatened  in  front 
by  Eugene,  and  on  the  extreme  right  of  the  allies 
by  Withers.  At  first  the  allies  were  driven  back 
with  great  loss,  but  when  Withers  threatened  to  out¬ 
flank  the  French  left,  Villars  was  compelled  to  with¬ 
draw  troops  from  the  centre.  Marlborough,  with  his 
unfailing  judgment, seized  the  opportunity  and  hurled 
upon  the  weakened  centre  English  and  Dutch  troops 
under  Tilly  and  Cadogan.  Villars  had  been  wounded 
and  carried  off  the  ground,  and  Boufflers  was  com¬ 
pelled  to  retire.  With  consummate  skill  the  old 
warrior  succeeded  in  drawing  back  in  good  order, 
leaving  the  allied  forces  in  possession  of  the  ground. 


and  Laniere  is  the  Trouee,  an  open  gap  through  which  Mons  can  he 
approached  from  the  south  and  west.  Villars,  attempting  to  raise  the  siege 
of  Mons,  fortified  himself  on  the  high  ground  near  Malplaquet.  The 
allies  took  the  offensive,  but  it  was  not  till  Villars  had  to  send  reinforce¬ 
ments  to  hold  the  wood  of  Taisnicre,  against  Withers,  that  Marlborough 
pierced  the  weakened  French  centre. 

387 


Lo7iis  XIV. 


[1710 


388 

It  was  a  dearly  bought  victory;  the  French  lost 
about  12,000  men,  while  the  allies  did  not  lose  less 
than  20,000.  Though  Mons  fell,  the  campaign  did 
much  to  restore  the  spirit  of  the  troops  and  the  con¬ 
fidence  of  the  nation.  Villars  had  shown  that  the 
dreaded  Marlborough  could  be  faced  and  fought, 
and  Louis  rightly  interpreted  the  popular  feeling 
when  he  "made  Artagnan  a  marshal,  and  showered 
favours  upon  the  wounded  general.  The  King 
still  desired  to  come  to  terms  with  his  foes.  But 
for  a  time  his  hopes  for  peace  were  frustrated. 
The  answer  of  the  Dutch  in  February,  1710, 
to  his  expressed  desire  for  peace  was  more  in¬ 
solent  than  ever.  Philip  was  to  be  dethroned 
by  Louis,  and  then  only  would  peace  be  possible. 
And  Philip  himself  had  successfully  opposed  his 
grandfather’s  wishes.  The  deliberate  inaction  of 
Bezons,  the  commander  of  the  French  troops  in 
Spain,  had  in  September  destroyed  any  hope  of 
Spanish  success  in  the  latter  months  of  1709,  and 
Philip  firmly  declined  to  consent  to  the  transference 
of  Luxemburg,  Mons,  Namur,  Charleroi,  and  Nieu- 
port  to  the  Elector  of  Bavaria.  English  writers  as¬ 
sert  that  Louis’  object  was  really  to  hand  over  the 
Spanish  Netherlands  to  the  Dutch  as  a  bribe  to 
induce  them  to  desert  the  Grand  Alliance.  In  any 
case  the  project  failed.  Philip  refused  to  yield  a 
single  town  and  the  English  made  with  the  Dutch  a 
Barrier  treaty  which  cemented  their  alliance  still 
more  closely. 

In  the  spring  of  1710  Louis  again  signified  his  will¬ 
ingness  to  enter  into  negotiations.  Opinion  at  the 


1710] 


Peace. 


389 


Court  lay  strongly  in  the  direction  of  peace,  though 
different  views  were  held  as  to  the  best  means  to 
bring  about  a  settlement.  Madame  de  Maintenon 
since  1706  had  openly  and  frequently  declared  in 
favor  of  an  immediate  peace.  She  was  willing,  if 
necessary,  to  turn  the  French  arms  against  Philip, 
and  to  carry  out  the  wishes  of  the  allies.  Clearly 
realising  the  lamentable  condition  of  France,  and 
convinced  that  God  wished  to  punish  her  country 
for  the  undue  extension  of  its  limits  and  for  its  inso¬ 
lence  and  pride,  Madame  de  Maintenon  declared  in 
her  letters  that  it  was  of  no  avail  to  struggle  against 
the  hand  of  God.  She  was  much  perturbed  at  Louis’ 
conversion  to  a  moral  life  being  almost  coincident 
with  the  beginning  of  a  series  of  misfortunes,  which 
increased  as  the  end  of  his  life  drew  nigh.  “The 
designs  of  God,”  she  wrote  at  the  time,  “  are  incom¬ 
prehensible.  Three  Christian  kings — namely,  Louis, 
the  Pretender,  James  Edward,  and  Philip  V. — appear 
to  be  abandoned,  and  heresy  and  injustice  triumph. 
Let  us  hope  that  it  will  not  be  for  long.” 

For  the  sake  of  securing  peace  to  her  own  country 
she  was  ready  to  sacrifice  Philip.  Though  her  views 
were  clear  and  decided,  and  though  they  were  based 
on  religious  conviction,  they  fortunately  did  not  pre¬ 
vail  with  Louis. 

The  Grand  Dauphin,  the  father  of  Philip,  naturally 
supported  his  son.  It  was  only  when  France  seemed 
to  be  on  the  brink  of  destruction  that,  yielding  to  the 
unanimous  opinion  of  the  members  of  the  Council,  he 
agreed  that  France  should  give  a  subsidy  to  the  allies. 

The  Duke  of  Berry  sided  with  his  father.  He  de- 


390 


Louis  XIV. 


[1710 


plored  Louis’  intention  of  abandoning  Philip  and 
applauded  the  latter’s  determination  to  fight  to  the 
last.  The  Duke  of  Burgundy,  after  the  disasters  of 
1709,  had  become  a  strong  advocate  of  peace.  He 
recognised  the  necessity  of  abandoning  Spain,  but, 
like  Louis,  he  refused  to  consider  the  possibility  of 
fighting  against  Philip.  The  Duke  of  Orleans,  labour¬ 
ing  under  suspicion  of  plotting  to  succeed  Philip  in 
case  the  latter  was  dispossessed,  had  little  influence. 

Of  the  ministers,  while  Desmarets,  Pontchartrain, 
and  Torcy  were  inclined  to  peace  at  any  price,  and 
were  thus  more  or  less  in  sympathy  with  the  views  of 
Madame  de  Maintenon,  Beauvilliers  and  Voysin 
sided  with  Louis  and  the  Princes. 

All  were,  however,  agreed  upon  the  necessity  of 
peace,  and  negotiations  were  opened  at  Gertruyden- 
berg  in  March.  Louis’  offers  were  far  more  con¬ 
siderable  than  those  which  were  afterwards  accepted 
at  Utrecht.  But  the  real  point  at  issue  was  the  de¬ 
thronement  of  Philip  by  French  troops.  At  long 
sittings  of  the  Council,  on  May  i  ith  and  June  ist,  the 
matter  was  fully  discussed  in  all  its  bearings.  Finally 
it  was  decided  to  recognise  the  necessity  of  a  par¬ 
tition  of  the  Spanish  monarchy.  Sicily  and  Sar¬ 
dinia  were  to  be  reserved  for  Philip,  and  France  was 
to  pay  the  allies  a  subsidy  during  the  continuance  of 
the  war.  A  chain  of  barrier  fortresses  was  to  be  set 
up  to  satisfy  the  Dutch,  and  the  whole  of  Alsace  was 
to  be  ceded  to  the  Empire.  These  with  other  conces¬ 
sions  made  the  terms  offered  by  Louis  well  worthy 
of  acceptance  by  the  coalition.  The  allies,  however, 
most  unwisely  insisted  that  France  must  aid  in 


1710] 


Peace. 


391 


the  dethronement  of  Philip,  and  declined  to  make 
peace  on  any  other  terms.  Louis,  as  a  last  resort, 
offered,  if  the  allies  would  retire  from  their  position, 
not  to  ask  for  any  compensation  for  Philip.  The 
allies,  however,  refused  to  consider  the  question,  and 
on  July  25th  the  P'rench  envoys  set  off  for  Paris. 
There  was  great  joy  in  Spain  at  the  news  of  the  rup¬ 
ture  of  the  negotiations  at  Gertruydenberg.  The 
Duke  of  Medina  Celi  had  fallen  on  April  15th,  and 
P'rench  influence,  guided  as  ever  by  the  Princesse  des 
Ursins,  had  now  still  further  triumphed.  Louis  re¬ 
newed  his  close  connection  with  Spain,  placed  Ven- 
dome  at  the  head  of  the  army  in  the  Peninsula,  and 
thought  of  sending  Amelot  back  to  Madrid.  But  the 
disasters  of  Almenara  in  June,  and  of  Saragossa  in 
August,  followed  by  the  entry  of  Charles  into  Mad¬ 
rid,  checked  for  a  time  the  rising  hopes  of  the  sup¬ 
porters  of  Philip  at  Versailles.  The  peace  party 
raised  their  heads,  and  Louis  for  a  moment  feared 
that  any  further  effort  would  be  useless.  Pie  de¬ 
termined  to  persuade  Philip  to  abdicate  quietly,  and 
the  Due  dc  Noailles  was  sent  to  Spain  to  make 
this  proposal.  The  year  1710  thus  marks  the  com¬ 
plete  desertion  of  the  policy  adopted  in  1701.  The 
condition  of  Spain  seemed  fully  to  justify  the  fears 
of  Louis  XIV.  It  had  been  denuded  of  French 
troops,  and  its  government  no  longer  directed  from 
Versailles,  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  men  hos¬ 
tile  to  the  P'rench  system.  P' ranee  had  moreover 
offered  to  the  allies  a  subsidy  to  enable  them  to 
expel  Philip,  and  Louis  had  attempted  to  persuade 
his  grandson  to  abdicate  voluntarily. 


392 


Louis  XIV. 


[1711 


But  from  1710  the  light  began  to  dawn  both  in 
Spain  and  France.  The  change  of  government  in 
England  marked  a  weariness  of  the  war  throughout 
that  country,  and  a  deep  distrust  of  the  war  policy 
of  the  Whigs.  In  Spain  the  victories  of  Brihuega 
and  Villa  Viciosa  (Dec.  8th  and  loth)  destroyed  the 
hopes  of  the  Archduke  Charles  and  replaced  Philip 
on  the  throne.  In  spite  of  the  embassy  of  Noailles 
the  King  had  firmly  refused  to  abdicate,  and  he 
was  fully  justified.  The  Spanish  nation  devoted  to 
Philip’s  cause  was  more  determined  than  ever  to  ad¬ 
here  to  the  sovereign  of  their  choice.  Lastly  Louis 
on  hearing  Noailles’  report  and  delighted  with  the 
victory  of  Villa  Viciosa  changed  his  whole  attitude 
and  wrote  encouraging  letters  to  his  grandson.  The 
year  1711  opened  most  hopefully,  and  before  the  end 
of  January  Vendome’s  successes  in  Catalonia  still 
further  damaged  the  fortunes  of  the  allies  in  Spain. 
In  April,  the  death  of  the  Emperor  Joseph  1.  brought 
fresh  hopes  to  the  House  of  Bourbon.  An  express 
was  sent  by  Louis  to  Philip  with  the  news.  Surely, 
it  was  now  argued,  if  the  Spanish  Empire  was  parti¬ 
tioned  and  forever  separated  from  the  French 
monarchy,  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe  would 
be  less  endangered  than  by  the  union  of  the  Spanish 
and  Imperial  crowns  under  Charles  VI. 

Though  Louis’  endeavours  to  make  some  arrange¬ 
ment  with  Austria  failed,  the  English  Tory  statesmen 
were  now  willing  to  consider  terms  of  peace  on  the 
basis  of  the  continued  possession  by  Philip  of  Spain 
and  the  Indies.  Philip  himself  strongly  opposed  any 
partition  of  his  dominions  and  resented  extremely 


i7in 


Peace. 


393 


the  loss  of  Gibraltar  to  the  English.  To  his  com¬ 
plaints  Louis  wrote  letters  of  moderation  and  good 
sense.  “  There  are  occasions,”  he  said,  “  when  it 
is  necessary  to  know  how  to  lose.”  But  Philip  was 
governed  by  his  wife  and  the  Princesse  des  Ursins, 
and  both  ladies  were  opposed  to  concessions.  With¬ 
out  any  clear  policy,  devoid  of  counsels  of  vigour 
or  energy,  Philip  took  no  advantage  of  the  victory 
of  Villa  Viciosa  and  things  were  allowed  to  drift. 
Nothing  could  be  expected  from  a  Court  influenced 
by  women  and  incapables,  honeycombed  by  intrigue, 
and  dominated  by  indolence.  At  this  crisis,  as  at 
every  crisis  during  the  war,  the  initiative  had  to  come 
from  France.  A  capable  envoy  must  be  sent  at  once 
to  obtain  the  adhesion  of  the  Court  of  Spain  to  a 
reasonable  partition  of  the  Spanish  Empire.  Taught 
by  experience  Louis  now  recognised  that  a  first 
minister  was  absolutely  necessary  if  order  was  to  be 
restored  and  wise  counsels  were  to  have  the  upper 
hand  in  Spain.  It  was  obviously  inconvenient  to 
place  the  French  ambassador  in  such  a  position, 
and  a  Spaniard  would  naturally  refuse  to  carry  out  a 
policy  of  partition.  An  Italian  then  must  be  found, 
and  Torcy  wrote  suggesting  three  Italian  cardinals. 
But  the  Court  of  Spain  offered  a  strenuous  resistance. 

The  Princesse  des  Ursins  replied  that  Philip  would 
have  no  first  minister.  Louis  was  in  a  difficult  posi¬ 
tion.  The  Spaniards  detested  the  French  influence, 
the  suspicions  of  the  allies  would  be  at  once  aroused 
if  they  noticed  any  tendency  towards  the  union  of 
the  two  kingdoms  such  as  Amelot’s  residence  in 
Spain  had  seemed  to  imply.  Louis’  solution  was  a 


394 


Louis  XIV. 


[1711 


wise  one.  From  1711  in  clear  and  emphatic  terms 
he  renounced  the  policy  of  governing  Spain  from 
Versailles  or  of  uniting  the  two  monarchies  under 
one  head.  This  new  definite  policy  carried  out 
during  the  embassy  of  the  Marquis  of  Bonnac  to 
Spain  in  1711  was  embodied  in  the  famous  renun¬ 
ciations  which  publicly  recognised  the  separation  of 
the  two  monarchies  of  France  and  Spain. 

Henceforward  France  may  influence  but  not  govern. 
The  two  nations  may  be  united  in  a  friendly  alliance 
and  the  reigning  houses  by  ties  of  blood.  But  Spain 
must  be  left  to  work  out  her  own  fortunes.  She 
must  appear  before  Europe  a  power  as  independent 
as  that  of  France  or  of  England.  Whatever  Louis’ 
wishes  and  hopes  had  been  in  the  earlier  phases  of 
the  war,  events  had  proved  too  strong  for  him. 
The  independent  spirit  of  the  Spaniards  was  a  reve¬ 
lation  which  he  slowly  was  compelled  to  recognise, 
and  though  the  accession  to  the  Imperial  throne  of 
the  Archduke  Charles  enabled  the  English  Tory 
Government  to  modify  the  policy  of  the  Whigs  and 
to  permit  a  Bourbon  to  sit  on  the  throne  of  Spain, 
public  opinion  in  England  insisted  on  the  renun¬ 
ciations. 

Probably  no  task  was  ever  undertaken  by  Louis 
more  difficult  than  that  of  persuading  the  Spaniards 
to  consent  to  a  partition  of  their  dominions.  His 
envoy  Bonnac  was  observant,  sagacious,  and  faithful, 
and  he  fulfilled  the  expectations  formed  of  him  in 
carrying  out  his  most  delicate  mission  with  infinite 
success.  He  immediately  grasped  the  political  situa¬ 
tion.  He  saw  that  Philip  V.  was  without  any  power  of 


1712] 


Peace. 


395 


decision,  and  was  governed  absolutely  by  the  Queen, 
who,  embittered  by  her  misfortunes,  was  strongly 
averse  to  any  concessions,  and  that  the  Princesse  des 
Ursins  was  alone  capable  of  influencing  the  Queen, 
but  very  sensitive  of  any  attempt  to  lessen  her 
authority  at  the  Court.  To  manage  such  a  trio 
required  tact,  and  Bonnac  advised  Louis  to  assert  no 
authority  over  the  King  and  Queen,  and  when  writ¬ 
ing  to  them  to  seemingly  allow  them  full  indepen¬ 
dence.  Four  days  after  his  arrival  Philip  signified  to 
his  grandfather  his  assent  to  the  loss  of  Gibraltar  and 
Port  Mahon,  and  his  adhesion  to  the  Assiento  treaty. 

At  the  close  of  1711  France  seemed  to  be  still  in 
a  most  perilous  situation.  Marlborough  certainly 
had  fallen  in  disgrace,  but  the  enemies  of  France 
were  apparently  still  united  in  desiring  her  ruin. 
France  was  only  saved  by  the  victory  of  Denain, 
and  by  the  policy  of  Harley  and  St.  John. 

In  his  interview  with  Villars  before  the  latter’s 
departure  for  Flanders,  the  aged  monarch  spoke  of 
the  possible  advance  of  the  allies  to  Paris,  and  told 
the  Marshal  that  he  had  resolved,  should  such  an 
advance  be  made,  to  collect  as  many  troops  as  he 
could,  and  die  in  a  last  attempt  to  save  his  country, 
and  his  crown.  The  English  commander,  Ormond, 
on  July  1 6th,  1712,  proclaimed  a  suspenion  of  arms 
with  the  French,  and  Villars,  with  whom  Ormond 
was  in  constant  correspondence,  published  a  like  pro¬ 
clamation  with  regard  to  the  English.  Weakened  by 
the  withdrawal  of  the  British  army,  the  allies  suffered 
a  series  of  disasters.  Eugene  had  left  Albemarle 
with  eight  thousand  men  in  an  entrenched  camp  at 


396 


Louis  XIV. 


[1712 


Denain.  This  camp  Villars  determined  to  storm. 
On  July  24th  the  attack  was  made,  the  principal 
obstacle  being  a  deep  ditch  in  front  of  the  entrench¬ 
ment.  Villars,  recognising  the  importance  of  rapid¬ 
ity  of  movement,  refused  to  spend  any  time  in  filling 
the  ditch  with  fascines.  “  Our  fascines,”  he  said, 
“  shall  be  the  bodies  of  the  first  fallen.”  After  a 
stubborn  defence  the  allied  forces  fled  in  panic,  and 
a  large  number  perished  in  the  Scheldt. 

“Villars,”  said  the  great  Napoleon  in  after  days, 
“saved  France  at  Denain.”  The  Marshal  had  again 
given  evidence  of  the  quickness  of  eye  for  which  he 
was  well  known,  and  of  his  unconquerable  energy 
and  dash.  Before  the  end  of  the  year  the  reduction 
of  many  towns  had  established  a  strong  barrier,  and 
France  was  safe.  It  is  impossible  to  overestimate 
the  political  importance  of  Denain.  Louis  XIV.  at 
once  recognised  the  real  meaning  of  the  victory.  On 
July  29th  he  wrote  to  Villars:  “  I  cannot  speak  too 
highly  of  the  way  in  which  you  formed  the  design 
in  concert  with  the  Marshal  Montesquieu,  the  secrecy 
which  you  preserved,  and  the  means  you  took  to 
execute  it.  Nothing  is  more  likely  to  advance 
favourable  negotiations  of  peace  than  the  re-establish¬ 
ment  of  that  superiority  of  our  arms  which  has  been 
so  unfortunately  lost  for  many  years.  .  .  .  The 

powers  now  in  deliberation  will  be  much  more  tract¬ 
able  when  they  see  the  disappearance  of  all  Prince 
Eugene’s  hopes  of  the  invasion  of  my  kingdom. 
This  is  the  result  which  I  hope  to  gain  le  fruit 
que  j' esptre  retirer')  from  the  very  important  service 
which  you  have  just  rendered  me.” 


MARSHAL  VILLARS. 

(  From  Courcy's  Coalition  of  IJOI.) 


1712] 


Peace. 


397 


Louis  was  not  deceived  in  the  estimate  which  he 
had  formed  of  the  importance  of  Denain.  The 
capture  of  Marchiennes,  Saint-Armand,  Mortagne, 
Douai,  and  Bouchain  restored  the  prestige  of  the 
French  arms,  and,  with  the  defections  of  the  English 
placed  to  the  Dutch  and  the  Imperialists  in  great 
measure  at  Louis’  mercy.  The  allies,  furious  at  the 
failure  of  their  plan  of  securing  ascendancy  at  the 
conference,  for  a  time  suspended  all  negotiations. 
But  Louis’  anxiety  for  peace  was  not  only  equalled 
but  surpassed  by  that  felt  by  the  English  ministry. 
Bolingbroke  determined  if  necessary  to  make  a  sepa¬ 
rate  treaty  with  France,  and  visited  Paris  early  in 
August.  Ten  days’  personal  negotiation  with  Torcy 
adjusted  the  principal  points  of  difficulty,  and 
smoothed  the  way  for  a  satisfactory  settlement  of 
all  the  matters  at  issue  between  the  two  countries. 
Before  his  departure  Bolingbroke  had  an  interview 
with  Louis  at  Fontainebleau. 

There  he  found  the  Court  in  high  spirits  at  the 
successes  of  Villars.  Even  Louis,  on  hearing  of  the 
capture  of  Marchiennes,  had  thanked  the  courtiers 
for  their  congratulations.  In  his  interview  with 
Bolingbroke,  the  aged  King,  speaking  rapidly  and 
indistinctly,  acknowledged  his  obligations  to  the 
Queen  of  England  and  avowed  his  earnest  desire 
for  peace. 

On  Bolingbroke’s  arrival  in  London  a  suspension 
of  arms  with  France  for  four  months  was  proclaimed 
in  London. 

The  congress  of  Utrecht  was  opened  on  January 
12,  1712,  but  before  many  weeks  were  over  both 


39^ 


Louis  XIV. 


[1713 


Bourbon  Courts  had  been  thrown  into  inexorable 
grief  and  consternation  at  the  successive  deaths  of 
the  Duchess  and  Duke  of  Burgundy,  followed  by 
that  of  their  eldest  child  the  Duke  of  Brittany.  In 
both  Paris  and  Madrid  it  was  believed  that  the  Duke 
of  Orleans  was  sweeping  away  the  royal  family  in 
order  to  secure  the  throne  for  himself,  and  it  was 
asserted  that  neither  the  lives  of  Louis  XIV.  or 
Philip  V.  were  safe.  But  these  domestic  afflictions 
only  increased  the  determination  of  the  allies  to  force 
from  Philip  an  absolute  renunciation  of  all  claims  to 
the  French  throne.  To  this  the  Court  of  Spain 
offered  an  obstinate  resistance,  and  during  a  great 
part  of  1712  Louis  had  to  employ  alternately  per¬ 
suasion  and  menaces  to  induce  Philip  to  accede  to 
his  demands.  On  July  8th  the  Spanish  nation  was 
informed  in  a  proclamation  that  their  King  had 
renounced  all  claim  to  the  French  throne,  and  in 
December  these  renunciations  of  Philip  were  rati¬ 
fied  by  the  Spanish  Cortes.  Somewhat  naturally 
the  English  ministers  desired  that  the  States-General 
should  ratify  the  French  renunciations.  But  Louis 
regarded  such  a  request  as  a  personal  insult,  and 
Torcy  wrote  to  Bolingbroke  that  “  the  Estates  in 
France  have  nothing  to  do  with  questions  regarding 
the  succession  to  the  Crown,  they  have  not  the 
power  either  to  make  or  to  abrogate  the  laws.”  It 
was  indeed  true  that  practically  the  States-General 
could  hardly  be  said  to  exist.  The  sovereignty  in 
France  resided  in  the  King  alone,  and  all  that  Louis 
would  concede  was  that  the  Parlement  of  Paris 
should  register  the  renunciations.  In  March,  I7I3> 


1713] 


Peace. 


399 


the  renunciations  of  the  Dukes  of  Berry  and  Orleans 
were  solemnly  registered  by  the  Parlement.  The 
Spanish  ambassador  in  France  was,  however,  firmly 
convinced  that  all  these  renunciations  were  worth¬ 
less,  and  that  in  the  event  of  the  death  of  the 
Dauphin,  Philip  V.  would  return  to  France. 

The  question,  too,  of  Bavaria  required  delicate 
handling.  The  ally  of  Louis,  the  Elector  had  lost 
his  territories  after  Blenheim,  and,  after  Malplaquet, 
he  had  been  compelled  to  leave  his  government  of 
the  Spanish  Netherlands  and  to  fly  into  France.  Re¬ 
stored  in  1711,  he  was  recognised  by  Philip  V.  in 
1712  as  hereditary  sovereign  of  the  Low  Countries. 
Maximilian’s  chances  of  being  restored  to  Bavaria 
seemed  indeed  remote.  He  had  been  put  to  the  ban 
of  the  Empire,  and  even  Louis  thought  the  recovery 
of  Bavaria  from  Austria  was  impossible.  But  the 
Elector  owed  his  eventual  restoration  to  the  deter¬ 
mination  of  the  Dutch  not  to  allow  any  ally  of  Louis 
to  reign  over  the  Spanish  Netherlands. 

Eventually,  after  much  negotiation,  the  best 
solution  of  a  difficult  matter  was  found  to  lie  in 
the  restoration  of  Maximilian  to  his  hereditary 
dominions. 

In  February,  1714,  a  close  alliance  was  formed  be¬ 
tween  France  and  Bavaria,  which  remained  unbroken 
for  many  years,  and  which  resulted  in  the  accession 
of  Charles  of  Bavaria  to  the  Imperial  throne  as 
Charles  VIL,  in  1742. 

On  April  ii,  1713,  the  Peace  of  Utrecht  was  finally 
signed.  To  England  France  yielded  Newfoundland, 
Acadia,  and  Hudson’s  Bay,  though  she  reserved  Cape 


400 


Louis  XIV. 


[1713 


Breton  and  her  share  in  the  fisheries  of  the  coast. 
She  also  promised  to  dismantle  Dunkirk  and  to 
recognise  the  Protestant  Succession  in  England. 
She  was  forced  to  see  the  firm  establishment  of  Eng¬ 
land  as  a  Mediterranean  power,  and  her  dreams  of 
domination  over  Southern  Europe  dispelled.  At  the 
time  of  the  Partition  treaties,  and  again  when  he 
accepted  the  Will,  Louis  had  definitely  aimed  at 
making  the  Mediterranean  into  a  Bourbon  lake. 

But  the  English  interests  in  the  Mediterranean  Sea 
were  very  considerable.  And  not  the  least  important 
results  of  the  Spanish  Succession  war  were  that  Eng¬ 
land,  obtained  ample  securities  for  the  interests  which 
she  had  already  acquired  in  the  Mediterranean,  and 
that  Louis  was  compelled  to  relinquish  schemes  which 
Napoleon  a  century  later  again  attempted  in  vain  to 
realise.  With  regard  to  Holland,  France  agreed  to  the 
establishment  of  a  Barrier,  and  to  the  cession  of  the 
Spanish  Netherlands  to  Austria.  She  managed,  hoAV- 
ever,  to  regain  Lille,  Aire,  Bethune,  and  Saint-Venant. 
With  Prussia  there  was  little  to  settle.  France  recog¬ 
nised  the  royal  title  of  the  Elector,  his  rights  over 
NeufchMel,  and  his  possession  of  Upper  Guelder- 
land.  The  King  of  Prussia  on  his  part  renounced 
all  his  claims  on  the  principality  of  Orange,  and  on 
the  lordships  of  ChMon  and  Chatel-Berlin  in  Franche- 
Comte.  France  further  recognised  the  claims  of  the 
Duke  of  Savoy  to  Sicily  with  the  title  of  King. 
She  restored  to  him  Savoy  and  Nice,  and  it  was 
agreed  that  if  Philip’s  line  failed,  the  House  of 
Savoy  should  reign  in  Spain.  Louis  made  no  con¬ 
cealment  of  his  delight  at  the  conclusion  of  peace. 


1714] 


Peace. 


401 


Writing  to  Philip,  he  congratulates  him  on  the  fact 
that  he  was  now  recognised,  even  by  his  enemies,  as 
King  of  Spain,  and  declares  that  at  one  time  he  had 
never  hoped  for  such  a  happy  result  of  the  war. 
France  had  suffered  severe  defeats  and  had  been 
forced  to  make  cessions  to  England,  but  these  ces¬ 
sions  were  mainly  in  America,  and  as  a  compensation 
she  could  look  to  the  establishment  of  a  Bourbon 
dynasty  at  Madrid.  Far  different  were  the  feelings 
of  Philip.  Spain  had  lost  heavily  by  the  peace. 
Her  possessions  in  Italy  and  the  Netherlands  were 
handed  over  to  the  Emperor  and  to  the  Duke  of 
Savoy,  while  England  secured  Gibraltar  and  Mi¬ 
norca,  and  the  Assiento  or  grant  of  the  slave  trade 
with  America.  She  was  now  shut  out  as  it  were  from 
the  general  life  of  Europe,  and  remained  isolated 
behind  the  Pyrenees.  This  feeling  of  rage  and  dis¬ 
appointment  explains  Philip’s  delay  in  signing  the 
treaties  of  peace  with  England,  Savoy,  and  Holland, 
and  his  deep-seated  determination  to  reconquer  on 
the  first  opportunity  his  lost  possessions  in  Italy. 
But  Spain  was  at  this  moment  helpless,  and  Louis, 
determined  to  obtain  peace,  could  always  secure 
Philip’s  obedience  by  threatening  as  a  last  resource 
to  withdraw  the  French  troops  from  Spain.  Though 
the  Emperor  stood  out,  he  could  do  nothing  without 
his  allies.  Villars  proved  too  strong  for  Eugene, 
took  Landau  and  Freiburg,  and  on  March  6,  1714, 
the  Peace  of  Rastadt  between  France  and  Austria 
was  made,  followed  by  that  of  Baden  between  France 
and  the  Empire.  Writing  in  F'ebruary  to  Madame 
de  Maintenon,  about  the  signature  of  the  Peace  of 


402 


Lords  XIV. 


[1714 


Rastadt,  Louis  had  said :  “  I  thought  you  would  not 
be  sorry  to  hear  this  good  news  a  few  hours  before 
the  rest  of  the  world,  but  say  nothing  about  it,  only 
that  Prince  Eugene  has  returned  to  Rastadt,  and  that 
the  conferences  are  going  on  again.  I  am  sure  of 
peace  and  rejoice  at  it  with  you.  Let  us  thank  God 
with  all  our  hearts.” 

By  the  treaties  with  the  Emperor  and  Empire, 
Louis  secured  the  replacement  of  the  Electors  of 
Bavaria  and  Cologne  in  their  territories  ;  he  kept 
Alsace  and  Strasburg,  and  the  terms  in  the  Peace  of 
Ryswick  with  regard  to  the  re-establishment  of  the 
Roman  Catholic  faith  in  all  his  dominions  were  re¬ 
tained.  The  Emperor,  on  his  part,  agreed  to  accept 
the  conclusions  come  to  at  Utrecht  with  regard  to 
his  possessions  of  Naples,  Sardinia,  Milan,  the  Tuscan 
Ports  and  the  Spanish  Netherlands.  He  further 
agreed  to  the  formation  of  a  Barrier,  and  Louis 
recognised  the  erection  of  Hanover  as  an  Electorate. 

Spain  was  not  included  in  the  above  arrange¬ 
ments,  and  Philip  felt  deeply  hurt  that  his  grand¬ 
father  should  have  made  peace  with  the  Emperor 
without  compelling  him  to  renounce  the  title  of 
King  of  Spain.  Till  the  death  of  Louis  XIV.  the 
relations  between  France  and  Spain  were  strained. 
The  reforms  of  Amelot  and  Orri  admirable  though 
they  were  in  many  respects,  had  been  accompanied 
by  the  appearance  of  a  vast  number  of  French  finan¬ 
ciers  and  contractors  in  Spain.  Extortion  had  in¬ 
creased  under  the  French  system,  and  taxation  had 
become  heavier.  The  French  agents  of  Louis  had 
begun  the  work  of  financial  and  commercial  re- 


1714] 


Peace. 


403 


organisation,  but  much  remained  to  be  done.  The 
French  were  unpopular  at  Madrid,  and  the  death  of 
Philip’s  brave  Queen,  Maria  Louisa  of  Savoy,  in 
February,  1714,  ‘followed  by  that  of  the  Duke  of 
Berry  on  May  i  ith,  only  increased  the  hostile  feeling 
against  the  French.  The  remaining  surviving  son  of 
the  Duke  of  Burgundy,  a  child  of  four,  alone  stood 
between  Orleans  and  the  succession,  and  it  seemed 
quite  possible  that  round  him  might  rage,  in  the  near 
future,  a  struggle  between  the  two  branches  of  the 
Bourbon  family. 

Philip  himself  was  determined  to  break  through 
his  renunciations  and,  though  not  to  unite  France 
and  Spain  under  the  same  head,  to  place  them  in 
the  hands  of  the  same  branch  of  the  House  of  Bour¬ 
bon.  Suspicious  of  Orleans,  he  demanded  that  the 
Dauphin  should  be  put  under  his  own  care,  and  that 
in  the  event  of  Louis’  death  the  Regency  should  be 
confided  to  him.  But  Louis  absolutely  refused  to 
listen  to  Philip’s  schemes  for  the  abrogation  of  the 
renunciations.  The  death  of  Anne  had  thrown  the 
government  of  England  into  the  hands  of  the  Whigs, 
who,  as  Louis  believed,  desired  an  excuse  for  re¬ 
opening  the  struggle.  Apart  from  a  question  of 
policy,  Torcy  assures  us  that  Louis  was  sincere  in 
his  determination  not  to  break  pledges  solemnly 
given.  But  an  event  soon  occurred  which  ended  for 
a  time  the  influence  of  France  upon  Spain.  The 
marriage  of  Philip  to  Elizabeth  Farnese  brought  with 
it  the  fall  of  the  Princesse  des  Ursins  in  December, 
1714,  and  gave  an  intimation  to  the  world  that  Spain 
was  prepared  to  act  independently  of  P'rance.  As 


404 


Louis  XIV. 


[1715 


the  Princesse  des  Ursins  “passed  the  mountains,” 
writes  Mr.  Armstrong,  in  his  Life  of  Elizabeth 
Farncse,  “  the  Pyrenees  recovered  their  existence, 
and  Spain  and  France  were  separate.”  Whatever  had 
been  her  faults,  the  Princesse  had  on  the  whole  used 
her  talents  in  the  service  of  France.  It  is  not  too 
much  to  say  it  was  greatly  due  to  her  agency  that 
the  influence  of  the  Grand  Monarque  was  exercised 
in  varying  degrees  in  Spain  for  some  fifteen  years. 
She  was  seen  at  her  best  when  working  with  Amelot, 
whose  wisdom  and  discretion  held  her  quick  and 
jealous  temper  in  check.  Always  governed  by  am¬ 
bition,  always  jealous  of  any  diminution  of  her 
power,  she  fell  from  a  position  almost  unique  in  the 
history  of  modern  European  monarchies  through 
want  of  tact  and  loss  of  temper.  Louis  was  un¬ 
usually  fortunate  in  his  agents,  but  he  rarely  was 
served  with  greater  ability  than  by  the  celebrated 
Princesse  des  Ursins.’ 

Her  return  to  Versailles  proved  to  be  only  the 
prelude  of  her  exile.  The  celebrated  friendship  be¬ 
tween  her  and  Madame  de  Maintenon  had  long  since 
cooled,  and  moreover  she  and  the  Duke  of  Orleans 
were  mortal  foes.  When  the  latter  heard  of  her 
probable  arrival,  he  proposed  at  once  to  go  to  Paris, 
since,  as  he  himself  declared,  he  would  not  answer  for 
himself  should  they  meet.  Madame  de  Maintenon 
promptly  recognised  the  necessity  of  getting  rid  of 
her  former  friend.  After  a  short  stay  at  Versailles 

*  Mr.  Armstrong  in  his  Life  of  Elizabeth  Farfiese  gives  a  graphic 
description  of  the  condition  of  Spain  at  the  end  of  the  Spanish 
Succession  War. 


1715] 


Peace. 


405 


and  several  interviews  with  the  king  at  Marly,  it  was 
clearly  intimated  to  the  unfortunate  and  heart-broken 
woman  that  though  Louis  would  grant  her  a  pension, 
she  would  do  well  to  reside  in  Italy.  After  remain¬ 
ing  in  Genoa  some  years,  she  established  herself  in 
Rome,  and  there  spent  the  rest  of  her  life  among 
strangers  far  away  from  the  France  that  she  loved 
and  had  served  so  well.  To  her  constant  watchful¬ 
ness  and  untiring  energy  the  Bourbons  owed  their 
possession  of  Spain. 

After  the  peace  of  Utrecht  was  signed,  Louis  de¬ 
voted  himself  to  the  completion  of  the  policy  which 
since  1711  he  had  set  himself  to  carry  out — the  po¬ 
litical  union  and  the  dynastic  separation  of  the  crowns 
of  France  and  Spain.  And  this  policy  was  one  which 
after  the  stormy  scenes  of  the  Regency  commended 
itself  to  statesmen  in  both  countries  and  influenced 
the  destinies  of  two  nations  down  to  the  Revo¬ 
lution. 

A  close  union  between  France  and  Spain — Louis 
had  said — was  necessary  for  the  benefit  of  both. 
Each  kingdom  should,  however,  govern  itself  accord¬ 
ing  to  its  usages  and  customs,  and  remain  indepen¬ 
dent  of  foreign  intervention.  Thus  the  jealousy  of 
hostile  Europe  would  be  unable  to  find  any  ground 
for  asserting  that  Spain  was  the  creature  of  France. 
But  Louis  had  not  before  his  death  secured  even  the 
partial  adhesion  of  Spain  to  this  policy  without  ex¬ 
periencing  grave  difficulties,  and  the  political  union 
between  the  two  countries  was  in  danger  of  ship¬ 
wreck  during  the  meeting  of  the  Congress  of  Utrecht. 
Louis  desired  peace.  He  was  old,  and  France  was 


4o6 


Louis  XIV. 


[1715 


exhausted.  He  was  convinced  that  she  could  not 
withstand  another  European  attack.  He  was  anxious 
to  hand  down  to  his  successors  France  at  peace  and 
with  her  borders  extended.  And  no  sooner  had  the 
Peace  of  Utrecht  been  made  than  his  desire  to  keep 
that  peace  became  overwhelmingly  strong.  Honour 
forbade  that  the  renunciations  should  be  broken. 
The  close  union  of  France  and  Spain  depended  on 
the  strict  adhesion  to  the  terms  of  peace. 

Philip  on  the  other  hand  was  young.  He  owed 
his  throne  to  the  national  feeling  in  Spain  against 
the  dismemberment  of  the  monarchy.  He  was  the 
founder  of  a  new  dynasty.  How  could  he,  then,  be 
expected,  before  he  had  been  on  the  throne  of  his 
adopted  country  twelve  years,  to  consent  to  a  serious 
and  disgraceful  partition  ?  He  had  during  the  long 
war  been  almost  miraculously  saved  time  after  time 
from  absolute  ruin.  Would  he  not  be  justified  in 
trusting  to  Providence  to  cover  the  plans  of  his  ene¬ 
mies  with  confusion  ?  Spain  had  actually  suffered 
less  than  France.  She  was  less  exhausted,  less 
denuded  of  men,  less  impoverished.  As  to  the  re¬ 
nunciations,  Philip  regarded  them  as  only  extorted 
by  force  and  only  made  to  be  broken.  The  authority 
of  Louis  XIV.  alone  compelled  the  unwilling  agree¬ 
ment  of  Philip  to  the  partitions  and  to  the  denuncia¬ 
tions.  No  sooner  was  Louis  dead  than  the  schemes 
of  Alberoni  and  Elizabeth  Farnese  expressed  the 
real  wishes  of  the  Spanish  King,  and  for  a  time 
checked  that  union  between  the  two  monarchies 
which  it  had  been  the  object  of  Louis  XIV.  to  bring 
about. 


1715] 


Peace. 


407 


The  history  of  the  last  fifteen  years  of  the  reign 
of  Louis  XIV.  must  ever  be  regarded  as  the  most 
remarkable  in  his  life,  so  far  as  he  himself  is  con¬ 
cerned.  At  no  period  did  Louis  show  more  energy 
and  vitality  ;  at  no  period  was  his  influence  more 
strongly  felt,  at  no  period  was  his  personality  more 
generally  recognised. 

During  the  years  from  1702  to  1708  and  from  1712 
to  1715,  the  Court  life  proceeded  pretty  much  on  its 
old  lines.  The  young  Duchess  of  Burgundy  did  her 
best  to  direct  the  gaieties  of  the  courtiers.  She  took 
part  in  the  hunting  and  riding  expeditions,  in  the 
comedies  and  fetes.  And  at  the  end  of  1707  we  find 
the  Court  assembled  at  Marly  and  the  Duchess 
arranging  entertainments  to  divert  the  King  and 
Queen  of  England.  The  victory  of  Almanza  gave, 
perhaps,  some  justification  for  these  festivities.  But 
the  King,  old  and  austere,  took  little  part  in  any 
Court  gaieties,  and  though  Madame  de  Maintenon 
sometimes  arranged  comedies  to  amuse  him,  and 
though  at  the  beginning  of  1708  he  appeared  at  some 
masques,  it  was  always  difficult  to  distract  him  from 
serious  considerations.  From  1708  to  1712  the  Court 
became  sombre  and  saddened.  These  were  the 
years  of  disasters  abroad,  followed  by  attempts  on 
the  part  of  the  allies  to  make  peace  on  terms  humili¬ 
ating  to  France  ;  these  were  the  years  when  famine 
and  misery  stalked  through  the  country,  and  when 
death  visited  the  royal  family.  The  gaiety  of  the 
Duchess  of  Burgundy  came  suddenly  to  an  end 
when  her  husband,  blamed  for  his  share  in  the  disas¬ 
trous  campaign  of  1708,  returned  to  be  attacked  by  a 


4o8 


Louis  XIV 


[1715 


malignant  and  badly  informed  public  opinion.  In 
the  spring  of  1711  the  death  of  the  Dauphin  filled 
the  whole  Court  with  dismay,  which  gave  way  to 
absolute  despair  when  the  Duchess  of  Burgundy, 
her  husband,  and  her  eldest  son,  the  Duke  of  Brit¬ 
tany,  were  carried  off  early  in  1712.  The  whole  of 
France  was  dazed  and  overwhelmed  with  grief.  The 
hopes  of  “  the  Burgundy  party,”  which  on  the  death 
of  the  Dauphin  had  turned  their  eyes  towards  Cam- 
brai,  in  anticipation  of  the  accession  of  the  young 
Duke  of  Burgundy,  were  dashed  to  the  ground.  The 
political  life  of  F^nelon  was  finished,  and  with  the 
death  of  Burgundy  passed  away  the  best  chance  ever 
offered  to  the  House  of  Bourbon  of  preventing  a 
future  revolution  by  strengthening  their  hold  on 
their  people  by  wise  and  timely  reforms.  “  We  have 
no  longer  a  Court,”  wrote  Madame  de  Maintenon  ; 
“  all  those  who  were  its  ornaments  have  disappeared.” 
During  these  years  of  terrible  disasters  abroad  and 
of  heartrending  misfortunes  within  his  own  family, 
Louis  showed  a  marvellous  control  over  himself. 
He  felt  his  afflictions,  says  Saint-Simon,  and  could 
not  restrain  his  tears  before  his  ministers  and  once 
before  Villars.  But  he  showed  undoubted  courage  in 
the  calm  and  dignified  way  in  which  he  faced  mis¬ 
fortune.  He  preserved,  as  a  rule,  the  same  impassive 
exterior  when  good  news,  such  as  the  success  of  the 
negotiations  for  peace,  had  been  conveyed  to  him. 
This  self-control,  which  he  first  learnt  to  exercise 
during  the  struggle  with  Conde  and  the  Fronde, 
never  left  him,  and  continued  to  the  end  of  his 
life. 


1715] 


Peace. 


409 


Saint-Simon’s  description  of  Louis’  courage  under 
adversity  is  well  known.  Overwhelmed  with  his 
country’s  misfortunes  and  his  domestic  griefs,  the 
old  King  showed  throughout  a  constancy  and  a 
strength  of  will  which  surprised  all  who  knew  him. 
His  constant  trust  that  the  future  would  bring  him 
good  fortune,  his  unshaken  courage,  his  wisdom — it 
was  such  qualities  as  these,  says  the  Court  historian, 
which  gained  for  him  the  admiration  of  Europe  and 
for  which  he  deserved  the  name  of  Great. 

It  was  not  till  1712  that  the  Court  shook  off  its 
gloom.  Peace  was  in  sight  and  Villars’  victory  at 
Denain  in  July,  1711  had  saved  France  from  invasion 
and  had  retrieved  the  national  honour.  Peace 
restored  many  nobles  to  Versailles,  and  till  the 
death  of  Louis  the  Court  became  again  brilliant  and 
gay.  After  four  years  of  restraint  a  reaction  natu¬ 
rally  set  in,  and  the  last  three  years  of  Louis’  reign 
form  a  prelude,  so  far  as  the  Court  was  concerned,  to 
the  days  of  the  Regency. 

Just  as  at  the  Restoration  of  Charles  II.  so  in  1712 
disasters  and  a  period  of  constraint  were  succeeded 
by  an  outburst  of  immorality.  Gambling  increased, 
scandals  multiplied.  Madame  de  Maintenon  was 
fully  alive  to  this  state  of  things,  but  was  quite  unable 
to  check  it.  Her  position  was  indeed  assured,  and 
the  troops  of  place  hunters  still  believed  that  her 
authority  was  paramount.  She  interviewed  the  min¬ 
isters  and  to  some  e.xtent  guided  their  counsels  ;  she 
was  treated  as  Queen  by  the  King’s  regiment ;  it  was 
said  that  Louis  had  appointed  her  to  be  Regent  on 
his  death.  But  she  was  too  fully  occupied  with 


410 


Loins  XIV 


[1715 


guarding  Louis  from  all  trouble  and  annoyance  to 
be  able  to  exert  an  energetic  influence  in  favour  of  a 
reformation  of  morals. 

Though  Louis  was  rapidly  approaching  his  end 
his  political  activity  was  still  remarkable.  He  was 
determined  before  his  death  to  carry  out  the  terms 
of  the  peace  of  Utrecht  with  regard  to  the  Spanish 
monarchy,  and  by  careful  arrangements  with  refer¬ 
ence  to  the  Regency  on  his  death  to  leave  France 
and  Spain  at  peace.  In  accordance  with  these  reso¬ 
lutions  Louis  sent  Berwick  to  Catalonia  to  aid  Philip 
in  reducing  Barcelona,  and  in  spite  of  the  sympathy 
shown  to  the  revolted  Catalans  by  the  Emperor  and 
by  England  Louis  carried  out  his  intention.  The 
fall  of  Barcelona  on  September  13,  1714,  marked  the 
end  of  the  Catalan  revolt.  Philip  was  anxious  to 
proceed  to  severities,  but  Louis  urged  moderation 
and  clemency.  He  was  willing  that  the  walls  of 
Barcelona  should  be  razed  to  the  ground,  and  that 
the  whole  country  should  be  forced  to  accept  the 
laws  of  Castille,  but  he  strongly  advised  that  the 
Catalans  should  be  allowed  to  enjoy  their  municipal 
privileges,  and  that  a  courageous  people  should  not 
be  treated  with  useless  inhumanity.  Majorca  and 
Ivica  were  conquered  in  the  following  spring,  and 
Louis  could  rest  satisfied  that,  in  spite  of  the  obstacles 
placed  in  his  way  by  the  Austrians  and  English,  the 
Emperor  had  lost  all  influence  in  Catalonia  and  in 
the  Balearic  Islands,  and  that  Philip  was  master  of 
his  dominions.  His  next  task  was  to  leave  the  two 
branches  of  the  Bourbon  House  in  amity,  and  to 
provide  for  the  succession.  To  effect  this  Philip  and 


1715] 


Peace. 


411 

Orleans  must  be  reconciled.  The  suspicion  that 
Orleans  had  aimed  at  succeeding  Philip,  if  the  latter 
was  dethroned,  had  never  been  removed,  and  it  re¬ 
quired  much  tact  and  correspondence  to  bring  about 
a  reconciliation.  But  Philip  never  wavered  in  his 
resolve  to  secure  control  over  the  Dauphin,  and,  if  he 
died,  the  eventual  succession  to  France.  And  this 
determination  ran  counter  to  Louis’  dispositions.  In 
July,  1714,  he  had  given  Maine  and  Toulouse  the 
position  of  Princes  of  the  Blood,  and  a  little  later  he 
had  left  the  Regency  to  Orleans  in  conformity  with 
his  rights  of  birth  and  the  spirit  of  the  late  treaties. 
The  education  of  the  young  Louis  was  to  be  placed 
in  the  hands  of  Fleury,  Bishop  of  Frfejus,  while  the 
Duke  of  Maine  was  to  be  his  guardian,  Villeroy  his 
governor,  and  Le  Tellier  his  confessor. 

In  this  manner  had  Louis  by  the  time  of  his  death 
settled  the  important  political  questions  which  re¬ 
quired  immediate  solution.  But  the  intrigues  of  the 
Spanish  party  made  it  quite  clear  that  on  Louis’ 
death  the  Regent  would  have  grave  difficulties  with 
Spain.  Louis’  own  predilections  were  in  favour  of 
the  Duke  of  Maine,  and  it  is  to  his  credit  that  he  did 
not  permit  himself  to  make  grave  political  blunders 
in  order  to  satisfy  his  own  personal  wishes. 

France  could,  on  the  whole,  look  back  on  the  war 
of  the  Spanish  Succession,  and  on  the  settlement  of 
Utrecht  with  satisfaction.  The  system  established 
by  the  peace  of  Westphalia  would,  in  the  opinion  of 
Europe,  have  been  overthrown  had  the  crown  of 
Spain  been  united  to  that  of  France  or  Austria.  And 
it  was  that  conviction  which  was  answerable  for  the 


412 


Lotiis  XIV 


[1715 


war  of  eleven  years.  The  coalition  of  1701  and  the 
preliminaries  of  peace  signed  in  London  in  1711 
(October)  averted  these  two  dangers.  French  blood 
had  been  spilt  in  Germany  and  on  the  banks  of  the 
Rhine  from  1702  to  1708,  in  Italy  and  Provence  from 
1701  to  1707,  in  the  Low  Countries  from  1701  to 
1712,  and  in  Spain  from  1701  to  1714.  In  spite  of 
her  disasters,  the  position  of  France  was  very  differ¬ 
ent  in  1714  from  what  it  had  been  in  1648.  No  one 
then  could  have  foreseen  her  steady  development 
and  consistent  territorial  aggrandisement.  She  had 
secured  by  the  treaty  of  the  Pyrenees  Artois  and 
Roussillon  and  many  other  important  places,  by 
the  treaty  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  a  portion  of  Flanders, 
by  the  treaty  of  Nimeguen  Franche-Comt6,  by  the 
treaty  of  Ryswick  the  rest  of  Alsace  and  Strasburg. 

The  system  inaugurated  at  Munster  and  Osnabriick 
in  1648  had  proved  successful.  The  theory  of  the 
balance  of  power  had  been  kept  diligently  before 
their  eyes  by  all  statesmen,  and  the  pacification  at 
Utrecht  was  the  triumph  of  that  theory. 

While  Spain  was  left  entirely  independent,  her 
territories  in  Italy  and  Flanders  were  given  to  the 
Emperor  and  to  Savoy.  Austria  herself  was  checked 
by  the  two  rising  powers  of  Savoy  and  Prussia,  the 
latter  of  whom  was  destined  to  succeed  France  in 
the  position  of  defender  of  the  German  liberties. 

Louis’  error  in  attempting  to  enrich  himself  at  the 
expense  of  the  Empire  had  resulted  in  the  enhance¬ 
ment  of  the  power  and  prestige  of  the  Emperor.  At 
one  time,  when  the  allies  refused  to  make  peace  at 
the  Hague  and  Gertruydenberg,  it  had  seemed  likely 


afteoJ^^  *^^^iOGCNBuscH 
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BRUSSELS 


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1715] 


Peace. 


413 


that  the  European  equilibrium  would  be  endangered 
if  not  destroyed  by  the  partial  annihilation  of  the 
F rench  power.  Europe  was  saved  from  this  calamity 
by  the  heroism  of  Louis  himself,  by  his  regard  for  the 
honour  and  welfare  of  his  people,  by  his  keen  sense 
of  what  was  expected  from  the  royal  power.  His 
indomitable  energy  during  misfortune  was  backed 
up  by  the  devoted  zeal  of  his  ministers,  by  the  skill 
of  his  ambassadors,  and  especially  by  the  prudence 
of  Torcy.  The  fall  of  the  Whigs  in  1710,  followed  by 
the  dismissal  of  Marlborough  and  the  death  of  Joseph 
I.,  each  in  its  turn  contributed  to  bring  the  leading 
European  ministers  to  take  a  statesmanlike  view  of 
the  situation.  The  untiring  efforts  of  Louis  during 
these  last  days  of  the  war  were  admirably  seconded 
by  the  brilliant  successes  of  Villars.  At  Utrecht, 
Louis  received  the  reward  of  his  labours.  He  ob¬ 
tained  terms  far  more  favourable  than  those  offered  at 
Gertruydenberg,  and  he  had  the  satisfaction  of  feel¬ 
ing  that  he  had  preserved  not  only  the  integrity  of 
his  kingdom,  but  French  nationality  itself.  During 
these  years  the  intimate  connection  subsisting  be¬ 
tween  the  Monarch  and  the  people  receives  ample 
illustration,  while  the  general  conviction  that  the 
sovereign  was  the  incarnation  of  his  subjects  was  of 
vital  importance,  and  its  thorough  acceptance  by  the 
French  nation  colours  and  explains  their  attitude  dur¬ 
ing  the  whole  of  the  Spanish  Succession  war.  Had 
France  been  governed  in  that  critical  year  of  1709 
by  any  other  than  a  monarchical  system,  she  would 
have  suffered  serious  territorial  loss,  and  would  have 
been  left  humiliated,  dismembered,  and  ruined. 


414 


Louis  XIV. 


[1715 


From  that  fate  Louis  had  saved  her,  and  at  the  end 
of  the  war  he  had  added  a  page  to  her  history  which, 
if  in  many  respects  an  overwhelmingly  pathetic  and 
painful  one,  will  at  any  rate  be  remembered  among 
the  most  glorious  in  her  history. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

THE  END. 

1714-1715. 

RANGE  after  the  conclusion  of 
the  peace  of  Utrecht  was,  com- 
2:)ared  with  most  European 
countries,  in  a  strong  position. 
She  had  undoubtedly  suffered 
enormously  from  the  calami¬ 
ties  of  the  war,  and  was  much 
exhausted. 

By  the  terms  of  the  treaty 
of  Utrecht,  she  had  lost  consid¬ 
erably,  especially  in  the  colonies.  Tournai,  Menin, 
Ypres,  and  Fumes  had  been  ceded  in  the  North, 
Exiles  and  Fenestrelles  in  the  Alps.  But  Artois, 
Roussillon,  Franche-Comt6,  Alsace,  and  Flanders 
remained  to  her,  and  Lorraine  was  almost  within 
her  grasp.  Compared  with  her  position  in  1643,  she 
had  achieved  an  enormous  territorial  extension. 


415 


4i6 


Louis  XIV. 


t1715 


Her  prestige  was  little  if  at  all  diminished  ;  she  had 
again  shown  herself  invincible.  She  had  defended 
herself  against  a  terrible  Teutonic  onslaught,  during 
which  struggle  the  question  of  the  Spanish  Succes¬ 
sion  had  lost  itself  in  the  reappearance  of  the  old 
rivalry  between  the  French  Bourbons  and  the  Aus¬ 
trian  Hapsburgs.  Though  the  balance  of  power  in  the 
Mediterranean  was  preserved,  France  had  succeeded 
in  carrying  out  the  principal  aim  of  her  policy.  She 
had  placed  a  Bourbon  on  the  Spanish  throne  and 
had  kept  him  there. 

No  doubt  the  allies  were  perfectly  justified,  in 
1701,  in  attacking  France  and  Spain  by  land  and  by 
sea.  Though  French  historians  delight  in  pointing 
out  that  as  Philip  remained  on  the  Spanish  throne 
the  desolating  war  of  1 701-17 12  was  useless,  it  must 
be  remembered  that  the  political  condition  of  Europe 
in  1712  was  very  different  from  what  it  was  in  1701. 
In  1701  Louis  XIV.’s  power  was  not  only  still 
unbroken,  and  his  schemes  of  aggrandisement  still 
vast,  but  Philip  was  his  nominee  and  instrument. 
In  1712  Louis’  power  had  been  brought  very  low, 
he  had  relinquished  all  schemes  of  aggression,  and 
Philip  had  shown  himself  independent  of  his  grand¬ 
father.  His  renunciations,  and  his  adoption  of  an 
independent  attitude  towards  France,  coincided  with 
the  accession  of  Charles  VI.  to  the  Imperial  throne 
and  with  the  failure  of  the  allies  in  Spain. 

The  Spanish  power  had  been  destroyed  in  Italy, 
and  the  Low  Countries  had  been  handed  over  to 
Austria.  “  Bourbonism  ”  had  received  a  check  and 
its  power  of  aggression  was  for  the  time  minimised. 


1715] 


The  End. 


417 


The  Grand  Alliance,  in  its  earlier  stages,  was  per¬ 
fectly  justifiable,  but  from  1707,  the  date  of  the  cele¬ 
brated  Whig  Resolution,  the  allies  began  to  deviate 
from  the  path  which  they  had  chosen  in  1701.  Like 
the  coalition  of  1793  their  object  from  1707  was  to 
reduce  France  to  the  rank  of  a  second  rate  power. 
Each  of  the  allies  was  bent  on  territorial  acquisitions 
though  the  balance  of  power  continued  to  be  the 
pretext  of  hostility.  It  was  not  till  the  Tories  under 
Bolingbroke  and  Harley  came  into  office  in  1710, 
that  the  new  policy  inaugurated  by  the  Whigs  was 
repudiated.  The  treaty  of  Utrecht  was  then  made. 
The  new  European  position  taken  up  by  England  in 
1688,  and  the  extraordinary  growth  of  her  power 
and  resources,  had  been  one  of  the  main  causes  of 
the  disasters  to  the  French  armies;  the  retirement 
of  England  from  the  war  was  the  principal  cause  of 
the  French  success  at  Denain,  her  victories  against 
the  Emperor,  and  the  maintenance  of  her  position 
in  Europe  in  1715.  And  the  results  of  the  war, 
while  they  satisfied  the  honour  of  France,  were  in¬ 
valuable  to  Spain  and  to  England. 

France  owed  her  safety  not  a  little  to  Spain  her¬ 
self.  The  allies  had  found  it  impossible  to  succeed 
in  face  of  the  patriotism  of  the  Castilians,  and  after 
Almanza  and  Villa  Viciosa  the  Spanish  resistance 
was  of  the  utmost  value  to  France.  Henceforward, 
Spain  having  passed  through  the  fire  of  adversity, 
had  to  be  reckoned  with  as  a  European  power.  The 
great  qualities  of  the  Spanish  race  had  shown  them¬ 
selves  ;  Spain  gained  by  losing  her  outlying  prov¬ 
inces,  and  a  veritable  renaissance  took  place  under 

27 


4i8 


Lotiis  XIV. 


[1715 


the*  Alberonis,  Ripperdas,  and  others,  culminating  in 
the  reign  of  Charles  III.  In  saving  Spain  from  the 
House  of  Hapsburg,  Louis  XIV.  had  done  much  for 
the  balance  of  power.  Though  “  Bourbonism  ”  be¬ 
came  the  terror  of  misguided  English  statesmen, 
there  was  surely  something  to  be  said  for  an  alliance 
between  the  Bourbons  of  France,  Spain,  and  Italy, 
as  a  counterpoise  on  the  one  hand  to  the  Teutonic 
peoples,  and  on  the  other  to  the  growing  Slav  in¬ 
fluence.  There  was  never  any  real  danger  of  the 
Pyrenees  ceasing  to  exist,  and  Louis’  solution  of 
the  greatest  international  puzzle  of  the  seventeenth 
century  was,  after  the  war  of  the  Spanish  Succession, 
recognised  to  be  the  only  possible  one.  If  there 
was  any  real  danger  of  a  universal  monarchy,  that 
danger  in  the  early  years  of  the  eighteenth  century 
came  rather  from  Vienna  than  from  Paris. 

France  too  owed  a  deep  debt  to  her  own  people. 
In  spite  of  the  unpatriotic  conduct  of  the  inhabi¬ 
tants  of  the  Cevennes,  in  spite  of  the  complaints  of 
F^n^lon  and  of  Vauban,  the  nation  as  a  whole  had 
loyally  supported  the  government.  After  Malpla- 
quet  Villars  had  not  suffered  any  reproaches,  but 
was  allowed  to  persevere  and  to  win  victories  at 
Denain  and  Landau.  France  lastly  owed  much 
of  her  success  to  her  able  diplomatists,  who  had 
watched  her  interests  with  extraordinary  skill  and 
success. 

But  though  Louis  bequeathed  the  tradition  of  a 
brilliant  and  successful  foreign  policy  to  his  succes¬ 
sors,  he  left  to  succeeding  generations  in  France  a 
religious  legacy,  which  proved  the  source  of  much 


1715] 


The  Ejtd. 


419 


trouble  and  confusion.  The  revocation  of  the  Edict 
of  Nantes  had  been  carried  out  and  the  reduction  of 
the  Cevennes  during  the  latter  war  had  removed 
any  further  danger  from  the  Huguenots.  But  the 
Jansenists  remained  a  strong  party,  including,  as  they 
did,  many  of  the  clergy  and  magistrates  and  well-to- 
do  bourgeois.  Jansenism  it  had  been  said  reached 
even  to  the  throne  of  the  King.  This  division  in 
the  Gallican  Church  between  Jesuitism  and  Jansen¬ 
ism  was  regarded  by  the  government  with  disfavour 
on  account  of  the  political  side  of  Jansenism.  Every 
opponent  of  the  existing  state  of  things  naturally 
sided  with  that  party  which  professed  independence 
of  thought,  and  opposition  to  extreme  centralisation. 
Louis  had  always  regarded  the  Jansenists  with  sus¬ 
picion.  He  knew  they  did  not  see  the  necessity  of 
absolute  union  in  both  religion  and  politics,  he  sus¬ 
pected  that  they  desired  provincial  liberties,  the  free¬ 
dom  of  the  Church  from  state  control,  and  more 
power  for  the  aristocracy.  He  was  himself  consid¬ 
erably  influenced  in  religious  matters  by  Le  Tellier, 
the  successor  of  Pere  La  Chaise,  and  Le  Tellier  was 
a  hard  intolerant  Jesuit. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  Jesuits  took  advantage 
of  the  King’s  dislike  of  any  tendency  to  divide  the 
nation  into  two  hostile  camps ;  they  exaggerated 
the  independence  of  the  Jansenist  opinions  and  their 
factious  designs  ;  they  accused  them  of  being  the 
enemies  of  all  authority  whether  residing  in  the  Pope 
or  in  Bishops  or  even  in  Kings  ;  they  accused  them, 
moreover,  of  trying  to  secure  for  Orleans  the  succes¬ 
sion  to  the  throne.  Louis  was  thoroughly  alarmed. 


420 


Loins  XIV. 


[1715 


Hoprobably  thought  that  the  Jansenists  and  Hugue¬ 
nots  were  equally  heretics,  and  he  believed  that  unless 
severe  measures  were  at  once  taken  his  successor 
would  find  on  his  accession  that  a  civil  war  was  on 
the  point  of  breaking  out. 

Madame  de  Maintenon,  many  of  whose  friends 
were  Jansenists,  was  distracted  by  her  fears  and 
doubts.  De  Noailles,  the  Archbishop  of  Paris,  was 
himself  a  moderate  Jansenist,  and  had  seen  much  of 
Madame  de  Maintenon.  But  the  Jesuit  faction  was 
unrelenting.  In  1705  a  Bull  from  Clement  XL  de¬ 
stroyed  the  Peace  of  Clement  IX.  (1668)  and  pro¬ 
claimed  the  heretical  nature  of  the  Jansenist 
opinions;  in  1710  Louis  ordered  the  destruction  of 
Port  Royal,  which  was  rased  to  the  ground.  Not 
content  with  this  success,  his  advisers  determined  to 
obtain  a  condemnation  of  the  doctrines  contained 
in  Quesnel’s  Reflexions  morales  sur  le  Nouveau  Testa¬ 
ment,  a  book  published  in  1695,  strongly  recom¬ 
mended  by  De  Noailles  and  other  bishops,  and  very 
popular  in  France. 

In  1713  Clement  XL  was  induced  by  the  Jesuits 
to  issue  the  famous  Bull  Unigenitus  in  which  he  ex¬ 
plicitly  condemned  loi  propositions  taken  from 
Quesnel’s  book.  To  accomplish  this  result  pressure 
of  the  most  illegitimate  kind  had  been  brought  to 
bear  on  the  Pope.  When  the  French  envoy  asked 
Clement  later  why  he  had  condemned  such  an  odd 
number,  the  latter  replied,  seizing  his  arm  and  burst¬ 
ing  into  tears:  “  O!  M.  Amelot,  M.  Amelot,  what 
would  you  have  had  me  to  do  ?  I  strove  hard  to  cur¬ 
tail  the  list,  but  Father  Le  Tellier  had  pledged  him- 


1715] 


The  End. 


42 1 

self  to  the  King  that  the  book  eontained  more 
than  a  hundred  errors,  and  with  his  foot  on  my 
throat  he  compelled  me  to  prove  him  right.  I  have 
condemned  only  one  more.”  ' 

Not  even  at  Rome  had  theological  hatred  been 
carried  to  a  like  extent,  and  the  blame  for  these  pro¬ 
ceedings  must  be  shared  by  Louis,  Madame  de 
Maintenon,  and  Le  Tellier.  The  effects  of  this  Bull 
were  most  disastrous.  De  Noailles  and  eight 
bishops  refused  to  accept  it,  and  were  supported  by 
the  Parlemcnt  of  Paris  and  many  of  the  most  intelli¬ 
gent  of  Frenchmen.  Louis  refused  to  yield  or  to 
adopt  a  neutral  attitude,  and  insisted  on  regarding 
the  opposition  to  the  Bull  as  opposition  to  his 
own  authority.  A  cruel  persecution  of  the  well-to- 
do  and  orderly  classes  at  once  took  place,  30,000  of 
whom  are  said  to  have  suffered,  and  the  result  of 
perhaps  the  saddest  episode  in  the  lives  of  Louis  and 
of  Madame  de  Maintenon  was  that  up  to  the  Revo¬ 
lution  the  nation  remained  divided  into  two  hostile 
camps. 

In  passing  judgment  on  the  general  character  of 
Louis’  rule  and  its  effects  upon  P'rance,  it  must 
always  be  remembered  that  his  rule  was  popular. 
France  had  from  the  beginning  of  her  history  shown 
a  strong  inclination  for  a  monarchial  form  of  govern¬ 
ment,  and  just  as  she  had  welcomed  the  rule  of 
Henry  IV.  as  a  relief  from  the  civil  wars,  so  she 
gladly  preferred  the  despotism  of  Louis  XIV.  to  any 
further  ruinous  attempts  to  secure  a  semi-constitu- 


'  For  an  impartial  account  of  the  struggle  between  the  Jesuits  and 
Jansenists,  see  Roequain,  L' esprit  Revoliitionaire  Avant  la  Revolution, 


422 


Louis  XIV. 


[1715 


tional  regime.  In  a  long  reign  such  as  was  that  of 
Louis,  it  is  an  easy  matter  to  find  subjects  for 
criticism. 

Perhaps,  however,  the  portion  of  his  life  for  which 
the  least  allowance  will  be  made,  is  the  period  be¬ 
tween  his  mother’s  death  in  1667  and  his  marriage 
to  Madame  de  Maintenon.  In  these  years  the  most 
successful  and,  from  a  military  point  of  view,  the 
most  glorious  of  his  reign,  his  private  life,  unlike 
that  of  Justinian,  was  often  open  to  severe  criticism. 
He  seems  to  have  thought  he  could  fly  in  the  face 
of  even  the  low  moral  standard  of  the  day,  and  not 
only  emulate,  but  surpass  the  conduct  of  Charles  II. 
of  England.  Freed  from  his  mother’s  control,  Louis 
plunged  into  a  course  of  life  which  continued  till  the 
death  of  Maria  Theresa.  In  1671  he  appeared  in 
public  driving  with  Madame  de  Montespan  and 
Louise  de  la  Valliere.  Such  conduct  on  the  part  of 
one  who  held  a  prominent  position  in  Europe  had 
very  evil  effects,  and  before  long  every  German 
princeling  had  his  Versailles  and  his  mistresses. 
Carried  away  by  his  successes,  and  by  the  extrava¬ 
gant  adulation  of  a  brilliant  Court,  Louis  appears  to 
have  thought  that  he  was  above  criticism.  During 
this  period  of  his  career  his  political  mistakes 
(though  often  disastrous)  were  the  natural  result  of 
over-confidence  or  bad  advice,  and  to  some  extent 
could  be  excused  on  the  ground  of  youth  and  inex¬ 
perience. 

The  non-acceptance  of  the  Dutch  terms,  followed 
by  the  release  of  the  Dutch  prisoners,  were  blunders 
which  were  redeemed  by  the  brilliant  campaigns  of 


1715] 


The  End. 


423 


Turenne,  and  the  territorial  acquisitions  made  at  the 
peace  of  Nimeguen.  The  success  which  attended 
Louis’  Rdiinion  policy,  and  the  preposterous  claims 
with  which  he  justified  that  policy,  need  not  astonish 
a  generation  which  has  followed  the  policy  of  France 
in  Africa  and  in  the  far  East  during  the  XIXth 
century.  But  the  truce  of  Ratisbon  was  a  most 
unfortunate  blunder,  and  can  with  difficulty  be  ex¬ 
plained.  Louis  was  at  that  time  intent  on  the  con¬ 
struction  of  Versailles,  he  had  acquired  a  brilliant 
European  position,  he  was  the  most  admired  and 
envied  monarch  in  Europe.  He  probably  thought 
that  the  Netherlands  were  within  his  grasp,  and  that 
the  hostility  of  the  Emperor  was  of  little  account. 
Nevertheless  the  truce  of  Ratisbon  was  an  error,  the 
consequences  of  which  were  most  serious. 

The  revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes,  the  attack 
on  Philipsburg  in  1688,  and  the  devastation  of  the 
Palatinate  in  1689  are  the  great  blots  in  the  reign  to 
which  most  historians  naturally  turn.  All  of  these 
have  been  fully  discussed  in  previous  chapters.  Each 
brought  its  own  retribution  during  the  Spanish  Suc¬ 
cession  war.  France  in  her  need  sadly  missed  the 
men  who  would  have  been  the  flower  of  her  troops, 
she  realised  what  the  revolution  of  1688  had  done 
for  England,  and  she  experienced  the  undying  hos¬ 
tility  of  the  Germans,  anxious  to  avenge  the  devas¬ 
tated  Rhineland. 

When  we  approach  the  Spanish  Succession  war 
we  are  at  once  in  a  land  where  confusion  worse  con¬ 
founded  seems  to  reign.  Most  writers  find  that 
Louis’  intention  of  placing  Philip  on  the  Spanish 


424 


Louis  XIV. 


[1715 


throne  was  in  itself  monstrous,  and  was  the  cause  of 
the  long  war  which  proved  so  disastrous  to  France. 
In  a  previous  chapter  it  has  been  sufficiently  shown 
that  the  actual  acceptance  of  the  Will  was  not  in 
itself  a  misfortune  for  the  world,  but  that  it  probably 
offered  to  Europe  the  best  solution  of  the  difficult 
Spanish  Succession  question.  The  war  was  caused 
by  Louis’  extraordinary  want  of  moderation  in  face 
of  a  highly  excited  state  of  feeling  in  Europe.  If  he 
had  not  reserved  Philip’s  right  to  the  French  throne, 
if  he  had  not  seized  the  barrier  towns,  if  in  a  word 
he  had  faithfully  carried  out  the  treaty  of  Ryswick 
and  had  not  taken  up  an  aggressive  attitude,  it  is 
very  probable  that  the  war  might  have  been  averted. 
By  bringing  on  his  country  through  these  ill-con¬ 
sidered  and  rash  acts  a  devastating  war,  Louis  in¬ 
flicted  on  France  an  injury  almost  comparable  to 
that  caused  by  the  revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes, 
and  in  consequence  on  his  death  he  left  France  un¬ 
conquered  indeed,  but  overwhelmed  by  the  miseries 
entailed  upon  her  by  the  long  wars,  and  from  which 
she  did  not  recover  before  the  Revolution.  He  left 
behind  him,  too,  a  legacy  of  discontent  which  proved 
in  the  end  fatal  to  his  family. 

All  these  misfortunes  might  have  been  averted  by 
a  wise  policy  at  the  time  of  the  acceptance  of  the 
Will.  But  the  feeling  of  overweening  pride  and  his 
exaggerated  self-confidence,  which  in  1672  and  in 
1684  had  been  so  strongly  in  evidence,  seem  again 
to  have  possessed  Louis.  No  sooner  did  he  win 
some  great  success  than  he  appeared  to  lose  all  sense 
of  moderation,  and  the  power  of  seeing  things  as  they 


1715] 


The  End. 


425 


were.  Prosperity  brought  with  it  apparently  an 
aggressive  spirit  and  for  the  time  eliminated  all  wise 
counsels.  On  the  other  hand,  no  sooner  do  danger 
and  difficulties  arise  than  the  real  heroism  of  the  man 
appears,  and  we  at  once  understand  the  influence 
that  he  wielded  for  so  many  years.  The  appoint¬ 
ment  of  Chamillard  was  unpardonable  and  Louis’ 
belief  that  he,  at  his  age,  could  correct  his  minister’s 
blunders,  direct  simultaneous  operations  with  success 
in  Flanders,  on  the  Rhine,  in  Italy  or  in  Spain,  be¬ 
sides  organising  the  whole  of  the  Spanish  govern¬ 
ment,  fills  us  with  wonder.  All  through  his  reign 
the  feeling  of  admiration  at  his  energy,  his  conscien¬ 
tiousness,  his  labours,  his  devotion  to  his  country, 
his  influence  on  men  as  widely  different  in  their 
tastes  and  ability  as  were  Bolingbroke  and  Villars, 
Saint-Simon  and  Bossuet,  contend  with  the  feeling 
of  amazement  at  the  pettiness  of  some  of  his  acts, 
at  his  religious  bigotry,  at  the  influence  of  the  Court 
over  his  choice  of  generals,  at  his  preference  for 
Villeroy  to  Villars,  at  his  suspicions  of  Turenne. 

Had  Louis  been  content  to  devote  his  whole  ener¬ 
gies  to  the  territorial  extension  of  F ranee,  to  the  expan¬ 
sion  of  her  colonies,  and  the  increase  of  her  trade,  pos¬ 
terity  might  haveaccused  him  of  ambition,  and  blamed 
him  for  his  vast  expenditure.  Such  a  line  of  policy 
would,  however,  in  his  case  have  been  excusable,  for 
his  interest  in  diplomacy  was  great,  and  his  fondness 
of  military  operations  excessive.  He  could,  too,  have 
found  some  justification  in  the  similarity  of  his  own 
views  with  those  of  most  of  his  subjects,  and  he  could 
always  point  out  that  in  diplomacy  and  in  war,  France 


426 


Louis  XIV. 


[1715 


held  during  his  reign  a  leading  position  in  Europe. 
But  from  the  date  of  his  marriage  with  Madame  de 
Maintenon,  his  resolution  to  lead  a  sober  and  severe 
life  synchronises  with  a  determination  not  to  rest  sat¬ 
isfied  with  a  policy  which  had  brought  his  country 
glory  and  territory,  but  to  plunge  into  the  labyrinth 
of  religious  controversies  and  to  root  out  of  France 
alt  opinions  which  did  not  agree  with  those  held  by 
himself  and  his  spiritual  advisers.  Naturally  igno¬ 
rant,  all  his  ignorance  and  all  his  intellectual  defi- 
ciences  were  at  once  revealed  in  a  strong  light  as  soon 
as  he  allowed  himself  to  be  influenced  by  a  number 
of  unstatesmanlike  ecclesiastics,  and  encouraged  by 
a  narrow-minded  enthusiast  like  Madame  de  Main- 
tenon. 

There  is  not  a  touch  of  greatness  in  Louis’  reli¬ 
gious  policy.  That  he  was  seriously  religious  there 
is  no  reason  to  doubt.  “  Father,”  he  once  said  to 
Massillon  after  the  termination  of  his  first  course  at 
V ersailles,  “  I  have  listened  in  my  chapel  to  many  great 
preachers,  and  I  have  been  very  well  satisfied  with 
them  ;  but  as  often  as  I  hear  you,  I  am  very  ill  satis¬ 
fied  with  myself.”  But  Louis’  religious  policy  teems 
with  ignorance,  vindictiveness,  and  short-sighted¬ 
ness.  After  1704  even  Massillon  was  excluded  from 
Court  favour,  owing  to  his  supposed  inclination  to 
Jansenism.  The  interests  of  France  were  ignored, 
measures  utterly  un-Christian  and  cruel  were  adopted, 
and  the  country  was  left  rent  and  torn  by  religious 
divisions. 

But  in  his  attitude  to  Europe,  Louis’  greatness  is 
distinctly  recognized.  Though  he  left  France  at 


1715] 


The  End. 


427 


war  with  herself  over  a  religious  question,  he  could 
at  any  rate  rest  satisfied  that  before  he  died  western 
Europe  was  at  peace.  He  was  in  all  his  political 
and  diplomatic  relations  a  great  King.  His  designs 
were  magnificent,  and  his  appreciation  of  the  true 
policy  of  France  was,  as  a  rule,  correct.  In  his  later 
years,  during  the  Spanish  Succession  war,  his  great¬ 
ness  was  more  than  ever  apparent,  and  was  acknowl¬ 
edged  by  English  statesmen.  The  tragic  incidents 
of  his  declining  years  only  serve  to  bring  out  more 
distinctly  his  better  and  greater  qualities. 

Louis’  mistakes,  serious  though  they  were,  did 
not  prevent  his  rule  from  conferring  real  benefits 
on  France.  The  establishment  of  an  orderly,  well- 
organised  government  rescued  the  country  from  the 
chaos  which  characterised  the  Fronde  period,  and 
launched  heron  a  career  of  prosperity  which  the  long 
wars  could  only  temporarily  check.  Throughout 
the  length  and  breadth  of  the  land  the  law  reigned 
supreme.  Feudal  anarchy  became  impossible,  and 
powerful  nobles  with  great  local  influence  ceased 
to  exist  in  any  part  of  France.  The  centralised 
administration  which  was  established  under  the  au¬ 
thority  of  the  King  worked  its  will  unfettered  by 
the  States- General,  the  Parlemcnts,  the  nobility,  or 
any  local  bodies.  At  the  Revolution  this  theory  of 
a  centralised  administration  was  adopted  by  the 
Jacobins,  and  the  system  of  Louis  XIV.  was  not 
only  adhered  to  but  developed. 

And  this  centralising  tendency  was  only  the 
natural  outcome  of  the  gradual  development  of 
France.  She  had  been  built  up  by  the  annexation 


428 


Lo7iis  XIV. 


[1715 


of  outlying  territories,  each  of  which  was  allowed  to 
retain  its  privileges  and  customs.  Thus  Artois, 
Brittany,  Burgundy,  Languedoc,  and  Provence  re¬ 
tained  their  own  provincial  estates  on  Louis’  acces¬ 
sion,  and  not  unfrequently  by  these  estates  a  very 
independent  attitude  was  assumed.  There  seems 
little  doubt  that  it  was  for  the  benefit  of  France  and 
for  the  increase  of  her  influence  that  the  political 
independence  of  these  provincial  estates  should  be 
temporarily  suspended  by  the  growth  of  the  King’s 
absolute  authority.  Union  and  centralisation  were 
demanded  by  the  geographical  position  of  France. 
In  a  similar  manner  all  independent  life  in  the  cities 
disappeared.  In  most  of  the  municipalities  corrup¬ 
tion  was  common  and  the  government  inefficient. 
Louis’  measures  were,unfortunately  more  in  the  direc¬ 
tion  of  abolition  than  of  reform,  and  the  net  result 
was  that  all  interest  felt  by  the  citizens  in  the  gov¬ 
ernment  of  the  towns  was  destroyed.  But  as  a  com¬ 
pensation,  the  system  of  guilds  was  broken  down, 
industries  were  organised,  manufactures  were  encour¬ 
aged,  and  France  was  prepared,  at  the  beginning 
of  the  eighteenth  century,  to  take  her  part  in  the 
coming  industrial  revolution. 

The  power  of  the  monarchy,  too,  exercised  a  bene¬ 
ficial  influence  in  the  region  of  law.  The  political 
powers  claimed  by  the  Parlemeiit  were  set  aside, 
and  they  were  bidden  to  limit  themselves  to  their 
judicial  duties.  Great  improvements  were  also 
effected  in  the  legal  system,  and  though  much  re¬ 
mained  to  be  done,  the  code  of  Louis  XIV.  proved 
of  incalculable  value.  This  centralised  system  was 


1715] 


The  End. 


429 

then  the  outcome  of  the  whole  previous  history  of 
France;  it  conferred  enormous  benefits  on  the 
country,  it  was  the  only  system  fitted  for  the  needs 
and  aspirations  of  the  French  people,  and  as  such 
has  been  adopted  by  all  succeeding  French  govern¬ 
ments. 

The  faults  of  the  absolutism  of  Louis  XIV.  are 
obvious.  With  regard  to  the  nobles  the  policy  of 
the  government  did  not  go  far  enough.  It  has  been 
very  truly  said  by  a  modern  writer  that  the  absolute 
power  of  the  King  “  was  held  in  check  by  the  in¬ 
numerable  usages  and  traditions  of  a  highly  civilised 
society.”  The  existence  of  these  traditions  may 
have  tended  to  incline  the  government  to  pursue  a 
compromising  policy  with  regard  to  the  nobles,  but 
whatever  was  the  cause,  the  results  of  the  policy 
adopted  were  most  disastrous.  The  whole  history 
of  France  in  the  seventeenth  century  proves  con¬ 
clusively  that  the  nobles  were  unfit  to  be  trusted 
with  political  power.  In  overthrowing  their  political 
influence,  Louis’  government  had  done  well.  But 
no  attempt  was  made  to  destroy  their  privileges, 
and  these  remained  to  bring  upon  the  nobles  and 
with  them  the  monarchy,  revolution  and  ruin.  The 
greatest  mistake  to  be  ascribed  by  Louis’  govern¬ 
ment  was  that,  in  respect  to  the  privileges  of  the  no¬ 
bles,  it  pursued  an  illadviscd  and  fatal  policy.  Had 
Louis  placed  himself  at  the  head  of  a  social  revolu¬ 
tion  and  reduced  the  nobles  to  a  condition  similar  to 
that  enjoyed  by  the  English  peerage,  the  monarchy 
would  probably  have  been  saved,  and  France  spared 
years  of  revolutionary  trouble. 


430 


Loiiis  XIV. 


[1715 


Much  alleviation  in  taxation  might  have  been 
given  to  France  in  the  eighteenth  century  had  Louis 
increased  the  powers  of  local  assemblies  over  the 
collection  of  the  taille.  Louis’  government  like 
that  of  Justinian  was  costly,  and  its  costliness  was 
increased  by  the  expense  of  collecting  the  taxes. 
The  central  administration  was  forced  to  employ 
an  army  of  officials  whose  opportunities  of  profit 
were  very  considerable.  Had  the  system  of  as¬ 
sessing  and  collecting  the  taxes  by  local  assem¬ 
blies  been  extended,  a  great  saving  would  have 
been  affected  and  taxation  consequently  diminished. 
It  was  a  calamity  for  France  that  the  results  of  the 
centralised  system  were  not  only  the  permanent 
impoverishment  but  also  the  destruction  of  much 
vitality  in  the  provinces,  and  in  the  city  govern¬ 
ments,  followed  by  the  overwhelming  increase  of 
the  influence  of  Paris.  But  the  indirect  results  of  the 
governmental  system  of  France  in  the  second  half 
of  the  seventeenth  century  must  not  be  entirely  laid 
to  the  charge  of  Louis.  In  the  social  and  political 
condition  of  France  a  strong  centralised  government 
was  the  necessity  of  the  hour,  and  with  the  estab¬ 
lishment  of  the  unquestioned  authority  of  the  King, 
France  enjoyed  increased  prosperity,  while  the 
sphere  of  her  influence  in  Europe  was  widely  ex¬ 
tended.  Had  Louis  destroyed  the  privileges  of  the 
nobles,  had  he  entirely  abolished  the  political  func¬ 
tions  of  the  Parlcments,  had  he  wisely  given  the 
local  assemblies  more  power  in  the  matter  of  taxa¬ 
tion,  France  would  have  developed  in  the  direction 
of  a  constitutional  government.  He  had,  however, 


1715] 


The  End. 


431 


given  France  a  definite  form  of  government  suitable 
to  the  times  in  which  he  lived.  The  establishment  of 
a  bureaucracy  dependent  on  an  absolutism  did  won¬ 
ders  for  France  in  the  seventeenth  century.  It  is 
much  to  be  regretted  that  Louis’  successors  did  not 
introduce  the  modifications  required  by  the  existence 
of  new  conditions  and  new  ideas  in  the  eighteenth 
century.  Their  failure  to  adapt  themselves  to  the 
exigencies  of  the  times  cannot  be  laid  to  the  charge 
of  the  Grand  Monarque. 

Louis’  latter  days  were  clouded  with  grief.  He  had 
witnessed  the  tragic  death  of  the  Duke  of  Burgundy 
in  1712  at  Marly  “la  funestre  Marly,”  where  one 
of  the  best  known  and  most  pathetic  scenes  in  his 
life  took  place.  Mary  Beatrice,  whom  Louis  had 
always  treated  with  the  greatest  respect  and  affec¬ 
tion,  had  lost  her  daughter  Louisa  and  in  her  grief 
came  to  visit  Louis  still  mourning  over  the  sorrows 
of  his  house.  It  is  related  that  they  laid  aside  all 
court  etiquette,  weeping  together  in  their  common 
grief  because,  as  the  Queen  said,  “  We  saw  the  aged 
were  left,  and  that  death  had  swept  away  the  young.” 
On  August  10,  1715,  Louis  took  his  last  walk  in  the 
gardens  at  Marly,  which  is  so  closely  associated  with 
Madame  de  Maintenon  and  so  fully  described  by 
Saint-Simon.  To  the  last  Madame  de  Maintenon 
remained  his  watchful  guardian  and  his  intelligent 
companion.  Her  devotion  was  unsurpassed,  while 
her  virtuous  existence  at  a  Court  distinguished,  be¬ 
fore  her  marriage  to  Louis,  by  frivolities  and  vice, 
renders  her  worthy  of  much  honour.  “  She  never 
did  harm  to  a  soul,”  was  the  verdict  of  the  Regent 


432 


Louis  XIV. 


[1715 


Orleans,  “  and  she  always  tried  to  keep  peace  and 
harmony  among  all.”  Throughout  her  life  she 
showed  an  unusual  unity  of  purpose  and  ever  con¬ 
scientiously  endeavoured  to  practise  the  doctrines 
which  she  had  adopted.  “  Though  her  life  was  a 
romance,  her  character  was  prosaic.  But  her  superi¬ 
ority  consisted  not  in  rare  qualities,  but  in  the  posses¬ 
sion  of  a  high  degree  of  those  which  are  common  to 
the  majority  of  sensible  persons.”  She  was  indeed 
worthy  of  being  termed  one  of  the  most  remarkable 
women  in  French  history. 

Louis’  political  interests  remained  as  keen  as  ever, 
and  in  one  of  his  last  letters  he  urged  Philip  V.  to 
support  the  claims  of  the  Pretender.  With  that 
chivalry  which  had  led  him  to  recognise  the  Pre¬ 
tender’s  claim  to  the  English  throne  on  James  IP’s 
death,  Louis  again  after  the  death  of  Anne  seemed 
to  be  gradually  preparing  to  re-assert  by  arms  the 
claims  of  the  Stuarts  against  the  Hanoverian  regime. 
But  before  steps  could  be  taken  which  might  have  had 
momentous  effects  upon  the  fortunes  of  England, 
the  aged  King  was  no  more.  On  August  nth  he 
had  written  a  letter  to  Philip,  and  after  that  day 
he  never  left  his  rooms.  He  met  death  with  firm¬ 
ness  and  courage.  His  advice  to  his  great-grandson 
showed  an  appreciation  of  his  own  errors.  “  Try,” 
he  said,  “  to  keep  peace  with  your  neighbours  :  I 
have  been  too  fond  of  war ;  do  not  imitate  me  in 
that,  nor  in  my  too  great  expenditure.”  He  seemed 
conscious  of  the  serious  blunder  made  in  the  expulsion 
of  the  Huguenots,  for  he  declared  that  the  clergy  were 
mainly  responsible.  On  August  26th,  addressing 


1715] 


The  End. 


433 


the  Cardinals  Berry,  Rohan,  and  Le  Tellier,  he  said 
that  he  died  in  the  faith  of  the  Church,  then  he 
added  that  he  was  grieved  to  leave  the  affairs  of  the 
Church  in  the  condition  in  which  they  then  stood, 
that  they  knew  that  he  had  only  done  what  they 
wished^  and  that  they  had  to  answer  before  God  for 
all  that  he  had  done.  Madame  de  Maintenon  was 
most  constant,  and  sometimes  nursed  him  for  four¬ 
teen  hours  without  a  break.  On  August  26th,  Louis 
himself  begged  her  “  to  leave  him  and  not  to  return, 
as  her  presence  affected  him  too  much.”  She  re¬ 
mained  almost  all  the  27th  by  the  King’s  bedside. 
In  the  evening  of  the  28th  she  went  to  Saint-Cyr, 
but  she  spent  most  of  the  29th  with  the  King.  On 
the  30th  the  King  was  worse,  and  bidding  farewell 
to  the  Princesses  and  to  Madame  de  Maintenon,  he 
ordered  the  latter  “  to  repair  at  once  to  Saint-Cyr.” 

'  On  September  ist  the  Great  Monarch  breathed  his 
last. 

In  Spain  the  news  of  his  death  was  received  with 
more  feeling  than  in  France,  where  everyone  was 
looking  forward  to  a  new  re'ginie.  P'or  fifteen  years 
Louis  had  consistently  supported  Philip  with  counsel 
and  with  armies.  It  was  to  P'rench  assistance  that 
Philip  owed  his  throne  and  his  ability  to  stand 
against  a  European  coalition.  It  was  due  to  Louis’ 
advice  and  aid  that  Spain  entered  upon  that  new 
period  of  her  existence,  which  culminated  in  the 
reign  of  perhaps  Spain’s  greatest  king,  Charles  III. 
Finally,  it  was  under  the  influence  of  Louis  that  the 
system  of  political  alliance  between  the  two  countries 
was  inaugurated.  It  might  be  expected,  then,  that 

28 


434 


Louis  XIV. 


[1715 


Spain,  which  owed  its  regeneration  to  Louis,  should 
receive  the  news  of  his  death  with  some  appearance 
of  sorrow. 

I  In  France  the  event  was  marked  by  universal  re¬ 
joicing.  The  absolute  monarchy  of  France  had 
already  passed  its  zenith  ;  with  Louis’  death  it  en¬ 
tered  upon  a  period  of  steady  decline.  The  central 
administration  had  indeed  done  much  for  France, 
but  too  high  a  price  can  be  paid  for  uniformity  and 
bureaucracy.  The  cries  of  joy  which  greeted  the  news 
of  Louis’  decease  expressed  perhaps  unconsciously 
the  general  sentiment  in  favour  of  greater  freedom 
of  life  and  thought,  and  a  widespread  desire  for 
some  change.  For  the  moment  France  was  weary 
of  military  glory,  she  was  suffering  from  the  exhaus¬ 
tion  produced  by  the  late  war,  she  was  rent  by  reli¬ 
gious  divisions.  Of  Louis’  great  contemporary,  the 
Emperor  Aurungzib,  who  had  lately  died,  it  has 
been  said  :  “  Every  plan  that  he  formed  came  to 
little  good  ;  every  enterprise  failed.”  This  dictum 
might  accurately  describe  Louis’  internal  policy.  In 
contrast  to  his  foreign  policy  his  home  policy  had 
been  a  grand  failure.  Painfully  and  methodically 
Louis  had  throughout  his  life  done  what  he  con¬ 
ceived  to  be  his  duty.  His  ministers,”  says  Miche¬ 
let,  “  might  change  of  die  ;  he,  always  the  same, 
went  through  his  duties,  ceremonies,  royal  fetes,  and 
the  like  with  the  regularity  of  the  sun  which  he  had 
chosen  as  his  emblem.”  He  had  marked  out  for 
himself  a  path,  and  in  the  full  belief  that  he  was 
acting  for  the  best  interests  of  his  country,  had 
steadfastly  pursued  it.  His  scheme  of  government 


1715] 


The  End. 


435 


was  an  impracticable  one  for  the  France  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  and  the  universal  gladness  which 
welcomed  the  Regency  showed  that  men  recognised 
that  absolutism  was  unsuitable  for  the  new  age. 
Louis  made  himself  responsible  for  all  the  acts  of 
his  government.  Though  his  successors — so  unfit  to 
rule — undoubtedly  aggravated  the  existing  evils  in 
France,  he  must  share  with  them  the  blame  for  the 
internal  condition  of  his  country  during  the  greater 
part  of  the  eighteenth  century.  When  he  died  the 
principle  of  royalty  had  already  received  uncon¬ 
sciously  a  severe  blow,  and  it  would  have  required  a 
very  able  succession  of  kings  to  restore  that  feeling 
towards  the  monarchy  which  had  existed  in  France 
till  within  a  few  years  of  Louis’  death.  Still  it 
would  not  have  proved  an  insuperable  task  for  an 
able  and  popular  sovereign.  The  doctrine  of  the 
Divine  Right  of  Kings  remained  unquestioned  in 
France,  the  instinct  of  royalty  was  strong  among- the 
French  people.  The  birth  of  the  Duke  of  Burgundy 
had  been  the  signal  for  the  wildest  rejoicing,  and  it 
was  evident  that  the  sentiment  of  loyalty  was  as 
yet  little  weakened.  In  spite  of  the  disasters  of  the 
Spanish  Succession  war,  and  in  spite  of  the  King’s 
age  and  the  desire  of  the  mass  of  the  nation  for  a 
change,  the  reverence  for  the  kingly  office  existed 
with  almost  unabated  force. 

Louis  died  convinced  of  the  value  of  religion,  and 
fully  conscious  of  the  sacred  character  and  solemn 
responsibilities  of  royalty. 


THE  END. 


INDEX. 


A 

Alberoni,  27g,  367,  406,  418 
Alexander  VIII.,  306 
Algiers,  232,  235 
Almanza,  battle  of,  373,  391, 

407,  417 

Alsace,  7,  29,  30,  192,  197,  198, 
204,  205,  227,  285 
Amelot,  350,  355.  365.  366,  369. 

370,  373.  380,  384.  393.  402 
Amsterdam,  28,  227 
Anjou,  Duke  of,  19,  27,  too,  323, 
335,  337,  338,  340  :  Philip  V., 
2,  346,  347,  349,  350,  3^6,  368 
Anne  of  Austria,  8,  ii,  14,  17, 
22,  25,  27,  34,  43,  44,  46,  56, 
58,  71-73,  82,  113,  115,  117, 
118,  146 

Anne  of  Gonzaga,  42 
Anne,  Queen  of  England,  276, 
397,  403 

Antoine  de  Bordeaux,  63 
Antwerp,  28 

Areillen,  conference  of,  216 
Armada,  the  Spanish,  267 
Artagnan,  385,  388 
Assembly  of  Notables,  10 
Assiento,  the,  395,  401 
Augsburg,  League  of,  137,  208, 
220,  251,  255,  267,  286,  306, 
310 

Aurungzib,  127,  434 
Austrian  Succession  War,  the, 
264 

Avaux,  Count  of,  18,  272 
Avignon,  316 


B 

Bailleul,  18 
Barbary  States,  224 
Barbezieux,  270,  281,  334,  358 
Barcelona,  26,  285,  370,  371,  374, 
410 

Barillon,  12,  208 
Barrier,  the  Dutch,  283,  347,  388, 
402,  424 
Bastille,  the,  49 

Bavaria,  province  of,  29,  133  ; 
Elector  of,  29,  i6g,  184,  215, 
216,  220,  254,  255,  259,  315, 
324,  326,  353,  361-365,  399, 
400,  402 

Beachy  Head,  battle  of,  273,  275 
Beaufort,  Duke  of,  13,  14,  16, 
3L  51,  52,  65 

Beauvilliers,  329,  335,  341,  377, 

390 

Ben  Aicha,  313,  317 
Berry,  Duke  of,  298,  328,  340, 
346,  389,  403 

Benvick,  Duke  of,  359,  372,  410 
Blecourt,  336,  384,  385 
Bleneau,  battle  of,  48 
Blenheim,  battle  of,  25,  365 
Bolingbroke,  83,  417,  425 
Bontemps,  301 
Bordeaux,  42,  48,  54 
Bossuet,  86,  89,  93,  287,  305-307, 
424 

Boufflers,  Marshal,  215,  261,  359, 
360,  374.  375 

Bouvines,  battle  of,  97,  228 
Boyne,  battle  of,  274,  275 


437 


Index. 


438 


Brandenburg,  the  great  Elector 
of,  146,  153,  168,  170,  173, 
180,  184,  1S5,  206,  207,  211, 
215,  216,  220,  221,  227,  244, 
252,  262;  Frederick  III.  of, 
262 

Bressac,  Madame  de,  18 
Brienne,  the  elder,  18,  19  ;  the 
younger,  loi,  103 
Brihuega,  battle  of,  192 
Brittany,  province  of,  16  ;  Duke 
of,  408 

Broussel,  35,  52,  63 
Burgundy,  Duchy  of,  15,  41,  53  ; 
Duke  of,  282,  298,  ,307,  308, 
340,  341,  346,  364,  390,  398, 

407,  408,  431 ;  Duchess  of,  407, 

408,  435 


C 

Canada,  128,  269 
Candia,  224 

Casale,  52,  215,  232,  279,  282 
Cassano,  battle  of,  366 
Cassel,  26  ;  battle  of,  189,  190 
Castel  Rodrigo,  148,  149,  151, 
156,  157,  160 

Catalonia,  26,  28,  52,  54,  318, 
371,  380,  410 

Catinat,  84,  215,  269,  279,  283, 
359,  361 

Caulet,  Bishop  of  Pamiers,  305 
Cevennes,  the,  365,  375,  418, 
419 

Chabot-Rohan,  51,  52 
Chambord,  233 

Chamillard,  84,  100,  358,  359, 
377,  378,  424 
Chamlay,  276,  359 
Champagne,  15,  18,  34,  47,  54, 

55,  63,  312 

Charles,  Archduke,  318, 321,  322, 
325,  326,  330,  336,  338-340, 
353,  365,  368,  371,  372; 

Charles  VI.,  Emperor,  392, 
394,  410,  416 

Charles  the  Great,  23,  58,  99 
Charles  I.,  8,  30,  35,  38,  194 


Charles  II.  (of  England),  47,  51, 
67,  113,  122,  139,  142,  146, 
162,  167,  168,  181,  189,  208, 
209,  211,  218,  219,  227,  260, 
268 

Charles  II.  (of  Spain),  137-140, 
159,  317,  322,  326,  327,  330, 
333,  336,  342,  368 
Charles  III.  (of  Spain),  418,  433 
Charles  V.,  Emperor,  224,  320, 
332,  339 

Charles  VIII.,  261 
Charles  X.  (of  Sweden),  74 
Charles  XI.  (of  Sweden),  220, 

254 

Charles  XII.  (of  Sweden),  375 
Chatenay,  298 
Chateauneuf,  35,  51,  247 
Chatillon,  Duchess  of,  51 
Chavigny,  35,  50 
Chevalier  de  Chaumont,  239, 
240 

Chevreuse,  Duchess  of,  14,  16, 

31,  117 

Chiny,  the  county  of,  209,  217 
Choisy,  the  Abbe,  114,  229 
Christina  of  Sweden,  65 
Clagny,  298,  299 
Clement  IX.,  420 
Clement  XL,  375,  376,  420 
Coalition,  the,  of  1673,  i8i  ;  of 

1793,  417  _ 

Code  of  Louis  XIV.,  99 
Colbert,  84,  92,  97,  100,  107, 
113-119,  123-131,  134,  137, 
143,  158,  160,  195,  231,  232, 
233,  237,  245,  246,  250,  283, 
292,  293,  369,  342 
Colbert  de  Croissy,  225 
Cologne,  the  Elector  of,  220,  227, 
257,  258,  262,  284,  402 
Compiegne,  24,  39,  50 
Conde,  Henry,  9,  15,  16,  20,  26 
Conde,  the  great,  14,  21,  25,  26, 
27,  30,  34,  36,  37,  38,  40-44, 
47-50,  53,  56-58,  64,  65,  96, 
108,  113,  115,  154,  155,  157, 
172,  178,  183,  186,  187,  269, 
311,  316,  359,  409 
Conference  of  Cologne,  180 


Index. 


439 


Conference  at  The  Hague  (1709),  . 

381 

Constantinople,  224 
Convention  of  Milan,  374,  376, 
379. 

Corneille,  97 
Courland,  223 
Courtin,  168 
Coventry,  Lord,  168 
Crequi,  g8,  140,  226  ;  the  affairs 
of,  304 

Cromwell,  Oliver,  47,  53,  64-67, 
71,  268 

D 

Danby,  190 
Danton,  233 

Danube,  upper  valley  of,  361- 

365 

Daubenton,  369 

Dauphin,  the,  206,  214,  258,  319, 
321,  324,  331,  335,  389,  408 
Declaration  of  1652,  243 
Denain,  64  ;  battle  of,  395,  396, 
410,  417 

D’Estrees,  Abbe,  354,  355  ;  Car¬ 
dinal,  353 
Descartes,  97 
Desfargues,  241 
Desmaret,  378,  390 
Despacho,  the,  351,  353,  369 
Deux-ponts,  Duchy  of,  220,  222, 

254 

Devolution  War,  135,  138,  145, 
164,  165 

DeWitt,  John,  143,  144,  156, 

157,  169,  174. 

Diet,  the  Imperial,  153,  208 
Dohna,  Count,  157 
Don  John  of  Austria,  64,  159,  319 
Duttlingen,  battle  of,  21 

E 

Edict  of  Nantes,  5,  166  ;  revoca¬ 
tion  of,  89,  137,  166,  238,  241- 
244,  252,  254,  262,  267,  287, 
302,  306,  310,419,  423,  424 
Egypt,  170,  224 


Electoral  Prince,  the,  322-324 
Elizabeth  Farnese,  403,  406 
Emery,  21,  24 
Empire,  the,  28,  30 
Esthonia,  223 
Etampes,  battle  of,  48 
Eugene,  Prince,  279,  374,  385, 
395,  396 

Exclusion  Bill,  the,  208 
F 

Fehrbellin,  battle  of,  184 
Fenelon,  89,  304,  307,  308,  408, 
418 

Ferdinand  III.  (Emperor),  29, 
30,  57,  67 
Fleury,  90 
Fleurus,  280,  281 
Fontainebleau,  112,  114-116, 

233,  333,  334 

Fouquet,  Nicholas,  54,  103-124, 
142 

Francis  I.,  23,  166,  222,  223,  239 
Franche  Comte,  132,  154,  155  ; 

conquest  of,  181-183 
Frederick  the  Great,  281 
Fribourg,  battle  of,  21,  217,  284 
Friedlingen,  battle  of,  361 
Fronde,  the  old,  8-37  ;  the  new, 
39-51  ;  in  the  provinces,  52.^., 
121 

Fiirstenburg,  Francis  Egon, 
Bishop  of  Strasburg,  211,  214, 
257,  262  ;  Archbishop  of  Co¬ 
logne,  57 

G 

Gassion,  14,  27 
Gaston  of  Orleans,  65 
Genoa,  227,  232,  235 
Gertruydenberg,  negotiations  at, 
390,  39L4I2,  413 
George  II.,  105 
George  IIP,  4,  97,  105,  250 
Gibraltar,  265,  266 
Grand  Alliance,  the,  347,  348, 

388.  417 

Grand  Trianon,  296 


440 


Index. 


Gremonville,  97,  152,  175 
Guienne,  41,  48,  53 
Giii  Patin,  5,  12 
Gustavus  Adolphus,  7,  269 
Guzon,  Madame  de,  307,  308 

H 

Hague,  preliminaries  of,  381,  412 
Hanover  formed  into  an  electo¬ 
rate,  402 

Harlay,  Archbishop  of  Paris,  307 
Harley,  395 

Harcourt,  the  general,  47,  48  ; 
the  diplomatist,  319,  320,  324, 

330,  352 

Henrietta  Maria,  45,  51,  76 
Henrietta  of  Orleans,  76,  167, 
169 

Henry  II.  of  England,  343 
Henry  H.  of  France,  223 
Henry  HI.  of  France,  346 
Henry  IV.  of  France,  7,  14,  23, 
88,  95,  244,  421 
Heinsiiis,  323,  324 
Hesse  Cassel,  216,  220,  254,  262 
Hochstadt,  battle  of,  364 
Hoines,  Admiral,  169 

I 

Infanta  Margaret,  the,  139 
Innocent  XL,  254,  257,  263,  305 
Innocent  XII.,  312,  328 
Intendant,  34,  43,  44 
Ireland,  271-275 

J 

Jacobins,  the,  53,  427 
James  II.,  167,  189,  218,  219, 
254-256,  260,  267,  269,  271- 
274,  276-278,  300,  348,  432 
James  Edward,  376,  389,  432 
Jankowitz,  battle  of,  48 
Jansenists,  88,  89,  93,  109,  122, 
4 I 9-42 I 

Jargeau,  battle  of,  48 


Java,  256 

Jesuits,  the,  308,  419-421 
John  George  HI.  of  Saxony,  216, 
220,  254 

Joseph  I.  (Emperor),  364,  365, 
392,  401,  402,  413 
Jus  Devolutionis,  139,  140,  141  ; 

war  of,  146  ff. 

Justinian,  422,  430 


K 

Kehl,  228 

L 

La  Ferte,  Marshal,  58,  64 
La  Fontaine,  121 
La  Hogue,  battle  of,  136,  276, 
277 

Lansac,  Madame  de,  12,  18 
La  Porte,  ig,  22,  33 
La  Vieuville,  54 
La  Vrilliere,  18,  105 
Lens,  battle  of,  35,  40 
Leopold,  Archduke,  58  ;  Em¬ 
peror,  67,  145,  153,  159,  160, 
181,  igi,  207,  209,  216,  220, 
226,  242,  251,  255,  263,  322, 

324,  330,  336,  348 

Le  Peletier,  309-3  ii 
Lerida,  26,  27 

Le  Tellier,  Secretary  of  State, 
18,  87, 100,  loi,  104,  105,  109, 
III,  117,  iig  ;  Chancellor,  247 
Le  Tellier,  Louis’  confessor, 
4ii,_  419,  433 

Limerick,  capitulation  of,  274 
Lionne,  71,  87,  97,  loi,  104, 
105,  no,  119,  143,  148,  158, 
160,  168,  231 

Lit  de  Justice,  12,  22,  24,  51, 
.53,  59 
Livonia,  223 

Longueville,  Duchess  of,  17,  31, 
41  _ 

Lorraine,  Duke  of,  4,  47,  57, 
I13,  182,  183,  284,  285,  325, 
327,  328,  337 


Index. 


441 


Louis  of  Baden,  269,  364 
Louis  XII L,  269,  364 
Louis  XIV.,  his  youth,  'iff;  his 
first  experiences  in  war  and 
politics,  45  ff ;  his  overthrow 
of  Fouquet,  \o'iff ;  his  foreign 
policy,  131  ff ;  the  war  of 
Devolution,  146  ff ;  the  war 
of  1672,  162  ff ;  his  rihtnions, 
194  ;  revocation  of  the  Edict  of 
Nantes,  230  ff ;  his  war  against 
Europe,  253  ff ;  his  life  at 
Versailles,  286  ff ;  the  Spanish 
Succession  question,  315  ff ; 
the  war  of  the  Spanish  Succes¬ 
sion,  329  ff ;  reflexions  on  his 
policy,  413  ff ;  his  death,  433  ; 
character  of  his  government, 
82  ff ;  288-292,  427,  431 
Louis  XV.,  3,  II,  41 
Louis  XVL,  3,  42 
Louise  of  Savoy,  Queen  of  Spain, 
352,  355,  403 
Louville,  352,  354 
Louvois,  84,  99,  134,  148,  154, 
158,  165,  167,  170,  171,  173, 
176-178,  189,  198,  202,  212, 
231,  246,  260,  265,  270,  271, 
281,  288,  292,  296,  300,  342, 
359 

I.ulli,  1 13,  302 

Luxemburg,  the  Duchy  of,  4,  209, 
215,  217,  218  ;  town  of,  215, 
217-219,  232,  283,  285  ;  Duke 
of,  183,  187,  189,  269,  281, 
282  ;  war  of,  226-228 

M 

Madagascar,  237 
Mademoiselle,  La  Grande,  37, 
49.  51 

Maine,  Duke  of,  296,  298,  377, 
41 1  ;  Duchess  of,  297 
Mainz,  capture  of,  278 
Maintenon,  Madame  de,  76,  84, 
100,  245,  247-249,  299-308, 
333,  335,  358,  376.  378,  379, 
389,  390,  401,  402,  404,  407, 
409,  421,  422,  426 


Malplaquet,  battle  of,  383,  385- 

387  _ 

Mancini,  Madame,  65  ;  Marie, 
62,  70-73,  296;  Olympe,  61, 
62,  65 

Man  with  the  Iron  Mask,  the, 
94,  102  tiote 

Marie  Therese,  Queen  of  France, 
71,  72,  76,  113,  115,  214 
Marlborough,  276,  359,  365, 

385-387,  413 

Marly,  128,  296-298,  407,  431 
Martin,  237 

Marsaglia,  battle  of,  279 
Marsin,  84,  352,  364,  366,  372 
Mary  Beatrice,  Queen  of  Eng¬ 
land,  271,  431 
Massillon,  426 

Mazarin,  9-82,  85,  87-90,  96- 
98,  100,  loi,  103,  104,  106, 
109,  115-117,  119,  120,  122, 
123,  132,  133,  135,  140,  141, 
165,  166,  169,  172,  243,  268, 
274,_  289,  308,  314,  373,  378 
Mazarinades,  37 
Medina  Cell,  Duke  of,  391 
Meilleraye,  de  la,  23,  34,  42 
Mergentheim,  battle  of,  21 
Mercy,  21,  22 
Milan,  convention  of,  374 
Mohaez,  battle  of,  225 
Mole,  32 
Moliere,  97 
Montecuculi,  185-187 
Montelar,  203,  205 
Montespan,  Madame  de,  168, 
193,  297,  422 

Montpensier,  Mademoiselle  de, 

73 

Muley  Ismael,  317 
Munster,  Bishop  of,  145,  146, 
191,  216,  220 

N 

Namur,  281-283 
Naples,  26,  331,  337 
Napoleon  I.,  2,  37,  170,  172, 
344,  361,  363,  396,  400 
Neerwenden,  battle  of,  282 


442 


Index. 


Netherlands,  the  Spanish,  4,  27, 
28,  137,  138,  140,  143,  164, 
165,  228,  283,  317,  326,  348, 
353,  416 

Nobles,  the  French,  g,  38,  288- 
290,  410 

Nordlingen,  battle  of,  21,  22,  25 
North,  Lord,  105 

O 

Omer  Talon,  46 

Orleans,  Gaston  of,  7-9,  12,  18, 
20,  27,  35,  37,  42-44,  46,  48  ; 
Philip,  Duke  of,  189,  190,214, 
220,  237,  257  ;  Philip  (Regent), 
355,  358,  372,  390,  398,  405, 
408-411,  419  ;  Duchess  of, 
214,  257,  261,  263,  284,  299, 

341 

Ormee,  the,  54 
Orri,  402 

Oudenarde,  battle  of,  5,  227 
P 

Palais  Royal,  the,  ig,  24,  35,  37, 
39,  43,  56 

Palatinate,  the  first  devastation 
of,  185  ;  the  second  devasta¬ 
tion  of,  137,  263-266,  300, 

423 

Par  lenient  of  Paris,  the,  11-51,' 
78,  91,  94,  95,  118,  122,  331, 
421,  427,  428,  430 
Pellisson,  114,  117 
Perefixe,  19,  22,  23,  83 
Pere  la  Chaise,  238,  245,  300, 
419 

Pere  Nithard,  146 
Perpetual  Edict,  the,  175 
Philip  Augustus,  97 
Philip  IV.,  71,  140,  145 
Philip  V.,  vide  Anjou,  Duke  of 
Philipsburg,  215,  260,  261,  284, 

423 

Picardy,  tenant-right  in,  312 
Pinerolo,  282 

Pomponne,  168,  170,  176,  358 
Pondicherry,  237 


Pontchartrain,  270,  31 1,  334, 
358,  377,  390 
Port  Royal,  89,  420 
Portland,  Duke  of,  322,  323 
Provence,  invasion  of,  374 

Q 

Quadruple  Alliance  of  1666,  the, 
146 

Quesnel’s  Reflexions,  420 
Quietists,  the,  89 

R 

Racine,  76 
Ragotsky,  George,  21 
Ramillies,  battle  of,  371,  372 
Ratisbon,  truce  of,  215-231,  254- 
256,  258,  260,  316,  423 
Renunciations  of  Philip  V.,  394, 
395,  398 

Resolution  (Whig)  of  1707,  374, 

417 

Rethel,  battle  of,  41,  42,  79 
Retz,  Cardinal  de,  31,  35,  36, 
42-44,  50,  51,  53,  65,  96,  109, 
122 

Reunions,  the,  68,  197,  199,  201, 
204,  206,  208,  217,  254,  423 
Revolution,  the  English,  134, 
261,  266 

Revolution,  the  French,  23,  43, 
289 

Rhine,  League  of  the,  67,  68,  72, 

139 

Rhine,  passage  of,  the,  172-174  ; 
the  Upper,  255 

Richelieu,  Cardinal,  7-1 1,  13- 
19,  25,  32-34,  39.  52,  55,  68, 
90-92,  96,  97,  109,  121,  123, 
133,  135,  137,  143.  144,  162, 
165,  166,  288,  308,  342,  373 
Richelieu,  Marshal  of,  90 
Ripperdas,  418 

Rocroi,  battle  of,  13,  14,  25,  40 
Rooke,  Admiral,  277 
Russell,  Admiral,  276 
Russia,  220,  280 
Ruyter,  de,  igo 


I 


Index. 


443 


s 

Saint-Cyr,  301-304,  433 
Saint-Germain,  7,  8,  ii,  36,  37, 
43,  50,  234 

Saint-Gothard,  battle  of,  140,  224 
Saint-Ruth,  274 

Saint-Simon,  83,  280,  296,  337, 
353,  355,  367 

Salankemen,  battle  of,  225 
Sarsfield,  274 

Savoy,  Duke  of,  4,  220,  251,  255, 
279,  282,  283,  316,  325-327, 
331,  335,  363,  365,  374 
Schomberg,  188,  227 
Seignelay,  136,  270-273 
Senecey,  Madame  de,  18 
Senef,  battle  of,  184,  316 
Servien,  54,  97 
Sevigne,  Madame  de,  5 
Seguier,  g,  15,  35,  59,  104,  105, 
no,  118 

Shaftesbury,  208 
Siam,  127,  235-241 
Sicily,  326,  331,  337 
Sobieski,  John,  185 
Spain,  decline  of,  320  ;  govern¬ 
ment  of,  342,  343 
Spanish  Succession  question, 
the,  I,  4,  285,  315# 

Spanish  Succession  War,  the, 

23,  279,  312,  318,  329/'-.  409, 
410,  425 

Staffarda,  battle  of,  279,  281 
States-General,  of  France,  10, 
II,  31,  44,  go,  95,  427 
Strasburg,  2,  196-215,  217,  219, 
220,  228,  230,  284,  285 

T 

Tallard,  84,  323,  324,  326,  329- 
334,  347,  362-365 
Temple,  Sir  William,  128,  157 
Tesse,  359,  360,  365,  374,  385, 
386 

Toekeli,  220 

Torey,  333-335,  358,  377,  383, 
385,  403,  413 
Torrington,  Admiral,  273 
Torstenson,  2I 


Toulouse,  Count  of,  298,  41 1 
Treaties  of  Aix-la-Chapelle,  no, 
162-164,  167,  315, 412  ;  Baden, 
402 ;  Bale,  57  ;  Breda,  157, 
276  ;  Carlowitz,  324  ;  Copen¬ 
hagen,  74  ;  Dover  (secret)  l6o, 
i6g  ;  Munster  (Jan.,  1648), 
28,  134,  144,  153,  164  ;  Nime- 
guen,  86,  163,  183,  191-194, 
196,  202,  208,  231,  245,  255, 
260,  264,  309,  318,  319,  345, 
412,  423  ;  Oliva,  74  ;  Baris 
(1662),  143 :  Partition  (i668), 
138,  153,  158;  Partition  (1698), 
323,  324,  329  ;  Partition  (1700), 
327,  328,  330-337,  345  :  Pyre¬ 
nees,  9,  73-75,  77,  97,  ii3. 
122,  171,  283,  412  ;  Rastadt, 
401,  402  ;  Roskeld,  74  ;  Rueil, 
38  ;  Ryswick,  127,  225,  283- 
285,  315-319,  322,  330,  345, 
348,  412,  424  ;  St.  Germain- 
en-laye,  igi,  206;  Ulm,  28; 
Utrecht,  267,  269,  327,  344, 
399,  400,  401,405,  406,410- 
413  ;  Westminster,  63,  67  ; 
Westphalia,  9,  29,  36,  65,  67, 
180,  197,  198,  201,  208,  225, 
287,  345,  411  ;  Zurawna,  186 
Triple  Alliance  of  1668,  156, 
157,  159-161,  163,  168 
Turenne,  21,  25,  29,  31,  37,  42, 
48,  49,  51,  52,  55,  56,  58,  61, 
64,  66,  70,  80,  97,  99,  100, 
io8,  114,  122,  147-158,  171- 
173,  177,  178,  180,  i8i,  183, 
184-187,  231,  264,  269,  359- 
361,  363,  423 
Turin,  battle  of,  372 
Turkey,  133,  135,  216-219,  221- 
224,  227,  242,  251,  256,  263 
Turkheim,  battle  of,  185 
Tuscan  Ports,  the,  310,  323,  325, 
328 

U 

Unigenitus  Bull,  89,  420,  421 
Ursins,  Princesse  des,  352-354, 
358,  359,  379.  380,  381,  383, 

385,  403,  404 


444 


Index. 


V 

Valliere,  Louise  de  la,  112,  118, 
153,  296,  422 

Vauban,  100,  128,  148,  149,  151, 
152,  172,  180,  182,  183,  189, 
194,  216,  231,  246,  269,  281, 
284,  317,  418 
Vaudois,  the,  251,  252 
Vendonie,  Duke  of,  54,  359,  363, 
366 

Venice,  220,  224 
Versailles,  114,  128,  232-235, 
237,  281,  282,  287-296 
Vienna,  siege  of,  'zuff. 

Villars,  4,64,  265,  284,  359,  360- 
365.  372.  375,  379.  382,  383, 

385-387,  395-397,  401,  409, 

410,  413,  418,  425 
Vigo  Bay,  battle  of,  353 
Vincennes,  35,  41,  51,  TI4 
Vincent  de  Paul,  62 
Villeroi,  the  elder,  19,  22,  24, 


37,  83;  Marshal,  269,  360,  361, 
411,  425 

Villa  Viciosa  battle  of,  392,  393 

W 

Wallenstein,  269 
William  of  Orange,  64,  175,  178, 
187,  189,  190,  208,  209,  218, 
219,  221,  254,  260,  261,  263, 
266,  267,  270,  276,  281-284, 
285,  315,  322,  323,  326,  327, 
330,  336,  347-349 
Withers,  286 
Wrangel,  29 

Y 

York,  Duke  of,  103  ;  vide  James 
II. 

Z 

Zenta,  battle  of,  225 
Zusmarshausen,  battle  of,  29 


Iberoes  of  the  IFlations. 

EDITED  BY 

EVELYN  ABBOTT,  M.A.,  Fellow  of  Balliol  College,  Oxford. 


A  Series  of  biographical  studies  of  the  lives  and  work 
of  a  number  of  representative  historical  characters  about 
whom  have  gathered  the  great  traditions  of  the  Nations 
to  which  they  belonged,  and  who  have  been  accepted,  in 
many  instances,  as  types  of  the  several  National  ideals. 
With  the  life  of  each  typical  character  will  be  presented 
a  picture  of  the  National  conditions  surrounding  him 
during  his  career. 

The  narratives  are  the  work  of  writers  who  are  recog¬ 
nized  authorities  on  their  several  subjects,  and,  while 
thoroughly  trustworthy  as  history,  will  present  picturesque 
and  dramatic  “stories  ”  of  the  Men  and  of  the  events  con¬ 
nected  with  them. 

To  the  Life  of  each  “Hero ’’will  be  given  one  duo¬ 
decimo  volume,  handsomely  printed  in  large  type,  pro¬ 
vided  with  maps  and  adequately  illustrated  according  to 
the  special  requirements  of  the  several  subjects.  The 
volumes  will  be  sold  separately  as  follows : 

Cloth  extra  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  $i  50 

Half  morocco,  uncut  edges,  gilt  top  .  .  •  i  75 


The  first  group  of  the  Series  comprises  the  following 

volumes: 

Nelson,  and  the  Naval  Supremacy  of  England.  By  W.  Clark 
Russell,  author  of  “The  Wreck  of  the  Grosvenor,”  etc. 

Gustavus  Adolphus,  and  the  Struggle  of  Protestantism  for  Exist¬ 
ence.  By  C.  R.  L.  Fletcher,  M.  A.,  late  Fellow  of  All  Souls  College, 
Oxford. 

Pericles,  and  the  Golden  Age  of  Athens.  By  Evelyn  Abbott,  M.A., 
Fellow  of  Balliol  College.  Oxford. 

Theodoric  the  Goth,  the  Barbarian  Champion  of  Civilisation.  By 
Thomas  Houckin,  author  of  “  Italy  and  Her  Invaders,”  etc. 

Sir  Philip  Sidney,  and  the  Chivalry  of  England.  By  H.  R.  Fox- 
Bourne,  author  of  “  The  Life  of  John  Locke,”  etc. 

Julius  Caesar,  and  the  Organisation  of  the  Roman  Empire.  By 
W.  Warde  Fowler,  M.A.,  Fellow  of  Lincoln  College,  Oxford. 

John  Wyclif,  Last  of  the  Schoolmen  and  First  of  the  English  Re¬ 
formers.  By  Lewis  Sergeant,  author  of  “  New  Greece,”  etc. 

Napoleon,  Warrior  and  Ruler,  and  the  Military  Supremacy  of 
Revolutionary  France.  By  W.  O’Connor  Morris,  sometime 
Scholar  of  Oriel  College,  Oxford. 

Henry  of  Navarre,  and  the  Huguenots  in  France.  By  P.  F.  Willert, 
M.A.,  Fellow  of  Exeter  College,  Oxford. 

Cicero,  and  the  Fall  of  the  Roman  Republic.  By  J.  L.  Strachan 
Davidson,  M.A.,  Fellow  of  Balliol  College,  Oxford. 

Abraham  Lincoln,  and  the  Downfall  of  American  Slavery.  By 
Noah  Brooks. 

Prince  Henry  (of  Portugal)  the  Navigator,  and  the  Age  of  Dis¬ 
covery.  By  C.  R.  Beazley,  Fellow  of  Merton  College,  Oxford. 

Julian  the  Philosopher,  and  the  Last  Struggle  of  Paganism  against 
Christianity.  By  Alice  Gardner,  Lecturer  on  Ancient  History  in 
Newnham  College. 

Louis  XIV.,  and  the  Zenith  of  the  French  Monarchy.  By  Arthur 
Hassall,  M.A.,  Senior  Student  of  Christ  Church  College,  Oxford. 

To  be  followed  by  : 

Saladin,  the  Crescent  and  the  Cross.  By  Stanley  Lane-Poole. 

Joan  of  Arc.  By  Mrs.  Oliphant. 

The  Cid  Campeador,  and  the  Waning  of  the  Crescent  in  the  West. 
By  H.  Butler  Clarke,  Wadham  College,  Oxford. 

Charlemagne,  the  Reorganiser  of  Europe.  By  Prof.  George  L. 
Burr,  Cornell  University. 

Moltke,  and  the  Founding  of  the  German  Empire.  By  Spenser 
Wilkinson. 

Oliver  Cromwell,  and  the  Rule  of  the  Puritans  in  England.  By 
Charles  Firth,  Balliol  College,  Oxford. 

Alfred  the  Great,  and  the  First  Kingdom  in  England.  By  F.  York 
Powell,  M.A.,  Senior  Student  of  Christ  Church  College,  Oxford. 

Marlborough,  and  England  as  a  Military  Power.  By  C.  W.  C. 
Oman,  A.M.,  Fellow  of  All  Souls  College,  Oxford. 

Frederic  the  Second,  the  Wonder  of  the  World.  By  A.  L.  Smith,  of 
Balliol  College,  Oxford. 

Charles  the  Bold,  and  the  Attempt  to  Found  a  Middle  Kingdom. 
By  R.  Lodge,  M.A.,  Fellow  of  Brasenose  College,  Oxford. 

Alexander  the  Great,  and  the  Extension  of  Greek  Rule  and  of 
Greek  Ideas.  By  Prof.  Benjamin  I.  Wheeler,  Cornell  University. 

G.  P.  PUTNAM’S  SONS 


new  YORK 

27  WEST  J  WUNTY-THIRD  8T. 


LONDON 

24  BEDFORD  ST.,  STRAND 


XLhc  Stor^  of  the  IRations. 


Messrs.  G.  P.  PUTNAM’S  SONS  take  pleasure  in 
announcing  that  they  have  in  course  of  publication,  in 
co-operation  with  Mr.  T.  Fisher  Unwin,  of  London,  a 
series  of  historical  studies,  intended  to  present  in  a 
graphic  manner  the  stories  of  the  different  nations  that 
have  attained  prominence  in  history. 

In  the  story  form  the  current  of  each  national  life  is 
distinctly  indicated,  and  its  picturesque  and  noteworthy 
periods  and  episodes  are  presented  for  the  reader  in  their 
philosophical  relation  to  each  other  as  well  as  to  universal 
history. 

It  is  the  plan  of  the  writers  of  the  different  volumes  to 
enter  into  the  real  life  of  the  peoples,  and  to  bring  them 
before  the  reader  as  they  actually  lived,  labored,  and 
struggled — as  they  studied  and  wrote,  and  as  they  amused 
themselves.  In  carrying  out  this  plan,  the  myths,  with 
which  the  history  of  all  lands  begins,  will  not  be  over¬ 
looked,  though  these  will  be  carefully  distinguished  from 
the  actual  history,  so  far  as  the  labors  of  the  accepted 
historical  authorities  have  resulted  in  definite  conclusions. 

The  subjects  of  the  different  volumes  have  been  planned 
to  cover  connecting  and,  as  far  as  pos3i’bie,  consecutive 
epochs  or  periods,  so  that  the  set  when  completed  will 
present  in  a  comprehensive  narrative  the  chief  events  m 


the  great  STORY  OF  THE  NATIONS;  but  it  is,  of  course, 
not  always  practicable  to  issue  the  several  volumes  in 
their  chronological  order. 

The  “Stories”  are  printed  in  good  readable  type,  and 
in  handsome  i2mo  form.  They  are  adequately  illustrated 
and  furnished  with  maps  and  indexes.  Price,  per  vol., 
cloth,  $1.50.  Half  morocco,  gilt  top,  $1.75. 

The  following  volumes  are  now  ready  (March,  1895): 

THE  STORY  OF  GREECE.  Prof.  JAS.  A.  Harrison. 

“  “  “  ROME.  Arthur' Gilman. 

“  “  “  THE  JEWS.  Prof.  James  K.  Hosmer. 

“  “  “  CHALDEA.  Z.  A.  Ragozin. 

"  “  “  GERMANY.  S.  Baring-Gould. 

“  “  “  NORWAY.  Hjalmar  H.  Boyesen. 

“  “  “  SPAIN.  Rev.  E.  E.  and  Susan  Hale. 

“  “  “  HUNGARY.  Prof.  A.  VAmbery. 

“  “  “  CARTHAGE.  Prof.  Alfred  J.  Church. 

“  “  “  THE  SARACENS.  Arthur  Gilman. 

“  “  “  THE  MOORS  IN  SPAIN.  Stanley  Lane-Poole. 

“  “  “  THE  NORMANS.  Sarah  Orne  Jewett. 

“  “  “  PERSIA.  S.  G.  W.  Benjamin. 

“  “  “  ANCIENT  EGYPT.  Prof.  Geo.  Rawlinson. 

“  “  “  ALEXANDER’S  EMPIRE.  Prof.  J.  P.  Mahaffy. 

“  “  “  ASSYRIA.  Z.  A.  Ragozin. 

“  “  “  THE  GOTHS.  Henry  Bradley. 

“  “  “  IRELAND.  Hon.  Emily  Lawless. 

“  “  “  TURKEY.  Stanley  Lane-Poole. 

“  “  “  MEDIA,  BABYLON,  AND  PERSIA.  Z.  A.  Ragozin. 

“  ‘‘  “  MEDIHiVAL  FRANCE.  Prof.  Gustave  Masson. 

“  “  “  HOLLAND.  Prof.  J.  Thorold  Rogers. 

“  “  “  MEXICO.  Susan  Hale. 

“  “  “  PHCENICIA.  Prof.  Geo.  Rawlinson. 

“  “  “  THE  HANSA  TOWNS.  Helen  Zimmern. 

“  “  “  EARLY  BRITAIN.  Prof.  Alfred  J.  Church. 

“  “  THE  BARB  ARY  CORSAIRS.  Stanley  Lane-Poole. 

“  “  “  RUSSIA.  W.  R.  Morfill. 

“  “  “  THE  JEWS  UNDER  ROME.  W.  D.  Morrison. 

“  “  “  SCOTLAND.  John  Mackintosh. 

“  “  “  SWITZERLAND.  R.  Stead  and  Mrs.  A.  Hug. 

“  “  “  PORTUGAL.  H.  Morse  Stephens. 

“  “  “  THE  BYZANTINE  EMPIRE.  C.  W.  C.  Oman. 

“  “  “  SICILY.  E.  A.  Freeman. 

“  “  “  THE  TUSCAN  REPUBLICS.  Bella  Duffy. 

“  “  “  POLAND.  W.  R.  Morfill. 

“  “  “  PARTHIA.  Prof.  George  Rawlinson. 

“  “  “  JAPAN.  David  Murray. 

"  “  “  THE  CHRISTIAN  RECOVERY  OF  SPAIN.  H, 

E.  Watts. 

“  “  “  AUSTRALASIA.  Greville  Tregarthen. 

“  “  “  SOUTHERN  AFRICA,  Geo.  M.  Theal. 

“  “  “  VENICE.  Alethea  Wiel. 

“  “  “  THE  CRUSADES.  T.  S.  Archer  and  C.  L.  Kings* 

FORD. 

“  “  VEDTC  INDIA.  By  Z.  A.  Ragozin. 


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